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What if the geopolitical turmoil we're seeing today are symptoms of something more than the changing balance of power in a multipolar world. What if we’re witnessing the unraveling of the liberal world order that has shaped global politics since the end of the Second World War? On this episode of #ConsiderThis Melisa Idris speaks with Bangkok-based political analyst and strategist Marc Saxer, author of,‘Geopolitical Conflict in the Wolf World: Great Power Competition and the Illiberal Revolt against the Liberal Order’.
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00:10Hello and good evening. I'm Melissa Idris. Welcome to Consider This. This is the show
00:14where we want you to consider and reconsider what you know of the news of the day. What
00:19if the geopolitical turmoil that we're seeing in the world today are symptoms of something
00:23more than the changing balance of power in a multipolar world? What if we're witnessing
00:28the unraveling of the liberal world order that has shaped global politics since the end of the
00:35Second World War? Well that's one of the arguments made by the Bangkok-based political analyst and
00:41strategist Mark Saxer in his new book Geopolitical Conflict in a Wolf World. Great power competition
00:48and the illiberal revolt against the liberal order. So I'm delighted to welcome him to the show. Mark,
00:54welcome. Let's begin with the use of the phrase Wolf World and I hope you can maybe set the scene
01:02for us today. What exactly do you mean by Wolf World and help us understand why you chose this particular
01:09phrase? Well thank you very much for having me. The Wolf World is actually a quote by Thomas Hopps who
01:16wrote in the 17th century his book The Leviathan in the world of the English Civil War where there was
01:24basically anarchy and he said you know where the law of the jungle rules man is another man's wolf and
01:33I
01:33found that striking because there's so many parallels to the situation that we have today. So we have seen
01:39an unraveling of the American-led world order over the last couple of years. I think there is an
01:46institute in Sweden who has counted more violent conflicts and interstate wars in 2025 than in any
01:54time since World War II, right? So we do see an escalation of violent conflict. We see disruptions in the
02:01economy and I think you can say this is what we see the end of Pax Americana and we're going
02:06in a much more
02:07disorderly world, a much more dangerous world, what I call the Wolf World. The Wolf World. So law of the
02:15jungle, I guess everything is up for grabs. Might is right, would you characterize it as that? Right, might
02:23is right and I think that's the kind of behavior we see. I mean the wolves obviously are the great
02:27powers
02:28in this analogy. They are not only disobeying international law, they're also ridiculing it sometimes.
02:36So I think this kind of the strong prey on the weak is certainly something that I think we can
02:42observe
02:43today. So I know this is a book about geopolitics, about US and China and Russia and the EU and
02:50the
02:50contestation of powers. Well as I read it Mark, I have to say I found myself more interested in another
02:56argument running through it which is that geopolitical turmoil that we're seeing today cannot be
03:02separated from the deeper crisis within liberal democracies themselves. And that's where I'd
03:10like to begin our conversation today I think. In your book you argue that in this wolf world
03:15it's born from the decline of the liberal world order. If I may quote you, the erosion of the liberal
03:20order are not passing trends that can be reversed but are rooted in deep structural shifts that have been at
03:27work for decades. So talk to me a little bit about that. What are these structural shifts and why do
03:32you
03:33think that this isn't just another geopolitical cycle that we'll get over?
03:37Right. So I basically call this the twin crisis of liberalism because you see a mutual reinforcing
03:45trend on the global level where what the Americans like to call liberal world order is collapsing. I
03:53know that's not a very popular term in this part of the woods but this is the kind of frame
03:57that was
03:58used for the idea of a rules-based order, an order with multilateral architecture, an order with a free
04:04flow of goods and capital and people and ideas and that was basically arguably at least for the last 30
04:11years
04:12maybe longer the international system. Right. Um, and then we see on the national level at home in our
04:19democracies an illiberal revolt against liberal institutions and liberal elites. Right. And what I argue is
04:26that these two trends are actually mutually reinforcing. They are part of the same package. Right.
04:32So what is driving, uh, the collapse of the liberal world order in a nutshell, I'm sure we're going to
04:38dive
04:39into that a little bit deeper, but what you've been seeing over one or two decades is a relative shift
04:45in power between great powers on the global level, which leads to a relative decline, um, of the West.
04:52And now in 2026, I think you can see that the United States as the liberal hegemon is overstretched,
05:00militarily overstretched because it is simultaneously challenged in Europe by Russia, in the Middle East
05:06by Iran and in East Asia by China, financially overstretched because it pushes upwards to 39 trillion
05:14US dollar debt. The issue of the world reserve currency has actually lost its triple A rating,
05:21which means there's doubts over the fiscal health of the US. And finally, you have this illiberal revolt
05:27also in the United States. Of course, we talk a lot about MAGA, but this is actually a cross current
05:33situation where the disenfranchised working and middle classes are just fed up with what they call
05:40the forever wars. So that means the US is constrained militarily, fiscally, financially, and domestic
05:47politically, and has now under Donald Trump declared the liberal world order obsolete. You can watch that,
05:55what, uh, Trump 2.0 is doing. He's putting the wrecking ball to all three pillars of the liberal world
06:01order.
06:02There is a liberal mission to promote democracy and human rights, defunding USAID, disobeying the,
06:09the international criminal court, uh, ridiculing human rights. There is a liberal economic order, free trade,
06:18that's the tariff war, wrecking ball directly in it. And then the defunding of the United Nations,
06:24uh, the withdrawal from the COP Paris climate agreement and so on, which is a direct basically
06:30attack on the multi-lectoral architecture. The US has founded and guaranteed for 80 years, right?
06:35So that means there is definitely a rupture on the global level and that has repercussions now on the
06:42national level. Like 30 years ago, Francis Fukuyama would talk about the end of history, the idea that
06:48all of us would somehow become liberal democracies at some point, right? Magically, maybe, or maybe
06:55driven by, by historical forces we cannot see. That is over. No one believes that anymore. Actually,
07:01it's going in the opposite direction. You see a backlash against liberal democracy all over the world.
07:07So that means the liberal heavens, the values and norms that have been over us have collapsed.
07:13And that means that this horizon, uh, on the national level that we're all going to progress towards
07:19there, or at least if you're, uh, actually violating checks and balance in rule of law that you may get
07:26into trouble, uh, with the world policemen, that has disappeared. And that has emboldened, uh,
07:32I think illiberal strongman on the national level, especially in the West. But, uh, I think it's a
07:38global phenomenon. Okay. So let's, let's look at Donald Trump because you, you mentioned him,
07:43you raised him as kind of a, a symbol of what's happening today. Figures like Donald Trump,
07:51is he the cause of liberalism's decline or is he a symptom of it? Is he a consequence of it?
07:58Well, he's a bit more of a symbol. I think he does. He is an actor, but I would argue
08:03that
08:03the structural trends that lead into this wolf world, they have started long before Donald Trump
08:08and they will outlast him, right? So the relative decline of the U S the overstretch of the U S
08:14the
08:14shift in the global economy and the shift in the global balance of power, all of this has started 10,
08:1920 years ago. If you want to date, maybe we take the 2008 global financial crisis,
08:24which happened in the United States and could only be, uh, solved with the help of China,
08:29you know? And after that we had a G 20, which is obviously a much different, uh, situation from
08:35a Western led world. Right. And I think that because this overstretch is structural,
08:41whoever's going to be in the white house after Trump will also have to see how they can repair the
08:46U S overstretch by shifting the burden, uh, of conventional defense onto the shoulders of allies,
08:53by using the still significant power of the U S for extracting economic benefits from allies and
09:00adversaries at the same time. So that kind of behavior may be in friendlier words, right?
09:06We'll continue, uh, if you are looking at the U S. Okay. So when we talk about some of the,
09:12um,
09:13erosion of U S hegemony and what we've seen in recent years as the, um, double standards within the
09:21liberal world order, what, what would you say has damaged that pillar specifically, Mark? The,
09:27what has damaged the credibility of liberalism, particularly in the eyes of the global South,
09:32when it comes to the double standard, the, the, you know, having these double standards
09:38in the liberal world. Well, there's always been the accusations of you, uh, preaching water,
09:44but you're drinking wine, right? Which means that, uh, the West has been preaching, you know,
09:49international norms and human rights and was seen as violating it, uh, for geopolitical, uh,
09:55interests. Right. I think that really has come to a head very recently. I think the allegations from
10:01the global South, uh, is that a life in Ukraine seems to matter more than a life in Gaza. And
10:08that
10:08has enraged a lot of people, uh, in the global South. Well, when people hear when I hear, um, the
10:15failure of liberalism, I immediately think culture wars, but what's interesting to me in your book is
10:21that you, I argue that the story is also quite economic. Um, and one line you wrote here that says
10:27the causes of today's multiple crises lie in, in part in the policy failures of the neoliberal era.
10:35Can you talk to me a little bit about why so many people have lost faith in, um, liberal democracy
10:42in the first place? Are they losing faith that their lives can become better in a liberal democracy?
10:51Right. I mean, if we go a little bit back and see what has been happening, especially in the West,
10:56but it's actually a global phenomenon, uh, in the so-called neoliberal age, the idea was to say,
11:02okay, let's unleash the forces of the market. Let's be as efficient as we can be. Let's trade
11:08with each other. Let's be, become interdependent and then actually prosperity for all will follow.
11:14What did follow was prosperity for the top 1% and the rest of the population felt that it's been
11:21thrown under the bus, right? So you have a situation where, uh, both the working and the middle classes
11:27in Western countries have not any seen any real wage rises in decades, right? Uh, their living
11:34wages do not keep up with the rise of productivity. And, uh, in, in many countries for the many crisis
11:40that we've seen, they've been falling in hard times. Think about the home foreclosures in the U.S.,
11:46think about the fentanyl crisis, think about many other things, right? So there is a deep frustration,
11:52anger in large parts of the population over this course of action that has been, uh, basically
11:58prescribed as a medicine by the liberal elites. Um, they don't necessarily have an answer to that,
12:04but if you would talk to a common man on the street, your taxi driver, your grandmother, whatever,
12:10they would basically say three fundamental things. Number one, we know things cannot stay the same.
12:17They're probably going to get worse for us. Number two, we don't think we're going to be told the
12:22entire truth about how dramatic the situation is. And number three, we are going to be the one who pay
12:29the price for this. And that's not just a question of welfare cuts. That is also a question of your
12:34sons dying in a trench somewhere in a war. So that is what you call the populist moment. That's where
12:41the
12:41anger comes from. That's where the mistrust comes from. And now enter right-wing populist,
12:48enter illiberal forces who are actually cooking their little soup on this, uh, on this mix that
12:53has been there quite successfully. So, and that's why you see these illiberal revolts popping up
12:59everywhere. And my favorite line from your book says, um, liberal elites focus obsessively on
13:05populist challenges. Fear of their rise drains the courage to pursue deep reforms. Why have liberals
13:13become so preoccupied with defeating these populists, this, um, illiberal revolts, these challenges, um,
13:22then asking why populism have become so attractive in the first place?
13:28Well, first of all, because they're the target also of the ridicule, by the way. So populists
13:33basically attack those in power and draining the swamp, you know, that's the kind of rhetoric.
13:39So they have been actually the target and their position in the social hierarchy is being questioned.
13:44That's number one. Number two, I think that's quite interesting. And I think the jury here is out there,
13:49but, um, if you would look at the situation or the challenge from the illiberal revolts, from a
13:56liberal perspective, um, the idea is that these illiberal forces want to do away with democracy.
14:04But if what you see in action, uh, when illiberal forces take power, like in the US, like in Hungary,
14:12like in Poland for a certain amount of time is what they absolutely do. And I do a deep dive
14:18in the book
14:18showing that, uh, they, they attack the liberal foundations of democracy, rule of law,
14:25law, the court system, federalism, checks and balances, minority rights, these kinds of things,
14:32right? They do not necessarily attack the core of democracy, which is elections and majority rule.
14:39In fact, they promote majority rule. So I think what you're actually seeing is a divorce of democracy
14:45and liberalism, uh, in the West. And this means that this fight against the anti-democrat is ill-equipped
14:53to beat them because they're actually beating up on the symptoms, but not on the root cause.
14:58The root cause is, as we have established, the deep frustration of larger and larger segments
15:05of the population with the cause of the country, right? That's what you have to tackle.
15:09But if you're basically trying to build a, a wagon, a circle around democracy, then you're completely
15:16missing what is actually the allegation. Right. So then we have these culture wars,
15:21which become a distraction. Do you think they are a distraction from actually solving some of the
15:27material problems? Well, culture wars usually, uh, coincide with situation where the cake's not
15:34getting bigger because if the cake's not getting bigger, you and I are fighting over smaller and
15:39smaller parts of the cake, right? So I put a label on you, you have an identity, I have an
15:45identity,
15:46and then we fight over the hierarchy and who gets most, right? So culture wars are always popping up when
15:52economic engine is stuttering. And I think that's precisely what we're seeing. Right. So when you said
15:57in your book that democracy and liberalism are, what was it, getting a divorce or increasingly, uh,
16:04separating, are democracies able to survive without being liberal? Well, there's many kinds of democracy.
16:12Personally, for instance, I, uh, propagate social democracy. I think that would be one of the antidotes.
16:18I think that the frustration of the people is that they don't have enough economic opportunities
16:23and they feel that their social position is being threatened. Right. And I think that's where,
16:28you know, we haven't delivered enough over the last three decades. Right. So that would be an
16:33antidote as well. Um, I do not believe that the illiberals have an answer, but they are very good at
16:40using the wind, uh, of, of, you know, the populist mood in order to get, uh, their, uh, their political
16:47projects forward. Why, why is it, why is it different? Why are they better at using that as opposed to
16:52liberals in solving some of these problems, not delivering enough using your words? I think,
16:57um, they're quite good. And one has to admit that at playing identity politics, right? Um,
17:03I think we used to have a wave of identity politics, uh, from the left, which was basically,
17:10putting people in smaller and smaller and smaller groups. Uh, and what the liberals are saying is
17:15like, okay, then we promote the identity of the biggest group, right? That's precisely what Trump
17:20has been doing, right? Uh, and of course they are, uh, always using, um, the nation as a collective
17:27identity. Uh, I don't know if you watched, uh, the world, uh, football championship, what kind of
17:35enormous energy and emotions are actually attached to national identity, right? If you can harness that
17:41force, you're going very, very far. And that is something where I think liberals and the left have always
17:46try to stay away a little bit because that is scary stuff for them. So, so is the decline of
17:53liberalism
17:54inevitable? Are there examples? You mentioned other countries study, uh, you've studied cases from
18:00Hungary, India, um, Thailand, elsewhere of the decline of this, but are there examples where there's been
18:08successful democratic reversals, uh, where democratic reversals have been checked and liberalism has been
18:15preserved? Um, I do believe that this is a global phenomenon. Um, I think, uh, we deservedly looking
18:23at Western democracies first, but you mentioned Brazil, Israel, Hungary, Thailand, you know, all the
18:30cases I have looked into in the book. So, it is actually a global phenomenon, um, that, you know,
18:36maybe also no closer from home, India, uh, Malaysia, maybe, uh, Indonesia, right? Um, but I do not think
18:44it's irreversible. I mean, there is no end of history for liberalism and there is no end of history
18:49for illiberalism either, right? So, I mean, I think at the end of the day, it is a struggle over
18:55the course
18:55of a country. I do believe liberals, progressives need to go back to the drawing board and really rethink
19:02their, their political structure, uh, strategies very deeply. Um, but I do not see a reason why this,
19:09there's no coming back. Examples are there. I mean, you saw that, uh, Viktor Orbán has been replaced as
19:17prime minister of Hungary. Not so sure if his successor is that liberal, to be honest, but, you know, that
19:23was something that was not, uh, on, on someone's notebook for 2026. You saw that, uh, liberal forces have
19:31pushed back, uh, in Denmark and in Netherlands, right? Poland actually elected, uh, a liberal government
19:37again. But, and I think this is the important part, the, the new, uh, forces that come in have mentally
19:46arrived in the wolf world. So they are actually saying what is in terms of what are the challenges for
19:55our
19:55country, for our society? And this is what we think are the solutions. And I think that's the fundamental
20:01dividing line between the liberals who are hiding behind the wagons, right? Because they're somehow
20:07fighting, uh, to uphold and save, uh, a world that has gone, that's actually no longer exists.
20:15So what about Malaysia? Country like Malaysia entering the wolf world. Is that an advantage
20:21for us being a quote unquote middle power or are we just as vulnerable as everyone else in this
20:30jungle, you know, where the rules of the jungle apply? Well, first of all, when I come here, what
20:36people tell me is, Mark, what do you want? There's always been a wolf world. I'm very used to it,
20:40right? There's actually a lot of truth to that. And I think, uh, Malaysia has a great advantage because
20:45you're used to it. So you are very good at the classical instruments of smaller and middle power,
20:51hedging, balancing, you know, like finding, uh, your niche, uh, seeking opportunities, uh,
20:58between the, uh, the blocks or the great powers. I believe that Malaysia is doing quite a good job
21:03at that. Um, so that's the good news. It will be the question for everyone, not only Malaysia. The
21:09question is, and I quote here, um, a former prime minister of Singapore who said, no one wants to
21:16two sides, but the structural forces may force us to do so against our best interest. So what are
21:23these structural forces? These structural trends, they have a lot to do with technology and economics.
21:30Take for instance, technology, uh, what you see is there is intense rivalry between China and the
21:36United States who is a technological leader when it comes to artificial intelligence, when it comes to
21:41quantum computing, semiconductors and so on. Right. And they are spending trillions and trillions and
21:48trillions of dollars to lay down the infrastructure for this. So if, um, basically the unipolar moment is
21:55over and we're going in a bifurcated tech situation where you have a China led IT stack and you have
22:03an
22:03American led IT stack, and they're no longer compatible, which is partly when you look at apps on your phone
22:09already the case. Right. In China you have different apps than from what you have here. Right. Um,
22:15that means it will be more and more difficult for countries to keep up. Right. Right. And that means
22:20that you may be pushed to choose one side when it comes to tech, just like you have been pushed
22:26to
22:26choose one side when it comes to what kind of weapons you buy. And maybe you will be pushed to
22:31choose sides when it comes to critical minerals. Right. So these are like these slippery slopes that come from
22:38the structure of geoeconomic structures that actually limit your room for maneuver to hedge and balance and
22:45keep your, basically your freedom of, of navigation. What, so what happens then if, if strategic hedging is
22:52going to be harder and harder to sustain in a wolf world, are we all picking sides? Are we all
22:59picking
22:59spheres of influence? Well, that's certainly what the great powers want. I mean, they actually say it very openly,
23:06you have to choose a side. Right. So that's what the U S is saying. That's what China is saying.
23:10And the smaller and middle powers are saying, no thanks. Right. We would rather stay independent
23:15because the second that we choose sides, actually our attraction will go down. They will take us for
23:21granted and we will have much less economic opportunities. Right. So of course, it's trying to hedge and
23:27balance as long as you can, uh, is, is the game that everyone's playing right now. There is of course,
23:34a hot topic discussion that's going on right now. And this is the question. So if we are too small
23:40by
23:40ourselves, can we band together and form a club? Right. So that's the famous, uh, middle power, uh,
23:47coalitions that Mark Carney brought up actually in Davos, uh, last year. And the idea is pretty simple to
23:53say, okay, if all the middle powers band together, um, then we're strong enough, big enough to actually withstand
23:59that pressure. Right. Of course, the devil hears the detail, you know, someone has to step out in the
24:06open and will immediately be attacked by the great powers. That's what happened to Carney, uh, and he's
24:11been attacked by Trump. Right. And there's lots of, lots of issues, um, that I think needs to be resolved.
24:18My take is this. I believe it's a good idea. I think we need to explore middle power coalitions.
24:25I would just try to fix three construction errors that I think should not, uh, would not be helpful.
24:32Number one, absolutely no one wants to be a middle power. Yes. Right. No one wants to,
24:37no one wants to be a middle power. We all want to be great powers. Second, if you're in Asia,
24:42don't talk about coalitions, you know, obviously we could just set, no one wants to choose sides.
24:46Anything that sounds permanent is not flying in the region. And third, get rid of this democracy
24:52versus autocracy stuff. Right. So I think my recommendations are partnerships in the middle.
24:59Right. Which would be flexible. There could be, uh, issue specific partnerships. A group of country
25:06can work together on climate. A group of countries can work together on pandemics. A group of countries
25:11can work together in AI regulation and so on. And maybe we learn how to do this, how we withstand
25:18global,
25:18uh, uh, great power pressure and how we actually regain some space for collective actions because
25:25the global challenges that are mentioned, they're not going to go away. Sure. Mark, thank you so much
25:30for coming on the show and, um, good luck with the book. Congratulations on the new book. Thank you
25:35for your time. Thank you very much. That's all the time we have for you on this episode of Consider
25:39This.
25:39I'm Melissa Idris signing off for Good Evening. Thank you so much for watching. Good night.
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