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Entrevista con María Victoria Llorente, investigadora y directora de la Fundación Ideas para la Paz, sobre su libro “La danza y el martillo. 25 años de decisiones frente a la violencia organizada en Colombia”.
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00:11Welcome to Interviews with the Viewer. My guest today is María Victoria Llorente.
00:15She is a political scientist from the University of the Andes, with studies at the Institute of Political Science
00:20From Paris, defense studies at the Higher War College, at the Hemispheric Center
00:25She has served in the U.S. Department of National Defense and has been a consultant for the Inter-American Development Bank.
00:29Development, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, National Planning,
00:35of the Ministry of National Defense, of the Mayor's Office of Bogotá, has been an advisor to the Secretariat
00:43of National Security and the Presidential Advisory Office for the issue, and for the last 20 years she has been the director
00:49From the Ideas for Peace Foundation. Welcome.
00:52Well, thank you very much Nelson for this invitation.
00:55Well, I invited her because I was very interested in this book that you are going to present inside
00:59of little, entitled The Dance and the Hammer, 25 years of decisions in the face of violence
01:05organized in Colombia. I found it very valuable that they undertake the investigative work together.
01:12with Juan Carlos Garzón to review a quarter of a century of decisions on violence and on
01:18Peace in Colombia. Why condense it and turn it into this document today?
01:23Well, I think that's precisely what, well, and it kind of came out, it came out like that, right?
01:29But what we were really discovering, Juan Carlos and I writing
01:35This book shows that, at the end of the day, none of the decisions made were final.
01:43Rather, it has all been like an accumulation of decisions, both within the framework of the negotiations
01:49with armed groups, as within the framework of security policies.
01:53And in reality, each government at the end of the day may come up with its own idea of what it wants to do.
02:00But on one hand, he has the baggage left by the previous government and he has to deal with
02:05the decisions of the previous government and on the other hand the decisions that will never be made
02:11They are, so to speak, clean decisions, but at the end of the day they have
02:16Instead of negotiating with Congress, he has to negotiate with the justice system, with society itself.
02:23So that's kind of what we wanted, what we wanted was to gradually rebuild from
02:29Like everyone else, because we have stereotypes about President Uribe's politics, only bullets.
02:37And there was really a lot of negotiation during that administration.
02:42President Santos, the peace agreement, but in short, all this is much more dynamic
02:49of the stereotypes we've created, and I think it really teaches you something at the end of the day.
02:55When we finished the book, we were left feeling like... we had been spectators and we had been
03:01in many of those decisions, but we learned in the cumulative, we have learned a lot.
03:07Yes, but one wonders, seeing that analysis, for example, from Caguán to total peace,
03:14Pastrana's Caguán, Petro's total peace, and one says, we've been through all that,
03:19All of that has been reviewed, but why does the country seem not to learn from the previous one, from the previous government?
03:25It seems that the newcomer wants to erase everything from the previous one, and we end up in a peace that never truly ends.
03:30to consolidate and in a war that always promises new cycles, new cycles.
03:35Yes, well, that does seem to me to be the million-dollar question at the end of the day, and I don't...
03:43We don't intend to answer that question because what we actually do there
03:49It's like analyzing a reality that is changing, that is constantly adapting and being built,
03:56that's like the notion of dance, that it's constantly adapting,
04:00Governments and other entities adapt, but we do have this...
04:07One is left with a lingering feeling after each operation,
04:15After each negotiation, we don't seem to be able to close the cycles.
04:20And we have an accumulation of unfinished cycles, even if one thinks about it today.
04:28The negotiation cycle with the paramilitaries remains open and unfinished.
04:35Despite the fact that there was a negotiation during the Uribe administration,
04:40There were tangible results and impacts on violence in Colombia,
04:45But we didn't finish, and the question we always ended up asking ourselves
04:51When we finished a chapter it was like, well, and the next day,
04:55the day after the operation, the day after the negotiation,
04:59And it's like something we couldn't quite close, but ultimately what we do have
05:05It's like an accumulation, we keep accumulating experiences, we keep building up.
05:10And I think that's the message of the book: let's not judge the past based on those stereotypes.
05:16that we have, but from that accumulated experience and how each government has dealt with it
05:22with that accumulated amount.
05:24But to show off, in the paramilitary field, for example,
05:28What was left unfinished or what was missing, according to what the book tries to explain?
05:32Well, let's say, on the one hand, that's a demobilization that for everyone
05:38It was, in general, a partial demobilization; not everyone demobilized.
05:45And in fact, the day after the demobilization of a very large number of combatants,
05:52Of at least 30,000 fighters, we already had close to 30 Bacrims,
05:58If you remember correctly that's what they were called at the time, that it was people,
06:04I don't know, but middle managers in general from these groups knew how things were handled.
06:10the business and they stayed, and they stayed, so the first thing is that they stayed
06:17such as the power structures and the incentives for illegal economies that were there
06:26And those rents that could continue to be exploited, on the one hand, we were unable to close that off.
06:33On the contrary, what it allowed was a new cycle of other groups
06:39which today are synthesized in what we know as the Gulf Clan,
06:43If it's like the group that remains there, it's a synthesis, but on the other hand,
06:47Justice and Peace, which was the model, let's say, of transitional justice,
06:51which was very innovative at the time for Colombia and the world,
06:56That model of transitional justice is still not finalized.
07:01There are cases where that's not the case; right now, for example, the prosecutor is still requesting reforms.
07:08that need to be done to expedite processes that are still underway in Justice and Peace,
07:16And look how interesting it is, precisely as a learning experience in Justice and Peace
07:21which was a model of justice that was envisioned in which all cases would be processed
07:29as a whole, that is, something of an unattainable magnitude,
07:39an analysis of that reality and of what happened in Justice and Peace
07:44and the difficulties of processing all those cases,
07:48That's what made the Santos government think afterwards,
07:52when they were beginning negotiations with the FARC,
07:56in establishing the legal framework for peace that is established
08:00as a transitional article in our Constitution,
08:06with the issue of case selection and prioritization.
08:09But before we get to the FARC issue, what if that whole process hadn't happened?
08:14that you explain and detail very well here, we wouldn't have arrived, for example
08:18Regarding what happened last week, the sentencing of the brother of former President Uribe
08:23Because of paramilitarism, it's all a cycle that continues.
08:26Of course, of course, it's still there, I mean, if we hadn't had that whole process,
08:32For example, the parapolitics scandal wouldn't have happened; I mean, this is a very strange country.
08:37because in general we have this fetishistic view of justice and that it's a country full of impunity,
08:46But if you look, for example, at the parapolitics scandal, at the number of people involved at the time
08:52Judged, politicians, governors, mayors, congressmen, that is, a hundred politicians
09:02linked to that process.
09:06So yes, that whole process allowed us to open up all that, it gave us the possibility of opening up all that truth.
09:15The thing is, and this is something that has been studied extensively worldwide,
09:20And that's the difficulty of dealing with the truth when it's so close.
09:26And when you have so many actors still in positions of power to deal with that.
09:34That's very difficult, let's say, those are processes that generally take much longer,
09:40But we in Colombia have them quite close.
09:44Of course, and something similar happened with the peace agreement with the FARC, right?
09:49Ten years later we see dissent, dissent.
09:53Yeah.
09:53It's a similar process.
09:55Well, look, this issue, this issue of the, that's not just in Colombia.
09:59In general, these transition processes are very complex
10:04because there are not always incentives for all the people who are part of the groups to give their all.
10:11The biggest problem is that middle management has the fewest incentives.
10:16because they won't receive the benefits from the bosses, yes, on the one hand,
10:22And on the other hand, they know very well how that criminal apparatus works.
10:30So, these dissident movements in Colombia always occurred with the demobilization of the paramilitaries.
10:37And then, of course, we have the dissident groups, but the FARC dissident groups existed even before the signing of the peace agreement.
10:46of the agreement.
10:47In other words, let's remember that there were some middle managers who decided to abandon the process and not sign the agreement.
10:56And then others who, once the agreement was signed, returned, returned to the mountain.
11:03So, but in general, the people who were left out, one could say that it was mostly the people who
11:10was more linked
11:12to illegal economies, drug trafficking, control of strategic corridors, and so on.
11:22Those are the people who... and it's like a sign of what we have today in our violence
11:29organized,
11:30which is ultimately organized violence that is much more linked to illegal economies as a purpose
11:39as a means to finance a rebellion against the State.
11:45Within that review, I was particularly struck by those figures, which are quite revealing.
11:50But putting them in that context, I understand one of the meanings to be, for example,
11:56that in the first two decades of the 21st century, violence decreased significantly thanks to that dance,
12:02In this case, dance is the equivalent of peace talks, for example.
12:07and the hammer, state repression.
12:10How and why did violence, specifically homicides, decrease by half in the first two periods?
12:18decades of the 21st century?
12:19What did all this have to do with it?
12:21No, it was precisely that mixture of dance and hammer,
12:25And there I would like to make a clarification, if you'll allow me,
12:28Because we actually use this analogy of the dance and the hammer
12:34not as something to replace the classic carrot and stick approach,
12:41Because what we really try to show in the book
12:45It is the complexity of these decisions.
12:48As I said at the beginning, these are not clean decisions,
12:51In other words, what President Uribe presented at the time was one thing.
12:56as their policy, even now that we are talking about anti-terrorism statutes,
13:02He presented his anti-terrorism statute at the time, which was blocked by the Constitutional Court.
13:06And another thing was what he presented regarding the law on alternative sentencing.
13:15for the paramilitaries, and something very different was what came out as justice and peace.
13:21So all these adjustments, that's why we think dance gives more of an image
13:28of a permanent adaptation, and in its relation to the hammer
13:35The dance and the hammer are adapting.
13:38So they are not mechanical things, nor are they imposed from above,
13:43but rather they have, let's say, a permanent adaptation.
13:46But anyway, now I'll get to the question you asked me.
13:48In any case, from that mixture?
13:49Yes. So, that mixture precisely, what I wanted to clarify is...
13:55But that mix precisely, and that's what it achieved, on the one hand,
14:01that impressive decrease in violence that occurred,
14:05especially during President Uribe's first term,
14:10closely associated, one, with the demobilization of paramilitary groups,
14:15And two, let's say, as with the entire withdrawal process taking place in the FARC
14:20based on democratic security and the democratic security policy
14:26and the military campaign heavily focused against the FARC.
14:31So it's like that mixture that ultimately produces that first drop,
14:36which is very large, then, if you see the fall, it starts to flatten out,
14:42And then there's another, less steep descent, but a descent nonetheless.
14:47in the case of the negotiation with the FARC.
14:51But I wanted to clarify one thing about that, which is very important, which is different.
14:55With the paramilitary groups, the most significant decline occurs,
15:00especially at the time, that is, it occurs as if from the demobilization
15:07and continues after demobilization.
15:10With the process involving the FARC, the fall occurs during the negotiation,
15:15It is very important, two years later, that is, after the demobilization
15:20until 2017, and from then on the trend changes again.
15:26And that's when all these rearrangements of organized violence occur.
15:31Sure. Could that have something to do with the fact that there are also many pending issues?
15:36in the implementation of the peace agreement with the FARC 10 years later?
15:39Well, yes and no. It's difficult to attribute anything, because you know we're in this narrative battle.
15:52Is everything that's happening to us due to the fact that we signed that agreement with the FARC?
15:57or everything, for example, the growth of illicit crops,
16:02Or is it all due, on the other hand, to the fact that we haven't implemented the agreement correctly?
16:08The deal really was a huge opportunity to make a lot of money,
16:15not only to achieve the demobilization of the FARC, which was no small feat.
16:20We seem to forget that in the late 90s that was actually a guerrilla movement
16:27that had this country in check.
16:30There were analysts who even considered that they could be taken
16:36national power, which was its strategic objective.
16:40So that's no small matter, the demobilization of that group and its closure.
16:46In a way, that represents, at first glance, the demobilization of the paramilitaries
16:51and then the demobilization of the FARC.
16:53The closing, like a cycle, like the end of the armed conflict in Colombia.
16:58And now we're in this new phase.
17:04But it's really not clear, I mean, for example, the peace agreement had this very important thing
17:13From point one, right?
17:16Recognizing that violence in Colombia, and especially the violence of the armed conflict
17:21It had a huge connection to those enormous gaps that exist in the Colombian countryside.
17:29and especially in areas that had historically been trapped in that violence,
17:37in illegal economies and in state weaknesses
17:43and the State's inability to enforce minimum rights in those regions
17:48and raises, let's say, how this whole idea of development programs
17:52with a territorial focus, which is like this logic of let's change those conditions.
17:57But those are processes, and it's presented as something that will happen, hopefully in 20 years.
18:02Emilio Archila, who was the post-conflict commissioner during President Duque's administration,
18:12which was right after the signing of the peace agreement,
18:17He strongly believed in that transformation agenda
18:20and he talked a lot about the opportunity that this transformation agenda offered
18:25so that we could transform those territories,
18:28But that's an illusion we've had for many years in Colombia.
18:35to do, to achieve those...
18:36And there is something that really prevents us from having state policies.
18:43to achieve those transformations in the territory.
18:47You guys analyze that very well,
18:48because, according to the book, we are clearly in a stage of fragmentation,
18:54again from all those acts of violence,
18:56And since 2022 the curve of violence has been rising again.
19:02So how can we explain these last few years in that sense?
19:05Yes, I think that's what we're trying to show.
19:11It's something that has been talked about a lot,
19:14especially during the period of former President Petro,
19:18And it's about how, let's say, first the demobilization of the FARC,
19:27Yes, they do create regulatory gaps in the territories.
19:32and the regulation of coca markets in certain territories of the country,
19:42And that was quickly, very quickly reconfigured in part...
19:48There were actors who were already ready for that.
19:51The ELN entered some areas, the dissidents,
19:56the groups that either left after or before the agreement was signed,
20:02And of course, the Gulf Clan was there.
20:06Then they very quickly begin to gain ground,
20:10because those structures ultimately create opportunities for illegal rents
20:15We didn't manage to truly break them.
20:21That's part of it...
20:23And part of the problem is that we think that the only illegal income that exists in Colombia
20:29It's cocaine, which is very important, but it's not everything.
20:32You reveal, for example, that after that record,
20:35I believe 240,000 hectares during the Petro administration.
20:39And research in rural areas shows that this is not the determining factor.
20:43of violence.
20:44Being important.
20:45Being important.
20:46No, because in reality, violence
20:48Violence, as we say there,
20:51is much more associated precisely with all these groups,
20:54diversity of groups, fragmentation,
20:57with very territorial logic,
20:59even the same group that claims to be...
21:04to be part of the same group,
21:06but that is in different territories,
21:07They operate with very different logics and form different alliances.
21:12They dance too.
21:14Then they form different alliances or a lot of disputes,
21:18dispute over rents.
21:20So, precisely what we see
21:24is that the increase in these effects,
21:28especially humanitarian ones,
21:30in many regions of the country,
21:32They have to do with the escalation of those disputes.
21:35One begins to see how little by little these groups
21:38Fewer and fewer people are fighting against the State.
21:41In some areas, they even want the State to be present.
21:45They are fighting against the State less and less.
21:48and more disputes between them.
21:52And that generates a lot of violence.
21:56But on the other hand,
21:57There are areas where these groups settle.
22:00and they manage to consolidate their dominance.
22:03And in those places we don't necessarily see homicidal violence.
22:07We see other kinds of things.
22:09Lots of extortion,
22:10which is very poorly measured.
22:12Then too
22:15There we propose how,
22:17In a way,
22:18Yeah,
22:18it increases,
22:20Violence is on the rise again.
22:22Never at the levels we experienced in the 90s.
22:25It's like something that stagnates,
22:28it grows
22:30and it remains stagnant.
22:32And often that stagnation
22:34It has nothing to do with it
22:35with the success of the security policies,
22:38but rather with success
22:40of the groups dominating territories.
22:42As a criminal way of life?
22:44Well, it's a way of life.
22:48Well, many times,
22:50I mean,
22:50the problem with those economies
22:52Not all of them are criminals.
22:55but they end up building ecosystems
22:59and economies
23:00that are totally
23:04intertwined
23:05the legal with the illegal.
23:07and part of the problem
23:09of those criminal economies
23:11because we have,
23:12we have the fixation
23:14that it is a topic
23:15only territorial,
23:17But then there's the territorial aspect,
23:19of course,
23:20It exists and it's very dramatic.
23:22in certain areas of the country,
23:24But the truth is
23:25It's that a lot of the money
23:28that is cooking
23:29in Putumayo,
23:31that is cooked in Tumaco,
23:33much of it in the Catatumbo region,
23:35because it ends up in circuits
23:40in Caracas,
23:42on circuits in Bogotá,
23:43in Medellín,
23:44then territoriality
23:48of the armed groups
23:50not necessarily corresponds
23:52with the flows of those rents.
23:55But that,
23:56You explain things well.
23:58no,
23:59as public policy
24:01thinking about this current reality,
24:04It's not even convenient
24:06the overflowing dance,
24:08what do you call it?
24:08the era of total peace
24:10Petro's,
24:11but neither
24:12the hammer
24:15intensified,
24:16that we are now
24:17precisely in a government
24:18what he said
24:18from day one
24:19if we have to impose ourselves
24:21by force,
24:22We're going to do it.
24:23Yeah.
24:23So,
24:24How to find
24:24that point of equilibrium?
24:26I think that
24:29in different ways,
24:32both governments
24:34Uribe's
24:34they had
24:35in a way
24:37the use of dance
24:38and the hammer
24:39in a very different way
24:42that was
24:44during the government
24:45de Santos,
24:46where also
24:47There was like that mix
24:49between dance and hammer,
24:50there we
24:51we show very well
24:53how could it not be
24:54of lies
24:55that while
24:56They were negotiating
24:57with the FARC
24:58blows were exchanged
24:59very important
25:00against the FARC,
25:03I mean,
25:05nothing is negotiated
25:06until everything
25:07It's been negotiated
25:08and they negotiated
25:10in the midst of the conflict,
25:12but then
25:13We have two experiences
25:15completely opposite,
25:16On one hand we have
25:17President Duque,
25:18We've already been through that.
25:19in different ways,
25:21President Duque
25:23your proposal
25:24It was to revive
25:25democratic security,
25:27Yeah?
25:29The question is
25:30if that was
25:31politics
25:31of proper safety
25:33for a scenario
25:34without the FARC,
25:36For example,
25:37without the paras,
25:38For example,
25:39but with another type
25:40of dynamics
25:41territorial
25:42very different,
25:44so,
25:45and then we have
25:46the model
25:47Quite the contrary,
25:49I mean,
25:49those two experiences
25:51of or just do,
25:53or just hit,
25:54or just the dance,
25:57We just had them,
25:59They are the last ones
25:59eight years of the country.
26:01Clear,
26:01You are an expert
26:02in public policy,
26:04one would like
26:05that the presence
26:06of the State
26:06not just,
26:07As you say,
26:08that way
26:12tax
26:13politics
26:14of the hammer,
26:14but that it was
26:15a comprehensive policy
26:16that would allow
26:16that those areas,
26:18For example,
26:18where they are becoming dominant
26:20illegal forces,
26:21finally
26:22access to the State
26:23and could overcome
26:25that eternal violence
26:26that they have been assigned.
26:27It's very difficult
26:28that a government comes to power
26:30that is neither on one side
26:31nor from the other,
26:31but rather achieve
26:32the ideal balance
26:33of those policies.
26:35I tell him,
26:36all governments
26:37have tried
26:38one way or another
26:39and they have called him
26:41in different ways,
26:42Do that,
26:44achieve a presence
26:45comprehensive
26:46of the State.
26:48I mean,
26:48That has always been the case.
26:49I'm telling you,
26:50For example,
26:51in the government
26:52from President Duque,
26:54although the vision
26:55It was a vision
26:56very heavy
26:57toward
26:59security
27:01and how to raise
27:04security,
27:07They had it there.
27:07a bet
27:08that they called
27:09the future zones.
27:10So,
27:10were chosen
27:12five or six territories
27:14of the country
27:14microfocused
27:16to do
27:16some interventions.
27:18It never happened,
27:19that remained
27:19in the law.
27:20Meanwhile,
27:22the commissioner
27:24Archila
27:26advanced
27:26in the implementation
27:28of the PDETs,
27:29of the programs
27:30in those 16
27:31subregions.
27:34the president
27:35Petro
27:37believe
27:38thousands
27:39of forms
27:40territorial,
27:41No?
27:41The pact
27:42Catatumbo,
27:43the mission
27:44from Caucasus,
27:46I mean,
27:47the other
27:48It was the model
27:50from Nariño,
27:51I mean,
27:51He put
27:52thousands of names
27:53to this idea
27:55and this longing
27:56to make interventions
27:57territorial
27:58integrals.
27:59The government
28:00Uribe,
28:02consolidation,
28:04they consolidated,
28:05I mean,
28:05This is really something
28:07that time and time again
28:08we have tried
28:09to do in Colombia,
28:10but it seemed
28:11that in general
28:13There are more incentives
28:14politicians
28:16to have,
28:17to show,
28:18I mean,
28:18because they are results
28:19that can be displayed.
28:20the results
28:21security
28:21are visible,
28:23Yeah?
28:23The operation
28:24is visible,
28:24the captures
28:25are visible,
28:26the seizures
28:27are visible,
28:28even though necessarily
28:30do not have the results
28:32or are they pure
28:34process results,
28:36but not necessarily
28:38results
28:39impact.
28:41So,
28:42and so?
28:43I think that in general
28:44politicians
28:45They know it,
28:46but there is no
28:47incentives,
28:48That's a question.
28:51I don't finish,
28:52right now the government
28:53of the president
28:55Abelardo de la Espriella
28:56And they're putting that in.
28:58within the law
28:59public order
29:00which they have just presented,
29:02something they call
29:03the interventions
29:04comprehensive territorial,
29:06I mean,
29:07It's something very similar,
29:10but
29:11we always say
29:12this time
29:13Yes, we're going to do it.
29:14This time we're going to do
29:15an accomplice
29:16that it will be
29:17and always
29:18We finished
29:19as in this
29:20a kind of disappointment
29:22that at the end of the day
29:23It also ends
29:24in a huge
29:25delegitimization
29:26of the State
29:27in front of the population.
29:29But
29:30It's only been two months.
29:31of the government,
29:32but
29:34yes it will legitimize
29:35to the State
29:36that we are
29:37watching every day
29:38who is a president
29:39with the gun
29:40to the belt,
29:41with a radiotelephone,
29:42conducting operations
29:43every day,
29:45or is it necessary to
29:47to clarify that
29:48with what type
29:49dance
29:49according to the analysis
29:50that you
29:51have done.
29:52I think that
29:55They are proposing
29:56the dance
29:57in their own way,
29:58which is the topic
29:59of submission.
30:00The statute
30:01counterterrorism.
30:02That's still the case,
30:04I mean,
30:04They've already raised that issue there.
30:05But let's say,
30:06it is, let's say
30:07as a whole scheme
30:08of submission,
30:08which is very necessary,
30:09part of the problem,
30:11let's say,
30:11of what he lacked
30:12to the president,
30:14to the bet
30:15from the president,
30:15It was missing many things
30:16to the bet
30:17from President Petro,
30:18but actually
30:20they always stayed
30:21we negotiate,
30:22But what is it?
30:23the mechanism
30:24exit
30:24and the guarantees
30:26legal
30:26so that I
30:28continue in this process,
30:30No?
30:30No, that's not it.
30:30then it is required
30:32a,
30:33Yes, they are required
30:33some rules
30:34of submission
30:35and the country
30:36has to give
30:36that discussion
30:37of some rules
30:38of submission.
30:39Another thing
30:40It's that the government,
30:41as it's being presented here,
30:43can impose them,
30:44We'll see.
30:45if someone submits
30:46to that scheme,
30:47We'll see.
30:48but if,
30:50I tell him
30:50just one thing,
30:51I believe in this
30:52of the gun
30:53to the belt
30:54and all these samples,
30:56let's say,
30:57of strength
30:58that are very well made
31:00to send
31:02the message
31:04and build
31:04the narrative
31:05of strength,
31:07That's very subjective.
31:09whom,
31:10Personally,
31:11Well, I,
31:13That makes me uncomfortable.
31:14It seems to me,
31:15It seems to me,
31:16I don't think so.
31:18but
31:20to many Colombians
31:22They like that.
31:23and they feel
31:24safer
31:25With that,
31:25It's a paradox,
31:26It's a paradox
31:27because these things
31:28They are not made
31:30only
31:32imposing,
31:33It also has to do with
31:34with wishes
31:35of the population
31:37that feels
31:38that felt
31:39very insecure
31:39with a great lack
31:40of authority
31:41during the government
31:44from President Petro,
31:45so,
31:46I think that
31:47It's very subjective,
31:48But, well, to me
31:49Personally,
31:49of course,
31:50of course,
31:51I'm impressed.
31:52One last question
31:53which I think is key
31:54and it is,
31:55How much will it impact
31:56all these investigations
31:58that you
31:58They are following
31:59the arrival
32:01intense again
32:02of politics
32:03United States,
32:04For example,
32:04in politics
32:05anti-drug
32:05in Colombia?
32:06Yeah,
32:07Well, politics
32:09United States
32:11nowadays
32:13of the president
32:14Trump
32:14It's more of the same.
32:15is more than
32:16we have always done,
32:17a policy
32:18completely
32:19focused
32:20in the hectares
32:21of coca
32:22and in how many
32:24hectares
32:24have
32:27and in using
32:29as the highest
32:30force
32:30in containing
32:32the hectares
32:33of coca,
32:33as much as we can.
32:35So,
32:35I think that's it
32:36There's nothing new.
32:37That's what we've
32:37always done,
32:38I'm only going to give him
32:39a fact
32:41that to me
32:42I'm very impressed
32:43and there it
32:44we mentioned,
32:45during the government
32:46of the president
32:47Duke,
32:48also very
32:50out of conviction
32:51but also
32:51very pressured
32:53by the first government
32:55of the president
32:56Trump
32:56in terms
32:57to reduce
32:58the hectares
32:59of coca,
33:00the president
33:01Duke
33:03eradicated
33:04forcibly
33:04more than
33:06300,000
33:07hectares
33:07throughout
33:08his government,
33:09That's a lot.
33:10and in the end
33:11of the day
33:12it turned out
33:12with more
33:13hectares
33:13cultivated,
33:16I mean,
33:16increased
33:17the hectares,
33:18So I don't say
33:20That's because,
33:21I mean,
33:21This is not a trial
33:22of value
33:22about what he did
33:24President Duque
33:26but a reality
33:27that there
33:29and about which
33:30well we
33:31we want
33:32attract attention
33:33because
33:34so
33:35perhaps there is
33:36an opportunity
33:37maybe
33:38to open
33:40a conversation
33:41different
33:42around
33:43of others
33:44mechanisms
33:46that they have
33:47what to see
33:47as with
33:47control
33:48further
33:49financial
33:50of all
33:50these flows
33:52transnational corporations
33:52of the resources
33:54associates
33:55to those economies
33:56What do we do?
33:56with gold
33:57For example,
33:58How is this possible?
33:59that 80%
34:00of gold
34:01that is for sale
34:02internationally
34:03is of origin
34:04illegal
34:05and nobody
34:06Say nothing?
34:07Yeah?
34:08And we are
34:08OK
34:08in which these two
34:09These are not the topics
34:10background
34:10you explain
34:12clearly
34:12which is structural
34:14and has
34:15more in depth
34:16but
34:17This leads to
34:18investigating
34:1925 years
34:20the Ideas Foundation
34:20for Peace
34:22to wrap things up
34:23you dedicate
34:24the book
34:24to their children
34:25And one wonders
34:2725 years later
34:31What future?
34:33it is visualized
34:34on this horizon
34:36between wars
34:36and peace
34:37and possibility
34:38for the generations
34:40who are coming?
34:40Yeah,
34:41Well,
34:41I think that
34:42Look,
34:43when I started
34:43to do this
34:45when I started
34:46to do this
34:46would have to
34:4895 years
34:49when I got in
34:51on this topic
34:55and
34:56I
34:56looking
34:57backward
34:59I do believe it
34:59that we have
35:00I mean,
35:01This is a country
35:01who is always
35:02in crisis
35:03and we love it
35:04say
35:04that we are
35:05in crisis
35:05that we are
35:06at the worst
35:06Colombia's moment
35:07I want to tell you
35:08of the worst moments
35:09from Colombia
35:12we have had
35:13what happens
35:14the thing is
35:16we always have
35:17the idea
35:18And I think that
35:19a bit
35:19the notion
35:20this notion
35:21peace
35:23determination
35:23of the conflict
35:24It's like a notion
35:25What are we going to do?
35:25to have a closure
35:26clean
35:27then we closed
35:29this
35:30and we are already
35:30Everyone's happy
35:31but actually
35:33These are processes
35:34and what we
35:36we want to show there
35:37the thing is
35:38we have made progress
35:39lot
35:40in the middle
35:42of a dance
35:42which has been
35:43very complex
35:44of a hammer
35:45which also
35:46has had
35:47let's say
35:48restrictions
35:49That's not it.
35:50That's not it.
35:51It's not like it either
35:52Uribe
35:54the president
35:54Uribe
35:55he used the hammer
35:56as
35:56wanted
35:58let's say
35:58They left
35:59generating
36:00restrictions
36:01in use
36:02of the hammer
36:03I think that
36:04This is a society
36:04a lot more
36:05evolved
36:06who understands
36:07a lot more
36:09the use
36:11of these
36:12tools
36:13that we are
36:14at certain levels
36:15of violence
36:16far inferior
36:17to those of us who had
36:1830 years ago
36:20and that we have
36:22an opportunity
36:23of
36:24thinking about us
36:25different
36:26and outside
36:27from the drawer
36:28the problem
36:29that we have
36:30opposite
36:30I think that
36:31Colombia
36:31which shows
36:32this book
36:33also
36:33It's a country
36:35which has a huge
36:35ability
36:36of inventing things
36:38we have invented
36:40many solutions
36:41And that's why
36:42in fact
36:42in many things
36:44not only
36:45in peace
36:46but also
36:47in the way
36:47as we have
36:48developed
36:49our policies
36:50security
36:52we have been
36:53examples
36:54in the region
36:55examples
36:56international
36:58I don't want to say
36:59that we
37:00let's sit down
37:01in complacency
37:02but also
37:03let's leave
37:05a bit
37:05of catastrophism
37:07and of the
37:08and of the idea
37:09which is impossible
37:10do something
37:11because actually
37:12This is a country
37:13what has he done
37:13many things
37:14in the last
37:1625 years
37:17to tell him
37:20we have demobilized
37:21about
37:2280,000 people
37:24we have taken out
37:2480,000 people
37:25of the war
37:28many people
37:28in any case
37:30Thank you for opening.
37:30the dialogue
37:31with this book
37:32the dance
37:33and the hammer
37:33this powerful
37:34investigation
37:35by Maravictoria
37:36Llorente
37:36and Juan Carlos Garzón
37:37that invites us
37:38to think
37:39what happened
37:39in the last
37:40quarter of a century
37:40not only
37:41to those who already
37:41we know
37:42what has happened
37:43here
37:43but to the new ones
37:44generations
37:45thanks a lot
37:46thank you for this invitation
37:48and so
37:48for opening us up
37:49this space
37:50in order to be able to talk
37:51of the latter
37:52quarter of a century
37:53which is not only
37:54the last quarter of a century
37:56but also
37:56It says a lot
37:57of what's to come
37:58so
37:59thanks a lot
38:00And thank you to the audience.
38:01Thank you for listening.
38:02Thank you
38:03for continuing
38:04interviews
38:05The Spectator
38:06Bye
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38:18Thanks for watching the video.