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00:00 Ukraine Turned UK’s Junkyard Armor Into a FRONTLINE MONSTER
27:07 How Ukraine DESTROYED Russia's Future FOREVER
44:47 Something SINISTER Just Made 500K Russians Run for Their Lives
01:02:09 5 Kurdish Armies Are Marching on Iran… The Mullahs Will Be Wiped From the MAP
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00:00 Ukraine Turned UK’s Junkyard Armor Into a FRONTLINE MONSTER
27:07 How Ukraine DESTROYED Russia's Future FOREVER
44:47 Something SINISTER Just Made 500K Russians Run for Their Lives
01:02:09 5 Kurdish Armies Are Marching on Iran… The Mullahs Will Be Wiped From the MAP
Support us directly as we bring you independent, up-to-date reporting on military news and global conflicts by clicking here: https://www.youtube.com/@TheMilitaryShow/join
#militarystrategy #militarydevelopments #militaryanalysis
#themilitaryshow
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NewsTranscript
00:00:01When the Ukrainian military first received FV-103 Spartan armoured personnel carriers in July 2022,
00:00:09it wasn't a shot heard around the world. In fact, most military analysts agreed that the vehicles
00:00:15likely wouldn't have much of an impact on the battlefield. After all, even then, they were far
00:00:21from modern infantry fighting vehicles, with Britain itself retiring them more than 15 years
00:00:26ago. Ukraine became the seventh country to use the vehicle, with Latvia being the only other
00:00:32European country to still have them. Compared to Russian modern military equipment, the Spartans
00:00:38looked paltry and inadequate. And yet, three and a half years into the war, the number of Spartans on
00:00:45the battlefield grew from 35 to close to 200. And out of that number, only approximately 35 had been
00:00:53lost, according to the open source intelligence monitoring company Oryx. The survival rate of
00:00:59about 82.5% is on par with some of the most successful Western and Ukrainian systems, suggesting
00:01:06that these humble vehicles are much more than meets the eye. So, let's examine exactly how Ukraine
00:01:14turned vehicles meant for the UK's junkyards into frontline monsters that could tumble with
00:01:20Russia's advanced tanks. Now, let's begin with the actual specs, what they represent and why they
00:01:26made the Spartans nearly obsolete in the first place. The FV-103 Spartan was developed in the 1970s
00:01:34as part of Britain's Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance Tract or CVRT family. The design philosophy was simple,
00:01:42create a fast vehicle that could transport specialist teams such as anti-aircraft crews or reconnaissance
00:01:49units across the battlefield while keeping pace with heavier tanks. To achieve this, British
00:01:55engineers went all in on trying to shed as much weight from a traditional infantry carrier as possible.
00:02:01The hull was constructed from welded aluminum alloy instead of steel, maxing out at just 60mm thick
00:02:08on the frontal arc. This provided protection against 14.5mm rounds from around 200m and shrapnel,
00:02:16but nothing more. A direct hit from any modern anti-tank weapon would punch straight through.
00:02:22The vehicle's 195hp Jaguar engine could push it to 60mph on an open road and only when carrying minimal
00:02:31loads. The flipside is that the weight-to-power ratio meant it could climb a 60-degree incline. The squad
00:02:38compartment held just four soldiers, not including the three crew members, which could be accessed through a
00:02:44rear door or roof hatches. The vehicle's armament consisted of a single 7.62mm L37A1 machine gun in a
00:02:54commander's cupola. This was enough for self-defense against infantry, but ultimately useless against
00:03:00armored targets, even another Spartan. The combination of lackluster armor and having only niche operational
00:03:07capabilities ultimately meant that the Spartan was never really used in actual combat, instead serving as
00:03:14auxiliary transport for the UK military. Even then, the steady improvements in armaments of
00:03:20traditional infantry fighting vehicles meant that the tank was rapidly approaching the point where it
00:03:25would get shot down by similar auxiliary vehicles. This led to the UK replacing the Spartan with the
00:03:32more capable Panther command and liaison vehicles. The last Spartans in British service were withdrawn by
00:03:392009. For context, compare the Spartan to Ukraine's existing Soviet-era equipment and
00:03:46Western alternatives. The BTR-3, Ukraine's standard domestically produced APC, weighs 16.4 tons and carries
00:03:56three to six troops, while being armed with a 30mm auto cannon. The American M113, which Ukraine also operates,
00:04:04weighs 14 tons and transports 11 soldiers. The M2 Bradley, that Ukraine desperately wanted,
00:04:12weighs 27 tons, carries six troops plus crew, and mounts a 25mm auto cannon plus tow, or tube launch
00:04:21optically tracked wire-guided anti-tank missiles with sophisticated thermal sights. Against these benchmarks,
00:04:28the Spartan looks pathetic. Yet when the UK pledged to send 35 Spartans in 2022, and then increased that pledge
00:04:37to
00:04:37over 120, Ukraine accepted gratefully. When the Sergi Prithula Charity Foundation crowdfunded $6.5 million in just
00:04:4836 hours to purchase 60 additional Spartans from UK private sellers in November 2022, Ukrainian soldiers celebrated.
00:04:57When the Ukrainian World Congress acquired 13 more through the Unite with Ukraine initiative, frontline units
00:05:03competed for them. The cheering was due to Ukrainian forces seeing something Western analysts missed. In a war
00:05:10dominated by drones, artillery, and constant observation, the Spartans' apparent weaknesses were actually
00:05:17hidden strengths. Ukrainian crews didn't even bother trying to use the Spartan as a frontline infantry
00:05:23fighting vehicle. That would have been suicide. Instead, they transformed it into a high-speed armored taxi,
00:05:30optimized for rapid insertion and extraction missions under the most dangerous conditions.
00:05:35One Ukrainian soldier explained the operational concept as move in unnoticed, complete the task
00:05:42unnoticed, drop off the assault team unnoticed, get in, get our guys out. This was radically different
00:05:49from NATO's doctrine of mechanized warfare when the vehicle was originally designed, where infantry fighting
00:05:56vehicles advance alongside tanks while suppressing enemy positions with auto cannons. A typical Spartan
00:06:03mission in Ukrainian service works like this. The vehicle waits, concealed in a tree line or behind
00:06:09terrain, with its engine off to minimize its thermal and electromagnetic signature. Ukrainian FPV drones
00:06:16scout the route ahead, identifying Russian observation posts, artillery positions, and drone operators.
00:06:23When the mission commander determines the window is clear, the Spartan's crew fires up the engine and
00:06:28accelerates rapidly across open terrain. The goal is speed and surprise. At 60 miles an hour, the vehicle
00:06:35can cover roughly a mile a minute, drastically reducing the time window for Russian forces to spot it, transmit
00:06:42targeting data, and launch counter-attacks. The compact size that seemed like a weakness became an advantage.
00:06:49The Spartan is one of the narrowest and shortest vehicles in its class,
00:06:54with a length of under 17 feet and a width of 8 feet 2 inches, meaning it can hide in
00:07:00positions that
00:07:00would expose larger vehicles like the BTR-3 or Bradley. Its low silhouette at slightly under 9 feet tall
00:07:08makes it harder for Russian drones to acquire and track, especially when moving fast across complex terrain.
00:07:15When Ukrainian forces needed to evacuate wounded soldiers from exposed positions near Bakhmut,
00:07:21Spartans proved invaluable. Due to the relatively low benchmark capacity, Ukrainians would often need
00:07:27to be crammed into the transport quarters depending on the severity of their injuries. Some evacuation
00:07:34runs became legendary among Ukrainian units, fitting more than a dozen soldiers. One crew member reported
00:07:41that, on the way back, there's no gear inside, so you pack them in like Tetris. This far exceeds the
00:07:48Spartans' design capacity of seven total personnel, but in emergency evacuations, Ukrainian crews prioritized
00:07:55saving lives over following specifications. The vehicle's lightweight also provides a crucial advantage
00:08:02that Western analysts consistently underestimated – ground pressure. At just 10.6 tons distributed across its
00:08:11track surface area, the Spartan exerts roughly 0.4 kilograms per centimeter square of ground pressure.
00:08:18Compare this to a main battle tank like the T-72 at 46 tons, creating approximately 0.9 kilograms per
00:08:26centimeter square. Or the Leopard 2 at over 60 tons, generating even higher pressure. This difference
00:08:32matters enormously in eastern Ukraine's notorious black soil, which turns into thick mud during spring
00:08:39thaw and after heavy rains. Heavier vehicles bogged down, becoming vulnerable targets for artillery and
00:08:45drones. The Spartan's low ground pressure allows it to traverse terrain that would immobilize heavier
00:08:52armor, opening tactical options that didn't exist for units equipped with BTR-3s or Bradleys.
00:08:58In fact, some reports would suggest that a soldier jumping off the vehicle could get stuck in the mud where
00:09:05the Spartan previously passed through without an issue. Even more remarkably, the lightweight may
00:09:10provide some protection against anti-tank mines. Most pressure-activated anti-tank mines are designed
00:09:17to trigger at weights of 150 to 300 kilograms, sufficient to ensure they detonate under tracked vehicles but
00:09:25don't waste themselves on lighter threats. The Spartan falls into a gray zone where some mines might not
00:09:31trigger consistently, especially older Soviet models that Ukraine and Russia have both laid extensively.
00:09:38While this isn't guaranteed protection, it could create survivability margins that simply don't exist for
00:09:44heavier armor. Of course, the Spartan replacements included major armor improvements to make them less
00:09:51vulnerable upon detonating a mine or getting shot from a larger caliber, so it's unclear how effective
00:09:57they were at dodging mines. But Ukraine realized quite early that some technical specifications of
00:10:03vehicles simply ceased to matter in the grand scheme of the war. The invasion quickly turned into a slog
00:10:10where neither side could advance reasonably. This led to the absolute dominance of unmanned systems.
00:10:16Both sides deployed tens of thousands of drones monthly, from simple commercial quadcopters dropping grenades,
00:10:23to sophisticated FPV racing drones retrofitted with anti-tank warheads, to long-range loitering munitions
00:10:30like the Russian Lancet and Ukrainian-modified systems. Traditional tank doctrine assumed that heavy armor
00:10:37and active protection systems would provide survivability. But drones attack from above,
00:10:44hitting the thinnest armor on any vehicle's roof. They also strike in swarms that overwhelm active
00:10:49protection systems like auto cannons or even passive add-ons such as netting. And even swarms of drones
00:10:56can cost orders of magnitude less than the vehicles they destroy. In this environment, the Spartans' lack
00:11:03of heavy armor became paradoxically advantageous. Because it was never designed to survive heavy anti-tank
00:11:10weapons, Ukrainian engineers were free to optimize it entirely for drone defense, without worrying about
00:11:16maintaining a balance between protection types. In a video from late July 2025, you can clearly see
00:11:23Ukrainian Spartans being fitted with the similar anti-drone netting used for main battle tanks
00:11:28and other IFVs. And in much the same way, the metal wire net is then covered with camouflage canvas
00:11:35or similar material, to allow for the aforementioned lion-weight tactic before the vehicles were needed for
00:11:41transport in the first place. Alternatively, some vehicles were retrofitted to serve as an auxiliary
00:11:47combat equipment rather than transport. This was done by attaching a turret that holds an M2 Browning
00:11:54heavy machine gun and an automatic grenade launcher instead of the stock auto cannon. While this precluded
00:12:01the vehicle from receiving the anti-drone measures, it drastically increased its offensive potential.
00:12:06But pure technical specifications alone don't fully explain why Spartans had so much success in Ukraine
00:12:13while they were originally headed for the junkyard. In actuality, the vehicles were simply outcompeted by
00:12:19newer designs when serving in their native NATO militaries. But Ukraine's practical requirements
00:12:25allow a sort of reset on those favored old designs. When Britain retired the Spartan fleet in 2009,
00:12:33it replaced them with Panther Command and Liaison vehicles. These were 6x6 wheeled vehicles,
00:12:39based on the Italian Iveco medium multi-role vehicle. The Panther weighs 7 tons, seats 6 personnel,
00:12:46and provides STANAG level 2 ballistic protection. It's faster on roads, more fuel efficient, easier to
00:12:53maintain, and significantly more comfortable than the tracked Spartan. For NATO operations in Iraq and
00:12:59Afghanistan, this made perfect sense. Coalition forces operated with overwhelming air superiority,
00:13:06sophisticated ISR, intelligence surveillance reconnaissance networks, and logistical chains
00:13:12that could deliver parts anywhere within 48 hours. In that environment, wheeled vehicles with lower
00:13:18operating costs and better road performance were ideal. But Ukraine doesn't fight for air superiority.
00:13:24It operates in a near-peer conflict where both sides have extensive artillery, drone swarms,
00:13:30and electronic warfare capabilities. Roads are heavily surveilled and frequently mined or struck
00:13:36with artillery or drones. At the same time, supply chains are contested and unreliable on both sides due to
00:13:43the overwhelming amount of long-range drone attacks happening daily across the 600-mile front. In this
00:13:50environment, the obsolete Spartan's track mobility, compact size, and simple mechanics made it more
00:13:56valuable than newer, more sophisticated alternatives. The track suspension is more stable when going over
00:14:03uneven terrain, and the vehicle's ability to climb steep hills makes it practically invaluable in the same
00:14:09sort of hilly terrain, speckled with fields and ditches, which dominates the Ukraine-Russia front in
00:14:15Donbass. Ukrainian forces are fighting a war that more closely resembles World War II's Eastern Front
00:14:22than the conflicts NATO prepared for. In this context, quantity, maintainability, and tactical
00:14:28flexibility matter more than individual vehicle capability. The numbers alone are telling, as Ukraine
00:14:35received approximately 200 Spartan variants through various channels. Compare this to the number of other
00:14:41Western systems they received. Approximately 100 Leopard 2 variants 2A4 through 2A6 from multiple NATO
00:14:50countries. 31 M1 Abrams tanks from the United States, of which Ukraine has lost 27. Roughly 300 M113 variants,
00:15:00mostly provided by Lithuania from Soviet-era production. 190 Bradley's M2-M3 provided by the United States,
00:15:09with about 40 lost or damaged. The Spartan fleet is numerically significant enough to equip multiple
00:15:16brigades. Ukrainian forces have formed the 251st Territorial Defense Battalion, the 127th Territorial
00:15:24Defense Brigade, and elements of the 67th Mechanized Brigade around Spartan operations. These units have
00:15:31developed specialized tactics that leverage the vehicle's mobility and transport-oriented capabilities.
00:15:37But here's where the story takes a fascinating turn. If Ukraine can achieve these results,
00:15:43with 50-year-old vehicles Britain considered worthless, what could it accomplish with the
00:15:47equipment NATO actually considers modern? Britain's Panther vehicles, which replaced the Spartan,
00:15:54haven't been offered to Ukraine. Neither have the track warrior infantry fighting vehicles
00:15:59that Britain recently retired, though they've been mentioned in potential future aid packages.
00:16:04The far more capable Ajax reconnaissance vehicles entering British service now aren't even being
00:16:10discussed. Part of the reason for Britain sticking to the equipment from roughly the same era as
00:16:16Ukraine's native vehicles is political risk management. NATO countries want to avoid providing
00:16:22such advanced systems because their loss or capture would compromise classified technology.
00:16:27Another reason is training complexity. Modern vehicles require sophisticated crew training that takes
00:16:33months. Finally, there's maintenance infrastructure, with newer vehicles needing specialized facilities and
00:16:40parts that Ukraine doesn't have and can't have. Of course, there's another possibility where Russia
00:16:46declares that some of the donation transfers can tilt the scale too much in Ukraine's favor and supposedly
00:16:52threaten Russia as a whole. In return, Russia could escalate the war by using tactical weapons,
00:16:58including nuclear ones, against Ukraine to speed the war along, so to speak. This intimidation tactic isn't new,
00:17:06as Putin had previously attempted to block the transfers of long-range missiles, tanks and aircraft,
00:17:11and there's no telling where he might draw the next imaginary red line. But the Spartan success suggests
00:17:18these calculations might be overly cautious. Ukrainian forces have proven remarkably capable of adapting
00:17:24Western equipment, improvising solutions to maintenance challenges, and developing tactics that maximize
00:17:31platform strengths while minimizing weaknesses. Consider what this means for the broader Russia-NATO military
00:17:37balance. Russia has lost over 23,000 pieces of military equipment since the invasion began, according to Oryx's
00:17:45documented visual confirmations. This includes approximately 13,500 armored vehicles destroyed,
00:17:53which were drawn from stocks accumulated over decades. Russia's current production capacity
00:17:58is roughly 250 T-90M tanks and between 70 and 100 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles per year,
00:18:06which is far short of replacement needs. The country has been forced to pull progressively older
00:18:12equipment from storage, deploying T-62s from the 1960s, and even reported instances of T-34s from World
00:18:20War II appearing on trains headed towards Ukraine. NATO's combined military-industrial capacity dwarfs
00:18:27Russia's by orders of magnitude. According to Polish military analysts, the United States produced over
00:18:348,800 M1 Abrams tanks from 1979 to 1993, with thousands in storage and roughly 135 new ones produced each
00:18:45year to date.
00:18:46Germany manufactured over 3,000 Leopard 2 tanks, Britain produced nearly 500 Challenger tanks,
00:18:53and France built over 400 Leclerc tanks. And these are modern main battle tanks with composite armor,
00:18:59120 mm smoothbore cannons, advanced fire control systems, and sophisticated active protection systems.
00:19:07If NATO countries decided to transfer even 10% of their non-active duty tank fleets to Ukraine,
00:19:14it would represent over 1,000 modern MBTs entering the conflict. Spartans would practically be useless by
00:19:21comparison. The same calculus applies to infantry fighting vehicles, artillery systems, air defense
00:19:28platforms, and combat aircraft. NATO has the equipment. The question has always been political will.
00:19:35The Spartans' performance demonstrates that even junk Western equipment, when properly employed,
00:19:41outperforms Russian contemporary systems. Ukrainian soldiers and engineers aren't really inherently
00:19:47superior to Russia's, which is arguably one of the most experienced military suppliers in the Eastern
00:19:53hemisphere. But Western military development over the past 50 years, even on vehicles considered obsolete,
00:20:00produce capabilities that Russia's current military industrial complex can't match.
00:20:04Beyond tactical employment and strategic implications, the Spartan success rests on specific
00:20:11engineering choices that Ukrainian modifications enhanced. Specifically, the M2 Browning provides
00:20:18dramatically improved firepower against infantry, light vehicles, and fortified positions. With a maximum
00:20:25effective range of slightly over a mile, it allows Spartan crews to engage targets that would have been
00:20:30untouchable with the original 7.62 mm weapon. The Mk-19 grenade launcher extends this capability even
00:20:38further to 1.37 miles, delivering high-explosive fragmentation rounds that can suppress enemy positions
00:20:46weapons or punch through less armored vehicles. However, these weapons come with a significant drawback.
00:20:52Unlike the original L.37A1, which could be fired from inside the vehicle, the M2 and Mk-19 required the
00:21:00gunner to expose themselves above the turret. Ukrainian crews addressed this by adding improvised armor shields
00:21:07around the weapon mount, such as welded steel plates that protect against small arms fire and shrapnel,
00:21:13while allowing the gunner to operate the weapon. The vehicles also received modern communication
00:21:18systems. Some Spartans now carry Harris radios, allowing integration with Ukrainian command networks
00:21:25and coordination with drone operators. This addresses one of the original vehicle's major limitations,
00:21:31but the 1970s-era radio systems are simply incompatible with modern encrypted communications.
00:21:37Fire control upgrades proved equally valuable. While the Spartan wasn't designed as a tank destroyer,
00:21:44Ukrainian forces recognized its potential as a fire support platform. Some vehicles received laser
00:21:50rangefinders and improved optical sights, dramatically improving accuracy and extended ranges. One crew
00:21:57member noted, the road wheels are rubberized, and that's one of its perks. It's quiet, no metal clanging,
00:22:03and the tracks have rubber pads too, which helps reduce noise. This quiet operation, combined with
00:22:10thermal signature reduction through engine management, makes the Spartan surprisingly stealthy despite
00:22:15lacking sophisticated anti-surveillance systems. In an environment dominated by thermal optics and
00:22:22acoustic sensors, operating quietly provides crucial advantages during insertion and extraction missions.
00:22:28Perhaps most importantly, the Spartan is mechanically simple, which means Ukrainian crews can perform
00:22:35most maintenance in field conditions. When a track breaks, they replace it. When the engine overheats,
00:22:41they swap coolant lines. The vehicle requires neither specialized diagnostic computers,
00:22:46nor hard-to-source electronic components. Compare this to the Bradley, which features a complex turbocharged
00:22:52diesel engine, automatic transmission, digital fire control system, and integrated battlefield management computers.
00:23:00When a Bradley breaks down in Ukraine, it often requires transport to specialized maintenance facilities
00:23:06with trained technicians and proprietary diagnostic equipment. This maintenance advantage compounds over time.
00:23:14After months of operations, the Bradley fleet's operational readiness rate drops as vehicles accumulate
00:23:19minor faults that can't be fixed in the field. The Spartan fleet maintains higher availability because crews can address
00:23:26problems immediately rather than waiting for specialized support. The success of Ukraine's Spartan program
00:23:33also reveals how military procurement economics have shifted over time between regions. More specifically,
00:23:40Western militaries have previously pursued increasingly sophisticated platforms, assuming that technological
00:23:46superiority would provide decisive advantages in any conflict. This led to systems like the F-35 fighter jet
00:23:53at $100 million per aircraft, the Zumwalt-class destroyer at $7.5 billion per ship, and the Future Combat
00:24:01Systems program, which got cancelled after spending $18 billion without fielding a single operational vehicle.
00:24:08The logic seems sound. Advanced technology multiplies combat effectiveness,
00:24:13so investing in the best systems produces optimal military capability. But Ukraine's experience hints at
00:24:19this logic, breaking down in high-intensity conventional warfare. The problem isn't that advanced systems lack capability,
00:24:27as the Bradley is undeniably more capable than the Spartan in almost every measurable way. Advanced systems simply
00:24:33can't be produced, maintained, or fielded in sufficient quantities to matter when attrition rates are high. Take, for example,
00:24:41some simple mathematics. If a Bradley costs $4.35 million, the approximate unit cost for recent US Army orders, and
00:24:49a refurbished Spartan costs approximately $50,000, which is the price Ukrainian Charitable Foundation's paid UK private sellers, you can
00:24:58field 87 Spartans for the cost to one Bradley.
00:25:01Now, assume both vehicles have similar survival rates in Ukrainian conditions, which appears roughly
00:25:07true based on available lost data. Even if the Bradley is three times as effective per vehicle,
00:25:13and even that is debatable in the drone-saturated environment, the Spartan fleet provides 22 times more
00:25:19operational vehicles for the same investment. This naturally allows the cheaper vehicle to be more
00:25:25versatile and usable in actual combat situations. Ukrainian commanders can deploy Spartans on risky
00:25:32missions that would be unacceptable risks for limited Bradley stocks. They can position Spartans in forward
00:25:38areas where rapid reinforcement matters more than individual vehicle capability. This suggests Western
00:25:44militaries have over-indexed on per-platform capability at the expense of fleet survivability, maintainability,
00:25:51and quantity. In counter-insurgency operations against technologically inferior opponents,
00:25:57this didn't matter, as having the absolute best vehicle was worth the financial cost when you could
00:26:03mow down the opposition while sustaining minimal equipment or human losses. But against near-peer adversaries
00:26:09with sophisticated weapons, mass, and availability might matter more than marginal capability improvements.
00:26:16The Spartan story, much like many others, further drives the narrative that the war in Ukraine,
00:26:21isn't a conflict between cutting-edge military technologies where marginal advantages decide
00:26:27battles. It's an attritional struggle where sustainability, adaptability, and will determine
00:26:33outcomes. In that environment, an aluminum box on tracks from 1978 becomes a frontline monster,
00:26:41not through sophisticated electronics or advanced weapons, but through smart employment, rapid adaptation,
00:26:47and the resourcefulness of soldiers who refuse to let those boxes fade into memory.
00:26:52As one Ukrainian crew member put it, the thing was made in another era for another war, but somehow
00:26:58it fits this war too, because when the mission is survival, reliability matters more than shiny upgrades.
00:27:06The war in Ukraine is heading into its fourth year, and both sides are pulling out all the stops.
00:27:12Every inch of territory has become a battleground, as Ukraine and Russia push for tactical,
00:27:17strategic, and technological dominance. But let's take a step back.
00:27:21When Russia's so-called special military operation began, Ukraine's military was dwarfed by Russia's
00:27:28in size and power. Russia was widely believed to have the second strongest military in the world,
00:27:33and most analysts thought Ukraine wouldn't last more than a few weeks. Yet, here we are.
00:27:38Not only has Ukraine held its ground, but it's managed to repel Russia's advances and even mount
00:27:43counter-offensives that have shocked the world. How did this happen? How did Ukraine,
00:27:47the underdog, manage to go toe-to-toe with a global superpower? In this video, we'll take
00:27:52you through the early days of the war, the critical tactics and strategies that helped Ukraine survive,
00:27:57and the advancements that have turned the tide. But first, let's look at just how vast the
00:28:01military disparity was when the war began. A CNN report dated February 25, 2022, has some of the
00:28:08closest approximations of Russia and Ukraine's military strength at the time. Russia's active manpower
00:28:13war was estimated to contain around 900,000 soldiers, compared to Ukraine's 196,000, giving
00:28:19it roughly four and a half times the manpower to use in the oncoming conflict. Perhaps the greatest
00:28:23manpower disparity lay in the air forces, where Russia outnumbered Ukraine roughly five to one,
00:28:28at 165,000 to 35,000 total personnel. Notably, Russia didn't, and couldn't, amass all of its forces
00:28:35to enter Ukraine at the start of the invasion. Instead, the report suggested that there were between
00:28:39160,000 and 200,000 soldiers out of the country's 300,000-strong land force used for the invasion.
00:28:46On the other side of the conflict, Ukraine filled at around 120,000 infantry. Essentially,
00:28:51while Ukraine was severely on the back foot at the start of the war, Russia didn't actually go all
00:28:55out as had frequently been suggested it would do so. Part of this was due to logistics and history.
00:29:00Simply put, a part of Russia's military is comprised of mandatory conscripts, i.e. troops that are
00:29:04drafted at regular intervals to serve for shorter periods than contracted troops.
00:29:08By precedent, conscripts can't be deployed outside of Russian territory, something that came as a
00:29:13consequence of the previous Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s, where Soviet casualties rose to around
00:29:18670,000 over 10 years. After the war ended, the Russian population urged the government to prevent
00:29:24future deployment abroad, which seemed to have taken root. Even Putin seems to heed this precedent
00:29:29despite the country's woeful record in the ongoing conflict. But perhaps the biggest part of why
00:29:33Russia didn't bring its entire infantry to Ukraine is more in line with previous tactics and plans.
00:29:38The war in Ukraine could be said to be an escalation, and perhaps even a natural progression of,
00:29:43a conflict that started over 10 years ago with the Russian annexation of Crimea. And in that event,
00:29:48Russia managed to overtake one of Ukraine's regions with almost no shots fired. Instead,
00:29:53the Russian military performed what was essentially a martial coup, flying elite troops to Sevastopol's
00:29:57airport, surprising the local military and national defenses. Then, the Russian military seized control of the
00:30:03local government, replaced the leadership with Russian loyalists, and started a sham referendum
00:30:07that prodded Crimea to join the Russian Federation. In 2014, Russia used the political crisis and civil
00:30:13unrest as the backdrop for the incursion, which helped nullify Ukraine's potential responses and
00:30:18speed up the process. When Russia announced the start of the special military operation,
00:30:22in February 2022, Putin tried to repeat the tactic. This time, he'd go for the head of the entire
00:30:27country's government in Kyiv. In Putin's mind, Russia already had a claim on Ukraine both politically
00:30:32and culturally, and the Ukrainian people should have been overjoyed to rejoin the Federation.
00:30:36He believed that the core of the country wouldn't really pose much more than token resistance.
00:30:41Even though many administrations and independent bodies published proposed plans that Russia was
00:30:45gearing up for an invasion, Putin believed that a forewarning would only make Ukraine move a
00:30:49bulk of its forces to the contested Donbass region rather than reinforce Kyiv. He was only partially
00:30:54correct. On the first day of the war, Russia launched a two-pronged attack on Kyiv, with a
00:30:59small contingent of Russian special military forces aboard some 34 helicopters being the first strike
00:31:04team to approach the Ukrainian capital by air. The mission for these 200-300 soldiers was to take
00:31:09over the Hostomel airport, the largest airport that served Kyiv, and one with significant capacity
00:31:14to accept military transport. The attack would come from Belarus, or more precisely from Mzia,
00:31:19which was only an hour or so away from Kyiv by air. At roughly the same time,
00:31:23Russia mounted its land offensive from both Belarus and Russia, trying to push its mechanized units to
00:31:28reach the airport as quickly as possible. The plan turned into a disaster from the get-go.
00:31:33The aerial invasion was practically a non-starter, as the Russian forces took significant losses before
00:31:38they even managed to land near the airport and start fighting to occupy it. The Ukrainian troops
00:31:42barricaded the runway, prevented any aircraft from using it for the initial invasion. The airport's
00:31:47meagre anti-air defenses managed to down at least four aircraft before the Ukrainians were overwhelmed,
00:31:52and were forced to either surrender or fall back. Despite that, the Ukrainians managed to delay the
00:31:56Russian occupation of the airport for a few hours, which was enough time for them to ferry some of
00:32:00their own mechanized forces from the surrounding area. The Russian forces that were supposed to
00:32:04arrive by land were heavily delayed. Putin planned for that contingency by supposedly sending between
00:32:09one to five thousand soldiers by aircraft transport. However, the Ukrainian military shelled the runway
00:32:14again, making it completely unusable and forcing the proposed reinforcements to fall back.
00:32:19With an occupied airport they couldn't use, and land troops that encountered far more resistance
00:32:23than expected, the Russian troops couldn't adapt to the new situation. Which brings us to the
00:32:27equipment disparity between Russia and Ukraine, and how the latter managed to bypass it.
00:32:32Perhaps the most notable advantage Russia had over Ukraine at the start of the war was its
00:32:36impressive arsenal of vehicles. Russia had around 15,900 armored fighting vehicles compared to Ukraine's
00:32:423,300, approximately 10 times the number of military aircraft and roughly 17 times more helicopters.
00:32:49But none of these assets would end up mattering in the long run. While Russia had a significantly
00:32:53larger arsenal of tanks, they were heavily underutilized at the start of the invasion. Russian
00:32:57troops advanced too quickly for their own good at the start of the war, with the military trying to
00:33:01take over Ukraine on practically three fronts at once. The tanks were the fastest moving among the
00:33:06military vehicles as tank squads typically didn't have support vehicles and infantry slowing it down.
00:33:10That would end up being their downfall. Without key anti-air support nearby,
00:33:14Russian tanks could be targeted by Ukrainian artillery and drones, which would turn out to
00:33:18have devastating consequences. The Russian main battle tanks, the T-80 and T-90,
00:33:23traced their lineage back to Soviet designs from the end of World War II. Russian war doctrine
00:33:28emphasized producing tanks that were smaller, lighter, and more maneuverable than their Western
00:33:32counterparts. This design made them harder to hit on the battlefield, but came with compromises in
00:33:37power and survivability when compared to NATO's heavily armored vehicles. To achieve their smaller
00:33:41profile, Russian tanks implemented an autoloader system that eliminated the need for a third crew
00:33:46member. However, this design also created critical vulnerabilities. The autoloader stored ammunition in
00:33:52a ring around the turret, which had areas with minimal armor. Compounding this issue, the tank's
00:33:56smaller size meant additional ammunition was often stored messily throughout the hull and turret,
00:34:01outside heavily armored compartments. This lack of compartmentalization made Russian tanks particularly
00:34:06susceptible to catastrophic explosions. Penetrating ordnance or anti-tank mines, whether striking from
00:34:12above or below, could ignite spare ammo, triggering a chain reaction known as the jack-in-the-box effect.
00:34:18This flaw has persisted across Soviet and Russian tank designs, including the T-90Ms. The T-90M
00:34:23attempts to address this issue with modernized safety features, such as storing most of its spare
00:34:28ammunition in the back of the turret with blowout panels, similar to Western tanks. However,
00:34:32whether these changes effectively counter the design flaws remains a topic of debate. While
00:34:36stymied by the fact that the initial aerial invasion of Kyiv ran contrary to the plan,
00:34:41Russia still maintained a heavy numbers advantage near the Ukrainian capital. However,
00:34:45the Russian military has been making a series of logistical and tactical errors ever since the
00:34:49start of the invasion. First, there was the failed aerial invasion of Hostomel. There was
00:34:54practically no reason to believe that such a bold strategy would actually yield
00:34:57positive results. Putin had already used the same move to occupy Crimea, so repeating it on
00:35:02a larger scale against the same country less than a decade later seemed to be completely out of
00:35:07character for a supposedly calculating ruler who also served in the KGB. In the same vein,
00:35:12the Ukrainian military was once part of the Soviet Union itself. The decapitating strike that was
00:35:17performed in Crimea and attempted in Kyiv was part of the wider Soviet military playbook as it was
00:35:22already exercised twice before, in Prague and Kabul. Ukrainian officers were taught how to think like
00:35:28the Soviets so they ostensibly knew about the tactic in one way or another. Furthermore,
00:35:32the Ukrainian military started to receive vital training from NATO forces after 2014, making them
00:35:37much more prepared to fight against an enemy that could exercise some modicum of aerial superiority,
00:35:42such as Russia. Secondly, after the initial invasion attempt was rebuffed, Russia seemed unprepared for
00:35:47the scale of the war it got itself into, despite being the aggressor. The military convoys practically
00:35:52traveled through unoccupied territory to get to the front line, giving the Ukrainian military more than
00:35:57enough opportunity to target them from afar. Worse yet, the convoys seemed dead set on trying to move in
00:36:03a single file, which turned out to be a devastating mistake. If the lead and the rear of the convoy
00:36:08were
00:36:08destroyed, the rest of the vehicles had a much harder time mounting a united defensive front and could be
00:36:13disabled freely. Ukraine managed to take out a convoy that contained 100 vehicles by leveraging this exact
00:36:18strategy, showing just how badly Russia screwed up with its tactical planning. Thirdly, Russia never
00:36:24actually managed to surround Kiev from all sides. The south of the city remained open to reinforcements,
00:36:29allowing the Ukrainian military to keep a steady supply of ammunition and military equipment flowing
00:36:33in and out of the city. Furthermore, the Ukrainian military could pick off the invading Russians from
00:36:38behind, effectively pincering them against the city. Meanwhile, the area to the north of the city is
00:36:43dominated by the river Dnipro and its tributaries, which were controlled by a series of hydroelectric
00:36:48and irrigation dams. Ukrainians opened several of these dams, drastically changing the landscape
00:36:53around their capital city. With the entryway to the city practically dissected by the river, and few
00:36:58entry points remaining to the northwest, where Dnipro's tributaries were flooded, Russia suddenly had a
00:37:02much harder time delivering new supplies to that portion of the front line. Fourthly, the Ukrainians
00:37:07actually had NATO support long before the war officially began. After the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine set
00:37:13about modernizing its military, which also included working closely with NATO to get more modernized
00:37:17equipment. As a part of that, NATO also provided vital military intelligence on Russian movements
00:37:22around Ukraine, which would turn out to be enough to develop an early warning signal for NATO and Ukraine
00:37:27on a possible Russian attack. And while we've discussed at length how Ukraine has received top-notch
00:37:32equipment from NATO during the war, and we'll mention some of those a bit later, the first donations actually
00:37:37started long before February 2022. A statement posted by US and Ukrainian officials in 2018,
00:37:43four years before the invasion, included an announcement that the US was supplying anti-tank
00:37:47javelin systems. In a similar vein, the UK started sending anti-tank N-laws to Ukraine in January 2022,
00:37:53just a month before the invasion began. This meant that Ukraine was already gearing up to protect its
00:37:57territory, and that the subsequent war was probably considered imminent by all parties involved. The javelins and N-laws
00:38:03would prove to be as pivotal as Ukrainian tactics, as they could strike Russian military vehicles from
00:38:08afar and create significant pressure on the invading troops. Faced with multiple setbacks,
00:38:13the siege of Kyiv effectively lasted only one month and two weeks. The Russian military officially
00:38:17retreated on April 8, 2022, and Ukraine claimed that it had liberated the entire north of its territory
00:38:23shortly thereafter. The Russians were forced to reconvene on the Eastern Front in the Donbass area,
00:38:28and they faced a similar set of issues there. With the Ukrainian capital no longer under significant
00:38:32threat, although Russia would continue to use long-range drones and missiles to pelt the city
00:38:36throughout the war, Ukraine could move most of its defenses to the east. The added month and a half of
00:38:40surviving the invasion also allowed NATO to start sending in more equipment. These included a mix of
00:38:45Soviet-era weapons that NATO countries and their allies had in stock, such as modified T-72. Poland,
00:38:51the Netherlands, Denmark, the US, and the Czech Republic donated around 470 overhauled or modified tanks,
00:38:57which Ukraine already had experience working with. More modern weapons, such as newer artillery designs,
00:39:02would prove to be similarly devastating in the Donbass region. Effectively, NATO countries started using
00:39:07the war in Ukraine to test their newer weapons in real-life scenarios. Despite the Russian military
00:39:11failing to create innovative strategies, it still had some of the most modern pieces of military
00:39:16equipment around. This would give NATO actual metrics to work with when designing and improving
00:39:21their arsenals. One example of donated equipment that started to turn the tide actually came in an area in
00:39:26which Ukraine had a definitive disadvantage throughout the war, artillery. Russia is the
00:39:31world's largest producer of both artillery batteries, towed howitzers and self-propelled
00:39:35artillery alike, and artillery rounds, outproducing the entirety of NATO threefold. This meant that it
00:39:40could use quantity-based tactics to create significant pressure and push into Ukraine. France was the one
00:39:46to deliver one of the biggest counters to this strategy, at least during the first months of the war.
00:39:50The Caesar is a French, truck-mounted 155mm howitzer equipped with an Advanced Fire Control System, or FCS.
00:39:57It can fire six rounds in under two minutes before rapidly relocating for safety, although it can
00:40:02remain in position if necessary. With a total capacity of 18 on-board rounds, the Caesar offers
00:40:07exceptional agility and survivability on the battlefield. With the truck using a 6x6 or 8x8 wheeled chassis,
00:40:13the entire system is faster, more maneuverable, and impact-resistant than a tracked howitzer,
00:40:18like the ones used by the US and Russia. Furthermore, the digital FCS, the rapid fire rate,
00:40:23and fast deployment and redeployment times allow the Caesar to practically zip in and out of the
00:40:28battlefield. The artillery can arrive at its destination, find its targets, launch rounds,
00:40:32and then be on its way in mere minutes. Add to this the fact that the Caesar has a maximum
00:40:36range of
00:40:37around 25 miles, far more than Soviet-era weapons, and you get a threat that is near the top of
00:40:42its class.
00:40:42This would prevent Russian forces from being able to mount a counterattack by triangulating
00:40:46the source of the fire. The range advantage of the Caesar would be overshadowed by the introduction
00:40:51of ramjet-assisted artillery, which has a theoretical range nearing 100 miles.
00:40:55While Germany and Boeing are advancing ramjet-powered designs, the 155mm shells currently
00:41:01being provided to Ukraine by Rheinmetall have a range of around 100 kilometers, or 62 miles,
00:41:06and do not include ramjet technology. However, these extended-range shells still offer a significant
00:41:10boost to Ukraine's artillery capabilities, bringing them closer to traditional missiles like
00:41:15attackums in terms of reach. Caesar's track record would drill in the two pillars of modern warfare,
00:41:20range and mobility. So long as Ukraine could leverage weapons that either outranged or outmaneuvered
00:41:24Russian counterparts, they could stay one step ahead. But there was a third important factor
00:41:28that allowed Ukraine to pull ahead, economics. Ukraine had received more than $250 billion in
00:41:34donations from NATO, whether in direct financial aid or military equipment and ammunition, as well as
00:41:39humanitarian assistance. It allowed the country to funnel its efforts elsewhere and still keep up with
00:41:44Russia's spending, which was about $140 billion in 2024. More importantly, Ukraine managed to make
00:41:50more effective yet cheaper weapons – drones. The war in Ukraine has seen a proliferation of small
00:41:55drones, such as those for recreation and filming, for military purposes. The basic drone could cost at
00:42:00most a few thousand dollars, and the larger agricultural drones, which have a higher carrying capacity
00:42:04suitable for mounting anti-tank mines, better ordnance or more drones, have a cost ranging into the
00:42:09area of tens of thousands. When combined with the dirt-cheap grenades and anti-tank bombs that were
00:42:14nevertheless effective against vehicles and infantry alike, a single drone usually costs far less than
00:42:19the thing, or person, it targeted. To make matters worse for Russia, it doesn't have many counters for
00:42:23this type of warfare. Jamming techniques led to a technological arms race between the two countries,
00:42:28in which systems would clash against one another and get redeveloped month after month. Russia could only
00:42:33use dedicated anti-air systems, which cost hundreds of thousands of dollars per missile to strike down a
00:42:38drone. With that, Ukraine launching waves of drones started putting serious dents in Russian military
00:42:43equipment and budgeting. A $10,000 drone destroying a half-a-million-dollar tank or getting taken out by
00:42:48a $100,000 missile was always going to be worth the effort for Ukraine, even if they ended up losing
00:42:5310 drones for each hit. Drone warfare was also how Ukraine has managed to retake control over its coast.
00:42:59The Russian Black Sea Fleet was forced to stop its blockade of the port of Odessa in November 2023,
00:43:03after numerous Ukrainian drone and long-range missile strikes on ships and refueling ports
00:43:08in Crimea. Ukraine also prototyped and deployed the world's first sea kamikaze drone, one designed
00:43:13to swim to its target. The nighttime raids on ships took out the fleet's flagship and destroyed many
00:43:18others. Freeing up sea access would allow Ukraine to revitalize its exports, as it's one of the world's
00:43:23largest exporters of grain. The sea trade returning to its pre-war levels just a year into the war
00:43:28showcased just how little pressure Russia could put on a country that had no navy to speak of.
00:43:33Finally, there's the matter of the aerial advantage Russia supposedly has. In truth,
00:43:38Russia has never really managed to exert air superiority over Ukraine. The air forces conduct
00:43:42most of their missions close to Russian borders, never straying too far out of Russian airspace.
00:43:46This was because NATO has managed to supply Ukraine with a multi-layered anti-air system throughout the
00:43:51country. It's used Patriot batteries and missiles, drones, man-portable launchers,
00:43:55and various surface-to-air missile systems to disable enemy radars, scramble targeting systems,
00:44:00or shoot down drones. Protected by a wide spreading shield, the engagement range for
00:44:05Russian forces is typically far below the maximum range of each of its constituent parts,
00:44:09and with Russia being the aggressor, every piece of equipment will be under constant threat,
00:44:13as Ukraine can combine its anti-air systems with aircraft and drones to add yet another layer of
00:44:18defense. With a surprising lack of foresight and an over-reliance on systems that haven't
00:44:22stood the test of time, it's fairer to say that Russia is performing so badly due to its own lack
00:44:27of innovation and military tactics, and the situation hasn't really improved for Russia since
00:44:31the start of the war. NATO has started sending more modern equipment with every new donation package,
00:44:36and Ukraine has managed to create an actual drone-making industry. Meanwhile,
00:44:40Russia's casualties amounting to the point where it has to use North Korean soldiers to boost its numbers.
00:44:44It's a sign that the end of the war might be on the horizon.
00:44:48Even as his soldiers die in droves as they smash their faces against Ukraine's drone wall,
00:44:54the Kremlin thinks that everything will be okay. Russia is a big country, there will always be more
00:44:59meat to feed into the grinder. Only that isn't looking like the case anymore. Russia is emptying
00:45:05out as people have started to refuse the call to fight in Putin's war. Those people know that something
00:45:12sinister is afoot, and they're getting out before they're pushed to the front lines. 500,000 Russians
00:45:18could be called up to fight. Nobody in Russia wants this. Now we're seeing people running for their
00:45:24lives, forcing the Kremlin to face up to the fact that the wellspring of cannon fodder it's forcing
00:45:30into Ukraine is running dry. How do we know? It all lies in the internet searches and what Russians are
00:45:36actually doing as we speak. In an August 20th report, United 24 media revealed that July saw
00:45:43online inquiries from Russian citizens relating to emigration reach their highest levels since early
00:45:492023. That's according to data from Yandex, which is Russia's equivalent to the Google searcher.
00:45:55That data shows that the term relocation was searched 809,900 times in July alone, which is over 100,000
00:46:04more
00:46:04times than in June and represents a record number for emigration related searches since Russia carried
00:46:10out its partial mobilization in September 2022. Keep mobilization in mind plays a huge role in all of
00:46:16this. Other search queries indicate that millions of Russians aren't just contemplating getting out of
00:46:22their country, but are actively looking into ways to do it. Yandex reports that there were 1.3 million
00:46:28queries for the word leave in July. Russians are also looking for places they can run to without being
00:46:34forced to apply for a visa and thus put themselves in the firing line of recruiters who will be
00:46:39watching every move that they're making. Searches for visa-free rose to 171,600 in July, which is 27%
00:46:48more than the previous month. The phrase leave without visa also set a record not seen since January 2023
00:46:54with 2,253 queries. Our Russians also seem to experience a strange spike of Georgia-related interest.
00:47:03The nation, which has had its own problems with Putin's aggression, was searched 22,000 times in
00:47:08July, which is more than double the search rate for travel to Georgia seen at the beginning of 2026.
00:47:14What all of this tells us is that there are hundreds of thousands, if not millions,
00:47:17of Russian people who are actively looking for ways to get out of Dodge as fast as they can.
00:47:22And it's not just Yandex that's reporting this. According to Novaya Gazeta, daily requests made to the Russian
00:47:28relocation support project, Relocats, have also spiked. Since April, daily inquiries to that service
00:47:35have risen from 70 to 120. According to Relocats's editor-in-chief, Aleksandra Nazarova, this spike
00:47:41coincided with the Kremlin enforcing internet restrictions on its people, combined with a
00:47:46growing sense that life has become less predictable for the average Russian.
00:47:50Now the inquiries are growing more urgent. People are practically begging Relocats to help them choose
00:47:56a country and get the appropriate documents so they can leave Russia before the fall.
00:48:00So a lot of questions are being asked. But there's more to it than that.
00:48:04As the internet searchers make their plans, other Russians are actively fleeing from Russia.
00:48:08That's according to an August 19 Ukraine Today report which says that a record-breaking
00:48:1320,000 Russian people are crossing the border from their country into Georgia every single day.
00:48:19Specifically, the number was over 19,000 on August 15-16, before rising to more than 20,000 on August
00:48:2618.
00:48:27Those three days alone represent 60,000 people who have left Russia,
00:48:30and there is plenty more where that's coming from. Even Russia's migration affairs have
00:48:35been forced to take notice, stating that the numbers significantly exceed those for the same
00:48:39periods in previous years. The Moscow Times adds more in its own report. It says that there are now
00:48:45massive traffic jams that have formed on the Russian side of the border. Russians are so desperate to
00:48:51get out that they are willing to wait in these queues, which are crawling along at a pace of just
00:48:5550m per
00:48:56hour. It could be literally days before those at the back of this queue actually get into Georgia.
00:49:01And what's more, we're seeing something similar in Armenia. There are no reports of queues there yet.
00:49:06However, demand for apartments in the country's capital city of Yerevan has risen to the point
00:49:11where prices have increased by 30%, all driven by Russian demand. The big question has to be asked,
00:49:18why is this happening? It's because the Russian people know that something sinister is in the air.
00:49:24We'll give you a little clue as to what that is. There's something we haven't revealed about the
00:49:29Yandex data we share. A certain search term that Russians used in July more than any of the others
00:49:34that we've already mentioned. That term was mobilization, and millions of Russians searched
00:49:39for it in July. According to the Moscow Times, there was a 166% spike in searches for this single
00:49:45word,
00:49:46up from 1.3 million in June to 3.4 million in July. Russians haven't looked up mobilization this much
00:49:52since January 2023, the outlet reports, and we're starting to see a certain chain of events taking
00:49:57place. Russian people are hearing about mobilization, likely through social media channels or news
00:50:03sources that aren't state-owned and operate. They conduct searches themselves, and they don't like
00:50:08what they see. In fact, they hate it. So much so that many of those who look up mobilization on
00:50:13Yandex
00:50:13end up searching for ways to leave Russia. Others, in the tens of thousands, are already getting out
00:50:18while they still can. The panic exists for a good reason, and Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy
00:50:24has been pointing to that reason since May. On May 8th, DW carried words spoken by Ukraine's
00:50:30President. He is concealing his intention behind different words and signals, but he is making
00:50:35preparations. It's important that we, together with our partners, exert sufficient pressure on Russia
00:50:40so that the idea of ending this aggression, the idea of peace rather than further Russian
00:50:45mobilization prevails, Zelenskyy declared. The intention in this quote is to mobilize hundreds
00:50:51of thousands of Russian reservists for the war in Ukraine. Zelenskyy repeated the claim in August,
00:50:56adding an extra wrinkle. The only reason that mobilization hasn't happened yet, he says,
00:51:01is that Putin is waiting until the conclusion of state Duma elections, scheduled for September,
00:51:06before he takes his next steps. They are preparing it for the fall, right after the imitation of
00:51:11parliamentary elections. Putin's plan is not particularly complicated. He wants to create
00:51:15the impression that Russians supposedly support the war. All the parties that are currently allowed
00:51:20to participate are, one way or another, against peace, Zelenskyy said. Even for Russia's political
00:51:26elite, this is a strategy so transparent that it may as well be made out of glass. And it's clear
00:51:31that
00:51:31there are plenty of Russians who can see right through it. We don't just have to take Zelenskyy's word for
00:51:37what Putin has planned either. Moves are being made behind the scenes that tell us that mobilization
00:51:42is coming soon to a Russia near you. In its July 22 Russian campaign assessment,
00:51:48the Institute for the Study of War, or ISW, revealed that Russia has already taken several
00:51:53legal steps to prepare for a future mobilization. Among them was the passing of a bill by the state
00:51:58Duma on July 22 that expands the number of criminal Russians who can sign contracts with the Ministry of
00:52:04Defense to include those convicted of drug smuggling and organized criminal activity.
00:52:09That move is a stealth mobilization. A day before, Russia's internal security force,
00:52:14Roskvadia, published a proposed amendment to its own regulations that allows it to protect against
00:52:19unspecified dangers relating to civil unrest and mobilization in wartime. Before all of this,
00:52:25the ISW says, November 2025 also saw Putin sign a bill that allows him to deploy reservists to combat
00:52:32areas without declaring mobilization. It is mobilization. Just carried out in the sort of
00:52:37sneaky and slimy way that we'd expect from the Kremlin. Other hints about what the Kremlin has
00:52:42planned come from August. On August 20th, the BBC Monitoring Service reported that Russian companies
00:52:47are actively hiring staff to handle military registration. That's a strange move right now,
00:52:53as volunteer registration is down. But it's happening. Over 2,600 job vacancies have been posted for this
00:52:59type of role over the past few weeks, the BBC says. That compares with just 500 such roles in late
00:53:052022.
00:53:07Guidelines have also been reissued by several financial industry journals in Russia, all telling
00:53:11employers what they have to do if mobilization is declared. There's some smoke, and the fire likely
00:53:17won't be far away. Adding to all of this, the partisan group Atesh reports that authorities are making
00:53:23visits to military training grounds in several Russian regions. Those visits include checks to see if the
00:53:29training grounds are suitable to accommodate large groups of people, almost as though Russian
00:53:33authorities are expecting a large wave of recruits to come filtering through any day now.
00:53:37And another sneaky bill has just been submitted to the State Duma. Bill number 13220968
00:53:44introduces the suspension of operations for up to 90 days and fines up to about $12,100 for companies
00:53:52that fail to comply with decisions of operational headquarters, RBC Ukraine reports. In other words,
00:53:59if a company tries to say no when the Russian military comes calling, it will be punished.
00:54:03This bill clears the way for forced seizure of assets, equipment and even people for use by the
00:54:09Russian army. We see subtle and not so subtle signs all coming together to tell us what hundreds of
00:54:14thousands of Russians already know. Mobilization is coming. If you're Russian and of fighting age,
00:54:21it's time to get out. For the Kremlin, this is a case of desperate times calling for desperate measures.
00:54:26Before we explain how Russia got here, this is a quick reminder that you're watching the military
00:54:31show. If you're getting value from the channel, don't forget to hit subscribe and enable notifications
00:54:36so you don't miss any of our videos. A couple of minutes ago, we told you that there is no
00:54:42reason why
00:54:43Russia would be hiring people to handle military registrations en masse. Volunteer recruitment has
00:54:48fallen considerably in Russia. And that fact alone shows us how Russia has gotten to the point where
00:54:53it needs mobilization. DW shares some regional figures from April and May. It says that 1,708
00:55:00people volunteered to go to the front from Moscow in April, followed by 1,378 in May. This amounts to
00:55:07about 1,000 fewer people than those who volunteered during the same period in 2025. That is a microcosm of
00:55:14something that's happening all over Russia. People are simply not signing up to fight Putin's war in
00:55:19the numbers that Russia needs right now. Across Russia, the first quarter of 2026 saw about 20%
00:55:25fewer people sign up for military service in Russia than during the same period in 2025. That's according
00:55:31to Yanis Kluge of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, who says the numbers are as low as
00:55:37800 volunteers signing up per day. That seems like a lot until you realize that Russia is losing well
00:55:43over 1,000 soldiers daily in Ukraine. On August 22nd alone, Russia lost 1,310 soldiers. That isn't an
00:55:51outlet. It's a standard day for Russian soldiers on the front, who are being torn apart by Ukraine's
00:55:56defences as they are ordered to conduct suicidal assaults or try to sneak through their kill zones to
00:56:01reach Ukrainian positions. It's a simple case of inputs and outputs no longer align. Russia isn't able to
00:56:07hire enough volunteer soldiers to deal with the churn that results from the Kremlin's terrible tactics.
00:56:12As a result of all of this, Russia has been left in what The Guardian calls a recruitment scramble.
00:56:17We call it desperation. The outlet also points to Kluge's figures, noting a top end of 1,000
00:56:23volunteers per day. It also says that Russian recruiting has transformed from being a case of
00:56:28waving huge sums of money in people's faces to becoming what Alexei Tabarlov, who is a human rights
00:56:33activist who helps Russian conscripts, dubs a hunt for people. According to Tabarlov,
00:56:40under various pretexts, through deception, blackmail, violence, and threats, they are forcing them to
00:56:45sign contracts. That claim is backed by a report in the Wall Street Journal, which says that recruiters
00:56:50are now working with Russian police to detain fighting-age men, often close to their places of
00:56:55work. Those men are told that they are being detained so their documents can be checked. They end up in
00:57:00military enlistment offices where they're beaten into submission, sign contracts, and then get sent
00:57:05to the front. That's how far Russian military recruiting has fallen. What could once be achieved
00:57:10with money now has to be done using fists, feet, and the butts of rifles. The recruiters can't keep up
00:57:16with the casualties and that's why the Kremlin is putting so many new legal frameworks in place that
00:57:21support mobilization. It's coming, no matter what the Kremlin says. Russian people believe that Putin is
00:57:26soon going to force them into war. And beyond the internet searches and the exodus of tens of
00:57:32thousands of Russians to Georgia, we can also see how Russians feel about living in their country
00:57:36from survey results. On August 19th, United24 media reported on a poll conducted by VTS IOM. This
00:57:44isn't any old polling company. VTS IOM is state-run, Kremlin-backed, and will do everything that it can to
00:57:50massage figures to ensure they look as good for Putin as they possibly can. And not even that pollster can
00:57:56hide the mood in Russia. A survey that it conducted in July found that 66% of Russians believe that
00:58:02difficult times lie ahead for their nation. That represents a 16% upswing since the beginning of
00:58:082026. And it all translates into something very simple. Russians know that mobilization is coming.
00:58:15They're now trying to get out. They're now trying to get out while they still can. Here's what all of
00:58:20this boils down to. Despite its own claims, Russia is putting all of the pieces in place for a
00:58:26mobilization that would spread across the entire country. As many as 500,000 people could be caught
00:58:31up in the Kremlin's net, sent to training grounds that are being inspected as we speak, and then
00:58:35shipped off to Ukraine. There are already rumblings that Russia is preparing a renewed offensive that
00:58:40will kick off in February 2027, coming on the back of the failed 2026 campaign that has seen it make
00:58:46almost no real progress while losing about 225,500 troops in the first seven months of the year
00:58:53alone. This mobilization would be Putin's gamble, his last throw of the dice to get what he wants out
00:58:59of Ukraine so he can claim some sort of victory in a war that was never supposed to be a
00:59:03war.
00:59:04What Putin hopes is that he doesn't get snake eyes when he tosses the dice. But what he has planned
00:59:10could end up tearing through the entire fabric of Russian society. Yes, mobilization would help
00:59:15Russia solve the lopsided war calculus problem that it has right now. According to the new voice of
00:59:20Ukraine, an anonymous Russian general has claimed that Russia now needs to find a way to replace up
00:59:25to 60,000 casualties per month if it's to capture the Donbass region. That would have to be done through
00:59:31mobilization as volunteer recruitment simply isn't cutting it. Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev
00:59:36has a different view. He puts the possibility of mobilization at about 30% and he says that it would
00:59:42happen not due to Russian manpower issues but because Putin has lost the plot in Ukraine.
00:59:47Russia's leader is no longer making rational decisions, the economist argues. He's now the
00:59:51guy at the craps table who's been on a bad streak for so long that he doesn't even know what
00:59:55a win
00:59:55feels like anymore. But he keeps on demanding those dice. Putin would do well to pull himself out of his
01:00:01gambler's haze and remember what happened in the past. We touched on the September 2022 partial
01:00:06mobilization earlier. Protests broke out all over Russia following that announcement,
01:00:11leading to at least 1,300 arrests. The Kremlin cracked down hard, warning people that they could
01:00:17face up to 15 years in prison for taking part, but thousands did it anyway, chanting slogans such as
01:00:23no to war and life to our children. And that was for a partial mobilization of 300,000 people.
01:00:29Looks like the Kremlin wants to add another 200,000 to that number the second time around,
01:00:33and just the rumors alone are sparking a mass exodus. Again, Russia saw that in 2022. Only now,
01:00:40Russians are searching for ways to get out or actively running to places like Georgia and Armenia
01:00:45before the hammer drops. The Kremlin knows all of this. That's why it's waiting and lying about all
01:00:50of the preparations being made. If a mobilization happens, the new voice of Ukraine reports, then it
01:00:55won't be until the state Duma elections conclude on September 20th. That's what Zelensky referred to when he
01:01:00said that he wanted to create an impression of a pro-war country. Fill the elections only with
01:01:05parties that run on a pro-war platform and you create that impression by default. Once Putin has
01:01:10the people he wants in Russia's parliament, that's when he will roll the dice on mobilization.
01:01:15Until then, the lies are being delivered to the Russian people. On August 21st, Russia's permanent
01:01:20representative to the United Nations, Vassily Nabenzia, claimed,
01:01:24We do not need mass mobilization at the moment. It's not planned or expected as far as I know.
01:01:29The numbers say otherwise, not just in recruiting, but in the thousands upon thousands of Russians who
01:01:33are expressing their refusal to fight by getting out of the country while they're still able.
01:01:38They know that something sinister is coming. They don't want to wait around for the recruiters
01:01:42to come knocking on their doors at home or at work to force them into a fight they never wanted,
01:01:47so they run. As far away from Putin's grip as they can get, so they can watch from afar as
01:01:53their
01:01:53leader sends Russia plunging from one catastrophe to the next. The dice are already in Putin's hand.
01:01:58The next, and possibly final, roll is coming. And for Russia, a new round of mobilization could
01:02:04spell the end of the Kremlin as it makes the move it's always promised it would never make.
01:02:10Iran thought it had won. The nation had absorbed the thousands of strikes that came with Operation Epic
01:02:16Fury and its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz had created so much oil price pressure that the US
01:02:22was forced to negotiate. An evil regime still stood and soon things would be back to normal
01:02:28for the morphed mullahs of Iran. Then the mountains exploded and everything changed.
01:02:33But it's not the US that Iran's regime will have to worry about. Something else is coming. Five Kurdish
01:02:39armies are on their way to wipe the regime out, and the danger from within now looks more lethal
01:02:44than the fire from above. It all started with reports of deaths within the Iranian Revolutionary
01:02:50Guard Corps, or IRGC. On June 30th, news broke that the previous few days had seen several armed
01:02:57skirmishes in Iran that had led to the deaths of four Iranian security personnel, along with injuries
01:03:03to several others. Among the dead were two members of the IRGC, the Jerusalem Post reported,
01:03:09in what Iranian authorities are already calling armed terrorist attacks. But it's where these
01:03:16attacks took place that deserves notice. The two IRGC members died in Pava, which is a border city in
01:03:22Iran's Qamanshah province. The other two casualties, who were both police officers, died of wounds
01:03:28sustained in shootings in Bana, which is in Iran's Kurdistan province. Clashes have also happened in
01:03:34Mahabad and Marivan, the outlet reports. These locations matter. All of these incidents took
01:03:40place in the mountainous terrain of western Iran, where the Kurds live, and they were spread out far
01:03:46and wide. Mahabad and Marivan are about 230 kilometers apart, with Bana between them. Pava is 100 kilometers
01:03:53south of Marivan, but all are in or around Kurdish territory. And that's the connective tissue that runs
01:04:00through all of this. Something is brewing in Iran right now. As more time has passed since this
01:04:06initial flurry of attacks, more information has emerged about what's going on in the mountains of
01:04:11western Iran. Rumors are emerging that these four attacks are far from isolated incidents.
01:04:16They're spread across over 200 kilometers of Zagros Mountains territory, and they're part of a larger
01:04:23movement of strikes that are all occurring across territory in which Kurdish fighters have operated for
01:04:29decades. That's a hint of what's to come for Iran's regime. The Kurds, whom that regime has brutalized
01:04:35for so long, seem to have finally gotten their act together and are now launching coordinated assaults
01:04:41against the IRGC and other Iranian authorities throughout their territory. And worse yet for Iran,
01:04:47the Kurds have already claimed a big scalp, allegedly. On June 30th, right around the time that the four
01:04:53attacks were happening, Iran Wire reported on a strange incident that had occurred on the highways of
01:04:58the Kerman province. On June 29th, Mohamed Akbazadeh's vehicle reportedly flipped over. He suffered
01:05:05severe injuries at the scene and, despite being taken to hospital, Akbazadeh died a few hours later.
01:05:11Why does all of this matter? Akbazadeh was a rear admiral second class and was also the political
01:05:17deputy of the representative office of the supreme leader in the IRGC navy. In other words, he was the
01:05:23precise type of high-profile figure that you would expect to be targeted by Kurdish militants if those
01:05:28militants are ramping up their efforts to kick the IRGC and Iran's regime out of the seat of power
01:05:34for good. Of course, Iran claims this was all an accident. Akbazadeh rolled his car, no more than
01:05:40that, nothing to see here. But Iran's higher-ups have a strange tendency to die in car accidents,
01:05:46and the timing of all of this is just far too coincidental. Granted, Kaman is in Iran's southeast,
01:05:52far away from the attacks that have been occurring in and around Kurdish territory,
01:05:55but a major IRGC figure dying when the IRGC and Iran's security forces are battling Kurds fits far
01:06:02too well to be ignored. What Iran has on its hands now may not just be localized aggression from some
01:06:08Kurdish upstarts, it could be the start of a revolution. And if it is, there has never been
01:06:13a better time than now for the Kurds to rise up and take on Iran's regime. The IRGC claims this
01:06:19is all
01:06:19about terrorism – isolated acts of aggression that are going to be put down. If we ignore the
01:06:25hypocrisy in that statement from an organization that is as terrorist as they come, the IRGC has
01:06:30attempted to respond. As Iran International reported on June 30th, the IRGC claims that it killed six
01:06:36armed men during a clash close to Iran's northwestern border, somewhere in the mountains between Mahabad
01:06:42and Piran Shah. Again, this is Kurdish territory, and if the IRGC is to be believed, the six-person
01:06:48team was carrying weapons and military equipment with the goal of carrying out sabotage and terrorist
01:06:54operations. This shouldn't be seen as a success for the IRGC, it should be a sign. A new front is
01:07:01opening up in the war that has engulfed Iran, and it's not the US that is opening it. Iran's Kurds
01:07:06are
01:07:06going on the attack, and this initial spate of skirmishes is just the starting point for something
01:07:11much larger than the IRGC will be able to handle. According to Newsweek, the Norway-based Hengor
01:07:16Organization for Human Rights says the Pave strike was carried out by a Kurdish group called Khori
01:07:22Hiwa, which means Son of Hope. That group is newly formed, the organization says, and it's far from the
01:07:27only army that the IRGC is facing. Four fighters killed in the Mahabad incident were part of the Kurdistan
01:07:33Free Life Party, or PJAK, rebel group. PJAK itself says, this public declaration is revealing in its
01:07:41own right. PJAK is outright saying that its fighters are battling against the IRGC, but the fact that the
01:07:47IRGC is having to deal with several different groups at once is even more worrying for the regime.
01:07:53That suggests collaboration, coordination, cohesion, and if all of these things are coming together now,
01:07:59it tells us that a front is opening up along Kurdish territory in Iran. A new front is rising, and
01:08:06there are
01:08:06five separate armies now united at its core. But we'll be getting back to that. Right now, what we're seeing
01:08:12here
01:08:12is Iran being delivered a terrible dose of its own medicine. For years, the regime has oppressed the Kurdish
01:08:18people in the mountains. Resistance has always existed. Now, that resistance is beginning to blossom into something
01:08:25that Iran's regime knows it won't be able to handle. The writing is on the wall, and even the new
01:08:30Supreme
01:08:30Leader, Moitaba Khamenei, knows that he needs to get the regime's house in order, so that it's ready to do
01:08:35something about the Kurdish threat. Khamenei's approach to the ongoing peace talks with the US tells us all
01:08:41we need to know about where his head is right now. Back on June 18th, Al Jazeera reported that Khamenei
01:08:46had
01:08:46signed the Memorandum of Understanding proposed through peace talks with the US, despite having initially
01:08:52disagreed with the contents. At the time, Khamenei said he signed despite his difference in opinion
01:08:57with Iran's president, Masoud Pazeshkian, because he wanted to safeguard the rights of the Iranian
01:09:02nation and the resistance front. Now we see a much different story emerge. A story in which Khamenei
01:09:08and his IRGC need to focus all of their resources on a war to come, rather than the one that
01:09:13they are
01:09:14fighting with the US. America isn't Iran's big problem anymore. The Kurds have taken that role,
01:09:19and in a moment we're going to tell you why all of this matters and explore what these initial
01:09:23sparks of a Kurdish rebellion could mean for Iran in the long term. There may even be a surprising
01:09:29role that the US could still yet play. But before we dig into that, this is the military show. We
01:09:35bring you the full picture, not just the headlines. If you haven't already, hit subscribe and ring the
01:09:40bell to make sure that you see what we have coming up. So the Kurdish threat, is it really as
01:09:46much of a
01:09:46problem for Iran's regime as this spate of attacks suggests that it is? To answer that question,
01:09:52we first need to dig a little deeper into the history between Iran's regime and the Kurds that
01:09:56have made the Zagros Mountains their home. That history isn't pleasant. Despite Kurds making up
01:10:0310-12% of the Iranian population, they have been persecuted by Iran's regime from practically the
01:10:08moment that former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei came into power. They have always been treated like a
01:10:14threat. For around four centuries, the Kurds have lived right where they are now in the Zagros
01:10:18Mountains. And though they have always had some sort of trouble with Iran's various governments over
01:10:23the years, the jihad that the elder Khamenei declared back in 1979 was the surest sign that
01:10:29Iran's regime wanted to get rid of them for good. Throughout the 1980s and even up to the present day,
01:10:34Iran's regime has mostly been able to keep the Kurdish resistance under control. Of course,
01:10:39there have been isolated attacks, but for so long, the Kurds have been scattered and their resistance
01:10:44underfunded and fractured, which has made it easier for Iran's regime to maintain control.
01:10:49But it's not just control that the regime and the IRGC want. As Genocide Watch pointed out in a
01:10:55November 2025 piece, the Kurds in Iran have been subjected to multiple attempts by Iran to limit their
01:11:01autonomy and force them into assimilating into the Iranian culture that the regime has created.
01:11:06Whenever the Kurds have spoken out about any of this, the result has always been brutal crackdowns.
01:11:13Kurdish political groups have been outlawed by Iran's regime, which prevents Kurdish voices from
01:11:18being heard in Iran's political structure. Civilian leaders are often arrested, stripping away the social
01:11:23tools that would allow the Kurds in Iran to organize any sort of peaceful dissent. Kurdish symbols are
01:11:29banned in Iran, so is the Kurdish language. Physically, it engages in arbitrary arrests, torture,
01:11:35surveillance and hands out death penalties on an unimaginable scale, Genocide Watch says of the
01:11:40Iranian regime and its approach to the Kurdish population. That's the backdrop for what we're
01:11:45seeing in Iran right now. It's also the reason why many have suggested that it would ultimately be a
01:11:51Kurdish uprising that spells the true end of Iran's regime once Operation Epic Fury started. In early
01:11:58March, both the Atlantic Council and the Council on Foreign Relations or CFR speculated on whether the
01:12:03beginning of Operation Epic Fury could lead to Iran's Kurds mounting a true challenge against Iran's
01:12:09regime. The CFR suggested that the end of the US operation would signal an attempt by Iran's regime
01:12:14to crack down on groups within Iran that could be a threat. The Kurds are perhaps the most prominent
01:12:20group that fits under that umbrella, and that is motivation, if any more were needed, to start the
01:12:25uprising. The Kurds may still continue to resist the central government, and significant fighting may
01:12:30ensue. It's not uncommon for Kurds from other countries to come to volunteer their support to
01:12:35their Iranian brethren. Much would depend on Washington's willingness to continue standing
01:12:39by them and to persuade the Iranian regime not to seek revenge, the CFR said. We'll come back to
01:12:44Washington's potential role soon. The Atlantic Council took a more practical approach to its assessment,
01:12:50pointing out that the various Kurdish armed resistance groups in Iran are far from helpless,
01:12:54even if they were once fractured. These organizations have armed wings that are equipped with rifles,
01:13:00RPGs, and mortars that can be deployed against Iran's regime. Kurdish security forces also maintain
01:13:06several special operations units. One of those units, the counter-terrorism group, has been trained by
01:13:12the US and has more advanced equipment, including M4 carbines, night vision technology, and sniper rifles.
01:13:19So the ability is there, and though a minority group, the fact that the Kurdish people make up around
01:13:2410% of a country with a population of over 90 million people, suggests that there is enough
01:13:29manpower to create a formidable unified army. But that brings us to the two things that we need
01:13:34to see for the attacks that the Kurds have carried out in late June to evolve into a more coordinated
01:13:39war against Iran's regime. Opportunity and unity. The former has definitely arisen,
01:13:45all due to Operation Epic Fury. The absolute firestorm that the US and Israel unleashed on Iran,
01:13:51despite all of the geopolitical problems that resulted, has severely weakened Iran's regime
01:13:56and the IRGC. CBC reports that the US has managed to strike 13,000 out of an estimated 16,000
01:14:03targets
01:14:04in Iran during its campaign. Those targets ranged from air defenses and warships to command and control
01:14:10centers that are vital to keeping the IRGC and Iran's army organized. More than 50 Iranian military bases
01:14:16have been damaged since Operation Epic Fury began, the outlet adds, and it's been suggested that Iran's
01:14:21military has been degraded to between 60 and 80 percent of its capacity. Iran International also
01:14:28reports that there is even talk about disbanding the IRGC, due to the group gaining greater power
01:14:33in the Iranian regime. Whether this would be a true disbandant or simply a rebranding exercise
01:14:38isn't clear, but the fact that it's even being spoken about at all showcases the disarray within
01:14:44Iran's military structure. That chaos creates chances for the Kurds to launch a large-scale campaign
01:14:50that, at the very least, could force Iran's regime to leave them be or, if executed well,
01:14:55could even lead to the crumbling of a regime that is still teetering too close to the precipice.
01:15:00The stability that Iran's regime needs to function well enough to stop an organized Kurdish resistance
01:15:05was already crumbling as mass protests over the state of the country's economy
01:15:09triggered everything that we've seen so far in 2026. Now, with so many regime and IRGC leaders dead,
01:15:16it's hard for Iran to organize the sorts of crackdowns that have kept the Kurds down for so long.
01:15:21However, opportunity must be married to unity. And that brings us back to something we mentioned
01:15:26earlier. We told you that there are five Kurdish armies all ready to fight against Iran.
01:15:31That wasn't hyperbole. Just a few days before the US launched Operation Epic Fury,
01:15:36an interesting development took place among the Kurds. Five Kurdish Iranian political parties
01:15:41decided to unite to form the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan.
01:15:46All five of those parties have military wings, The Atlantic reports, and they all seem to be willing
01:15:52to fall under the overall leadership of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, or KDPI.
01:15:58It's almost as though these parties knew that something was coming that would rock the Iranian
01:16:02regime to its core, and they wanted to be ready to take advantage. The US is also believed to have
01:16:08communicated with several of these groups as early as March 5th. That's when Al Jazeera reported that
01:16:13US President Donald Trump had spoken to the leaders of the Kurdistan Democratic Party,
01:16:17the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and the KDPI that we mentioned a moment ago.
01:16:22The unified Kurdish parties, which we must remind you the Iranian regime has tried to make illegal,
01:16:27also issued a call for Iranian military members to defect to their cause.
01:16:31That's an interesting wrinkle. Unhappiness with Iran's regime extends far beyond the Kurdish
01:16:36population. If this united group of Kurds can bring others onto their side, then the Iranian regime has
01:16:42a serious problem on its hands. In this, we see the confluence of unity and opportunity. And remember
01:16:48that these Kurdish groups are not amateurs. They are armed. Many of the members of their military
01:16:52wings are well-trained. What we're now seeing in the Zagros Mountains region of Iran could be the
01:16:57beginning of a dangerous strategy that will cause massive problems for Iran. Kurds know those mountains
01:17:03well, certainly better than the IRGC. It's possible that the unified Kurdish militants are launching
01:17:09attacks against Iran's regime outside of their territory to bait the IRGC into launching an assault
01:17:15in the Zagros Mountains. If that's the case, then Iran is going to struggle. It will be bringing tanks and
01:17:20missiles
01:17:21to a fight where both would end up being useless. The Kurds know all of the natural choke points in
01:17:26their mountains. They can leave, launch attacks, then withdraw back into the cover of the mountains,
01:17:31inflicting damage against an Iranian military that has already been devastated by Operation Epic Fury.
01:17:37Whittle away at that military and the weakened regime may follow. And that mention of Operation Epic
01:17:42Fury brings us back to the US. America may yet have a role to play in the toppling of Iran's
01:17:47regime.
01:17:48No boots on the ground will come from the US. The country has already laid the groundwork for an
01:17:52uprising with its bombardment of Iran. What it could do now is provide the support that the Kurds need
01:17:58to finish the job. There were even suggestions that America was doing just that as far back as March 4th.
01:18:04CNN reported that sources it had spoken to claimed that the CIA was actively working with Kurdish
01:18:10resistance groups to encourage a popular uprising in Iran. This sort of thing is in the CIA's wheelhouse,
01:18:15and we know that the US has worked with the Kurds before. However, there are also signs that the
01:18:20US may not be willing to work with the Kurds. The Trump factor came into play several months after
01:18:26this report. In a June 16th piece, the conversation claimed that the US has abandoned the Kurds,
01:18:31and Trump had plenty to say about the matter.
01:18:45It's always so difficult to get a beat on whether what Trump says is really what he means. But what
01:18:50we're seeing now in Iran could well indicate that the US is back on board with the Kurds. Peace talks
01:18:55with Iran have stalled once more, even after Khamenei signed a memorandum he didn't want to sign. Those
01:19:01peace talks being finalized would allow Iran's regime to focus on the Kurds. Maybe we're seeing
01:19:06some sort of political play here that nobody expected as the US lengthens the peace process
01:19:11to give the Kurds time. Now we're seeing the Kurdish forces carry out coordinated attacks against the IRGC
01:19:17and Iran's regime across hundreds of kilometers of territory. Coincidence? Maybe.
01:19:24Or this could be the start of something much bigger, with the US working in the shadows to support a
01:19:29united group of people whose goal is to get rid of an oppressive regime that is weaker now than it's
01:19:34ever been. Iran isn't the only nation that is dealing with issues on its own territory.
01:19:39Thousands of kilometers away, Putin and his Russian cronies, who are allies of Iran,
01:19:42are dealing with issues of their own. Chechnya is barreling toward a succession crisis,
01:19:47and that could result in Putin having to deal with an internal uprising of his own.
01:19:52You can find out what all of this means if you watch our video.
01:19:54And if you enjoyed this video, remember to subscribe to The Military Show,
01:19:58and hit the notification bell to see more of our coverage and analysis
01:20:01of the latest geopolitical developments from all around the world.
01:20:05And thank you, as always, for watching.
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