- 1 week ago
As Beijing increases military and maritime pressure around Taiwan, the risk of a wider regional conflict grows. Can deterrence prevent escalation? Farhana Sheikh speaks with Peter Chang of the Institute of China Studies, Universiti Malaya, and Meia Nouwens of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on Taiwan’s changing security landscape and what a crisis could mean for Asia and Malaysia.
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00:07Hello and welcome to Awani Global. I'm your host, Fahada Sheh.
00:11Now, the Taiwan Strait is becoming one of the most closely watched flashpoints in the world.
00:16As Beijing steps up military and maritime pressure around Taiwan,
00:20Taipei is also strengthening its defenses,
00:23while the United States and its regional allies are recalibrating their own security posture.
00:28But what does a Taiwan crisis mean for Asia and particularly for Malaysia as well?
00:34Joining me are Peter Cheng from the Institute of China Studies at University of Melayia,
00:39as well as Maya Nawens from the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
00:44Thank you so much for joining me, both of you.
00:48We want to get straight into it. We know what's going on.
00:51We've been tracking the developments every day.
00:53Okay. Dr. Peter, we're seeing continued military and maritime pressure around Taiwan right now.
01:00But how much more dangerous is the situation today compared with, say, a few years ago?
01:05Maybe you can provide us first with the landscape or context of what's been going on in developments right now.
01:11There's an increase of China's military presence, both.
01:16Now, it used to be across the Straits of Taiwan with the mainland,
01:19but now it's making its presence fell on the east side, eastern side of the island.
01:24And this is really in reaction to what they feel is the Democratic Progressive Party,
01:30like this administration steps towards more separatists and independents posturing.
01:38And also because of some of the allies, Japanese and the Philippines alignment as well,
01:45that is seemingly working alongside with the Taiwanese to want to respond to the Taiwanese crisis.
01:55And Beijing doesn't see that as the right move, and they just want to make their presence known.
02:01through military presence across the Straits and also on the other side as well.
02:09Mia, so what are you watching most closely right now?
02:13The frequency of PLA activity, the nature of these activities,
02:17or the increasingly prominent role of China's Coast Guard and other maritime forces?
02:23You know, you've been tracking this for quite a while now.
02:26What are you closely watching?
02:28I think it's all three of those things, Farhana.
02:31I think it's the kind of horizontal escalation, as we would term it,
02:38in terms of the persistence, the scope, and the scale of the activity.
02:45How many incursions are there?
02:47What type of capabilities are involved?
02:50How often and frequent are these incursions?
02:53Second of all, also the horizontal escalation, I suppose,
02:57which is what new different types of activities is the PRC undertaking to, as Peter said,
03:03make its position very clear when it comes to Taiwan.
03:07And that could mean, again, things like using scientific or surveying vessels east of Taiwan
03:15with regards to mapping territory or delineating continental shelves and maritime boundaries.
03:22Those are things that China is very concerned about at the moment,
03:25following on an agreement between the Philippines and Japan to discuss this in the waters on the east of Taiwan.
03:32But more broadly, also, I suppose I'm also watching how these activities correspond to the domestic context in China
03:40and China's international relations, because they're not only a signal to Taiwan or to Japan or the Philippines.
03:47They're, of course, also a signal to the Chinese domestic public
03:49and about China's seriousness in terms of these policy positions.
03:55And they can at times also be used as symbolism towards other foreign policy issues,
04:01for example, moves by the United States.
04:04We saw that all of this increased activity and more pointed assertive activity by the PLA,
04:11by the Chinese military took place predominantly after former Speaker of the House of Representatives
04:17of the United States, Nancy Pelosi, visited to Taiwan.
04:20And since then, it's been ramping up and up and up.
04:23Now, we actually see comparatively year on year, there's been a decrease.
04:27So whereas the frequency on number of days is increasing in total,
04:31the number of capabilities being used is decreasing compared to last year.
04:35And one can question why that is.
04:37Has the situation fundamentally changed?
04:39Or is it perhaps a response to the two leaders of the United States meeting
04:44through their various summits this year and not wanting to rock the boat too much?
04:49So all of these factors are important to keep in mind.
04:52Right. It seems like the situation right now is a bit volatile in a sense that
04:56there's a bit of hardening of stance when it comes to China
04:59and increased military and maritime pressure.
05:02At the same time, there's a lot more involvement when it comes to regional actors.
05:07You know, Dr. Peter and you both mentioned, you know, Japan, Philippines as well.
05:11And also the US, you know, encompassing all of this.
05:16Right. We're going to get to that a bit later.
05:19But May I want to touch a little bit about the report that you recently authored.
05:25You said, you know, that we've seen Beijing basically increasingly use military
05:29and maritime pressure below the threshold of an outright conflict.
05:33And you actually painted this scenario.
05:35So at what point does the pressure become something more dangerous?
05:39What could we be watching here?
05:41You know, you've sort of outlined a few scenarios here, you know, other than, you know, full-scale war.
05:47That's right. And we do, I think, when we talk about Taiwan contingencies,
05:52think only of the full-scale kinetic war or the amphibious invasion of Taiwan.
05:57But below that, as you say, Farhana, in our report, we outline what a crisis might look like.
06:02And a crisis, I think, is much more likely than a full-scale conflict.
06:06Full-scale conflict is going to be incredibly costly for everyone involved, including China.
06:11And I don't think anybody is aiming for a full-scale conflict.
06:14And that's on nobody's wish list.
06:16But what is, of course, in China's interest is to gradually harden or rather make clear
06:28its sovereignty claim over Taiwan and de facto have other countries agree with that.
06:33One way in which they could do that is through the application of a maritime economic quarantine,
06:40for example, that could have an element and a maritime presence.
06:45Key for that would be Coast Guard activity.
06:47And one of the reasons that we're looking at the Chinese Coast Guard's activity around Taiwan
06:51is precisely as to understand better whether or not this is something that they're working towards,
06:58where their capabilities are with regards to being able to enact something like this
07:02and how willing they might be to actually intentionally put in place an economic quarantine.
07:07What that would mean in practice is that the Chinese Coast Guard dictates what goes in and out of Taiwan
07:15through trade, through inspections or redirection of traffic to, for example,
07:21a Chinese port instead of to the port of Kaohsiung.
07:26That redirection of maritime trade to mainland China, as opposed to directly to and from a Taiwanese port,
07:33would enact an in effect de facto require countries to abide by Chinese customs laws
07:40and allow for inspections and thereby also double down, I think, on this claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.
07:50Right. And I mean, I have to say now in 2026, there's a lot of means and ways that, you
07:55know,
07:55we are utilizing, you know, quarantine, blockade, sanctions, tariff as just sort of one point threshold
08:02just before outright conflict.
08:04And, you know, we've seen it more prominently now in 2026, I feel.
08:08Not just in, you know, the Taiwan Strait crisis, but other places as well.
08:13Dr. Peter, I'm going to bring you in here.
08:15You know, you've talked about China's role in terms of, you know, its hardening stance against Taiwan
08:22and the increased pressure.
08:24But Taiwan is also responding with a major increase in defense spending
08:28and also greater focus on drones and asymmetric capabilities.
08:33You know, President Lai Ching-te is full on trying to push for the budget.
08:38So, is Taiwan becoming better prepared to deter an attack?
08:42And how is Beijing interpreting this move?
08:47Well, the Taiwanese just feel that they really should take a page off the Ukraine war,
08:53how you do an asymmetrical defense against a much stronger opponent.
09:01So, the drones and other kind of capabilities that they are strengthening right now
09:06as a defensive mechanism in case of a conflict.
09:11Certainly, the Lai Ching-te administration is pushing towards that direction.
09:18From Beijing's perspective, they clearly see it not just so much as defensive
09:24against any eventual invasion, but really they see these are just Lai Ching-te administration's
09:32building blocks for a separatist movement of move towards independence.
09:38It has always been the DDP sort of position that they do want to see themselves as distinct
09:46and separate from the mainland, and China sees this as another move towards the direction.
09:54So, I think Beijing doesn't do too well on this, and then they really,
10:01and that's probably the other reason why they are ramping up their own military maneuvering
10:07across the straits and on the other side of the island as well.
10:11Yeah, I think, yeah, sure, Mia.
10:15Can I just add something for Hannah?
10:16I agree that those are the two perspectives on either side of the Taiwan Strait.
10:21There's one thing that I would add that Taiwan is looking at and learning from the Ukraine war,
10:27which is the importance of national resilience.
10:30So, civil defense, preparedness at the kind of national and the regional and local level
10:36is incredibly important.
10:37That's all being built up at the moment as well, and I think that's a focus of this government.
10:42But I do want to question a little bit, I suppose, what the situation would look like
10:49if the Taiwanese were not doing this.
10:52And I would question whether there's anything that this government in Taiwan can do
10:57that would actually placate Beijing.
10:59And I think at this point, there really isn't much that they could do.
11:02In the past, it would have been acknowledging and recognizing the 1992 consensus,
11:08which was a mainstay of kind of cross-strait agreement and cooperation
11:14during the last KMT government.
11:17I don't think that's coming back anymore on the Taiwanese side.
11:21So, what else is really left?
11:24And I think that puts us in a quite tense and dangerous situation.
11:28Right.
11:29And I think, you know, Taiwanese response to this, at least for the recent years,
11:35has been to increase its defense capabilities and, you know, going sort of the other way
11:41as opposed to more talks and dialogues.
11:44And it's been apparent that, you know, with the alliance of the U.S. as well,
11:49there's been a bit more push with regards to, you know, we are going to deter this
11:54for the sake of our national security and this is the reason that we're doing it.
11:59So, drawing on that, we're also seeing Japan significantly strengthening its defense capabilities
12:05as well, sort of taking heed to what Taiwan is doing.
12:09Dr. Peter, the Philippines as well.
12:12So, Japan is significantly strengthening its defense capabilities.
12:15The Philippines is also becoming increasingly important to the U.S. military posture.
12:19We're seeing this movement, you know, slowly building up.
12:23Are we seeing Asia's security landscape being reshaped around the possibility of a Taiwan contingency?
12:29What's your thoughts on this, Dr. Peter?
12:32Yes, absolutely.
12:33It's already changing.
12:34The security landscape has significantly changed.
12:39Takashi, Prime Minister Takashi, make the infamous pronouncement that any contingencies in Taiwan
12:46will be an existential challenge to Japan's security.
12:53So, basically, it just draws the Taiwan state's potential conflict towards,
12:59as a national security for Japan itself.
13:02So, it becomes a regional, no longer just a domestic Japan, a China-Taiwan issue, but it's become an international.
13:10Japan will be drawn into it.
13:12And recently, we hear politicians in the Philippines making similar remarks.
13:18If there's anything, any conflicts in the Taiwan Straits will draw the Philippines in as well.
13:23So, the Taiwan Strait crisis is no longer just a national domestic issue for China.
13:32Certainly, certainly for those countries neighboring to China, Japan, and the Philippines in particular.
13:38So, there is a great risk that this conflict, this crisis, if it is not managed well, could turn into
13:46a regional conflict.
13:47There is talk of linking both the South China Sea Christ disputes with the Taiwan Straits disputes and the East
13:57China Sea disputes.
13:59All the three will link into one.
14:02Anything that happens to one will involve all the three.
14:06So, that this is a very, very dangerous development.
14:11And I think Malaysia and ASEAN as a whole has to be mindful of this and take whatever necessary political,
14:19sort of diplomatic effort to try to contain the expansion of the Taiwan crisis into a regional crisis.
14:29I mean, seeing you lining up everything all in one go there, it's a bit daunting and worrying.
14:35And I don't think we want to get there, you know, not any time at all.
14:40But another actor here.
14:41So, we talked about Japan.
14:42We talked about Philippines.
14:44Both of you mentioned, you know, both are trying to, both countries are trying to sort of navigate, you know,
14:50this landscape right now.
14:51The United States, however, remain sort of deliberately ambiguous at this point still about exactly what it would do if
15:01Taiwan were attacked.
15:02We understand, you know, U.S.-China ties is there.
15:06It's been ongoing, long-going, very good friends, despite the tensions.
15:12And Taiwan, at the same time, you know, ally of the U.S., protected from the U.S.
15:18So, does the U.S. strategic ambiguity still work as a deterrent, seeing that, you know, this increased pressure militarily
15:26and also politically going on right now?
15:29Mia, maybe we can have you on this.
15:31I mean, I think this is a very live debate, even in the United States at the moment, amongst analysts.
15:36Whether or not strategic ambiguity has served its purpose, but we're in a different world now where greater clarity is
15:42needed.
15:43And I think there are arguments on both sides.
15:45I would personally argue that ambiguity is still required.
15:49And I would say that actually, at the moment, the U.S. position is still one of ambiguity.
15:53We've moved away from directly talking about Taiwan.
15:56If you look at statements from President Trump at the moment, he does mention it once or twice.
16:02But even if you think about other cabinet members in the U.S. administration,
16:08we're now much more in a position where the U.S. is talking about a first island change strategy.
16:14So looking at a broader lens than just specifically Taiwan and providing clarity.
16:20In fact, I think it was President Biden, former president of the United States,
16:24who moved a little bit more away from a strategic ambiguity by making some quite strong and direct statements about
16:30U.S. support for Taiwan.
16:31We're seeing less of that under President Trump.
16:35Yeah, I mean, I think it's interesting that you mentioned the first island chain because that's definitely sort of moving
16:40a little bit away from, you know, Taiwan specifically.
16:43And we're looking at sort of a few cluster of islands that, you know, U.S. says it's heavily invested
16:49in and wants to protect.
16:51But, okay, putting aside a little bit, you know, further away, let's bring this a bit closer to home.
16:57Yes, sure, Dr. Peter.
17:01Okay, I think the official policy right now is still for the U.S. to retain strategic ambiguity.
17:08Basically, the principle is this.
17:10It's just that, you know, U.S. is not going to let China know whether it's going to come to
17:14the defense of Taiwan in the event of a conflict.
17:19Okay, that is the policy.
17:21But the reality is quite clear.
17:25Even if the U.S. has the political will, their military resources are so expanded right now.
17:34Allies across the region knows it.
17:39U.S. military has got no means to respond in the event of conflict in Taiwan.
17:48So I think the strategic ambiguity as a policy may still stand, but the reality speaks of a different story
17:56because of the numerous conflicts, engagement that U.S. Army or U.S. military is involved in right now in
18:05Iran, for example, and drawn to in their own southern hemisphere as well.
18:12So they are overstretched.
18:15So I'm not exactly sure.
18:17The reality speaks a different story when it comes to the U.S. strategic act of ambiguity.
18:23But I think we need to keep in mind that those capabilities that the U.S. is expending, and I
18:28agree with you, Dr. Peter, is limited to a few things.
18:33It's not across the board, right?
18:35We're thinking about air defense systems, which are key, and this is not something that is not important.
18:44Of course, it is a very important system and capability for the United States.
18:48But that is what we're talking about when we're talking about the depletion of U.S. military capabilities and stockpiles
18:56at the moment.
18:57And the other thing that I would say is there's another conflict that's happening, of course, and that's Russia's war
19:03against Ukraine that the United States has been supporting as well.
19:06Here, the ambition and I think the intention of the Trump administration has been that European partners and allies need
19:13to step up and do more for themselves.
19:14And we are seeing that happen.
19:16It's Europe, so it's always going to be slow.
19:19But it's faster than it's ever been.
19:21So we have to give some credits there.
19:22And the idea here is that European defense industry also increases its production capacity to look after its own defense.
19:31So I agree.
19:31For the moment, things are not looking positive on the air defense space.
19:37More broadly, I think U.S. capability is still in place in Asia.
19:42Right.
19:42And I think, you know, we have to monitor this as well, seeing that, you know, U.S. President Donald
19:47Trump wants to be, you know, sort of the person to sort of solve all this conflict.
19:55So resources might be stretched.
19:57But as Mia pointed out, you know, that's also, you know, we never doubted sort of U.S. capabilities historically
20:03as well.
20:04So definitely something that we need to monitor with regards to, you know, where U.S. stand when it comes
20:09to, you know, you mentioned just now the first island chain, Taiwan, China, where U.S. stand in all this
20:15and how involved are they in, how involved is U.S. when it comes to, I guess, protecting its allies.
20:22Right.
20:22Let's bring this a bit closer to home.
20:24If a Taiwan crisis erupted, would ASEAN actually be able to remain neutral?
20:30Because this is a debate that we have going on right here.
20:34Malaysia in particular has been very clear about maintaining strategic autonomy and avoiding choosing between Washington and Beijing.
20:41How sustainable is that position right now if those two powers were actually in conflict, seeing what you've mentioned just
20:48now with regards to the U.S. and China's role as well?
20:51Maybe, Dr. Peter, you can take this.
20:53Yeah.
20:54ASEAN, Malaysia will stay neutral.
20:58Let me give you a very good example.
21:01It just happened last week or last month.
21:04Indonesia had decided to join China for the first time, join naval exercise on the eastern side of Taiwan.
21:13Indonesia has got plenty of joint exercises, military alliance, cooperations with the United States, with Australia, with Japan.
21:24But recently they stepped up, just to affirm Indonesia's own neutrality.
21:29We're going to work with everyone.
21:33It's the same with Malaysia.
21:34And it's the same with ASEAN as a whole.
21:38And we will maintain that open-up policy.
21:41We're going to cooperate with every country that will serve our interests.
21:46I think if there is a conflict, it will probably, across the Taiwan Straits, with the exception of the Philippines,
21:57the rest of ASEAN will take on the neutrality policy that we will not take sides.
22:05Right.
22:06And I think, you know, those expanding partnership is important.
22:09I think we've learned, I think ASEAN in general had a steep learning curve when tariffs hit us.
22:14And, you know, we've been full-on blasting, you know, when it comes to expanding our partnership and making sure
22:20that intra-ASEAN trade, you know, intra-ASEAN ties are also strong with regards to dealing with some of the
22:26shocks that comes with, you know, crisis like be it Taiwan, be it Iran.
22:30So, I guess, drawing on that, Mia, I want to highlight your recent report as well.
22:37You estimate that an economic quarantine of Taiwan alone could cost Malaysia around RM79.5 billion and affect roughly 250
22:46,000 jobs.
22:47That's jarring.
22:49What actually drives that economic shock?
22:52Do you mind explaining a little bit so we are a bit well aware over on this side?
22:56Sure. So, the project basically sought to estimate what the economic impact would be on a neutral country in Southeast
23:04Asia choosing Malaysia as the case study country in the event of two scenarios.
23:11One is a Taiwan Strait crisis, an economic quarantine, and we projected the impact to one year.
23:17And then the second is a conflict across the Taiwan Strait, and we projected that conflict to one year as
23:25well.
23:26So, just on terms of the crisis, the scenario was an economic quarantine, as we discussed previously.
23:32Trade would be disrupted for a period of time and would slowly return to normal, but there would still be
23:38questions around how much economies could recover.
23:41And here, the reason why Malaysia is such an interesting case study is, of course, it has a very open
23:48economy.
23:49It trades a lot with external partners.
23:52It has relations with Taiwan, with China, and, of course, with the United States and other powers.
24:01It has a very vital role in electronics supply chains, particularly when it comes to semiconductor chips.
24:09And that is going to be one area that is going to be incredibly disrupted in the event of a
24:14crisis and more so in the event of a conflict.
24:18So, we did a very simple analysis, and in a way, although these numbers are shocking, they should be seen
24:24as a minimalist estimation,
24:27because all we did was look at what disruption would occur and who that disruption would affect, so which trading
24:34routes would be affected.
24:35And then we deducted that from an annual kind of economic calculation.
24:42So, very simplistic.
24:44We didn't think about kind of action-reaction cycles, which could make it even worse, potentially.
24:51So, yes, it is a large number.
24:54But a bigger number, of course, is the impact of a potential conflict.
24:59Can I have a take on this?
25:01I think we're running a bit out of time, because I have one last question to pose to you before
25:06we wrap this up.
25:08I'm pretty sure this kind of debate when it comes to the Taiwan Strait Crisis, which is quite close to
25:14home to us, there's a lot to unpack.
25:16But I'm going to leave with one last question for one short answer here.
25:21So, we've talked about military pressure, U.S.-China rivalry, regional militarization, and the economic consequences for Malaysia.
25:28So, I'll put this both for you.
25:30Are we looking at a crisis that is becoming increasingly likely, or a deterrence game that is actually succeeding in
25:37preventing war?
25:39That's my last question to both of you.
25:41Maybe, Dr. Peter, you can take this first.
25:43Yes, I think the risk of a conflict is rising.
25:47But war is not inevitable.
25:50You know, there's no reason.
25:51China doesn't want it.
25:54The status quo has benefited China.
25:56I can tell you, China will not be the one that initiates any conflict across the Straits.
26:02China, however, does have a red line.
26:05That is, Taiwan doesn't announce independence.
26:10If China, for some reason, the Lai Ching-Tang administration chooses to cross a red line, then sadly, we might
26:16face the horrific scenario of a conflict across the Taiwan Straits.
26:24Right.
26:24Mea, your last thoughts, short and brief.
26:27I agree with Dr. Peter.
26:30War is not inevitable, but it is increasingly, unfortunately, and concerningly possible and plausible.
26:39And I think that what we need to be most careful about is that we don't sleepwalk into a crisis
26:45that could become a conflict.
26:46And here, all countries play a role in deterrence.
26:50And in particular, what this shows, what our report showed was that even a country that seeks to stay neutral
26:56and seeks to stay out of a cross-straight scenario can become embroiled because the world is interconnected.
27:02And there is no isolation from these types of crises or conflicts anymore.
27:07And so, therefore, everyone plays a role in deterrence.
27:09Right, and I think that's famous last words, I guess, from Mea here.
27:15The Taiwan Straits crisis might be a thousand kilometers from Malaysia, but as we've heard tonight, a crisis that would
27:22have consequences far beyond Taiwan, from regional security to Malaysia's economy as well.
27:28Peter Chang and Mea, everyone, thank you so much for joining us today.
27:31I'm Siti Fahana.
27:32Thank you for watching Awani Global.
27:35See you again.
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