- 1 week ago
In an exclusive interview with the Tehran Times, former Japanese ambassador to Iran Mitsugu Saito said Washington’s strategic miscalculations, contradictory objectives, and failure to understand Iran’s asymmetric strengths prevented its overwhelming military power from delivering victory.
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00:00Thank you so much for taking the time to speak with Tehran Times today. It's really a pleasure for me.
00:07Me too. Before starting your first question, allow me to have some remarks to accept your interview.
00:20First, as you know, I have left the Japanese foreign ministry six years ago, and I currently have no connection
00:30whatsoever with the ministry or any other part of the Japanese government.
00:35It means my view, I'm going to express entirely my own view, nothing to do with the government.
00:45And my view, or my analysis, is based on my over 20 years experience served in the Middle East.
01:00And I served in seven countries in the region, including I was ambassador to Islamic Republic of Iran, and also
01:10I was ambassador to Sultanate of Oman,
01:13the two very hot states now, vis-a-vis the Hormuz Strait.
01:18And I try to make my analysis entirely impartial, no particular ideological position.
01:29I criticize U.S. President Trump, not because I don't like him, but I believe he has confused the political
01:42objects of the war with Iran.
01:46And also, so I'm not ideologically supporting the Islamic Republic of Iran.
01:53You characterize the conflict as a clash between two fundamentally different strategy cultures.
01:59President Trump playing poker, while Iran playing chess.
02:04What were the key miscalculations caused by this strategic mismatch, and how did they fuel the escalation?
02:13First of all, the poker versus chess is very much a metaphor, not a description of the entire decision-making
02:28process of both countries.
02:30However, the Japanese public, I wrote this book for the Japanese public, very little knowledge or interest in the Persian
02:45Gulf region.
02:46Although Japan depends on 90% of its oil import from the Persian Gulf region.
02:53And I decided to write this book for the Japanese people to understand properly, at least from my view, what's
03:06going on, what is this Iran war.
03:09So I used several analysis or metaphors to help them understand.
03:20So that's my answer.
03:22Yeah.
03:22Yeah.
03:23OK, thank you.
03:25You argue that military superiority does not guarantee a strategic victory.
03:31Is this a general lesson for asymmetric warfare or is it the U.S.-Iran case unique?
03:42My answer is both is not.
03:45Both are not.
03:46Because I think this idea that I mean, as you mentioned, military superiority doesn't guarantee strategic victory is more a
04:03general lesson in the past wars.
04:07There are so many cases.
04:09For example, during the Vietnam War, no doubt the United States had overwhelming military power.
04:22However, it ultimately failed to achieve its political objects.
04:27In my view, the lesson is that American political leaders pursued objectives that were different to reconcile.
04:40I see a similar problem with President Trump.
04:47He pursued contradictory objectives in this war.
04:52So, Iran-employed sophisticated asymmetric strategy is certainly one reason why it has been able to withstand the military superiority
05:07of the United States.
05:08But confusion over America's political objectives is another important reason why the United States is defeated by Iran.
05:25And there is also another historical lesson that the Iranians know very well.
05:31Do you know, do you know, Nader Shah was an extraordinarily successful military commander who won battle after battle and
05:40built his own empire.
05:44However, his military victories produced little of lasting value.
05:52His reign ended disastrously.
05:55The problem of Nader Shah was he did not have sufficiently clear political objectives to achieve through his battles.
06:09So, I think asymmetric warfare is a very important element for Iran to take the present superiority.
06:24But this is my another argument.
06:30Even repeating the tactical victory does not lead to the strategic victory.
06:39This is the lesson of the warfare history.
06:45Thank you so much.
06:47Regarding the metaphor that you mentioned that you wrote so the public, the Japanese public can understand the different strategy
06:58of the two countries.
07:01If we don't want to be very specific about the words poker and chess.
07:07But do you think these two different understanding of the world, of the war, of the differences caused the escalation?
07:20Since this war started, I have been saying that this war will not end until both parties, I mean President
07:34Trump and Islamic Republic of Iran, can keep the dignities.
07:42No one-sided victory.
07:45No one-sided victory.
07:46You know, Iran is now a much better position, but it's nonsense to imagine Iran will occupy Washington.
07:57You know?
07:58But same.
07:59So, America has a mighty military power, but it is impossible for US military power to occupy Teheran.
08:10So, this is a very important point.
08:14Usually, people are focusing on Hormuz Strait.
08:17Yes, Hormuz Strait is a very important strategic point.
08:23However, the source of the strongness of Iran is its geographic environment itself.
08:35It's in a large country, surrounded by the cross and other mountains in the border area.
08:43So, even the United States, yes, I say United States is the strongest military power they have, but they can't
08:54conquer Iran.
08:55So, if there's no option, US can conquer Iran.
09:02So, Iranian dignity must be admitted to end the war.
09:06There's no one-sided game by the United States.
09:10This is my opinion.
09:11But it is very slight chance to achieve face saving, both parties.
09:20But this is the only chance to end this war.
09:24Long time.
09:25Long time.
09:26Long time.
09:27My next question focuses on the Strait of Hormuz.
09:32As you said, many analysts focus on the importance of the Strait of Hormuz and its importance as Iran's leverage.
09:44But what do you think, how much of Iran's leverage comes from the Strait of Hormuz itself conferred with military
09:54capabilities, strategy, and political will?
09:59Well, talking about the Strait of Hormuz, this is the most important tool for Iran to pressure President Trump.
10:16And indeed, this is working.
10:24But at the same time, the war should be calculated.
10:31One is military power or asymmetric power.
10:37I mean, the US has a huge military power, but Iran mobilized asymmetric power, that is the control of the
10:48Hormuz Strait.
10:49The second point is also very important.
10:52Not only military power or asymmetric power cannot achieve the victory.
11:01And second point is very important.
11:04This is what Iran has.
11:07This is a political will.
11:10Islamic Republic of Iran has a very strong political will that they will not be defeated.
11:16It is very important.
11:18On the other hand, as I have already mentioned, President Trump is, you know, shaking his goal.
11:26As I said, even if the US is mighty military power, but the strategy is not good.
11:36I mean, President Trump is changing his goals.
11:40So in my book, I wrote, so now President Trump is not fighting against Iran, but fighting against gas price
11:53in the United States.
11:54And this is really the victory of Iranian asymmetric strategy.
12:01But again, I emphasize, even if the military power itself does not guarantee the victory of war,
12:10Iran needs a political will.
12:13And I say, the Islamic Republic of Iran has a very strong political will to not be defeated,
12:24and not to be defeated by the United States, you know, aggression.
12:30This is a very important thing.
12:35You are the only Japanese diplomat to have served as an ambassador to both Iran and Israel,
12:42which makes your views and experiences very special for our audience.
12:48From your vantage point, what would you identify as the single most critical miscalculation made by Washington and Tel Aviv
12:57regarding Iran's strategic patience?
13:00And how did that miscalculation contribute to the outcome you described?
13:07First of all, based on my experience in Israel, I think it is very clear that Israel,
13:21a state of Israeli government and the Jewish population in Israel,
13:27are believing that the Islamic Republic of Iran is their security threat.
13:36Whether it is true or not, but this is the reality.
13:40They are believing.
13:41And just to make sure, I never say Israel as a Jewish state,
13:48because 30% of the population is non-Jewish.
13:53So I say, but the government is controlled by Jewish population.
13:58I say Israeli government and the Jewish population in Israel.
14:02I don't call Israel as a Jewish state.
14:05Okay.
14:06But the point is, they by 100% believe that Iran intend to collapse Israel.
14:18So this is their highest, one of the highest priorities to collapse Iranian regime.
14:32So I can explain to you why Israelis are believing and so on, but this is not the main point.
14:38So in that sense, and it is based on my experience in Israel, it is a very unique Israeli attitude.
14:46Yes, every country in the world, Iran, Japan, or even Israel, the survival of the country,
14:54or the prosperity of the people, and the economic development is important.
14:59But Israeli rule book has another rule.
15:07To achieve their goal, they can do whatever they want.
15:13So whatever international law or international communities, you know, demand, that's nothing for them.
15:22So this time, I suppose, Israel, but another point, but Israel is still a very small country.
15:33Cannot fight and win Iran alone.
15:39So this time, I suppose, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu convinced President Trump its best chance to attack Iran, and Netanyahu
15:56succeeded.
15:56And also one more thing, Netanyahu has his own private reason to persuade President Trump to attack Iran.
16:09He is charged by bribery, and if he is obliged to leave the prime ministership, it is highly believed he
16:21is going to be arrested, and he wants to avoid it.
16:24And Israeli general election is coming this October.
16:29So he needed some tangible, you know, success.
16:36And for him, you know, destroying Iran is, yeah, will help him to win the election.
16:48You have spent years in the Middle East region across multiple postings.
16:56Has this world changed how Persian Gulf states view the U.S. as their security guarantor, or does that role
17:03still hold?
17:04Well, I served about GCC states.
17:10I served Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Oman.
17:15So based on my experience in GCC countries, so for decades, they relied on U.S. security umbrella.
17:27One reason, but there are two reasons.
17:30One reason is, naturally, they are afraid of increasing Iranian influence to their countries.
17:38So, but there is another reason, which is not well known, but for me, similarly important.
17:46That is, they are, you know, not in good relations.
17:53The typical case, you know, they are suspecting each other, and they are, you know, cannot cooperate, or even they
18:01are, you know, battling sometimes.
18:04In the history, the latest notable case was, that is, you know, boycott of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain.
18:16You know, it is in 2017 to 2071.
18:22You know, it is surprised, but for them, and the reason is one, they are, you know, they have a
18:30lot of border disputes.
18:31Also, they have some historical rivalry, and some tribal or religious reasons.
18:40But it should be noted, you know, GCC is not one solid organization or solid organization.
18:54They are divided deeply.
18:58And to avoid, you know, fighting each other, they need U.S. security guarantee.
19:05This is, I wrote a report 20 years ago at Columbia University, that they are, you know, suspecting each other.
19:17So, they need U.S. security guarantee to prevent it.
19:22So, when GCC wanted to have a security agreement with the United States, U.S. asked, okay, they have an
19:30agreement between U.S. and GCC as a form.
19:34But Arab countries refused.
19:36No, they want a security guarantee individually.
19:40And that, you know, Qatar boycott really worked it.
19:45Yes, even Saudi Arabia, UAE intended to invade, you know, Qatar.
19:52But there is a huge U.S. military base.
19:55And Americans stopped them, don't invade.
19:58So, this is a very important thing for GCC to have a security relationship with United States for two reasons.
20:09And, but, however, this war proved that U.S. security guarantee is not effective as they expected or not working
20:20as they expected.
20:21So, after the war, or all the graduates starting, they will diversify its security arrangement.
20:34So, now, solely relied on the United States.
20:38But now, okay, how about Russia, how about China, how about Turkey or Pakistan?
20:44For example, recently, Saudis signed an agreement with Turkey and Pakistan.
20:48But still, my second point, but they are afraid each other.
20:56That point, they still need a U.S., you know, presence or needed some security arrangement with United States.
21:06So, I don't say the GCC will totally keep distance from the United States.
21:14Still, they need a U.S. presence or U.S. commitment.
21:17But they will diversify.
21:20U.S. will no more sole guarantee of their security.
21:25This is my opinion.
21:26So, you think that Iran now in this war had to retaliate and attack U.S. bases in these Gulf
21:37countries?
21:39Do you think they lost their trust in the U.S. for good?
21:46Or it's just something...
21:48So, I repeat again, so, their trust in the U.S. is very much damaged.
21:55Yes.
21:56But mainly because that is their rivalry, each other, they need someone who can stop.
22:05But Turkey, Pakistan cannot stop, you know, fighting between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, for example.
22:11This is only United States can stop it.
22:13So, in that sense, they will diversify their relations, security relations, with other countries.
22:22But they will still...
22:23But the U.S. still remain a major part of their security guarantee.
22:30Yeah.
22:31Okay.
22:32I want to ask about Japan's position in this war.
22:36You described Japan's relationship with Iran as distinctive within the U.S. alliance system.
22:43What makes Japan's position different from that of European allies that also depend on Middle Eastern energy,
22:51but have taken a more confrontational approach towards Iran?
22:56Well, first of all, I think it was yesterday, it was a debut for yesterday,
23:00a Japanese Prime Minister made a telephone call to your president, Pezheshkem.
23:06This is only Japan among G7 countries, or other major Western countries,
23:14and the head of the state can telephone Iranian president.
23:19So, this fact itself proves Japan has a different position from other major countries vis-a-vis Iran.
23:31But I have been saying, but both Iran and Japan, or Japanese, not Japanese government,
23:43Japanese people should not overconfident this unique Japan-Iran relationship.
23:55Yes, Japan-Iran relationship is very unique among the Western countries.
24:00But, however, not much stronger than before.
24:06Just briefly explain to you the recent history of Japan-Iran.
24:11In fact, until early 2000, for Japan, the relationship with Iran was very good, very important.
24:24Even sometimes there is a contradiction or argument between Japan and the United States vis-a-vis Japanese attitude to
24:40Iran.
24:42One typical case is Azadeghain oil concession case.
24:51I think it was the year 2000, when Iranian President Musabi visited Japan,
25:01he proposed an open oil concession of Azadeghain.
25:06And Japanese government and the companies were interested in it, and we started negotiation.
25:14However, U.S. pressured Japan not to do it, not to benefit Iran.
25:21So it took three years, but finally, in spite of U.S. pressure, Japanese consortium signed an agreement with Iran,
25:33and started the excavation, and almost reached producing oil from Azadeghain oil field.
25:41However, unfortunately, that is the timing.
25:46You know, Iranian nuclear, you know, program was revealed and internationally criticized,
25:53and there is a, unfortunately, UN Security Council sanction.
25:58So finally, Japanese consortium has withdrawn from Iran.
26:05But, so what I mean, so until early 2000, so even Japanese government or Japanese private sectors took relationship with
26:18Iran is more important than that with the United States.
26:22Yeah.
26:23However, situation changed, particularly in East Asia.
26:30You know, there is a continuous threat by North Korea.
26:34China is expanding its military power.
26:38So Japan is facing more strategic challenge or security, increasing security concern.
26:46Japan.
26:47So for Japan, Japan-U.S. Security Alliance is more year by year important, more important issue.
26:59Through this, this is my personal observation.
27:03So Japanese government or Japanese private sector tend to not to provoke the U.S. or U.S. government.
27:16I call it a self-restriction, you know, self-restriction.
27:20So even there's no clear intervention from the United States, Japanese side tend to keep more distance from Iran.
27:30For example, yes, when I was ambassador to Iran, it was in year 2019, Japanese Prime Minister Abe visited Teheran
27:43to mediate between Trump administration and Iran.
27:49But that was initiated.
27:52But to be fair with late Prime Minister Abe, he himself is very much interested in relation with Iran.
28:00However, alone, he can't visit Iran.
28:05But it was President Trump asked Prime Minister Abe to go to Teheran and persuade Iran to negotiate with the
28:15United States.
28:15This is a fact.
28:17This is a fact.
28:17You can check from a memoir written by John Bolton, that was a national security advisor.
28:32You can find it.
28:33Bolton wrote that Trump asked Abe to go to Teheran to persuade Iran.
28:40But to be fair with Japan, I say, but certainly it is very easy.
28:47If the Japanese Prime Minister visits Teheran and asks the Supreme Leader Khamenei, you should negotiate with Trump.
28:54Supreme Leader Khamenei will simply refuse it.
28:57So Japan proposed its own very unique proposal, which both Iranian side and the US side make them happy.
29:11So with this, our own unique mediation plan, in fact, as an ambassador in Teheran, I negotiated with Iranian officials,
29:21mostly with Foreign Minister Araguchi.
29:25That was, he was Vice Foreign Minister.
29:29Unfortunately, this Japanese mediation plan did not work.
29:34So what I intend to tell you is, it is true, Japan's growing security concern in the Far East, Japan
29:46is obliged to limit its relation with Iran.
29:49However, such as Prime Minister Abe's case, but still, in general, Japanese government or Japanese public are happy to, if
30:00possible, if the situation allows to expand its relation with Iran.
30:09Thank you so much.
30:10Thank you so much.
30:11Yeah.
30:12Yeah, please.
30:13No, no, that's fine.
30:14So that's all.
30:16I hope you're satisfied with my answer.
30:18Yeah.
30:19Yeah.
30:19And I really hope that the relationship between the two countries can expand.
30:28I don't know, considering the situation, it's possible or not, but let's hope for the best.
30:35You said that you wrote your book for the Japanese public, the metaphor you used, the style that you used.
30:48I want to know, was this the main reason you decided to read this book?
30:56You wanted to explain the situation, the most important conflicts happening in the world for the Japanese public?
31:05Or there were some other motivations that inspired you to write your book?
31:11My motivation was, as I mentioned to you already, so Japan is so much heavily depending on oil coming from
31:21the Hormuz Strait.
31:22However, the public or even the government is rather indifferent.
31:29And now, after the war started, the public almost, no, I don't say panic, but shocked by this.
31:40Oh, oil is not coming, no more coming from Hormuz Strait, so on.
31:44So I decided to write this book to make people understood what's really going on in the region
31:53and why the US-Iran relation is so much deteriorated, even into the war.
32:03So, because ignorance is not good, people should understand what's really going on.
32:12And those Japanese people, in general, are indifferent and has little knowledge about the Middle East.
32:20So I used several metaphors or analogies to help their understanding of the situation.
32:32How has the book been received in Japan, especially by scholars and policy makers?
32:39First of all, I wrote this book primarily for the general readers.
32:47And the response was, in general, very good.
32:51And about the academics, and so I think, as long as I know, their response was also positive.
32:59Yeah.
33:00But one point, Japanese academics studying on the Middle East, mostly they are focusing on very particular narrow subjects,
33:13like Shiite religion, or what's the role of the COM, or just some, you know, linguistic.
33:24So they usually do not deal with international affairs.
33:29About those who, academics, those academics who are, you know, teaching international affairs,
33:36but their method is based on American style, you know, international relations.
33:46I mean, so there is the number of the missiles, the number of tanks, blah, blah, blah.
33:55So as a result, obviously, United States is superior to Iran.
34:01But my analysis is very different.
34:04My approach is based on history, and culture, religion, and psychology of the leadership.
34:14The psychology of Trump, it is very difficult to, you know, analyze, to analyze, but also the psychology of the
34:22leadership in Iran.
34:25So my approach to this issue is very different from other, you know, academic people.
34:32So some people, some academics, appreciate, because that's quite a new approach.
34:39But others, for them, it's hard to understand from their, you know, best, you know, method, yeah.
34:54You have lived and worked in Iran.
34:57What impression of the country stayed with you the most?
35:04First, I'm very much impressed by Iranian people,
35:13because Iranian people are very much conscious of their, very much conscious or proud of their history, culture, and national
35:25dignity.
35:27And as I anticipated, the falling pressure only lead to them to be more nationalistic.
35:40So I'm very much impressed by Iranian people, because in the Middle East, I have experiences in the Middle East.
35:47Iran is a very unique country.
35:49Success to establish itself is the Western ideology, but I dare use the word as a nation state.
35:59Iran is, yeah, still, yeah, there, you know, Persian people, or Azeris, or Kruz, or, but in general,
36:06Iran is a successful nation state.
36:09It is marvelous.
36:11You know, Iraq seems to be, Iraq once believed its success to establish a nation state.
36:19But after the Iraq war, what happened?
36:21It, you know, dissolved into a tribe, religion, and so on.
36:27But Iran is very, you know, coherent.
36:29It's very important.
36:30Yeah.
36:31It's very important.
36:32But another important, another thing is I'm very much deeply impressed.
36:39There are so many bookshops in Teheran.
36:43Also, the divine of Hafiz is popular among Iranian people.
36:50I was very much shocked.
36:52Why?
36:53You know, I served GCC countries and other, you know, Arab countries.
36:59Yes, Egypt, there are bookshops.
37:01They have a tradition.
37:02But in GCC country, I never see any Arabic bookshop in GCC.
37:09There are no books, no Arabic bookshops.
37:11There are English bookshops.
37:13But the English bookshops are for the expatriates, you know, foreign workers.
37:17So they don't read, you know, books.
37:23So, I'm very much impressed by so many bookshops in Teheran.
37:29And you, you know, the divine of Hafiz, the divine of Hafiz, so close to your daily life.
37:37For the last question, I want to ask, if you could send one message to the people of Iran today,
37:43what would you say to them?
37:47I have great respect for Iran's long history, culture, and the people.
37:53And my years in Iran remain an important part of my life,
37:59where I dare say the highest point of my diplomatic career.
38:06And at the same time, you know, friendship with a country does not mean agreeing with everything its government does.
38:15I have expressed concerns about some politics of the Islamic Republic.
38:20But it is just as I criticize the politics of the United States, Israel, and other governments, when I believe
38:29my criticism is justified.
38:31So I do not, you know, praise the Islamic Republic of Iran by 100 percent.
38:39But still, I respect Iran very much, and I hope Iranian people can live in peace with dignity and prosperity
38:51without war in the near future.
38:55Yeah.
38:58Thank you so much.
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