- 4 days ago
Corruption in Russia is not a bug in the system — it is one of the ways the system works. This political analysis explains how Putin’s Russia uses bribery, kickbacks, stolen budgets, and selective prosecutions to keep elites rich, loyal, and afraid, while turning state power into a network of protection and dependence.
Using the ideas of zanos, otkat, and raspil, the episode shows how access to contracts, permits, land, and megaprojects is traded through patronage rather than open competition. It also explores why massive state-funded projects, propaganda cinema, and protected business clans create incentives for officials to serve the ruler above the public. In the end, the real function of anti-corruption crackdowns is not to end corruption, but to control who gets protected and who suddenly becomes a criminal.
Created for viewers interested in Russia analysis, Kremlin politics, corruption networks, authoritarian power, political commentary, and documentary-style explainers. Useful for anyone searching for Russian corruption explained, Putin and bribery, state capture, patronage systems, and modern Russia politics.
Using the ideas of zanos, otkat, and raspil, the episode shows how access to contracts, permits, land, and megaprojects is traded through patronage rather than open competition. It also explores why massive state-funded projects, propaganda cinema, and protected business clans create incentives for officials to serve the ruler above the public. In the end, the real function of anti-corruption crackdowns is not to end corruption, but to control who gets protected and who suddenly becomes a criminal.
Created for viewers interested in Russia analysis, Kremlin politics, corruption networks, authoritarian power, political commentary, and documentary-style explainers. Useful for anyone searching for Russian corruption explained, Putin and bribery, state capture, patronage systems, and modern Russia politics.
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LearningTranscript
00:00The Russian government is constantly fighting corruption, at least officially.
00:06Officials are arrested, criminal cases make the news,
00:11Putin regularly demands that state money be protected from theft.
00:17Every few years another anti-corruption campaign begins.
00:22And yet corruption remains everywhere.
00:25The reason is not that the Kremlin has been trying to defeat it.
00:30And somehow failing.
00:31At the highest level of the Russian system,
00:34there is very little intention to eliminate corruption at all.
00:39For many people, access to government power is valuable
00:42precisely because it creates opportunities to make money.
00:47A state position gives you influence over contracts,
00:51permits, budgets, companies, land, investigations.
00:55Everyone inside the system understands this.
00:58And within the elite, becoming rich through your position
01:03is not treated as something shameful or extraordinary.
01:07What matters much more is whose interests you serve,
01:11whom you share with,
01:14and whether you remain loyal to the people above you.
01:17But corruption in Russia is also much more complicated than somebody taking a bribe.
01:22Over time, entire chains of relationships have grown around it.
01:28Remove one piece and you may disrupt everything connected to it.
01:33Without these informal relationships,
01:36people would no longer know how to get anything done.
01:40I am Elvira Bari, a writer born in the Soviet Union.
01:43Today, we are going to look inside this machine.
01:46How Russian corruption actually works,
01:49how the different parts depend on one another,
01:52and why a government that constantly promises to fight corruption
01:55has built a system that cannot easily function without it.
02:00Here is our roadmap for today.
02:02Three main words,
02:04three Russian words that explain how corrupt deals actually work.
02:08The price of access,
02:10why doing business in Russia requires a political patron.
02:14Built for theft.
02:16Why the Kremlin loves megaprojects.
02:19When the official is the customer.
02:22How state funding rewards pleasing the patron instead of the audience.
02:27Why the system needs Putin.
02:30How corruption replaces institutions and makes the elite dependent on the ruler
02:36who protects and balances their networks.
02:39If you enjoy this kind of analysis, please subscribe.
02:43And if you listen on Spotify, follow the show there.
02:46It really helps.
02:48Let's begin.
02:50Three main words.
02:53To understand corruption in Russia,
02:56you need three words.
02:58ZANOS,
02:59ANCUT,
03:00and RASPIL.
03:01They sound like criminal slang because they describe criminal practices.
03:06Yet in Russian business and government,
03:08everyone understands them.
03:11ZANOS means bring a money or a favor to the person who can open a door.
03:16In Russia,
03:17businesses depend heavily on permits,
03:20licenses,
03:20inspections,
03:22land decisions,
03:23and access to infrastructure.
03:24Formerly,
03:25they are procedures.
03:26in practice, an official has enough discretion to help you, delay you, or block you. That is where
03:33the nose comes in. Sometimes it is a direct bribe. More often, especially at higher levels,
03:41it is disguised as something else. Hiring an official's relative, giving business to a friendly
03:49company, donating to the right foundation, or paying for an expensive vacation. Often, nothing is
03:57requested immediately. The businessman is simply building a relationship. Suppose several developers
04:03want to build on the same valuable plot of land. On paper, they compete. In reality, the decisive
04:09question may be which one has the better relationship with the official. Once their choice is made,
04:16the paperwork can be arranged around it. Then comes a cut, the kickback. Suppose a company
04:25receives a state contract worth 10 billion rubles. Part of that money is expected to return to the
04:32people who helped secure it. The contractor builds the kickback into the price from the beginning.
04:39That means the winner is not always the company that can do the job best or cheapest. It may be
04:45the
04:46company from which the kickback can be collected safely. Trust matters. You need people who will
04:53pay, stay silent, and not suddenly create legal problems. I know a case in which a lawyer received
05:00an apartment in the center of his city for acting as an intermediary between a construction company and an
05:06official who approved the project. The official's mistress received an apartment nearby. No envelope of
05:15cash. Just expensive property transferred to the right people. This creates a tight connection between
05:22business and officials. They protect each other and keep outsiders away. Competition falls. Innovation matters
05:31less. Quality suffers. And the cost is passed on to the state, the company, or the consumer. The third word
05:41is
05:42raspill. Literally, it means sewing something apart. A state budget is allocated for a road, a stadium,
05:51city renovation, or a major event. Formally, the goal is to complete the project. With raspill,
05:58the budget is also treated as money to be distributed among insiders. The project may still be real. But
06:06contracts go to the right companies. Prices are inflated. Work is subcontracted. Extra expenses appear.
06:15More money is requested. Large public projects are especially convenient because they are complicated
06:22enough to hide inflated costs. So, the three words describe three parts of the same system.
06:30Zanos buys access. Atkat returns part of the money to those who arrange the deal.
06:36Raspill distributes the public budget among connected people. Together, they create the network in which
06:42officials, businessmen, intermediaries, and contractors depend on one another. That is the corruption machine.
06:52The price of access.
06:56Corruption in Russia does not consist of isolated deals. It creates clans that operate like huge
07:04corporations with many affiliate companies. At the top of each clan is a powerful patron. A senior
07:11official, governor, security chief, head of a state corporation, or someone with direct access to the
07:17Kremlin. Below him are people who depend on his protection. Officials, businessmen, contractors,
07:24lawyers, intermediaries. The relationship resembles a patron vessel system. The patron gives access. The
07:33people below him return money, favors, political loyalty, and services. This is why a successful Russian
07:39businessman needs more than a good company. He needs a roof. Someone powerful enough to protect him.
07:49You may legally own a factory, a construction company, or an oil business. But regulators can
07:56suddenly discover violations. Prosecutors can open a case. A court can challenge an oil privatization. A
08:05competitor with stronger connections can take your contract or even your company. Your patron helps
08:12make sure this does not happen. And in return, you become part of his network. A businessman without
08:19protection is not competing only against another businessman. He competes against an entire political
08:26network. This is why corruption in Russia is so difficult to dismantle. The people inside these
08:33networks have spent years building them. Their careers, wealth, status, and security all depend on
08:41those relationships. Break the network and many of them lose everything. And outside the system,
08:48they often have little to fall back on, including the skills needed to succeed without it.
08:541. Build for theft
08:59Putin's system favors concentration. It is easier to control a few large companies than
09:05thousands of independent ones. But large monopolies need large contracts only the state can provide.
09:13And this changes the logic of investment. These projects are usually initiated by insiders close to the
09:20state. To move forward, they need to look patriotic, strategically important, and useful enough to win
09:27the backing of an official who controls the money. That official has his own reasons to approve them.
09:34He may expect a share of their benefits, but he also gains politically. A major project makes him look
09:40effective and ambitious in front of his superior. And very often, the ultimate audience is Putin himself.
09:49The larger and more complicated the project, the better. A pipeline, a cosmodrome, or a strategic bridge
09:56requires construction, equipment, roads, power, security, and layers of subcontractors. Billions can pass
10:04through dozens of companies. And it does not even have to be commercially profitable. It is a state
10:11project, after all. Profitability can always be secondary to some strategic or political goal.
10:18Better yet, the costs can keep growing along the way. Once construction begins, there are many ways for the
10:25budget to grow. Designs change. Additional work becomes necessary. Deadlines approach. More money is
10:34allocated. Vastochny Cosmotrom shows what this can lead to. Russia had a legitimate reason to build its
10:41own civilian spaceport and reduce its dependence on Baikonur in Kazakhstan. But in 2019, Kremlin spokesman
10:50Dmitry Piskhov acknowledged that 11 billion rubles had been stolen from the first 91 billion allocated to
10:59Vastochny. People were persecuted, putting complaints publicly about the theft. But the system that produced
11:06it remained in place because the problem was never one dishonest contractor. The problem is the model
11:14itself. The state concentrates resources and business opportunities, suppresses honest
11:20competition and gives top officials enormous power to distribute national wealth for their own benefit.
11:27That privilege, in turn, helps secure their loyalty to the leader above them.
11:33When the official is the customer
11:37This system produces a lot of activity, but not necessarily good results. The reason is simple. The real
11:45customer is not the person who will use the product. It is the official who approves the project and
11:52releases the money. Russian state-funded cinema is a perfect example. A filmmaker seeking government money
11:58doesn't have to ask first what audiences want to watch. He needs to understand what the officials
12:05distributing the money want to hear. So he offers them the right Russia. Patriotic soldiers, grateful citizens,
12:14traditional families, evil Ukrainians, decadent West, and a wise state defending the country from its enemies.
12:23If the proposal fits the political agenda, it can receive funding. Whether people actually want to watch the
12:30finished film becomes a secondary question. The 2023 war film The Witness cost about 200 million rubles and
12:39presented the invasion almost exactly through Kremlin propaganda. Ukrainians are Nazis committing
12:46atrocities and Russia as the force exposing the truth. After two weeks in theaters, it had earned less than 14
12:56million rubles. Then came Tolerance in 2025, a state-backed film about a fictional European country destroyed by
13:04immigration and liberal values. It reportedly cost at least 200 million rubles. Only 192 people came to see it during
13:15its opening weekend. In a normal commercial industry, results like this are a warning. You made something people
13:24do not want. In this system, they do not necessarily mean failure. The producer received the money. The film was
13:32made. The ideological assignment was fulfilled. Everyone involved can report that another patriotic project
13:40has been completed. And this is where corruption begins to affect more than money. Artists and producers
13:47quickly learn what the people about them want to see. If portraying Russia as prosperous, united,
13:53powerful, and morally superior brings contracts and funding, that is the Russia they will produce.
14:00The same logic works far beyond cinema. People below create the picture their patrons want.
14:07Their patrons show that picture to the people above them. Eventually, the leadership is surrounded by an
14:14alternative reality created to please it. And after seeing that reality reflected back from every
14:21direction, it begins to believe it. Why the system needs Putin
14:29The most important function of corruption in Russia is that it substitutes for institutions. In a
14:35functioning institutional system, you do not need to know the right person to protect your business.
14:41Property rights do that. You do not need a patron to settle a dispute. Courts do that. Government money is
14:49distributed according to rules that remain in place when ministries and presidents change.
14:55In Russia, many of these functions are performed through personal relationships instead.
15:02A businessman needs someone who can protect him. An official needs someone who can protect his position.
15:09Competing clans needs someone powerful enough to settle disputes between them. At the top of this
15:16structure is Putin. His role is not to stop everyone from stealing. His role is to decide who is allowed
15:23to
15:23benefit from the system, who is protected, and who is no longer protected. This is why anti-corruption campaigns
15:31do not weaken the system. If everyone at the top has participated in questionable deals,
15:36corruption charges can be used selectively. An official may become enormously wealthy for years without
15:44consequences. Then he loses political protection and suddenly investigators discover the corruption.
15:52The message to everyone else is clear. Your wealth is safe only while the system protects you.
15:59This gives the ruler enormous power. But it also makes the entire elite dependent on his continued presence.
16:08Even replacing Putin with another authoritarian ruler is dangerous for them. A new ruler would have his
16:15own people, his own obligations, and his own networks. Nobody can be certain that all guarantees will survive.
16:24Putin, by contrast, knows how the existing clans fit together. He knows who owes what to whom, who can be
16:33rewarded, and who can be punished. That makes him more than a president. He becomes the guarantor of the
16:41arrangement. And this helps explain why the system has such difficulty imagining Russia without him.
16:51If Russia had strong institutions, changing the president would not threaten the fortunes of
17:00thousands of people around him. But when the state operates through personal favors – protection,
17:07corruption, and informal agreements – changing the person at the top can threaten the entire structure.
17:14That is why corruption does not merely enrich Putin's system. It helps keep Putin in power.
17:22Before you go, I'd like to ask you something. Have you ever worked inside an organization where the
17:28official rules mattered less than knowing the right person? And where honest competence could actually
17:35make you more vulnerable than loyalty? What happened to the people who refused to play along?
17:42Were they able to change the system? Or were they pushed out while the network protected itself?
17:50Please tell me where you saw it and how the system justified its behavior.
17:56Corruption rarely presents itself as corruption from the inside. It calls itself loyalty, teamwork,
18:05tradition, or simply how things get done. If this episode helped you understand why corruption in Russia is
18:13not merely theft but a system of political control, please like the video, subscribe, and share it with
18:22someone who still believes Putin genuinely wants to eliminate it. You can also help keep this channel
18:28independent by joining my think tank, leaving a super things, supporting through paypal, or using your
18:36hype points to help this episode reach more viewers. And please follow the show on Spotify. It genuinely helps
18:44and the next episode will appear in your feed automatically. Thank you for watching. I'll see you in the next
18:51one.