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⏱️ CHAPTERS:
00:00 Ukraine WIPES OUT 81% of Russia’s WILDBERRIES
17:35 UKRAINE'S Masterstroke at Engels-2
34:12 Ukraine Found a GENIUS Way to Destroy 100 Russian Missiles With One Blow

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Transcript
00:01Wildberry's CEO, Tatyana Kim, must be praying for it all to end.
00:06Russia's richest woman and the co-founder of Wildberry has spent the last month watching
00:11hopelessly as her company is systematically dismantled by Ukrainian drone strikes. She
00:17can do nothing about it. Putin seems unwilling to do anything about it and the strikes just
00:21keep on happening. This is what you get for supporting Russia's war machine, Kim.
00:25Ukraine exposed the connection. Then it destroyed Wildberries. 81% of Wildberries has been wiped
00:34off the map and Ukraine is coming for the last 19%. On August 26th, the news broke that Ukrainian
00:40drones had struck yet another Wildberries facility. With that strike, Ukraine has burned 81% of the
00:46company's combined warehouse space to the ground, leaving Wildberries a shell of its former self.
00:52A withered plant gasping for water, literally. Ukraine has now hit 8 of the 10 largest warehouses
01:00that Wildberries operates, with its latest strike being among the most damaging of them all.
01:05Before we say more, if real, human-made military reporting matters to you, subscribe and tell us
01:10what you think below. You can also become a member for exclusive content while directly supporting the
01:15work behind this channel. Overnight, Ukraine targeted the Wildberries logistics center in Russia's
01:20Tambov, causing a fire so massive the center has been forced to suspend all operations. This is becoming
01:27a familiar story for Kim. Several other Wildberries warehouses have also suspended operations because
01:33it's not exactly easy to ship products to customers when those products have been turned into ash. The
01:39telegram channel, Argenzvo, shares several videos of the aftermath of Ukraine's Tambov strike, all showing
01:46the same thing. A raging inferno and plumes of smoke rising into the sky. It's also clear that the fire
01:52has raged for
01:53hours, as the video shifts from nighttime to morning conditions, showing that Tambov's emergency services are
01:59struggling to get the blaze under control. Every hour that the fire burns is more money going up in flames.
02:06Reports are filtering in from Russian authorities, and even they highlight just how much damage Ukraine did. The Tambov regional
02:13governor, Yevgeny Pervishov, claimed that Russia shot down 16 drones over Tambov on the night of August 26th,
02:19which is the usual setup for the old drone debris excuse. Pervishov couldn't hide the scale of the
02:24damage though. He says that the fire Ukraine caused has spread over 100,000 square meters of the Tambov
02:30complex. The entire facility measures 108,000 square meters. We can safely say that pretty much that all of
02:37wild berries Tambov operation has gone up in smoke. There's a certain poetry attached to this particular
02:43strike for Ukraine. As AP news reveals, this Tambov depot had been among the first that Ukraine hit back
02:49on July 18th, ahead of the country kicking off its full-blown wild berries campaign. Ukraine has just
02:55gone full circle with a double tap that has taken the Tambov facility out for good. We'd say that Ukraine
03:01has ended where it started, but we know that isn't true. After all, there's still 19% of wild berries
03:06warehouse space to go. It's practically a certainty that what little the company has left is going to
03:12be visited by Ukrainian drones in the very near future. However, the second Tambov strike is just
03:17the latest in a series. This is the breakdown of the damage Ukraine's drones have done so far.
03:22In Kolodino and Elektrostal, which are both in the Moscow region,
03:27warehouse space amounting to 250,000 square meters has been destroyed. United24 media says that the
03:33Elektrostal warehouse has been completely wiped off the map. A little bit of the Kolodino facility may
03:38have survived, but the logistics hub has been forced to cease operations since August 16th,
03:43in the wake of the fire that Ukraine caused. In the Voronezh region, the 156,000 square meter
03:49facility wild berries built has been out of commission since August 11th. A facility of a similar size,
03:55the 154,000 square meter warehouse in Krasnybor, which is in the Leningrad region, has also suspended
04:01all operations following a strike on August 4th. And on and on the story goes. In Russia's Tula,
04:07Samara and Vladimir regions, Wildberry's warehouses with a combined size of 397,000 square meters are
04:14offline. All victims of strikes during the first five days of August and showing no signs of recovery.
04:20And finally, a 157,000 square meter facility in Yekaterinburg and a 150,000 square meter warehouse in
04:28Tatarstan have also been targeted. They both continue to operate. But for how long, given that Ukraine
04:34just showcased its ability to carry out repeat strikes, is anybody's guess. All told, United24
04:40media reports Ukraine has managed to shut down about 1.3 million square meters of the 1.6 million square
04:46meters of warehouse space that Wildberries operates in Russia. Ukraine's Center for Strategic
04:51Communications, or Spravdy, adds that Ukraine's drone forces have now carried out more than 30
04:57strikes against warehouses operated by Wildberries since Ukraine began its campaign against Russia's
05:02online retailer. Specifically, Ukraine has recorded 32 confirmed hits on Wildberries facilities across 19
05:09Russian regions, some of which are veering into the Russian Far East, showcasing that there is nothing
05:15safe in Russia anymore. The most distant point struck so far is a facility in Permkry, which is around
05:211,400 kilometers away from the border that Ukraine shares with Russia. In a separate report published on
05:27August 23rd, Spravdy points out that Ukraine had disabled about 8% of Wildberries' warehouse capacity
05:33during the week prior, with a percentage bumping up to 10% when taking other logistical facilities into account.
05:39That would have been a slower week for Ukraine, perhaps explained by the country also starting to focus
05:44strikes against Ozone, which is Wildberries' biggest competitor during that week. But even then,
05:4910% of capacity lost in a single week is a blow that few companies can recover from, and yet
05:55that 10%
05:55has ended up being just a small fraction of the damage that Ukraine has done to Wildberries.
06:00Tatiana Kim's multi-billion dollar business is burning. Russia is being hit with economic body blows
06:06that it can ill afford at this point in its Ukraine invasion. Those body blows are coming from two
06:11directions, one of which impacts the Russian people, and the other the Kremlin's war machine.
06:17When it comes to Russia's people, we need to explain how Wildberries functions.
06:21The company is often called Russia's version of Amazon, with good reason. Wildberries offers an
06:26online platform to vendors all over Russia who can sell their products to millions of people in the
06:30country. The warehouses that Ukraine is taking offline are filled with products that are primarily owned by
06:36these vendors, rather than Wildberries itself. In other words, Wildberries is a company that serves
06:40as the platform for an estimated 500,000 to 800,000 sellers, as well as being used by a huge
06:47portion
06:47of the Russian population to get their hands on items they might not be able to find in stores.
06:53With that context, you see why the figures that we are about to share really matter.
06:57According to United24 Media, the financial damage done to Wildberries as a business is enormous.
07:02By mid-August, Data Insight lead analyst Sergei Semko was estimating that the damage done to the
07:08company's logistics infrastructure had reached up to $2.66 billion, rising to over $3.3 billion when
07:15taking clean-up and reconstruction costs into account. All of this impacts sellers, of course.
07:21With the infrastructure down, Wildberries can't send the products that those vendors sell to customers,
07:25so payments get refunded. Thousands upon thousands of sellers aren't getting their income from Wildberries
07:31anymore. Of course, this assumes that there are products left to sell, and that's perhaps the
07:36bigger problem. The cost incurred by Wildberries itself is nothing compared to the cost absorbed
07:41by the many vendors on the platform. According to United24 Media, Wildberries sellers have likely lost
07:46between $5.31 and $8.35 billion of merchandise, and counting, in the fires that Ukraine's drones have
07:54caused. That brings the total estimated losses across all aspects of the business to as high as 12,
08:01billion dollars. And that was in mid-August. More facilities have burned, and more products have
08:06been lost since then. So not only do the Wildberries vendors have to deal with the loss of the logistical
08:11network that formed the backbone of their businesses, they also can't get their products back, meaning
08:16they have to eat another loss on top. And to add a healthy heaping of salt to those sellers' wounds,
08:22Wildberries isn't compensating many of them. In a move that makes it seem as though Kim had an inkling that
08:26something bad was coming Wildberries' way, the company updated its vendor partnership agreement
08:31in early July. Starting from July 7, Wildberries is no longer required to compensate its vendors for
08:37the loss of products under force majeure circumstances. In other words, if a drone happens
08:42to burn down a Wildberries warehouse, the sellers who have their products in that warehouse are out of
08:47luck. Sellers are getting screwed over in other ways too. On August 13, Moscow Times reported that
08:53vendors are reporting delays in payments for items that they sold before August 3, even though Wildberries'
08:58own terms state that funds generated by sales will reach vendor bank accounts within five business
09:04days of a withdrawal request. Basically, Wildberries isn't paying its sellers, which is as sure a sign
09:09as any that the company is in serious trouble. Vendors are getting hit from both sides. The products
09:15they've lost are gone for good. No compensation is coming. And the products they've successfully sold
09:20aren't earning them money because Wildberries is holding onto the cash. What's the big solution to
09:25these problems? Temporary loan relief. On August 10, Russia's central bank urged the country's leaders
09:31to support businesses that have been impacted by Ukraine's Wildberries campaign by offering them
09:36loan relief. Those banks are already struggling with a deluge of refinancing requests from Wildberries'
09:42sellers, with Sparebank alone having fielded about 2,000 applications by the time of the Moscow
09:47Times report on the central bank's solution. So that's something, we guess. With loan relief,
09:53a vendor doesn't have to pay interest on a loan they can't repay anyway because their products have
09:57gone up in smoke. Of course, all of these problems impact the wider Russian economy by tanking small
10:02businesses and creating less money that can be spent and taxed to fund the Kremlin war machine. But that
10:08machine has a much bigger problem that has resulted from the Wildberry strikes. Before we reveal what it
10:13is, this is a reminder that you're watching the military show. If you're getting insight from our
10:17channel, don't forget to subscribe and enable notifications so you don't miss what we have coming
10:22next. The dirty little secret about Wildberries is that it isn't some innocent consumer business
10:28that Ukraine has started targeting out of the blue. For all of Kim's claims of acts of terrorism,
10:34Wildberries is a target because the last few years have seen it become a major cog in the Kremlin's
10:38war machine. Spravdy reveals how. It points out that what lies behind Wildberry's civilian facade is
10:44a CEO who is incredibly pro-Putin, going as far as to serve on the Russian President's Advisory Council
10:50for the Ministry of Industry and Trade and a business model that serves the so-called special
10:55military operation. You see, beyond the clothes and gadgets that you would expect to see being sold
11:00on Russia's version of Amazon lies a much deeper form of business. It all started in 2024,
11:05when Wildberries carried out a merger with Russia's outdoor advertising operator Rus. Putin publicly
11:11endorsed that merger, which linked Wildberries to sanctioned oligarch Suleiman Kirimov. And what this
11:17merger also did was serve as what Spravdy calls a sort of protection payment, which brought Wildberries
11:22under the sort of tight state control that allowed Putin to generate revenue more readily for his
11:27Ukraine invasion. While this new level of state control helped to keep the money rolling in for the
11:32war, Wildberries also supported the Russian war machine in more transparent ways. Before Ukraine
11:37started its strike campaign, you could head to Wildberries and find drones and components
11:41for drones that were being bought for and by Russian soldiers on the front lines. The platform
11:47specialized in the types of dual-use products that can be claimed as being for civilian purposes,
11:51but are actually being sold to the military. As the new voice of Ukraine reports beyond the drones
11:56themselves, you could find fiber-optic spools for FPV drones, motors and release mechanisms for those
12:02drones, and even small arms, body armor and other military equipment, often marked as being usable in
12:08the Special Military Operation for sale. While Kim might try to claim she runs a civilian business,
12:14Wildberries is anything but. Wildberries has now removed the everything for the Special
12:19Military Operation tag from the platform. Too little, too late, and too transparent a move for Ukraine to
12:24fall for it. Spravdy goes deeper, noting that Wildberries essentially transformed itself into a
12:30key channel that Russian soldiers used to get their hands on grey market supplies that Russia isn't
12:35supposed to have. That everything for the Special Military Operation tag we mentioned had more than 200,000
12:41items listed underneath it before it was taken down. And it's not like Wildberries is seeing the error
12:46of its ways. The tag may have gone, but the products remain. Or they would if they weren't burning along
12:52with 81% of Wildberries' warehouse space. There's also another piece to the Wildberries puzzle that
12:57worsens the impact that all of this is having on Russia's economy. Spravdy adds that the transformation
13:02of Wildberries from the civilian business it began as into the military-civilian venture that it became
13:08extends right down to the financial level. The integration with the Russian state that begins
13:13with the Russ merger was going to be extended before Ukraine began its campaign. Russia's state-owned
13:19VTB Group, which Spravdy calls one of the pillars of Russia's invasion due to its serving as a major
13:24source of financing for companies making weapons and equipment for Russia, was planning to buy some
13:29of the digital financial assets of Wildberries back in May. It also intended to purchase 5% of the shares
13:34in WB Bank. Yes, Wildberries operates its own bank. With these purchases, Wildberries sellers and buyers
13:41would gain direct access to VTB's financial products through the Wildberries platform. And Wildberries itself
13:46would have taken one step closer to being a state-run enterprise, making Kim her billions while
13:52allowing the Kremlin to use Wildberries however it saw fit to serve the invasion. Here's what it all
13:57boils down to. Wildberries had become a military logistics facility masquerading under the guise
14:02of a civilian company before Ukraine began its strikes. Now, Wildberries are being picked all over
14:08Russia. VTB isn't having a particularly great time now that the majority of Wildberries' warehouse space
14:13has been destroyed. In an August 27th report, UNN revealed that VTB shares have been plummeting,
14:19losing 45% of their value since the beginning of 2026. A share in VTB is now worth about 50
14:26cents,
14:27which is an all-time low for the company. The state-run bank is still valued at $7.7 billion,
14:32but it's lost 88% of its market capitalization since its highest point in 2015, and the decline isn't going
14:38to stop. Wildberries is the reason why. As UNN explains, the decline in the share price is being
14:44driven by VTB's obligations related to Russia's largest marketplaces. At the end of May, the bank
14:50announced a strategic partnership with Wildberries, after which drone strikes destroyed about one-third
14:55of the company's warehouse capacity, while direct losses reached several hundred billion rubles.
15:01VTB also has strong links to Ozone, by the way. So it's exposed on two fronts as Ukraine continues
15:07its campaign against Russia's domestic logistics. We have three layers of economic damage here.
15:12Sellers and buyers are losing out, which ultimately means both have less money to pump back into the
15:17Russian economy. Wildberries' facilities being destroyed also means the logistical network that
15:21serves the Ukraine invasion is going down. Russia will need to find a way to replace that network,
15:27which is also going to cost money. And because the state has its tendrils in Wildberries via VTB,
15:32one of Russia's main financial institutions is now under threat. Putin is panicking, and he should be.
15:38This panic is likely what led him to making a desperate move on August 24th. AP News reported
15:44that Putin has signed a special decree that allows the state to temporarily seize control of whatever
15:49is deemed critical infrastructure if private owners fail to protect that infrastructure from
15:54Ukraine's drone attacks. Wildberries will easily fall under that category, and we can't help but think that
16:00the Kremlin is trying to take advantage of a terrible situation for the company. The Kremlin can now
16:04seize control of Wildberries, and it can do it under the guise of the company failing to protect itself,
16:09as though it would have had any way to stop Ukraine's drones without direct military support.
16:14There's a saying about lying down with dogs and getting fleas that comes to mind here, Kim.
16:18The man you've supported for so long has just signed a decree that allows him to snatch your business
16:23out from under you. Temporarily, of course. Because we all believe that. At best, what Putin has done
16:29is just place Wildberries under intense pressure to fix the issues that Ukraine's drones have caused,
16:34and to fix them fast. Billions of dollars have to be found from somewhere for repairs, and the erection
16:40of whatever drone defenses Wildberries can muster for the rest of its warehouses. And it's not like
16:44Ukraine's drones will stop coming. And though this measure is supposedly mostly focused on oil
16:49refineries, which have been hit even harder by drones than Wildberries, it's wide-ranging enough
16:54for a militarily vital company like Wildberries to fall under its ream. Perhaps that will end up being
16:59the story of Wildberries. The multi-billion dollar business that was burned to the ground and taken
17:04over by the state. A war machine contributor exposed. Russia's richest woman displaced. And a desperate
17:11president who thinks that he could somehow fix the problem, even though he's overseeing a country that
17:15is plunging into economic decline. Ukraine will let the Kremlin come up with whatever desperate
17:20fixes it can muster. We'd hazard a guess that the next Wildberry strike is already being planned.
17:25It may have even happened by the time you watch this video. After all,
17:29Ukraine won't want to leave the job undone. 81% down, 19% to go.
17:35What sounds like a better strategy to you? Do you shoot the dozens if not hundreds of arrows that are
17:42fired at you every single week? Or do you shoot the archer that is firing those arrows? It's a no
17:47-brainer,
17:47right? Take out the archer and the arrows can't fly. When that archer is 800 kilometers away,
17:53distance becomes a problem. Or it would be for anybody other than Ukraine. 800 kilometers is nothing
17:59to worry about anymore, as Ukraine has just destroyed something irreplaceable inside Russia.
18:04An archer just got hit with an explosive arrow of Ukraine's making. And there is set to be a lot
18:09more
18:09where this comes from. On August 28th, the news broke that Ukraine has carried out a successful
18:14strike against Russia's Engels II airbase in the Saratov region. Again. And during that strike,
18:21Ukraine had taken out an invaluable Tu-95MS strategic bomber. Again. The attack marked the
18:28second time in six weeks that Russia has lost one of these bombers, reducing its already limited supply of
18:33these Soviet-era aircraft, which in turn limits the number of Kh-101 cruise missiles that Russia can
18:39launch into Ukraine. The Tu-95 is Russia's primary launch platform for these missiles. In other words,
18:46the archer that unleashes the arrows. With the latest strike, Ukraine has taken that archer out of
18:51commission with a shot fired from a range of 800 kilometers and delivered with impressive power by the
18:56MICH-2000 long-range attack drone. Before we go on, this is a reminder that everything you see here is
19:03researched, verified, and produced by real people. If you value that, subscribe, comment below, and
19:09consider becoming a member for access to exclusive content. The Security Service of Ukraine, or SBU,
19:16was quick to confirm the strike on Telegram, stating that it carried out a successful special operation
19:21hitting a Tu-95MS strategic bomber at Engels airfield in the Saratov region. Official statements noted that
19:28the long-range SBU drones covered about 800 kilometers to reach the target. It also highlighted that strikes
19:34conducted on the same night destroyed an ammunition depot, as well as a depot where the Russian military
19:39stored fuel and lubricants. However, it was the shattered Tu-95 that grabbed all of the headlines,
19:45and it doesn't look like Russia is going to stand a chance of getting that bomber back into the air
19:49anytime soon, if at all. Defense Express has the details in its report on Ukraine's attack,
19:55as it points out that satellite images of Engels 2 in the aftermath of the strike
19:59show the Tu-95 with a part of its right wing missing. Well, it's not exactly missing. Rather,
20:05it seems to be lying on the ground, having been completely severed from the aircraft that it's
20:09supposed to keep in the sky. Militanyi shares the same image, stating that the extent of the damage is
20:14such that the Tu-95 is likely beyond repair. And it's not like Russia can build more. This is a
20:20Soviet-era strategic bomber, and the facilities used to build it simply don't exist anymore.
20:26But we'll be getting into all of that soon. The pain continues as Defense Express reports that the
20:31bomber is also likely to have received additional damage as a result of drone fragments potentially
20:36slicing through the fuselage. Plus, the intense heat caused by Ukraine's drone is likely to have
20:41weakened the internal metal structure of the broken wing, perhaps leading to damage extending to the
20:46Tu-95's fuel system, as well as the wing control mechanism. So, this shouldn't be a relatively
20:51simple case of making a new wing and strapping it on to complete a repair. Intricate components
20:56would need to be sourced if Defense Express's assessment is right, which only makes the repair
21:00job even harder. But if you want to hear about pain, plenty more of it comes from the fact that
21:05this
21:05was the SBU that carried out this strike. The very same SBU that little over a year ago
21:09pulled off the brilliant Operation Spiderweb inside Russia. That operation, which involved
21:15using trucks to sneak FPV drones into Russia that were later unleashed to attack bombers at several
21:20airfields, took a huge toll on Russia's strategic bomber fleet. The numbers vary depending on who you
21:26listen to. Ukraine claims to have caused $7 billion worth of damage to military hardware,
21:31destroying or damaging 41 Russian aircraft in the process. Russia said differently. Officially,
21:37it claims that only 11 aircraft were hit and that Ukraine did a much smaller $26 million in damage,
21:43TechRadar reports. Somehow we think that Russia might be hiding the truth a little bit.
21:48Still, the damage done during this insane operation isn't the point. What is the point is that Ukraine
21:53doesn't have to do anything like Operation Spiderweb anymore. August 28th proves it. Engels 2 is easily
21:59within range of Ukraine's long-range drones and it can be hit almost at will. The SBU behind the 2025
22:05operations Spiderweb has evolved. So have the drones that it's using. But the results are the same.
22:11More Russian bombers are being blown to pieces. Russian propagandists are trying to claim that the
22:16latest Tu-95 strike was no big deal. Fighter Bomber, who is one of the most prominent pro-Russian
22:22voices on Telegram, claimed that the Tu-95 that Ukraine struck wasn't even active. They weren't bothered
22:28by the fact that the aircraft was missing its propellers and judging by the nacelles its engines as well.
22:32I'll say it again. All airworthy aircraft were moved out of Engels a couple of years ago.
22:37But there's something fishy about this claim. We know, right? What a shocker for a claim made
22:41by a Russian propagandist. As Defense Express points out, clear signs of a fire are visible
22:46in the satellite photo of Russia's shattered Tu-95. OSINT Technical backs that up on X,
22:52sharing footage from the ground that shows smoke rising, indicating a fire that is in the vicinity
22:56of the Engels 2 flight line. That evidence of fire suggests that the Tu-95 was carrying fuel,
23:02likely in preparation for a takeoff. And if the Tu-95 was loaded with fuel at a time when Russia
23:07is
23:07struggling to make its own aviation fuel due to Ukraine's refinery strikes, then that means it
23:12was being used. Why waste the fuel otherwise? Fighter Bomber won't have an answer, and neither will any of
23:18the Russian propagandists who are trying to tell the tale of this attack being pointless. Ukraine knows
23:23where Russia's KH-101 strikes are coming from. Engels 2 is in use, but it's losing Tu-95s fast.
23:29If we need any confirmation that Ukraine believes Engels 2 is very much in use, we only have to
23:34consider the fact that the August 28 attack was just the latest in a string. We mentioned a similar
23:39attack that took place six weeks before. That strike happened on July 16, and it involved Ukraine taking
23:45out another Tu-95-MS at Engels 2 using the same type of MICH-2000 drone, which was also operated
23:53by the
23:53SBU. That drone, by the way, costs about $40,000 per unit, Tech Times reports. The true cost of a
23:59Tu-95
24:00has never been reported by Russia, though Aero Corner suggests a figure of around $26 million.
24:06We'd call that an immense return on investment for Ukraine. Even if Ukraine has to send several drones
24:11just to score one hit, the target it struck was more than worth the outlay. The SBU described the
24:17damage as critical, yet another strategic bomber taken out of the sky. We're seeing the start of a
24:22campaign forming here, but if you've been paying attention to the words of Ukraine's President
24:26Volodymyr Zelenskyy, this sort of strike shouldn't come as a surprise. Just five days before the SBU hit
24:33Engels 2 for the second time in six weeks, Zelenskyy revealed that Ukraine has carried out an attack on
24:37a Russian ballistic missile launcher as part of a new strategy in which Ukraine attacks the missile
24:42launchers rather than the missiles themselves. Again, Archer instead of the Arrows.
24:47By taking out Russia's missile launch sites, Zelenskyy says, Ukraine hopes to mitigate the
24:52missile threat that is presented to Ukraine, especially with winter around the corner.
24:57What we've just seen at Engels 2 may not be an attack on a ballistic missile launch site,
25:01but it's still a strike against a different type of Archer. Taking Tu-95s out means fewer
25:06KH-101 cruise missiles over Ukraine, which in turn means Ukraine can focus more of its air
25:11defense resources on other projectiles. The last thing that Russia wanted to see was another of
25:16its irreplaceable Tu-95s go up in flames, but the second to last thing would be the drone that did
25:22the damage. The Mish 2000 has an interesting story, and it's one that often goes underappreciated when so
25:28much focus is placed on the more famous Ukrainian drones such as the Flamingo. That story begins with a
25:33single word, no. That's what China said to Ukraine in the summer of 2023 when it restricted the export
25:39of the civilian drones that Ukraine's units had been buying and turning into long-range strike
25:44drones for use against Russia. In particular, China stopped selling ZTK-150 drones. A short time later,
25:51Ukrainian engineers flew to the Chinese factory that made these drones, and they asked to buy the
25:56manufacturing rights. That's when the two-letter word that Ukraine didn't want to hear was uttered.
26:00But Ukraine couldn't be stopped. The intermediaries who tried to set up the deal with China decided on
26:05an alternative strategy. Build the drones somewhere that didn't have the export controls, and then
26:10train Ukraine's pilots to fly them. Those pilots promptly took the training, and in the words of
26:15one member of the team, and in parallel with the training we photographed everything that was there.
26:20Everything from the production process to the arrangement of the shelves and cabinets.
26:24Ukraine got trained pilots and eight Chinese drones out of a deal that China didn't want to happen,
26:28but more importantly, it had the building blocks of what would become the Mish 2000 in its hands.
26:34Now Ukraine has a TU-95 killer. The drone that just traveled to Engels 2 is basically a copy of
26:40the drone that China refused to sell, but with a slightly lower price tag. Capable of traveling up
26:45to 2,000 kilometers, carrying a warhead weighing up to 60 kilograms. The drone has now become a key
26:50part of Ukraine's long-range strategy. Euromiden Press reports that the list of targets that the Mish 2000
26:56strikes grows by the week, and now includes ports, industrial sites and military bases around Moscow,
27:02and of course, Engels 2. And it's not as though Russia can hope for any respite from Ukraine's
27:07bomber destroyer. According to Tom's Hardware, Ukraine is building around 6,000 of these drones
27:12every year. What all of this means is that Russia now has a TU-95 problem on its hands. And
27:18we mean
27:18beyond the bomber that has a broken wing that now languishes at Engels 2. But before we dig deeper,
27:23this is a reminder that you're watching the military show. If this is the kind of insight
27:27you want to see, make sure you are subscribed to the channel and have notifications enabled.
27:33There's the whole KH-101 problem for a start. We mentioned this earlier. The TU-95 is Russia's
27:38main platform for KH-101 launches. And given Russia's strategy right now, losing any of these
27:44platforms is bad news for the Kremlin. The KH-101 is one of the most important cruise missiles in Russia's
27:50arsenal. Army recognition calls it a highly capable weapons system that provides Russia with a long
27:55range precision strike capability. And it has proven to be just that in Ukraine. Capable of traveling at
28:01subsonic speeds, the KH-101 has a range of around 3,000 kilometers and can carry a conventional warhead
28:08weighing up to 450 kilograms. There is also a version capable of carrying a 20 kiloton nuclear warhead,
28:14offering even more incentive for Ukraine to get these particular arrows out of the sky for good.
28:19This nuclear capability makes the KH-101 and the TU-95s that fire them part of Russia's wider
28:25nuclear deterrent. But for Ukraine, the biggest problem is that Russia has been launching more
28:29KH-101s than ever before. 2026 has been the year that Russia intensified its missile campaign against
28:36Ukraine. And July highlighted how bad it's become. That month was a record breaker when it comes to the
28:41number of missiles that Russia launched, with the Moscow Times reporting 376 missiles fired during
28:47the course of the month. Many of those missiles would have been KH-101s. Of course, taking out a
28:52TU-95 doesn't mean that Russia can't fire missiles anymore. But it does mean that Russia can't fire as
28:58many as it could before. And when you consider this in the context of Ukraine's wider campaign against
29:02Russia's strategic bomber fleet, you see a second problem starting to emerge. Russia is staring a
29:08shrinking fleet of strategic bombers in the face. In its report on Ukraine's August 28 strike,
29:14United24 media said that this is now the 12th TU-95 to be taken out since the Ukraine war began,
29:20with Tech Times adding that Russia's fleet of these strategic bombers has now shrunk to about 37
29:25aircraft. Again, that's bad news for the KH-101 campaign. But it's even worse news when you realize
29:31that Russia isn't able to build new TU-95. And very likely it will also be unable to repair any
29:36of those
29:37that Ukraine has struck. On the building side of things, the TU-95 is like so many of the weapons
29:42that Russia has deployed in Ukraine, a Soviet-era relic that isn't built anymore. This is an aircraft
29:47that first flew in 1952, entering service in the Soviet military just a few years later. The TU-95
29:55MS variant, which is the version of the bomber that can fire KH-101 missiles, entered service in the 1980s.
30:01And it's this version that remains a core component of Russia's strategic posture due to its nuclear
30:06capabilities. Production of the TU-95 in all of its variants ended several decades ago, leaving
30:12Russia with none of the facilities it once had for building more of the bombers. The last TU-95 MS
30:17rolled off the production line in 1993. And even without Ukraine's help, more and more of these
30:22bombers are struggling to perform. Tech Times says that we can see that in the missile loadouts.
30:27Most TU-95 MS bombers are now being loaded with four KH-101s. They have capacity for eight,
30:33at least they're supposed to. The fact that Russia isn't loading more missiles into these bombers
30:38tells us that Russia is either running out of KH-101s, which is unlikely, or the airframes are
30:43degrading to the point where they can't be fully loaded anymore. So Russia has TU-95s that are being
30:48held together by spit and tape. Ukraine is also taking out these bombers with its long-range drones,
30:54leaving Russia with even fewer options for its KH-101 missiles. Still, there must be a solution to the
30:59problem. Surely Russia can repair the damage done to its TU-95s, especially when it's a case of a
31:04wing breaking off rather than the entire bomber going up in flames. Not really. And it's for this
31:10reason that each lost TU-95 is truly irreplaceable. Technically, what we can see from the satellite
31:15photos of Ukraine's attacks suggests that the TU-95 hit on August 28th should be repairable. Losing an
31:22outer section of a wing isn't necessarily a death sentence for an aircraft, though Russia would still
31:26have to do an assessment to see if the bomber can be salvaged. But even if it can be, that
31:30doesn't
31:31mean Russia has the capacity to carry out a repair. The reason is that Russia only has a handful of
31:36plants capable of carrying out these types of repairs, including the 360th aircraft repair plant in
31:41Ryazan and the Beriev-Tagenrog Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex. These also happen to be the
31:48facilities where Russia is carrying out upgrades and modernizations of its bomber fleet, including the
31:52TU-95MS. So what's the problem? We'll answer that with another question. How is Russia going to get
31:58its wingless TU-95MS from Engels II to either of these repair plants? The aircraft certainly can't
32:04be transported the hundreds of kilometers it would need to travel in its current condition. There are
32:08about 540 kilometers between Saratov and Ryazan as the crow flies, and another 160 kilometers or so can
32:15be tacked onto that if Russia tries to ship its damaged bomber to Tugam. Not exactly short distances to
32:21transport an already damaged aircraft. Russia's other option would be to partially dismantle its
32:26struck bomber, transport the pieces via the ground, reassemble them at the repair facility, and then
32:31build a new wing. But the complexity of that kind of repair, especially when added to the age of the
32:36airframe, the damage it's just experienced, and the possibility that worse could have happened that we
32:40can't see in the satellite photos, would make this a very costly repair. Would Russia eat that cost,
32:45assuming the repair is even possible? It seems unlikely. What we're seeing in all of this is that
32:50Russia is slowly losing its status as a strategic bomber power. Russia modernizes and builds on its
32:56Cold War bombers rather than building brand new ones. The exception is the Tupolev Pak-DA bomber
33:01program, which is supposed to be replacing the aging fleet that Ukraine is slowly crippling,
33:05but not a single bomber from that program has flown yet, so Russia can't look toward the new to replace
33:10the old. It seems unlikely that Russia will have a new type of bomber in the air by the end
33:15of the decade,
33:15especially with funds being redirected to support the war effort, which makes the loss of another
33:20Tu-95MS more acute. And in the future, the Kremlin has to consider a pretty terrible mathematical
33:26equation. Ukraine builds about 6,000 Mish 2000s per year. That's 16 of these long-range drones daily.
33:34Russia, on the other hand, only has somewhere in the region of 37 Tu-95MS bombers left. Ukraine is
33:40building a massive stockpile. Russia is drawing from an aging fleet that isn't being replenished.
33:45The asymmetry in the maths here is obvious. With its Mish 2000 production, Ukraine would launch wave
33:51after wave of drone strikes against every Russian bomber that it locates. Russia might be able to
33:56stop many of those strikes, but it only takes one drone hitting its mark to take a Tu-95 out,
34:01potentially for good. The Russian archers are more vulnerable than ever before, and that goes for
34:06every Russian bomber that is within 2,000 kilometers of Ukraine's Mish 2000 launch sites.
34:12It's no secret that Ukraine faces some serious challenges when trying to deal with Russia's
34:17ballistic missiles. Those missiles keep coming, and Ukraine lacks the interceptors it needs to shoot
34:22them down. Does that mean that Russia is winning this aspect of the war? Maybe it was a few weeks
34:28ago,
34:28but ever able to adapt, Ukraine has decided to tackle Russia's ballistic missiles a different way.
34:33If you can't take them down in the sky, destroy them before they're able to launch.
34:38Ukraine has found a genius way to destroy dozens of Russian missiles with a single blow.
34:43But even more than that, we're seeing Ukraine continue its transformation from a defensive nation
34:48to one capable of going on an all-out offensive to achieve victory. It all starts close to the
34:54border between Russia and Ukraine. On August 22nd, Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky revealed
35:00that the Ukrainian military had carried out a successful strike against an Iskander ballistic
35:06missile launch site somewhere along the border.
35:08Today, we have another success. We cannot provide many details because of the operation's sensitivity,
35:14but a fact is a fact. We struck an Iskander launcher near our borders, Zelensky declared.
35:19Ukraine's President didn't provide any more details. We don't know where the site was specifically.
35:24Zelensky says that's due to operational security concerns, as Ukraine doesn't want to give away too
35:29many details about how it's conducting these strikes. After all, details mean information
35:34that Russia can use to defend itself. On the surface, the strike against an Iskander launch
35:39site appears to be the headline. And we don't want to underplay the importance of the attack itself.
35:44Iskander ballistic missiles are some of the most lethal weapons that Russia brings to the table.
35:49Whenever we hear about the latest aerial attack carried out by Russia,
35:53we almost always hear that Iskanders were part of the strike.
35:56With their stated range of about 500 kilometers and the ability to deliver both conventional
36:01and nuclear warheads weighing up to 700 kilograms, Iskanders provide Russia with the ability to do
36:07a lot of damage, often against Ukrainian cities rather than military targets, in a single attack.
36:13Russia recognizes the importance of these particular weapons even more than Ukraine.
36:18Ballistic missiles like the Iskander are difficult to shoot out of the sky.
36:21They must be countered by special types of interceptor missiles.
36:25Knowing that Ukraine doesn't have stockpiles of those interceptors,
36:29Russia has gone all in on building as many as it can. According to the Kyiv Independent,
36:34Russia likely has between 600 and 630 ballistic missiles in its stockpile.
36:39Pravda adds that around 130 of Russia's ballistic missiles are Iskands. And according to Zelensky,
36:45Russia could potentially produce up to 1,300 annually. Though Zelensky says that Russia hasn't reached
36:51that level of production yet. But it could. And that's a problem that Ukraine needs to solve.
36:57This is where the real headline that lies behind the Iskander launch site strike comes into play.
37:02It's the strategy behind this strike that really matters, not so much the strike itself.
37:07With this single attack, we've just seen Ukraine conduct a complete turnaround in its
37:11approach to Russia's ballistic missiles. Instead of being on defense, which is what you have to do
37:16when relying on interceptor missiles to shoot ballistic missiles out of the sky, Ukraine is
37:21instead going on the offense. It's attacking Russia's launch sites. Or to put it another way,
37:26Ukraine is going to start shooting the archers instead of the arrows.
37:29We made a bold claim at the beginning of the video that Ukraine has just figured out how to destroy
37:33dozens of missiles with a single blow. This is how you do it. The missiles don't have to be
37:39destroyed directly. Rather, Ukraine can focus on taking out the launchers. Without those launchers,
37:44the missiles become useless to Russia, effectively destroying them in the sense that they can't be
37:48used to damage Ukraine anymore. And Zelensky says that this is precisely what Ukraine is going to
37:53be doing from now on. So this is one of the options when we have very few anti-ballistic missiles.
37:58There is another tactic, a more difficult one that we developed, hunting their nearby sites from
38:03which they launch ballistic missiles. This is a separate story, a separate program,
38:07a separate operation. And today we managed to do it. Our defense forces did a great job,
38:13Zelensky said in the wake of the August 22 strike. This followed on from a similar declaration on
38:18August 5, when Ukraine's president said that military personnel know that they need to destroy
38:23enemy launchers to reduce Russia's ballistic missile threat. This is a brilliant move by Ukraine.
38:28For one thing, it counters increased missile production, which has escalated in recent months
38:33due to Ukraine's interceptor stockpile shortages that we'll be getting to in a moment.
38:37But beyond that, there's the Iskander itself to consider. There's a reason why the launch site
38:42that Ukraine destroyed was close to the border. You may have picked up on that reason when we shared
38:46the Iskander's range. Iskander missiles can travel 500 kilometers. And while that might sound like a lot,
38:52what it means is that Russia is somewhat limited in where it can place its launchers for them to be
38:57usable. Crimea has Iskander launch sites, as do many of Russia's border regions. But beyond that,
39:02there's no point building any more as the Iskander can't travel far enough. For Ukraine, what this
39:07means is a narrowing down of its target area. The archers are easily in range of Ukraine's drones,
39:12so Ukraine's task is now to identify where the launch sites are. Once that information is at hand,
39:18Ukraine's drones can do the rest. Though Zelensky has shared this strategy as though it's brand new,
39:23there have been hints that Ukraine was trying something like what we've just heard about
39:27earlier in 2026. Back in April, Ukraine carried out a far-reaching strike that took out multiple
39:33Russian targets in Crimea, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia. All in a day's work for Ukraine in 2026, as strikes
39:39against these occupied territories are carried out almost daily to weaken Russia's forces on the front.
39:45But what made this particular strike interesting was what happened in Crimea. Located near the
39:50settlements of Korotna and Myzeria were a pair of bases that hosted Iskander missile systems.
39:56Both were home to launchers, and Ukraine took them out in its attack.
40:00Perhaps a hint of what was to come. Now, just a few months later, Ukraine has done it again,
40:05only this time the attack on an Iskander launcher wasn't an isolated incident. Zelensky says that
40:10Ukraine is going all-in on its new strategy, and he signaled that intention by trying to call on the
40:16man
40:16who may be able to help Ukraine take out more Iskander launchers in the future, Elon Musk.
40:22That's according to the Financial Times, which says that Russia is now seeking approval from Musk
40:26and SpaceX to use Starlink-enabled drones for strikes against Russia's ballistic missile
40:31launchers up to 200 kilometers inside Russian territory. This is a big ask for Ukraine.
40:37Though SpaceX finally cut off Russia's use of illicit Starlink terminals inside Ukraine earlier in 2026,
40:43it has historically banned Ukraine from using Starlink-equipped drones inside Russia itself.
40:48Those drones are for defending Ukraine. Musk and SpaceX likely don't want to risk incurring Russia's
40:54wrath for allowing them to be used inside Russian territory. Zelensky hopes that he can change Musk's
40:59mind. As Zelensky put it on August 22nd, so far he has said that this constitutes an escalation.
41:06However, he may change his mind once he sees further arguments. Zelensky wants to present those
41:11arguments to the point where he even asked US President Donald Trump to speak to Musk on
41:15Ukraine's behalf when he visited the White House back in July. Even back then, the pitch was to
41:20allow strikes 200 kilometers beyond the border, and ballistic missile launch sites were named,
41:25along with command systems and other assets. Musk hasn't commented since Zelensky made it clear what
41:30he wants. For Ukraine, this Starlink permission could be huge for the new strategy. Due to using SpaceX
41:37satellites, which boast stronger connections than traditional radio links, Starlink enables drone
41:42operators to have their drones cover long distances while enjoying more resistance to jamming.
41:47Zelensky's challenge here is that the man who negotiated the Russian Starlink shutdown in February,
41:52Mikhailo Fedorov, is no longer Ukraine's defense minister. Fedorov has a direct link to Musk and may
41:58be able to present the arguments that Ukraine needs to present, but he hasn't returned to government,
42:02despite Zelensky offering him various government roles, including the position of deputy prime
42:07minister. Fedorov might be the key to making Ukraine's new strategy work. At the very least,
42:12he could present the arguments for why Starlink should be allowed for strikes inside Russia.
42:17But even without him, Ukraine has just proven that it can take out an Iskander launch site.
42:21And if Ukraine can do it once, it can do it again. Ukraine needs to. This strategic transformation
42:26hasn't come out of nowhere. It's a shift in approach born from necessity rather than choice,
42:31but it's also a shift that reflects what Ukraine has been doing throughout 2026.
42:36Before we dig into all of that, this is a reminder that you're watching the military show. There's a
42:40lot more where this comes from, so make sure you subscribe and enable notifications if you're
42:44getting value from the channel. We'll be completely blunt here. Ukraine has a serious missile interceptor
42:50problem. If Ukraine has an Achilles heel in its fight against Russia, it's that it has to rely
42:55heavily on its Western partners for interceptor missiles that can be used to destroy Russia's ballistic
43:00missiles in flight. And chief among those interceptors are Patriot missile. Ukraine basically
43:06doesn't have any of them left. CNN reports that Ukraine's stockpiles have run dry, meaning it has
43:11Patriot missile batteries, but they aren't able to do anything. It's the inverse of the problem that
43:16Ukraine wants to create for Russia. Ukraine has the launchers, but no missiles. It wants Russia to
43:22have its missiles, but no way to launch them. According to Zelensky himself, Ukraine needs 5% of the stockpile
43:28Patriot missiles that the US has to survive the winter. Right now, it only has enough missiles to
43:33amount to 1% of that stockpile. This is the catalyst for Ukraine's change in approach.
43:40The lack of Patriot interceptors is already starting to cause major problems for Ukraine. Russian missiles
43:46rain down on Ukraine weekly, and they're causing a lot more death and destruction than they were
43:50earlier in the year. That's what Putin wants. The entire point of Russia's aerial campaign is to
43:55terrorize Ukraine, to cow its people into submission by breaking their morale and destroying their homes.
44:01The Guardian says that there is now a constant air of anxiety that clouds Kyiv,
44:05as Russian missiles break through the city's defenses with alarming regularity.
44:10The latest of those strikes, which took place on August 20th,
44:13left 17 people dead and several dozen wounded. Ukraine saw this coming. It started rationing its
44:19Patriot interceptor missiles as far back as April, which is when Euromiden Press reported that Ukraine was
44:24pulling Patriot crews mid-attack to preserve interceptor missiles for future Russian strikes.
44:29Ukraine has also started using Patriot interceptors in ways that were never intended,
44:33such as using a single missile to attack a target rather than the two to four that are typically
44:38required. On one hand, this shows just how competent Ukraine's Patriot crews have become,
44:43and it bodes well for a future where Ukraine has more interceptors. But on the other hand,
44:48it's a sign of how bad the Patriot shortage is. What we're seeing now from Ukraine is the adaptation.
44:54Something that Ukraine has mastered during its war with Russia is the ability to see a situation and
44:59come up with a novel solution when the original solution no longer works out.
45:03Attacking ballistic missile launch sites eases the pressure on Ukraine's depleted Patriot missile
45:08stockpiles. The immediate goal is to create a situation where Russia is unable to maintain its
45:13volume of attacks due to launchers being destroyed, allowing for the preservation of Patriot
45:18missiles for the fewer attacks that are unleashed. It's not the perfect situation for Ukraine,
45:22but it will do for now. Ukraine is working toward a future where it will be able to combine its
45:28targeting of Russia's ballistic missile launch sites with an air defense approach
45:31that includes Patriot missiles once more. Indeed, there are more Patriot missiles coming.
45:37According to TVP World, Ukraine and Germany have just signed a deal that will see Germany provide
45:42Ukraine with 600 PAC-2 interceptor missiles. However, those missiles won't start arriving in Ukraine until
45:482027 and the full delivery may not be completed until 2028. That means they won't be coming in
45:54time for that crucial winter period that Zelensky mentioned. Again, that leads to the new strategy.
46:00If Ukraine can take out enough launch sites between now and the winter,
46:03Russia's threat diminishes and the Patriot problem doesn't bite as hard. More will be needed, of course.
46:10Zelensky has made that much clear as he is calling on Western nations that implement new sanctions to
46:15cause more issues for Russia's defense supply chain. Pressure is needed on every supply chain for
46:20foreign components and every enterprise working to enable strikes against lives,
46:24Ukraine's president wrote on Facebook in an August 14 post. There is a clear logic to these calls.
46:30Russia needs to build its missiles and its launchers before it can attack Ukraine.
46:34With this new strategy, Ukraine takes out launch sites to render Russia's ballistic missiles useless.
46:40What it also wants is for the West to work harder at cutting these pieces of equipment off at their
46:44source, which would lead to Russia struggling to send replacement launchers after Ukraine carries out
46:49a strike. The ideal is the combination of three layers – take out the source, destroy the launchers,
46:55and have enough interceptors at hand to shoot down the arrows when Russia manages to fire them.
47:00Work has to be done to bring all three of these elements together. However, the adaptation that
47:05Ukraine has made shows that it's taking a new approach to its air defense.
47:09It's no longer wait and shoot down, it's find and disrupt. Ukraine is going on the offense as it
47:14carves out a path to victory. Russia might be surprised by the attack on an Iskander launch site,
47:19it shouldn't be. That attack is simply the next step in a complete shift in Ukraine's approach,
47:25as offense has defined the best things that Ukraine has done in 2026.
47:29There are plenty of examples, take Crimea. For much of the mid-portion of the year,
47:33Ukraine has been engaged in a campaign to isolate the Crimean Peninsula, cutting off fuel supplies to
47:39make this key piece of territory strategically useless, all while letting the occupiers in Crimea
47:44know that Putin can't protect them. This is an offensive strategy. Ukraine has been striking trucks,
47:50ships and roads. These proactive attacks are now causing Russia a lot of problems in Crimea,
47:56and they wouldn't be happening if Ukraine were still in the defensive mindset that it has held
48:00throughout the war. The development of middle strike drones, capable of striking targets up
48:04to 250 kilometers away from the front, has made this attacking strategy possible, and Ukraine is
48:10making the most of it. We see something similar in Ukraine's strikes against Wildberries and,
48:15more recently, Ozon. Together, these two companies form the backbone of Russia's e-commerce logistics.
48:21They're used by millions of people, and they employ thousands. Since July 18th,
48:26Ukraine has recorded at least 20 strikes against Wildberries facilities, doing billions of dollars
48:31of damage in the process. The company has lost over 1.18 million square meters of warehouse space,
48:38the Conversation reports. Again, this is offense, direct attacks on Russian territory that do impact
48:43the front in the sense that they hit companies that sell military gear. But more importantly, and similar
48:48to what we see in Crimea, these attacks bring more pain to the Russian people without targeting them
48:53directly. We've also seen Ukraine go on the offensive on its own turf. Since the Starlink shutdown we
48:59mentioned, Ukraine has been launching targeted attacks against weak points across the Russian
49:03front line, resulting in large amounts of territory being liberated. On August 12th, Zelenskyy revealed
49:09that Ukraine has retaken 745 square kilometers of territory in the Oleksandrovka direction alone since
49:15January, along with liberating 26 settlements. These counters allow Ukraine to fortify and set up later
49:22attacks. We don't mean to harp the point, but it's yet another offensive strategy. Rather than only
49:27waiting for Russia to attack so that Ukraine can inflict damage through its defense, Ukraine is
49:32actively going on the offense to inflict damage while still using its defense to attrip Russia's
49:37forces. What we're seeing with the targeting of Russia's ballistic missile launch sites is simply
49:41the next evolution in this offensive approach. That evolution has been made possible by Ukraine's
49:47growing arsenal of long-range drones and drone missile hybrids. Ukraine now has weapons capable
49:52of striking up to 3,000 kilometers inside Russia. Those weapons won't need to travel so far to destroy
49:59Iskander launch sites due to the limited range of these types of missiles. However, it does open up
50:04possibilities for Ukraine to conduct attacks against facilities that manufacture missiles and
50:08components deeper in Russia, which feeds into the idea of cutting Russia's missile attacks off at the
50:14source. It all boils down to one important realization. Ukraine knows that it isn't going to win this war
50:20with defense alone. Putin has already demonstrated that he's willing to sacrifice the lives of as many
50:25Russians as it takes to achieve his goals. Almost 1.48 million casualties and counting are evidence of
50:32that. If Ukraine does nothing but defend, Putin will simply keep sending in the meat for as long as he
50:37is
50:37able. Ukraine may be able to kill hundreds of thousands, maybe even millions more, but it will
50:43lose soldiers and equipment while doing it, perhaps enough for Russia to achieve the attritional victory
50:47that Putin seems to desire, so offense is needed. That simple concept has been the defining aspect of
50:54Ukraine's 2026 strategy. Now Iskander missile launch sites are in Ukraine's crosshairs. Zelensky has just
51:00reported on one strike. Look for more in the coming weeks and months as Ukraine's attacks whittle away
51:05at Russia's aerial capabilities. By the way, we dug a lot deeper into Ukraine's counterattacks in the
51:10south. It's not just about the 745 square kilometers. Ukraine has shattered the Russian
51:16narrative with its offensives, and you can find out how by watching our video. But before you go,
51:21subscribe and tell us what you think in the comments below. And if you want even more from
51:25the channel, consider becoming a member for access to exclusive content. And thank you, as always, for watching.

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