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German generals in Italy kept asking one question: where were the Canadians? Captured telephone logs reveal how Field Marshal Kesselring and his staff tracked Canadian divisions from Ortona to the Gothic Line—and how Allied deception used that attention against them.

Follow Major General Bert Hoffmeister and the Fifth Canadian Armoured Division as they move in secret to the Adriatic, then race to exploit a gap before German troops can occupy their defenses. From the costly fighting at Ortona to the Perth Regiment’s breakthrough, this Second World War military history documentary explores battlefield strategy, intelligence, deception, and the soldiers behind the campaign. A detailed account for viewers interested in Canadian history, WW2 stories, the Italian Campaign, and the human decisions that shaped a turning point in the war.

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Transcript
00:00On the morning of August 27, 1944, on the Adriatic coast of Italy, German interrogators
00:07had a group of fresh prisoners in front of them, and they wanted one thing from them.
00:13Not their names, not their ranks, their unit.
00:18The prisoners had been taken in the opening hours of a new allied attack, in the hills
00:23between the Matauro and Folglia rivers, where the German 10th army was pulling back toward
00:29the Gothic line.
00:30Some were from a British division, some were Canadian.
00:34One of them had been shot while being brought back through the lines, and had died.
00:39And the report on the Canadians that went up the German chain of command that morning came
00:44down to four words.
00:46They refuse to speak.
00:49Keep that silence in mind because of what happened at the other end of the telephone line.
00:54The evening before, a battalion commander in the 1st Parachute Division, the same division
01:00that had held Ortona against the Canadians the Christmas before, had reported that the
01:05troops in front of him were Canadian.
01:07His superiors were not convinced.
01:10He was.
01:12In the words recorded in the German telephone log, he swore by his head that they were Canadians.
01:19At twenty past nine on the morning of the 27th, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the German
01:25commander-in-chief in Italy, was on the line to General Fritz Wenzel, Chief of Staff of the
01:3110th Army.
01:33He did not ask how deep the attack had gone.
01:36He did not ask about reserves.
01:38He asked a question that sounds, the first time you hear it, almost odd.
01:44Which Canadians are they?
01:46Wenzel had to admit they did not know yet.
01:49Nobody on the German side did.
01:52Stop and think about that.
01:548th Army was coming up that coast with British, Polish, and Canadian divisions.
01:59The Germans could see the attack was big.
02:01And the Field Marshal's question was not about the British.
02:05It was not about the Poles.
02:07It was which Canadians.
02:10Somewhere behind that front, a 37-year-old former lumber sales manager from Vancouver
02:16was bringing his division forward with the Canadian badges taken off its uniforms.
02:22Bert Hoffmeister had joined the Seaforth Highlanders as a cadet at twelve.
02:27He commanded from the front in a Sherman tank named Vancouver.
02:32Now, he was a major general commanding the 5th Canadian Armored Division.
02:38When that division first came into the line seven months earlier, Kesselring had brushed
02:43off the newcomers as unseasoned troops the Germans could easily cope with.
02:48In two days, Hoffmeister would crawl up a hill above the folia and see something no one at 8th
02:55Army headquarters expected.
02:57What he decided on that hill is why this story ends the way it does.
03:02But his decision only makes sense once you understand the Field Marshal's question.
03:07If what the Canadians did in Italy matters to you, a subscribe helps these stories reach
03:13more people.
03:14Thank you for being here.
03:16So why would the most senior German officer in Italy care which Canadians were in front of him?
03:22Here is what makes this story unusual.
03:25We do not have to guess what the German generals were thinking.
03:28After the war, historians at Canadian Army headquarters in Ottawa worked through captured war diaries
03:35and telephone logs from Kesselring's headquarters and the 10th Army, call by call,
03:41sometimes minute by minute, and translated what the Germans said about the Canadians.
03:46Read them in order, and one question keeps coming back, month after month,
03:51from generals who had a whole allied army in front of them.
03:55Where are the Canadians?
03:57At the end of January 1944, after a stiff fight near the coast,
04:02German staff officers note on the phone that it was again the 1st Canadian Infantry Division.
04:08In late April, Wenzel warns that failing to notice the Canadians leaving the line
04:13could have very unfortunate consequences.
04:16And in August, Kesselring asks the 10th Army commander flatly,
04:21Have you found out just where they are?
04:24These were not men who frightened easily.
04:26Kesselring had held the Allies south of Rome for months.
04:31Wenzel counted enemy divisions for a living.
04:34In one August call, he grumbled that a whole British division seemed to be missing from his map.
04:40And yet the Canadians, a corps of two divisions, from a country of 11 million people,
04:46fighting with largely British equipment inside a British army, had become the thing they kept looking for.
04:53Why?
04:54The easy answer is reputation.
04:57Tough troops, so watch them.
04:59But the German records tell a stranger story.
05:02And the Germans did not fully understand it themselves until it was too late.
05:07It begins in a ruined town on the Adriatic that Kesselring said, on the record,
05:12he did not want to defend decisively.
05:15In December 1943, he complained about Ortona in a sentence every Canadian who fought there would have understood.
05:24But it was something else he said that winter, about how his enemy always seemed to know exactly where to
05:30strike,
05:31that marks the moment the Germans started watching.
05:35And it tells you who taught them to.
05:37On December 22nd, 1943, in the town of Ortona on the Adriatic coast, Brigadier Bert Hoffmeister had a decision to
05:48make,
05:48and every hour he took to make it was costing him men.
05:53For two days, the loyal Edmonton regiment had been fighting up the main street toward the town square.
05:59The day before, Hoffmeister had fed in a company of his old battalion, the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada.
06:07It had not been enough.
06:08The German paratroopers holding Ortona had blown down buildings to block the side streets,
06:15so every attack was pushed into the open, onto ground their machine guns already covered.
06:21The Germans had chosen the street.
06:23The Canadians were expected to walk up it.
06:27Hoffmeister was thirty-six.
06:30Four years earlier, he had been a militia major commanding a company.
06:34Now, instead of feeding more men up one street, he widened the fight.
06:40He put the rest of the Seaforths into the town, and he split Ortona in two.
06:46The Edmontons would take one half, the Seaforths the other.
06:50Two battalions, side by side, each clearing its own ground.
06:55Remember that moment.
06:57It is the first time in this story a Canadian commander looks at a German defense and declines
07:04to fight it the way it was built to be fought.
07:07It will not be the last.
07:09And by the last time, Kesselring will be on the telephone asking who is doing it.
07:16What followed was a week the men who lived through it never forgot.
07:21They learned fast that the street meant death, so they stopped using it.
07:27They blew holes through the walls between houses and moved through the town from the inside,
07:33room to room, building to building, without stepping into the open.
07:39Mouseholing, they called it.
07:40The paratroopers answered by mining houses and waiting.
07:45On Boxing Day, they blew up a building with a whole platoon of Edmontons inside.
07:51On Christmas Day, the Seaforths did the thing Ortona is still remembered for.
07:57They set up tables in the church of Santa Maria di Constantinopoli,
08:00a few streets back from the fighting, and brought the companies out of the line one at a time for
08:06Christmas dinner.
08:08Each company ate and then went back into the houses.
08:12On the night of December 27th, the paratroopers pulled out.
08:17In the morning, Ortona was Canadian.
08:21Now listen to the other side, because this is where the German watching begins.
08:27Kesselring had never wanted a battle in Ortona.
08:30He said as much.
08:32But as the fight went on, he blamed Montgomery and the Allied press for turning the town into a symbol.
08:40The English, he complained, have made Ortona as important as Rome.
08:45He told his generals the town was not worth so much blood.
08:49And then he sent more troops into it anyway, because he would not give it up.
08:55The paratroop commander, General Richard Heydrich, was so sure the reinforcements would hold the
09:02Canadians that he left Italy on leave for Germany.
09:06It was his corps commander, General Traugat Hare, who finally looked at units that were wasting away,
09:13decided enough was enough, and pulled them back to a new line north of the town.
09:19Listen to Kesselring's word again, the English.
09:22A week of street fighting against two Canadian battalions, and to the field marshal,
09:28the enemy in Ortona was still simply the English.
09:32Hold on to that word.
09:34Within weeks, German staff officers would stop lumping the Canadians in with the English,
09:39and start asking for them by number.
09:42Because there was something else Kesselring said that December.
09:45Earlier in the month, as the Canadians fought their way across the Moro River toward Ortona,
09:51he told his commanders,
09:53the enemy always comes on our boundaries.
09:56And then, the devil knows how he always finds out where they are.
10:01Think about what a boundary is.
10:03It is the seam where one German division ends, and the next begins.
10:08Where two commanders each assume the other has the gap covered.
10:12An attack on a seam hits the confusion between two headquarters.
10:16And Kesselring could not work out how this enemy kept finding his.
10:21Now hold that idea next to the call from the start of this story.
10:25In August, the report was that the Canadians had appeared exactly at the point between two German
10:32divisions, Heydrich's paratroopers, and the infantry division beside them.
10:37Eight months apart, the same complaint.
10:40So that is the first thing the Germans learned in Italy about the Canadians.
10:45They found the seams, or seemed to, and they did not stop.
10:50But that is a reputation, and a reputation makes a general careful.
10:55It does not make him ask, before anything else, which Canadians.
11:00One more detail from Ortona, because it matters more than it looks.
11:05On Christmas Eve, 75 reinforcements reached the battered Edmontons.
11:11They were not Edmontons.
11:13They were Cape Breton Highlanders, drawn from a second Canadian division
11:17that had only just arrived in Italy.
11:20Three weeks later, their own battalion made its first attack.
11:24And what happened that day is what Kesselring was looking at
11:28when he decided these Canadians would be easy.
11:31On January 17, 1944, on the Ariely River, north of Ortona,
11:37the Perth Regiment of southwestern Ontario went into its first attack of the war.
11:42They went in early in the afternoon, alongside the Cape Breton Highlanders,
11:47the same Cape Bretons who had sent 75 men into Ortona on Christmas Eve.
11:52Two days before, the Cape Bretons had lost their first man killed in action,
11:57when mortar bombs hit a forward observation post.
12:01Now, both battalions were attacking German paratroopers who had had time to dig in.
12:07The Perths did not reach their objective.
12:10In all the fighting that followed, it would be the only battle in which they failed to.
12:16Private Ross Colmer Williams of the Perths died that day.
12:20He has no known grave.
12:22His name is carved on the casino memorial, with the others who were never found.
12:28I am not going to soften it.
12:30Ariely was a bad day.
12:33A new brigade sent in to make noise on the Adriatic, while the real Allied effort was
12:38building far to the west. And it paid for the noise.
12:42The Germans saw exactly what it was. The war diary of the 1st Parachute Division called the attack,
12:49apparently, a diversion. And the Germans kept moving artillery west, toward the real threat.
12:56Then, on January 19th, Kesselring was on the telephone to General Heinrich von Vietinghoff,
13:03commander of the 10th Army. And the two of them talked about these new Canadians.
13:09Vietinghoff remarked,
13:10They all want to show their wares. Kesselring was blunter.
13:15The pressure on the coast had eased, he said, because the veteran division that took Ortona
13:20had been pulled out. As for the newcomers?
13:24They are unseasoned troops, and we can easily cope with them.
13:28Then a line worth remembering.
13:31The trial runs of green troops are nothing famous.
13:36Hold on to that sentence.
13:38The green troops were the 5th Canadian Armored Division.
13:42Before the year was out, Vietinghoff himself would describe that same division with a single,
13:47very different word. Listen to what else is in these calls, because this is where the watching
13:52really starts. In these calls, the Canadians are no longer simply the English. The Germans talk about
13:59the Canadian divisions by number, and they want to know which is which. A German intelligence officer,
14:06Major Ludwig von Kokritz, could not pin the new division down for weeks. His January report could
14:13say only that a brigade of the 5th Canadian Division had appeared on the coast. Armored or infantry? He did
14:21not know. The best he could manage was that it would be reasonable to assume it was armored.
14:27At the end of January, after another fight near the coast, the Germans identified their attackers
14:32again. The telephone log records it. It was again the 1st Canadian Infantry Division. And then, in the
14:41same breath, the worry. Where the 5th Division was, they did not know. Wentzel could only guess.
14:48They must be up there. Think about that. Twelve days earlier, the field marshal had called this division
14:57green and easy. Now, his staff could not find it on the map, and it bothered them.
15:04Why should a general care where a green division is? The answer arrives in May, and it is not the
15:12one Kesselring expected. On March 20, 1944, that division got a new commander. Bert Hoffmeister was
15:21promoted to Major General and given the 5th Canadian Armored Division. An infantry officer handed a
15:28division of tanks, which was not the obvious choice. Three years earlier, in England, Hoffmeister had
15:36been hospitalized with anxiety. He put it down to the anxiety of having responsibility for a hundred men.
15:43What brought him back, he said later, was knowledge and proficiency. Now he had responsibility for a
15:50whole division. So he went and got to know it. He visited units and talked to officers, sergeants,
15:58and privates. He relieved commanders the men did not trust. They started calling him Hoffi. One of his
16:06battalion commanders put it simply. He knew what was going on. He didn't sit back somewhere and wait for
16:13news to come. In April, during an all-arms exercise called Tally Ho, his soldiers gave the division a name
16:22of their own, the mighty maroon machine, after the square maroon patch on their shoulders. The Germans,
16:30meanwhile, were watching. In March, their intelligence noted the 5th Canadian Armored Division pulled back
16:37to the Lucera area, reportedly, they wrote, for training in landing operations. In April, they read a
16:45move of the Canadian Corps headquarters to Naples as a sign that the Canadians were leaving the coast.
16:51On April 24th, Wenzel warned that failing to notice the Canadians being pulled out of the line
16:57could have very unfortunate consequences. Two days later, he reported, Canadians have left the sector.
17:05Left for where? For the next three weeks, German intelligence would hunt for two Canadian divisions
17:12across southern Italy. They found them too. Or believed they did. And the place where they found
17:19them is the key to everything that happened next. On May 8th, 1944, at 12 minutes to 11 in the
17:27morning,
17:27a German short-range wireless interception platoon, codenamed Marie, was listening to an allied radio net
17:35in southern Italy when it caught a mention of soldiers from Canada. The platoon reported it. And what the
17:42German analysts did next tells you exactly where their heads were. They explained it away. The net was
17:49French, they reasoned, so it must be assumed that these soldiers from Canada were not serving with a
17:55Canadian formation. Why would trained intelligence officers throw out a clue like that? Because they
18:01already knew where the Canadians were. Or thought they did. Since the start of May, the reports had been
18:08reaching Kesselring's headquarters. On the 1st, his own daily report recorded numerous Canadian troops
18:14and vehicles in the Salerno area. Days later came more Canadian movement around Salerno, heading for
18:21Avellino and Naples. Then, 10th Army Intelligence. The 1st Canadian Infantry Division was said to be on
18:29maneuvers there. Salerno is on the sea, south of Naples. Canadians by the sea, practicing.
18:37To a German staff officer, that pointed one way. A landing somewhere behind German lines.
18:45It was exactly what the allies wanted them to see. The Canadian army historians who later read these
18:52German files had a phrase for it. An artfully created Fata Morgana, a mirage, of Canadian forces
19:01getting set for a landing. Notice what the mirage was made of. Not British divisions. Canadians. A Canadian
19:10division on the coast was something the Germans would believe in and plan against. On the night of
19:17May 11th, the real attack came. Not at Salerno, but at Cassino and into the Leary Valley, the road to
19:25Rome.
19:26And now watch the German telephone logs try to catch up. On May 12th, captured Indian soldiers told their
19:34interrogators that about a hundred Canadian tanks were attached to their division. Those were real.
19:41Three days later, German counterintelligence was still reporting numerous Canadian troops at Salerno.
19:48And on the afternoon of May 16th, Wenzel told a colleague on the line, with confidence,
19:55that the Canadian Corps was not yet in the business. His colleague, Colonel Beelitz, answered with the
20:03most honest sentence in the whole file. There are so many questions without an answer.
20:10The Canadian Corps was already moving into the valley. The next evening, Wenzel changed his mind.
20:18I believe, he said, that 1st Canadian Infantry Division and 5th Canadian Armored Division are there.
20:27Beelitz pushed back. The 5th had not been identified. Wenzel held his ground. Tanks were there for
20:35certain. On May 23rd, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division broke the Hitler line. A German engineer
20:44battalion near Ponte Corvo sent out patrols that morning, and when the first prisoners came back,
20:50Tommies and Canadians, the report said, the Germans realized the breach was wider and deeper than anyone
20:58had thought. The next day, 10th Army recorded that the sudden breakthrough had come as a surprise to
21:05the Fuhrer. Now, the hole had to be used. At 1st Division headquarters, Chris Vokes turned to Bert
21:14Hoffmeister. Bert, this is the best we can do. There is not much of a hole. Good luck.
21:22This was Hoffmeister's first battle in command of the Green Division, and he made two decisions that
21:29told you what kind of commander he was. He judged that a normal artillery barrage would be useless.
21:36The dust and smoke would hide his targets and show the Germans exactly where he was coming.
21:43And he admitted what he did not know. He had never commanded tanks, so he gave the detailed planning to
21:50his armored brigadier, Des Smith, who marked 105 likely German anti-tank and observation positions on a map,
21:59and gave every unit a copy. The objective was a crossing of the Melpha River, six kilometers away.
22:07On May 24th, a reconnaissance troop of Lord Strathcona's horse under Lt. Edward Perkins reached the river
22:15first, light tanks carrying sappers, and captured eight surprised paratroopers in a house on the bank.
22:22Behind them came a company of the Westminster Regiment under Major John Mahoney,
22:28who crossed, held the bridgehead against German tanks with rifles and piats, and won the Victoria Cross.
22:36The German corps defending the line sent back its own verdict. However brave the troops may be,
22:43they are powerless against tanks. The intelligence officer of that corps, Captain Dietrich von Menges,
22:49wrote an experience report afterward. The Canadian and Indian troops, he said, had shown themselves
22:56particularly adept, definitely superior in fighting value to the British divisions beside them.
23:03And at the end of May, Kesselring asked who had made one more attack against his line.
23:09Wenzel's answer? It was 5th Canadian Armored Division. So now you have the first layer. To the Germans,
23:18a Canadian division was a signpost. Where it appeared, the main blow followed. They lost the signpost in
23:26April, chased a mirage to the sea, and the real Canadians came through the Hitler line while Wenzel
23:33was saying they were not in the business. But a trick that works once teaches both sides.
23:39The Germans learned to look harder. The Allies learned how much the Germans would believe.
23:46In August, in Florence, the Canadians were told to do something no soldier hiding from the enemy
23:52should ever do. Put their divisional signs back up, wear their patches openly, and let themselves be seen.
24:01The reason was the boldest idea of the whole campaign. On August 11, 1944,
24:08Field Marshal Kesselring was on the telephone to Heinrich von Wittenhoff, commander of the 10th Army,
24:14and he did not ask about the British, the Americans, or the Poles. He asked about the Canadians.
24:21Have you found out just where they are? Wittenhoff had an answer, of a kind. A first radio
24:28interception had placed them behind the German left wing. But deserters coming across from that sector
24:34said there was nobody there. The Canadian Army historians, who later studied the file,
24:40suspected the radio traffic itself had been a plant. Kesselring tried another idea. Perhaps,
24:46he suggested, the Canadians were assembled somewhere in the Allied rear. Remember where the last part ended.
24:53A Canadian division, to a German, was a signpost.
24:57In August 1944, the Allies decided to pick that signpost up and carry it wherever they pleased.
25:04It started in Florence. On August 5, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division came into the line
25:11beside a British corps in front of the city. And, instead of hiding, the Canadians did the opposite
25:17of everything a soldier is taught. They put up their divisional signs. They wore their patches.
25:23The plan was for German eyes to see Canadians in the center of Italy, and to draw the obvious
25:30conclusion about where the next blow would fall. Then, they vanished. From August 8th, the Canadian
25:37Corps began moving east across the Apennines to the Adriatic coast. Every Canadian badge came off.
25:45Vehicles were disguised. The columns moved at night. Canadian sappers had to build a one-way route for
25:52the tanks over the mountains. Two hundred kilometers of it. And they did it in five days. Somewhere in
25:59those night columns was Bert Hoffmeister's division. Back in April, his soldiers had named themselves after
26:06the square maroon patch on their shoulders. Now, every one of them had cut it off. Now listen to the
26:13German side because the next ten days are the deception working exactly as designed. On August 12th,
26:22the German 14th Army reported that the 5th Canadian Armored Division was confirmed in the rear area of
26:298th Army. From reliable sources, it said. Its maps showed the Canadian Corps near Florence,
26:37firmly believed to be complete in reserve. That same day, Kesselring said he was further put at ease
26:44about the Adriatic. And Vietenhof told him he had a definite feeling there was no one behind the Polish
26:51Corps on the coast. There was. There were two Canadian divisions on their way.
26:57On August 17th, a radio intercept still placed Canadian formations south of Florence.
27:04On August 20th, the 10th Army's own situation map showed the Canadian Corps complete in 8th Army
27:12reserve. Two days later, in all the calls between German headquarters that day, the Adriatic was not
27:19mentioned at all. Think about what that means. The Germans were not watching the Canadians because they
27:26were afraid of them in some general way. They were watching them as an instrument, the way a farmer
27:32watches the sky. And the Allies had learned to paint the sky. But here is the limit of a trick
27:40like that,
27:41and it matters for everything that follows. A deception lasts only until the shooting starts. The moment
27:50Canadians are in contact, Canadians get captured. And once one Canadian prisoner is in German hands,
27:57the mirage is over. On the night of August 25th, 8th Army attacked up the Adriatic coast. By the
28:06afternoon of the 26th, Wenzel was telling Kesselring that this Adriatic business was becoming ever more
28:13serious, and adding a line that shows the Germans had learned something since May. The enemy, Wenzel
28:21said, had done the same thing at Casino. At ten past five that evening came the report from the start
28:29of this story. Canadians had appeared exactly at the point between Hydric's paratroopers and the
28:35infantry division beside them. A battalion commander swore by his head that they were Canadians. Wenzel drew the
28:43conclusion. One must assume the enemy had something big in view. A staff officer on another call put it
28:51plainly. If these really were Canadians, then it would be a true major operation. 10th Army's intelligence
29:00summary that day said it formally. Since Canadians had been captured, the commitment of the Canadian
29:07Corps must be reckoned with. And now you understand Kesselring's question at twenty past nine the next
29:14morning. He was still hoping the attack was a diversion. Which Canadians are they? If it was one
29:22stray brigade, the coast could wait. If it was the Corps, he had been fooled. The prisoners refused to
29:31speak. It did not matter for long. On August 28th, the Germans captured a message from the 8th Army's
29:39commander, General Oliver Leese, that gave them the makeup of the Canadian and British Corps on the coast.
29:46At twenty-five minutes to one, Kesselring told Wenzel, I now agree with you that the matter on the coast
29:53is dangerous. The mirage was spent. The Germans knew who was coming. What they did not yet have was time.
30:03Their divisions were falling back into the Gothic line, and German records worried that the Canadians
30:09might reach it at the same moment as the withdrawing troops. So the whole deception, in the end, had bought
30:16the Canadians one thing, a gap measured in hours. And on the 29th of August, only one Canadian general
30:25went forward to look at that gap with his own eyes. On August 29th, 1944, Major General Bert Hoffmeister
30:34crawled up onto a hilltop overlooking the Folia River and looked across at the Gothic line. A division
30:42commander does not usually do this. He has staff officers for it, patrols, air photographs.
30:49But Hoffmeister was the man who did not sit back somewhere and wait for news to come. And what he
30:56needed now could not be brought to him on a map. Across the river was the most heavily prepared defense
31:02the Canadians had faced in Italy. The Germans had spent a year building it. On this stretch alone,
31:09according to Allied counts, they had laid more than 70,000 anti-tank mines. There were anti-tank ditches,
31:18belts of wire, concrete gun positions, and tank turrets set into the ground, panther turrets among them,
31:26buried so only the gun and the steel dome showed. Eighth Army's plan was to break it the proper way.
31:33Days of preparation, a set-piece attack, a heavy artillery program. Hoffmeister looked at the
31:40positions through his glasses, and what he saw was the line without the men. The strong points appeared
31:47to be unoccupied. Now put everything you have heard in this story into that moment. The Germans had been
31:55looking for the Canadians all month. They had found them on the Adriatic only three days before.
32:02Their divisions were still falling back into this line from the forward positions, and the ones meant
32:08to hold it had not yet settled in. The deception had not made the Gothic line weaker. It had made
32:15it
32:15late. The concrete was ready. The garrison was not. And Hoffmeister understood what a proper set-piece
32:24attack would cost. Every day spent preparing it was a day for German paratroopers to file into those
32:32positions. The same 1st Parachute Division the Canadians had fought at Ortona. Men who knew
32:39exactly how to make Canadians pay for a street. So he did not wait. He went to his Corps commander,
32:47Lieutenant General Tommy Burns, and proposed an immediate infantry attack. Push the infantry
32:54through before the Germans could man the line, and punch a hole the tanks could pour through. A gate
33:01crash. 8th Army's commander, Oliver Lees, had already been pressing for speed. Hoffmeister gave him the
33:09place and the moment. Burns agreed. This is the decision the whole story has been building toward,
33:17and you can see now why the German watching mattered so much. The Germans watched the Canadians because a
33:25Canadian division told them where the main blow would land. The Allies had hidden that signpost,
33:31but hiding it only bought time. And time is worthless unless someone on the ground sees it and spins it
33:40before it runs out. That was Hoffmeister's Hill. The attack went in on August 30th. It was not clean.
33:50I am not going to tell you it was. On the right, the West Nova Scotia Regiment advanced in daylight
33:56into a field of anti-personnel mines and lost about 90 men. The Cape Breton Highlanders,
34:04the battalion that had made its first attack at the Ariely, reached the slopes of their hill and
34:09were thrown back by a counterattack. The Perth Regiment, the other battalion of that bad January day,
34:16was pinned down by mortar and machine gun fire. Then, after dark, the Perths went again. A night charge led
34:24by Captain Sammy Ridge took the high ground called Point 111. It was the first Canadian break into the
34:32Gothic line. The Princess Patricia's Canadian light infantry crossed at night on the other flank and
34:38opened a second breach. Seven months earlier, these Perths had been the green troops Kesselring said the
34:45Germans could easily cope with. Now, they were inside his main defensive line before his paratroopers had
34:53finished moving into it. The German logs record the alarm rising. On the afternoon of the 30th,
35:00they report the Canadian and British Corps nibbling at the main defense line. By the 31st, in the words of
35:07the historians who studied the German files, the Canadian Corps had penetrated deeply into it. The
35:15same historians traced the breach to one cause. It was a product of the tactical surprise achieved.
35:23On August 31st, Hoffmeister's tanks went through the gap. Lieutenant Colonel Fred Vokes, commanding the
35:32British Columbia Dragoons, had no time for a proper orders group, so he briefed his squadron commanders
35:39over the radio. One squadron was told to take Point 204, the key hill in the center of the line,
35:47and hold it
35:48until relieved. Another, under Major G.E. Eastman, skirted a Panther turret and found the position unmanned.
35:58They took Point 204 without firing a shot. They were five kilometers deep in the Gothic line, alone, with no
36:07infantry. By late afternoon, the Dragoons were under continuous fire from every side, and their losses
36:15were heavy. Fred Vokes, whose brother Chris commanded the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, was among the dead.
36:23The Perths came up on foot, with tanks of Lord Strathcona's horse, and took over the hill. And the
36:30paratroopers, who now knew exactly who was in front of them, came back in the dark to take it from
36:36them.
36:36At a quarter to two in the morning, on September 1st, 1944, on Point 204, in the middle of the
36:44Gothic
36:44line, German paratroopers came out of the dark against the Perth Regiment. The main weight of the
36:52counterattack fell on number 18 platoon of D Company. Its acting commander that night was Lance Sergeant
37:00Kenneth Rowe, Blackie, his friends called him, 23 years old, from Kincardine, Ontario, on the shore of Lake
37:08Huron. Section positions were overrun. The platoon took heavy casualties. Rowe was hit in the head. He
37:17refused to be taken back. His award recommendation is plain about what came next. He rallied what was left of
37:25the platoon and led an attack to retake the lost positions. It was beaten back. He led a second.
37:33That was beaten back too. He led a third. And this time, he rushed a German machine gun post himself
37:41and cleared it with the bayonet. The recommendation records 20 paratroopers killed and 10 taken prisoner.
37:49The counterattack on his company failed, and the battalion held the hill. Rowe received the
37:55Distinguished Conduct Medal. Hold Rowe next to the Perths of January for a moment. Same regiment. The same
38:04German paratroop division across the line. At the Ariely, the Perths had not reached their objective,
38:11and Kesselring had called them green. On point 204, they took the hill, kept it through the night,
38:20and threw the paratroopers off it three times over. Their commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Bill
38:27Reed, a sportsman from Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, had taken over the battalion barely two weeks
38:34before. He was wounded twice in those days, and stayed at the head of his men. He received the
38:42Distinguished Service Order for point 204. By daylight, the Gothic line had a Canadian hole through its
38:50center, and behind the Perths, Hoffmeister's tanks were already moving north. Now go back to the German
38:57telephones, because this is where the watchers start to admit what they have seen. On September 1st,
39:03according to the historians who read the German files, Kesselring admitted that he had reacted too
39:09slowly to the developing threat. Reacted too slowly, after spending a month asking where the Canadians
39:15were. By September 4th, he was being told that the armored spearheads of the Canadian and British Corps
39:21were threatening to surround the next German position on Coriano Ridge, and he was threatening
39:27to replace commanders who could think of nothing but withdrawal. On September 6th, General Hare,
39:32the Corps commander who had pulled his paratroopers out of Ortona, told Viettenhoff that the attack
39:38on the coast had been stronger than it seemed. Even on the Allied side, the credit went somewhere
39:43unexpected. Lys had built his plan around the powerful British 5th Corps. He was forced to
39:50recognize that it was the Canadians, not the British, who had broken through.
39:56And then, at ten past ten on the night of September 7th, Viettenhoff and Kesselring talked about the
40:04Canadians one more time. Listen to Viettenhoff, the man who had shrugged in January that they all wanted
40:13to show their wares. The Canadians, he told Kesselring, were not strong in numbers, but they were right good
40:22soldiers. And the 5th Canadian Armoured Division, the division of the Green Troops, the trial runs
40:30that were nothing famous, was excellent. Kesselring did not argue. He said only that the Canadians were
40:38not fresh either. So here is the whole answer, and you now have every piece of it. The German generals
40:47in
40:48Italy watched the Canadians because they had learned, at Ortona, at the Hitler Line, on the Melfa, that
40:55wherever a Canadian division appeared, the main blow was coming. That was why the first question was always
41:04where. The Allies learned it too, and turned it into a weapon, showing the Germans Canadians at Salerno and Florence,
41:13while the real Canadians went somewhere else. But a deception only buys hours. The reason the watching
41:21mattered is that the Canadians spent those hours. A lumber salesman from Vancouver crawled up a hill,
41:28saw the line before the garrison, and refused to wait. And a regiment that had failed at the
41:35Aerelli went through the Gothic line at night, and would not be thrown back out. That is why the question
41:42on August 27th was which Canadians. It was never a compliment. It was a calculation. And the Canadians
41:52had made the calculation true. It came at a price. In the month of fighting that began at the Foglia,
41:59the Canadians lost more than 4,500 men killed, wounded, and missing. More than a thousand of them
42:08killed. And on point 204, the dragoons buried Fred Vokes. But there is a last page to this story,
42:17and it is the strangest one. Five months later, the German generals in Italy were still watching the
42:24Canadians, still tracking their signals, still marking them on the map. By then, the Canadians were gone.
42:32On February 22, 1945, the first Canadian troops began boarding ships in Italian ports,
42:40bound for Marseille. From there, they would drive north, more than a thousand kilometers,
42:45to join the first Canadian army in Belgium and the Netherlands. After 18 months, the Canadians were
42:52leaving Italy. And they did it the way they had come up the Adriatic, in silence. The operation was
43:00called Gold Flake, and its deception was called Pen Knife. A special unit of 230 Canadian officers and
43:08men stayed behind to keep the Canadians alive on paper. Canadian clubs, hostels, leave centers,
43:16and hospitals stayed open. The Maple Leaf, the Canadian army newspaper, kept printing in Rome until
43:23the middle of March. Men drove through the areas where the Germans believed the Canadians were,
43:29and put up unit signs, then came back the next day and moved them somewhere else. And the Royal Canadian
43:36Corps of Signals kept the Canadian wireless traffic at its normal level, filling the air with dummy messages.
43:43The Germans tried to jam them. Stop on that for a moment. Months after Vietenhof called them
43:52right-good soldiers, German operators in Italy were still listening for Canadian voices, still trying to block
44:00Canadian signals. Signals sent by a handful of men left behind to pretend to be an army corps.
44:07On March 17th, German intelligence still placed the Canadians near Ancona. Until late March,
44:17German situation maps showed Canadians at various places in Italy. Only in the middle of April did the
44:24Canadians disappear from those maps, by which time Hofmeister's division was fighting in the Netherlands.
44:31So go back to the beginning. August 27th, 1944. A handful of prisoners who would not give their unit. A
44:41field
44:41marshal on the telephone asking which Canadians they were. By the spring of 1945, the true answer to Kesselring's
44:49question was none. And his staff were still asking it. The German general's war in Italy ended a few weeks
44:58later. Vietenhof, by then in command of all German forces in Italy, saw them surrender in early May.
45:06Kesselring was tried for war crimes against Italian civilians, sentenced to death, had the sentence
45:12commuted and was released in 1952. The Canadians went home. Kenneth Rowe, the Lance Sergeant from Kincardine
45:22who led three attacks with a head wound on Point 204, came home with his Distinguished Conduct Medal
45:28and lived until the summer of 2000. Bill Reed went back to Charlottetown and spent the rest of his life
45:35working for sport on the island. He was made a member of the Order of Canada for it. Private Ross
45:41Colmer Williams of the Perths, who died at the Ariely on the day the Germans called his regiment Green,
45:49is still on the casino memorial, among the names of men who were never found. And Burt Hofmeister,
45:57the officer who had once gone into hospital over the weight of a hundred men,
46:02led his division into the Netherlands that spring. When the war in Europe ended,
46:08he volunteered to command the Canadian division being raised for the invasion of Japan.
46:14Japan surrendered first. He went back to the British Columbia forest industry he had left in 1939,
46:22rose to run Macmillan Bloedel, and spent 20 years as founding chairman of the Nature Trust of British
46:29Columbia, protecting the same forests he had once sold. He died in Vancouver in December 1999 at 92.
46:39One small thing about him belongs here at the end. After the fighting in the Leary Valley,
46:46he went to see his wounded. Some of them were sure they were going to be blind. He sat with
46:52them and
46:52told them how well their unit had done. That was the man on the hill above the Foglia.
47:00So why did German generals in Italy watch the Canadians so closely? Because wherever a Canadian
47:07division appeared, the main blow came. A corps from a country of 11 million, fighting with borrowed
47:15equipment inside someone else's army turned the enemy's own watching into the gap it went through.
47:23And by the end, the man who had called them green was being told by his own army commander that
47:30they
47:30were right good soldiers. Thank you for spending this time with me, and with these Canadians. If you
47:38think what the Canadians did in Italy deserves to be remembered, a like genuinely helps the story find
47:44more people. And if you'd like to hear more, we're here every week. If your father, your grandfather,
47:52or your uncle served in the Second World War, I'd be honored to hear about him in the comments.

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