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When German General Hermann-Bernhard Ramcke demanded proof that Brigadier General Charles Canham was worthy of accepting his surrender, Canham pointed to the GIs at the bunker entrance: “These are my credentials.” Their brief exchange became a defining story of the Battle of Brest and the men who fought their way across Normandy and Brittany to reach it.
This World War II military history documentary follows Canham from Omaha Beach to the Crozon Peninsula, where American infantry endured fierce fighting against German paratroopers and fortified positions. Discover the story behind a memorable surrender, and how leadership, courage, and the soldiers themselves shaped an army’s authority. A gripping piece of WW2 history for viewers interested in battlefield stories, the Battle of Brest, and the human cost of war.
This World War II military history documentary follows Canham from Omaha Beach to the Crozon Peninsula, where American infantry endured fierce fighting against German paratroopers and fortified positions. Discover the story behind a memorable surrender, and how leadership, courage, and the soldiers themselves shaped an army’s authority. A gripping piece of WW2 history for viewers interested in battlefield stories, the Battle of Brest, and the human cost of war.
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LearningTranscript
00:00On the afternoon of September 19, 1944, on the Croissant Peninsula, across the water from the
00:06smoking ruins of Brest, an American lieutenant named James Dunham looked up at the cliffs and
00:13saw white flags. Dunham led a platoon in Company I, 3rd Battalion, 13th Infantry, 8th Infantry
00:21Division. For nearly a month, his division had been fighting its way through concrete,
00:26rock, and wire at the tip of Brittany. His men had learned not to trust anything that moved on those
00:33headlands. So they watched. And out of the rocks came a single German, a medic, walking toward them.
00:42He carried a message. The general was waiting in a dugout. And he was waiting for American commanders.
00:49Not a lieutenant. Commanders. There was one German general on that peninsula the whole American Corps
00:57wanted. His name was Hermann Bernhard Rampke. And for a month, he had been the man holding Brest.
01:05Three Americans went forward. Brigadier General Charles Canham, Assistant Commander of the 8th
01:12Division. Colonel R.A. Griffin, Commander of the 13th Infantry. Lieutenant Colonel Earl Lorette,
01:20whose battalion had just fought its way onto those cliffs. A passage led them down into the rock.
01:27Hold on to this number, because it comes back. The room where Ramke waited was 75 feet underground.
01:35According to the 8th Division's own account, Ramke spoke first.
01:40I am to surrender to you. Then he added a condition. I want to see your credentials.
01:47Stop there for a moment, because this is not only the arrogance it sounds like.
01:52Look at the two men in that room. Ramke was 55, a General der Fallschirmtruppe,
01:59a general of paratroops, equal in rank to an American three-star. He had helped plan the airborne
02:06invasion of Crete in 1941, and fought in it. In the desert at El Alamein, when his own high command
02:14had written his brigade off, he refused to surrender, marched his men out across the sand,
02:20and seized a British supply column on the way. And here is a detail almost nobody remembers.
02:25The official date on his swords and his diamonds to the Knight's Cross is that same day, September 19, 1944.
02:37Only 27 men in the entire German armed forces ever received the diamonds. Ramke was being decorated
02:44on the day he walked into captivity. Now look at the American. Charles Canham was 43.
02:52He wore one star, and he had worn it for 29 days. His name meant nothing in Berlin. What he
03:00had was
03:00a scar on his wrist, from a beach in Normandy. That was most of what he carried down those 75
03:06feet.
03:07So the question is simple. What does a man with one star show a man with the diamonds?
03:14That is what this story is about. And I am going to make you wait for the answer.
03:19Because it only means something once you know what it cost.
03:23If you want to see what the G.I.s of the American 8th Infantry Division went through to reach
03:28that
03:28bunker, hit like and subscribe. It helps this story find the people it belongs to.
03:35Here is why the demand in that bunker was more than vanity.
03:41In August of 1944, Brest was a prize. It was the great deep-water port at the end of Brittany,
03:48and the American plan for supplying its armies in France leaned on ports exactly like it.
03:55Hitler understood that as well as anyone. He ordered the garrison to fight to the last man,
04:00and he gave the job to Romka, whose 2nd Parachute Division formed the hard core of the defense.
04:08The American official history calls them tough young soldiers. They earned the description.
04:15Three American infantry divisions, the 2nd, the 8th, and the 29th, with rangers, engineers,
04:21and tanks alongside them, spent most of a month breaking into a city ringed with old French forts
04:27and new German concrete. While they did it, the rest of the war raced east, all the way to the
04:33borders of Germany. And still, the G.I.s at Brest kept going, fort by fort, block by block, hill
04:42by hill.
04:43So when Romka asked for credentials, he was asking something sharper than it sounds. He was saying,
04:49in effect, prove to me that you are worthy of what I am about to hand over.
04:54However, he had held the Americans for a month. In his mind, that gave him the right to decide who
05:00took his surrender. Keep that in mind, because Charles Canham had an answer ready, and it was a
05:06short one. He did not need to think about it. But that short answer had taken 105 days to collect.
05:13And the first piece of it was collected at about 7.30 in the morning on the 6th of June,
05:17in three feet of water, on a stretch of sand the planners called Dog White, where a 43-year-old
05:24colonel was about to find out exactly what his rank was worth on a beach where almost nobody could hear
05:30his orders. To understand what Charles Canham carried into that bunker, you have to go back to
05:35the moment his rank stopped working. June 6th, 1944, Omaha Beach.
05:42At about 7.30 in the morning, a landing craft, numbered 71, ground its way toward the sector
05:48called Dog White. On board was the command group of the 116th Infantry, and with it, its colonel.
05:57The run-in nearly ended before it began. The boat struck one of the beach obstacles and nudged a
06:03teller mine fixed to it. The mine fell away without exploding. Then the ramp went down,
06:10and the colonel and his staff stepped off into three feet of water and began to wade toward a beach
06:16that
06:16was already full of dead and wounded men. They lost an officer just crossing the open sand.
06:22Shortly after he reached the shingle, a bullet went through Canham's wrist.
06:27Now, here is a fact worth holding onto. The colonel later reported that three-quarters of his
06:34regiment's radios had been destroyed or made useless. Think about what that means. A regimental
06:41commander exists to send orders. On that beach, most of the machinery for sending them was gone.
06:48His staff could not reach his battalions. His battalions could not reach their companies.
06:56The rank on Canham's collar was still there, but the system that turned rank into action had been
07:02shot away in the first hour. So what was left? Only the man himself. Walking.
07:10The official army account describes Canham's party, together with the assistant division commander,
07:15Brigadier General Norman Cota, moving up and down behind the crowded seawall, under fire,
07:21urging officers and sergeants to jar men loose and get them moving. Canham did not stay down to have
07:28his wrist dressed and evacuated. He wrapped it and kept walking. The men who saw him never forgot it.
07:36Sergeant Bob Slaughter of D Company remembered Canham shouting at a lieutenant who had taken cover
07:41in an abandoned pillbox. Get your ass out of there and show some leadership. Another veteran of the
07:48regiment, Don McCarthy, put it more simply, I was more afraid of Colonel Canham than I was of the Germans.
07:55That line sounds like a joke. It isn't. On a beach where no radio worked, fear of one particular man
08:02walking along the seawall was one of the few forces left that could move a frightened soldier forward.
08:09Now watch what happened a few hundred yards from where he was hit, because this is the part that
08:14matters for our bunker. At about 7.50, Company C of the 116th began to move. In front of them
08:22was a
08:23belt of wire along the promenade road. A private named Lambert went forward with a Bangalore torpedo,
08:30a long tube of explosive meant to blow a gap in that wire. He was killed trying to set it.
08:37A second lieutenant named Schwartz crawled up, fixed the igniter, and fired it. The charge blew a large hole
08:44in the wire. Through that hole, Company C started up the bluff in a narrow, single file. They reached the
08:51top, having lost about six men after leaving the seawall. Men of the 5th Ranger Battalion came through
08:57gaps nearby at about 8.10, and by 8.30, Ranger platoons were on top as well. By then, Canham's
09:04command
09:05party had climbed halfway up the bluff. Mortar fire killed two men standing near Coda. The party kept
09:12going and reached the top. Look carefully at that sequence. No general order sent Private Lambert
09:19into the wire. No radio told Lieutenant Schwartz to crawl forward. The decisive acts of that morning
09:26on Dog White were made by men with no rank worth mentioning who did the next necessary thing because
09:32someone had to. And notice what Canham did. He did not create those acts. He made sure the men around
09:41him saw an officer standing up while they were deciding whether to stand up themselves. That is
09:47the first layer of the answer this story is building toward. On Omaha Beach, an American colonel's
09:53authority did not come down a wire from above. It came from the men who were willing to move when
09:59he
09:59moved. Charles Canham understood this better than most colonels, and there is a reason. He had once been
10:06one of those men. Born in Kola, Mississippi in 1901, he joined the Army as a private in May of
10:131919.
10:14Two years later, as a sergeant, he was sent to the Army's first preparatory school for enlisted men
10:20trying to get into West Point. He made it and graduated in 1926. And here is the twist.
10:28Hermann Bernhard Rampke had started at the bottom, too. He joined the Imperial German Navy in 1905 as a
10:3616-year-old and fought as a Marine infantryman in Flanders in the First World War. Both men had
10:42climbed from the ranks to general. So the difference between them, when they finally met underground,
10:48was not where they came from. It was what each of them believed a general's authority rested on.
10:55Canham's regiment paid terribly for that beach. The men who climbed the bluffs on Dog White kept
11:00fighting through the hedgerows towards St. Lowe. Their colonel was awarded the Distinguished Service
11:05Cross for his leadership on D-Day and in the fighting that followed. And then, in August,
11:11he was taken away from them. Because another division needed him. The 8th Infantry Division had lost its
11:18assistant commander, Brigadier General Nelson Walker, in its very first days of combat in Normandy.
11:24He had been badly wounded up in the front lines on his second day and died the day after.
11:30So when Canham pinned on his single star on August 21st, he was not stepping into an empty office.
11:37He was taking the place of a man who had been killed doing the job he was now being given.
11:42And he was taking it just as his new division turned west, toward a port where the American army would
11:49discover that, for once, it did not have enough of the thing it relied on most.
11:54August 25th, 1944. On the same day that the pursuit across France was surging beyond the Seine toward
12:02Paris and the German border, three American divisions at the far western tip of Brittany
12:06began their opening attack on Brest. The commander who sent them in was Major General Troy Middleton of the
12:138th Corps. And before the 1st Rifleman moved, Middleton had already run into the problem that would shape
12:19everything that followed. Watch these numbers, because they explain the next three weeks.
12:25Middleton asked for an initial stock of 8,700 tons of ammunition and 11,600 more for the first three
12:33days of fighting.
12:35Third army thought the request was excessive. It allotted him about 5,000 tons. Bradley and Patton
12:42then authorized 8,000. But the full amount never arrived. The trucks, the trains, and the ships that
12:48could have carried it were feeding the armies racing east. Brest was now 300 miles behind the front line
12:54that mattered most. So think about what that means for a moment. The American army in France had built
13:00its way of fighting on one great advantage. When infantry ran into a strong point, they called
13:05the artillery and let the shells do the work. At Brest, the official history records, the artillery had
13:12to cut back to direct support missions only. Within days, Middleton had to suspend operations altogether
13:18and wait for ammunition. Every shell that did not fall on a German bunker became work that a rifleman
13:25would have to do himself. That is the second layer of what Canham was carrying into that
13:30bunker. Not just a willingness to move under fire. A willingness to move when the thing that usually
13:36protected you had been rationed. Look at what that looked like on the ground. Task Force B had been
13:42working forward since August 21st. On August 23rd, it attacked a height called Hill 154. A staff
13:50sergeant named Alvin Casey, already mortally wounded, kept going and destroyed a German pillbox with hand
13:56grenades before he died. That is how the hills around Brest were being taken. Not by barrage. By men.
14:05Canham's new division, the 8th, went in with the rest on the 25th. In the first two days, it gained
14:11about 1,200 yards. Then another 300. That is not a breakthrough. That is less than a mile, bought yard
14:19by yard, against paratroopers who had dug into stone. On September 1st, the 8th division's 121st
14:27infantry helped the 2nd division take a strong point called Fourneuf. On the 2nd, the 2nd division took
14:34Hill 105. Every one of those names on the map stood for a single small advance, paid for by a
14:42few
14:42companies of tired men with not enough fire behind them. And here is the question that should be in your
14:48mind right now, because the men at Brest were asking it too. Why keep going? The answer is
14:56uncomfortable. By the end of August, the Allied armies were moving so fast that the reason for
15:02taking Brest, its port, was fading. The front was hundreds of miles to the east. Other ports were
15:09coming within reach. The American commanders knew it. But the official history records the reasoning that
15:16kept the attack alive. Once the American army had put its hand to the plow, it should not let go.
15:23Take that sentence seriously. It means that by September, Brest had stopped being only a port.
15:30It had become a test. 40,000 German soldiers, behind concrete, under a commander who had sworn to
15:37Hitler he would fight to the last man, were betting that the American army would decide the price was too
15:42high and walk away. If it did walk away, every German fortress commander from the channel coast to the
15:49Atlantic would learn the lesson. So the credibility of the American army itself was now riding on a few
15:56battered divisions at the end of Brittany, short of shells. And Rompke knew it. He understood exactly
16:03what kind of fight this was. He did not need to win at Brest. He needed only to make each
16:09yard cost enough
16:11that the Americans would wonder whether the whole thing was worth it. His paratroopers were, in the
16:17words of the American official history, tough young soldiers. They were good at making ground expensive.
16:25Pay attention to this, because it sets up the scene in the bunker. Rompke was not merely defending a city.
16:33He was trying to break something in his enemy. The belief that if the American army began a job,
16:39it finished it. Charles Canham, one star, 20-some days in his new job, was right in the middle of
16:48that
16:48test. His task, as assistant division commander, was to be forward, where the 8th division's attacks
16:55were going in, to see what the men were facing, and to keep them moving. That is what an assistant
17:01division commander did in that army. The man who had held his job before him had been killed in the
17:06front lines in Normandy, doing exactly that. The ammunition came slowly. By September 7th,
17:13the Corps had enough to resume full-scale attacks. On September 8th, the 8th division seized the
17:19eastern end of a ridge called Lambezelec. The ring was tightening. But before the big assault could break
17:26the city open, something happened on the western edge of the siege that showed, in a single room,
17:31everything this story is about. On September 9th, near a German coastal battery called Locrist,
17:38an American lieutenant and three rangers walked through a minefield, into a fortress, and into the
17:45office of its German commandant. And the commandant asked them, in his own way, the very same question
17:51Ramke would ask ten days later. Who are you? And what is standing behind you? The lieutenant's answer
17:59would put a live grenade into the conversation. September 9th, 1944. The Le Conquet Peninsula,
18:06west of Brest. The German strongpoint there was a coastal battery the Americans called Locrist.
18:14The Germans called it the Graf Spee battery. It was a complex of gun positions, pillboxes, tunnels,
18:20and minefields built to cover the sea approaches to Brest, and at its center sat a heavy bunker the
18:27rangers simply called The Fort. An attack on it was planned for dawn. The night before, a patrol of
18:35four men went out ahead of that attack. Their leader was First Lieutenant Robert Edlin, Executive Officer
18:41of Able Company, 2nd Ranger Battalion. You need to know one thing about Edlin before he walks into that
18:48minefield. Three months earlier, on D-Day, his company had gone in at Omaha Beach, on the sector
18:55next to Canham's. Edlin was shot twice almost the moment he landed. He lost large parts of his left
19:03calf and pieces of bone from his right leg. He was evacuated to England, and he left the hospital early,
19:08against his doctor's advice, to get back to his men. His rangers had a name for him. The Fool Lieutenant.
19:17As one of them put it, that damn fool lieutenant ain't afraid of nothing.
19:22So this is a man limping on a rebuilt leg, leading three rangers, Bill Courtney, Bill Dreher, and Warren
19:29Burmaster, toward a fortress that was supposed to take a full assault the next morning. Their orders were
19:35modest. Spot pillboxes, chart minefields, bring back prisoners. American artillery had been working
19:42over that ground, and the shells had torn craters across one of the minefields. Courtney studied the
19:48line of craters running toward a pillbox and said, I think I can see a way through. A shell crater
19:55is one
19:55of the few places in a minefield you know is clear. So the four rangers moved from crater to crater,
20:01all the way to the bunker. Edlin sent Burmaster back to the edge of the minefield as their getaway
20:07man. The other three stormed the pillbox, shouting orders in broken German, and took the room.
20:12They came out with about twenty prisoners. Dreher stayed to guard them. That should have been the
20:18end of the patrol. A good night's work. Instead, Edlin and Courtney took one of the captured Germans,
20:24an officer who spoke English, and made him guide them deeper into the complex. Through tunnels and
20:30corridors they went. And whenever they met German soldiers, their prisoner talked their way past.
20:36Nobody stopped them. And then they were in the Commandant's office. The Commandant was Lieutenant
20:42Colonel Martin Furst. Edlin disarmed him and put his gun to Furst's face. And then he told a lie.
20:49Why don't you just surrender your fort and get this whole thing over with?
20:54The area, Edlin said, was surrounded. Now pay close attention to what Furst did next,
21:00because it is the same thing Ramke would do ten days later. He checked the Americans' credentials.
21:07Furst picked up a telephone and called his people. And when he put it down, he said,
21:11there are only three of you. You are my prisoners now. Think about that moment. A German Lieutenant
21:20Colonel, in his own bunker, surrounded by his own garrison, has just found out that the Americans
21:26pointing guns at him are almost alone. On paper, he holds every card. Edlin answered by pulling out a
21:34fragmentation grenade. He pressed it into Furst's belly. He pulled the pin. And he began to count.
21:42One. Two.
21:45Furst shouted, OK! Edlin put the pin back in. The Commandant then went on the battery's
21:52loudspeaker system and announced the surrender. Not a shot was fired. By one account, more than 800
21:59German soldiers came out and stacked their weapons in the courtyard. The American official history
22:05says the Commandant surrendered his forts and more than a thousand men. Edlin was awarded the
22:11Distinguished Service Cross for that night. Now let's look at what actually happened in that office,
22:15because it changes what the word credentials means. On paper, Furst was right. There were only three
22:23Americans inside his fort. If credentials meant numbers, Edlin had none. But Furst did not surrender
22:31to three men. He surrendered to what he believed was behind them. Outside the minefield was an American
22:38army that had been shelling his battery, that had already taken the hills around Brest, that had been
22:44told to take the city, and showed no sign of stopping. The grenade was real. But what made Furst shout,
22:51okay, was the certainty that if he killed those three rangers, the next morning would bring the rest of
22:57them. That is the third layer. An American lieutenant's credentials were not his rank, and they were not
23:05even the three men with him. They were the whole weight of the army that stood behind the men who
23:11were
23:11willing to walk in first. Keep this scene in your mind. Because ten days later, 75 feet underground,
23:19a German general would ask an American general for proof. And the American would give him an answer
23:25that pointed at the same thing Edlin's grenade had pointed at. But Rompke was not a lieutenant colonel
23:31in a coastal battery. He was the commander of the whole fortress. He had been offered a way out already,
23:36and he had turned it down. On the morning of September 13th, while the American guns around Brest
23:42fell silent, Troy Middleton sent Rompke a letter. What Rompke wrote back, and what Middleton then told
23:49his own soldiers, decided how the last week of the battle would be fought, and who would have to fight
23:54it. Among them was the regiment Charles Canham had led up the bluff on D-Day, September 13th, 1944.
24:02For a short while that morning, the American guns around Brest went quiet.
24:07Into that silence, Troy Middleton sent a letter to Hermann Bernhardt Rompke. It proposed surrender.
24:15By then, the Americans had broken into the outer defenses. The hills around the city were falling,
24:20one after another, and the ammunition had finally begun to arrive.
24:25Middleton was offering the German commander a way to end it. Rompke declined. And then Middleton did
24:33something unusual. The American official history records that he published the letters,
24:38his and Rompke's, for his own troops to read. He wanted every man in the VIII Corps to know that
24:45the enemy had been offered a way out and had refused it. Then he gave them their instructions,
24:51in four words, take the Germans apart. Stop for a moment and think about what Middleton was doing.
25:01He was not hiding the decision from his soldiers or wrapping it in staff language. He was telling
25:07them plainly, this is why you are going back in. The man in charge of Brest has chosen this. Now
25:14finish it. Remember that. Because a German general who had just turned down a surrender with honor was
25:21going to discover, six days later, exactly whom he had been dealing with. And now we come to what
25:27Rompke was relying on. Not just his paratroopers. Stone. Brest was ringed with forts, some of them
25:35centuries old, rebuilt and filled with German weapons. The 8th Division had already run into one of them.
25:42On September 10th through 12th, its 121st infantry stood in front of Fort Bougain, with walls 25 to 35 feet
25:51high and a dry moat in front of them. On September 11th, heavy artillery was turned on it. The division's
25:59own history records that it failed to make an appreciable dent. Here is what that means in plain terms.
26:05The American army's great answer to every problem in France was firepower. And at Bougain, the firepower
26:12simply bounced off. Those walls were Rompke's credentials. Thick, old and silent, and built to
26:21make the attacker pay in men. So how do you take a fort that artillery cannot crack? The answer came
26:28on the
26:29eastern side of the city. And it came from Canham's old regiment. The 29th Division was attacking a
26:35stronghold called Fort Montbury. The job fell to Company B of the 116th Infantry, the regiment Canham
26:43had led across Dog White on D-Day. Many of the men who had followed him up that bluff were
26:48now in front of
26:49another wall. They did not go alone. A squadron of British Churchill Crocodile flamethrowing tanks from
26:56the 141st Regiment Royal Armored Corps was attached to them, along with American tank destroyers.
27:03The men of the 116th had trained with the British crews before the attack, learning how to move
27:09together. It still went badly at first. A hidden naval shell, buried as a mine, struck the second
27:17crocodile in the column, killing its driver and blocking the way for the tanks behind.
27:23Another crocodile could not find an opening in the walls to flame, and had to pull back.
27:28For a while, the fort seemed to be doing exactly what Rompke wanted. Holding. Costing. Waiting.
27:37But the infantry kept working forward with what they had, and the flame tanks that could reach the
27:42walls poured fire into every opening they could find. Engineers brought up
27:46explosives, and on September 16th, Fort Montberry fell. Of its garrison, 80 survivors came out and
27:55surrendered. Notice what had happened here. The fort had beaten the shells. It could not beat men who
28:03simply kept coming, combining whatever they had—a British flame tank, an American infantry company,
28:09an engineer with a charge, until the wall no longer mattered. That is the fourth layer of this story.
28:17Rompke's credentials were the things he had built. Concrete. Stone. The reputation of his paratroopers.
28:25The American answer was not a better wall. It was the stubborn refusal of tired infantrymen,
28:31one alongside their allies, to let any wall be the end of the conversation.
28:37On the same day Montberry was taken, the 29th Division had already captured Fort Caron-Rue,
28:43on September 13th. Around the coast, the 5th Ranger Battalion was fighting what it called
28:49the Battle of the Forts, taking Petit Minou and the Forts of Montjean and Delec, one at a time.
28:56And Canham's own division had moved on. The 2nd Division had relieved the 8th in front of Bougon,
29:03and the 13th and 121st Infantry pulled back to regroup. Then the 8th Division was sent somewhere
29:11else entirely, south, across the water, onto a long rocky peninsula called Crozon. Remember that
29:19name from the very first minute of this story. Because Rompke had looked at the same map,
29:24By mid-September, he could see the end coming in the city. And on the peninsula,
29:29with its cliffs and its bunkers buried deep in the rock, he saw a place to make one last stand.
29:35On September 18th, the city of Brest finally gave up. When the Americans walked into the
29:41German positions that day, they found something that no one expected. Something that showed how
29:46the German garrison itself saw this battle by the end. And they found that the man they wanted most
29:52was not there. September 18th, 1944, Brest. On the western side of the city, in the old quarter
30:00called Recouvrance, the German garrison commander, Colonel Hans von der Mosel, surrendered all his
30:06troops to the 29th Division. On the eastern side, Colonel Eric Piazzonka came out and surrendered his
30:13part of the city to the 2nd Division, in a square named after an American president, Place du Président Wilson.
30:21And here is the detail I promised you. The American official history records that nearly 10,000 German
30:27prisoners walked out that day, and that they had prepared for the capitulation. They had shaved,
30:33they had washed, they had packed suitcases. Picture that for a moment. American infantrymen,
30:41who had spent almost four weeks crawling through rubble, filthy, unshaven, many of them carrying
30:47nothing but a rifle and what was in their pockets, now watching thousands of enemy soldiers come out
30:52of the cellars clean, combed, and holding luggage. What does that tell you? It tells you that a great
31:00many men in that garrison had known for some time that it was over. They had been ready to stop.
31:07They had been waiting only for someone above them to say the word. Hold that thought, because it is the
31:13mirror image of everything on the American side of this story. The man whose word they had been waiting
31:18for was not in the city. The official history says only that Ramka had escaped across the harbor to
31:24the Crozon Peninsula. The German news agency announced that he left the smoldering ruins of Brest under cover
31:31of night with what remained of his followers. He had chosen the place for his last stand.
31:37Cliffs. Narrow ridges. Bunkers cut deep into the rock. But the Americans were already there.
31:47The 8th Division had begun its attack on the peninsula on September 15th.
31:51Its 28th Infantry went for the Northern Ridge. The 121st went along the Southern Ridge,
31:57through the town of Crozon itself. The 13th Infantry was held in reserve, waiting.
32:03Now look closely at what the division's own history records about those days.
32:08Because it shows you who was really carrying the weight.
32:12On the 15th, the 3rd Battalion of the 28th Infantry attacked under Major Donald Ward.
32:19In one of its rifle companies, Company L, every officer became a casualty. Every one.
32:27A company in that condition can simply stop. Instead, a technical sergeant named Charles
32:33Balance took over, pulled the survivors back together, and kept Company L in the fight.
32:39The next day, a sniper killed him. The division history does not stop to dwell on it. It just moves
32:46on, the way the war did. But think about what that one line contains. A sergeant who was never meant
32:54to
32:54command a company, held one together for a day, and was killed doing it. And the company kept going
33:00without him. On September 17th, the German line broke on both ridges. The division recorded that
33:07one fort fell to a single machine gun of the 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry. One gun crew, one fort.
33:15The history does not even give their names. That night, 1st Lieutenant George McClendon took a
33:21reinforced platoon of Company L, 13th Infantry, forward, and outposted a height called Hill 70.
33:28And before 9 o'clock the next morning, a sergeant named Will Wheeler, leading a combat patrol of little
33:34more than a squad, came back with more than 100 German prisoners. Let me put that the way it deserves.
33:41A sergeant with about a dozen men brought in over a hundred of the enemy. So here is the fifth
33:48layer
33:49of this story, and it is the one that finally connects the beach to the bunker. On the German
33:54side, 10,000 men in Brest had packed their suitcases and waited for their commanders to give them
34:00permission to stop. On the American side, when the officers fell, a sergeant took command. When a whole
34:11one hired to give the order, a squad went out and came back with a hundred prisoners.
34:16Authority in the 8th Division did not sit only at the top. It reached all the way down to the
34:21men at
34:21the bottom, and it kept working when the men above them were gone. You saw it first on Dog White,
34:27with Private Lambert and Lieutenant Schwartz and The Wire. You saw it at Locrist, with Edlin and his
34:34grenade. Now you are seeing it on Crozon, in men whose names survive only as a line or two in
34:40a
34:40division history. By the afternoon of the 18th, the peninsula was being cut into pieces. Four separate
34:48forces moved out to clear its rocky fingers. One went for Cap de la Cheve. The 28th went for the
34:55point at Camoray.
34:57The 2nd Ranger Battalion, Edlin's Battalion, went for Lafret. And the 13th Infantry, the regiment that
35:03had been waiting in reserve, went for the tip called Pointe des Españoles. That same afternoon,
35:09the division captured Lieutenant General Erwin Rauch, the German commander of the Crozon forces,
35:14which left one man. On the morning of September 19th, the last morning of the battle,
35:20Ramke went out on a personal reconnaissance of what was left of his position. American aircraft
35:27caught him in the open and strafed him. He survived and went back underground. And somewhere that same
35:34day, in Berlin, the date was being fixed on his swords and diamonds. That afternoon, a Lieutenant named
35:42James Dunham, of Company I, 3rd Battalion, 13th Infantry, looked up at the cliffs. You already know what he saw.
35:50September 19th, 1944. The Crozon Peninsula. We are back where we started. White flags on the cliffs,
35:59a German medic walking toward Lieutenant Dunham's platoon. A message that the general was waiting in
36:04a dugout, and that he was waiting for American commanders. You know now who those Americans were,
36:11and what they had come through. Charles Canham. Colonel Griffin, of the 13th Infantry.
36:17Lieutenant Colonel Lorette, of its 3rd Battalion. They went down the passage into the rock, 75 feet
36:24underground, into the room where Hermann Bernhard Ramke was waiting. According to the 8th Division's own
36:31account, Ramke had twice refused chances to quit. Now, he was ready. I am to surrender to you.
36:39And then, the condition. I want to see your credentials.
36:44Think about everything that question had behind it. A general of paratroops. A veteran of Crete and
36:51El Alamein. The man who had held breast for a month against three American divisions,
36:56whose swords and diamonds carried that very day's date. He was asking the American with one star on his
37:02collar to prove he was worthy of what was being handed over. Charles Canham did not reach for papers.
37:09He did not argue about rank. He turned and pointed to the GIs standing at the entrance of the bunker
37:15with
37:16their M1 rifles. Dirty. Unshaven. Exhausted. Men who had been climbing cliffs and clearing bunkers for days.
37:25And he said, These are my credentials.
37:29The American official history tells it more briefly. And it has Ramke sending a message rather than asking
37:35face to face. But it records the same answer. Canham replied that his troops served to identify him.
37:43Now, let me show you why those four words are the answer to everything in this story.
37:49When Canham pointed at the entrance, he was not pointing at a few riflemen. He was pointing at the
37:54whole chain of men you have met. He was pointing at Private Lambert, killed with a Bangalore torpedo
37:59in the wire on Dog White. And at Lt. Schwartz, who crawled up and set it off. And at Company
38:06C,
38:06going up the bluff in single file, on a morning when three-quarters of the regiment's radios were
38:11dead and authority had to walk on its own two feet. He was pointing at the infantry around Brest,
38:17who went forward when the shells were rationed. And at Staff Sergeant Alvin Casey, mortally wounded,
38:24throwing grenades into a pillbox on Hill 154.
38:27He was pointing at Robert Edlin, on a rebuilt leg, counting one, two, with a live grenade in a
38:34German Commandant's belly, at a moment when that Commandant had just checked by telephone
38:39and discovered there were only three Americans in his fort. He was pointing at Company B of the
38:45116th Infantry, Canham's old regiment, working forward with British flame tanks against the walls
38:52of Fort Montberry, until the walls no longer mattered. And he was pointing at Technical Sergeant
38:57Charles Balance, holding together a company that had lost every officer, and killed by a sniper the next day.
39:06At one machine gun crew that took a fort. At Sergeant Will Wheeler and his squad,
39:12coming back with more than a hundred prisoners.
39:16Rampke wanted to know whether the American was worthy. Canham's answer was that the question was
39:22aimed at the wrong man. That is the full meaning of what he showed. In Rampke's army, a surrender
39:29was a matter between generals. Authority flowed down from rank, from decorations, from the man at the top,
39:36which is why ten thousand of his soldiers in Brest had packed their suitcases and waited for someone
39:43above them to say the word. In Canham's army, the authority ran the other way. A general's credentials
39:49were the men who had carried him there. His star meant something only because of the infantrymen
39:55standing at that doorway. And every one of them could have answered Rampke's question just as well as he
40:01could. And remember the very first thing I told you about Charles Canham. He had joined the army as a
40:08private. He had been one of those men at the entrance. When he pointed at them, he was pointing
40:14at what he had once been, and at the only thing he believed a general's rank was ever worth.
40:21Rampke surrendered. According to the history of Roscanville, the village nearest the bunker,
40:26he came out in the late afternoon with more than fifteen hundred of his men, from positions on the
40:32heights around the Fort de Capucin. A journal kept by one American soldier on the peninsula that day
40:38reads simply, all resistance over at sixteen hundred. A truce was signed that evening.
40:46Now here is the price, and I want you to hear it plainly. The battle for Brest yielded 38,000
40:52German
40:52prisoners, more than 20,000 of them combat troops. American casualties totaled nine thousand eight hundred
40:59thirty-one. And the port, the reason the whole battle had been fought, was in ruins. In the words
41:05of the official history, the Allies had captured a totally destroyed city and a thoroughly demolished
41:11port. So the Americans had not taken Brest for its harbor in the end. They had taken it because they
41:18had said they would. The next day, at the American headquarters at Les Nevennes, Rampke posed for the
41:24journalists with his dog at his side. And in the years that followed, the German general who had
41:30asked for credentials would end up writing letters, for about fifteen years, to the American commander
41:36who had beaten him. Hermann Bernhard Rampke's war did not end in that bunker. He was sent to Britain
41:42first, to Trent Park in London, where captured German generals were held and quietly listened to.
41:49The British staff there considered him one of the most outspoken Nazi supporters they had met.
41:54From there he was shipped to the United States, to a prisoner of war camp at Clinton, Mississippi.
42:00And on January 1st, 1946, the general who had demanded credentials did something almost nobody
42:09expects. He slipped out of the camp. Not to escape. To mail letters. He posted complaints about
42:18the conditions of German prisoners to American officials, among them a United States Senator.
42:24And then, he went back. Afterward, he was handed to France, to answer for what had been done to Brest
42:31and its people. On March 21st, 1951, a French court found him guilty of war crimes and sentenced him to
42:41five years and six months. He had already spent so long in French custody that he was released within
42:46about three months. He went home to West Germany, and he did not go quietly. In 1952, he stood before
42:54gatherings of former SS men and told them to be proud of being blacklisted, calling the list a list of
43:00honor. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer condemned the remarks in public. And yet, through all of it,
43:07he kept writing to one American. For about fifteen years, Rompka corresponded with Troy Middleton,
43:14the corps commander whose letter he had refused on September 13th. Middleton went on to command the
43:218th Corps again, three months after Brest, in the Ardennes, around a town called The Stone. Whatever
43:28Rompka thought of the American army before Brest, he spent the rest of his life writing to the man who
43:34had
43:34told his soldiers to take the Germans apart, and who had then done it. Rompka died on July 4th, 1968,
43:42in Kaphelm in northern Germany. He was 79. Now the Americans. Robert Edlin, the full lieutenant,
43:50received the Distinguished Service Cross for the night he walked into Lachrist with a grenade and two
43:55men behind him. The 8th Infantry Division went on from Brest to some of the hardest fighting of the war,
44:02into the Hürtgen Forest, and across Germany. And it took Charles Canham's four words with it.
44:08These are my credentials, became the division's motto. Read those words again and notice something.
44:15They are not about the man who said them. They point away from him. Canham himself stayed in the army.
44:23After the war, he served with the 82nd Airborne Division, first as assistant commander,
44:28and then as its commanding general. He commanded the 3rd Infantry Division and the 11th Corps.
44:35He retired in 1960 after 41 years in uniform, a span that began with a private's enlistment in May of
44:431919.
44:44He died at Walter Reed Army Hospital in Washington on August 21, 1963. He was 62.
44:52And here is one last detail. The kind you only find when you set two dates side by side.
44:58Charles Canham pinned on his first general star on August 21, 1944. He died on August 21, 19 years to
45:10the day.
45:11He is buried at Arlington National Cemetery.
45:14So let's go back one last time to the place where this story began. 75 feet underground,
45:21on a rocky peninsula at the end of France, on the afternoon of September 19, 1944.
45:29Look at the German general. 55 years old. Crete. El Alamein. The swords and the diamonds, dated that very day.
45:40He has held a fortress for a month. He has twice refused to quit. And now, he wants proof that
45:48the
45:48man in front of him deserves what he is about to surrender. Now look away from him. Look up the
45:55passage,
45:56toward the light, toward the entrance of the bunker. That is where the answer is standing. A handful of
46:04American infantrymen from the 13th infantry, holding their M1s. We do not know their names.
46:11The division history does not record them. They had come across Normandy and through the hedgerows,
46:17into Brittany, past the forts of Brest, and up the cliffs of Crozon. Some of the men who had started
46:24with them were not there anymore. A German general asked an American general for his credentials,
46:29and the American general showed him the GIs at the door.
46:33Thank you for watching this story to the end. If it meant something to you, please hit like. It is
46:39the single thing that helps a story like this find more people. And if you want more stories of the
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46:55father, your grandfather, or your uncle served in the Second World War, please share his name and the
47:01unit he served with. Every one of them was somebody's credentials too, and their names deserve to be read.