00:00 Well, for more on this story, we can speak with Sebastian Elisher, an associate professor
00:05 of political science at the University of Florida.
00:08 Sebastian, thank you so much for joining us.
00:12 Thank you for having me.
00:14 Well, as we've been discussing here on France 24, that deadline is looming and the coup
00:19 leaders are almost out of time.
00:22 How likely is it that ECOWAS will carry out a military intervention?
00:29 It's very hard to say at the moment.
00:31 In fact, what will happen over the course of the next few weeks and month is virtually
00:37 impossible to predict now.
00:40 It was always clear that even if the ultimatum passes, ECOWAS or indeed any military force
00:48 in the world would not be in a position to interfere immediately.
00:52 However, what ECOWAS I believe rightly is doing is trying to posture itself in order
00:59 to put pressure on the junta to release former President Basum and to engage in talks with
01:11 Nigerian civilian leaders.
01:15 To what extent Nigeria, Senegal and other ECOWAS members will be in a position to put
01:20 together an intervention force at this stage is highly questionable.
01:25 There have been precedents in the past if we think about Gambia or if we think about
01:31 the intervention in Mali or even in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
01:37 But even if it comes to that, it will take quite a while for this to materialize.
01:43 Now as we've seen, there are some countries in the region, I'm thinking of Chad and Algeria,
01:49 who said they oppose the use of force and that more voices are calling for more peaceful
01:54 options to be explored.
01:56 What does that mean for ECOWAS's plans?
02:01 So in particular, Chad's somewhat hesitant stance is bad news for ECOWAS.
02:10 Chad is not an ECOWAS member, but it has contributed military troops to various African countries
02:17 in order to fight the jihadi insurgencies there.
02:23 Of course, Chad itself is under junta rule at the moment, and the junta's main interest
02:31 will be to consolidate its power.
02:35 Algeria always has pursued a somewhat pragmatic stance toward the Sahel, and democratic considerations
02:42 will not be high on their political agenda.
02:46 Chad and Algeria first and foremost will be interested in stability and in making sure
02:52 that the jihadi insurgencies that increasingly is impacting Niger is being contained.
02:59 For ECOWAS, that's not great news, especially since Algeria, Chad, but also the senators
03:05 in Nigeria now give up the impression that they are not prepared to confront the junta
03:14 militarily.
03:15 What this does for the Nigerian junta is it's providing them with time to consolidate their
03:20 power.
03:21 So this is all potentially bad news.
03:25 If this standoff continues, the conflict risks spiraling out of control, what would that
03:31 mean for Niger and also for the region?
03:37 For Niger, it would mean first and foremost authoritarian rule, and the Nigerian junta
03:44 tries to emulate what the Malian and the Burkina Faso junta is doing.
03:51 So it would mean the suppression of dissent, the incarceration of regime opponents, and
03:58 it would mean losing most, if not all, Western military support.
04:03 Now if Mali and Burkina Faso provide any guidance, this would mean that the security challenges
04:11 that Niger is facing will be larger, and it would also be somewhat terrifying news for
04:21 the region as a whole.
04:23 So all of this is bad news for democracy, but it's also bad news for order, especially
04:29 along the border areas that Niger shares with Mali and Burkina Faso.
04:37 And one final follow-up question.
04:41 Sanctions have been imposed in Niger on the coup leaders.
04:46 What kind of effect can we expect from that?
04:49 Because we've already hearing reports of food shortages and electricity cuts.
04:53 I mean, how long can the coup leaders hang on in the face of those sanctions?
04:59 Niger is highly dependent on its immediate neighborhood, and that's indeed an important
05:04 difference to Mali, Burkina Faso, or Guinea.
05:10 This applies in particular to its electricity supply, and the sanctions that are now being
05:17 imposed on Niger were indeed the sanctions that were in place in 2009, 2010, that provoked
05:25 a military coup against an authoritarian president at the time.
05:29 Niger will feel these sanctions almost immediately.
05:33 Niger is also highly dependent on access to the port in Benin, because it's a landlocked
05:39 country and it's dependent on agricultural exports.
05:44 So personally I believe that the imposition of these sanctions might be a lot more effective,
05:50 certainly in the short to medium term, than ECOWAS attempts to put together an intervention
05:55 force.
05:56 Sebastian, thanks so much.
05:58 We're going to have to leave it there.
06:00 That's Sebastian Elisher, an associate professor of political science at the University of
