- 1 week ago
With more than 90,000 ships passing through the Strait of Malacca each year, carrying 60% of global maritime trade, any disruption could send shockwaves through the global economy. Following the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, to what extent can ASEAN prevent a similar crisis from unfolding in its own maritime chokepoint?
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00:06This is Awani Global with me, Nailah Huda.
00:09And in this episode, we want to look at the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz.
00:13But beyond war tactics or the economic spillover,
00:16we want to look at how this crisis in West Asia may or may not have set a precedent
00:22for other similar regional maritime choke points.
00:26Take the Strait of Melaka, for instance, every year more than 90,000 ships pass through the strait
00:32carrying 60% of global maritime trade, carrying one-third of the world's petroleum and other liquid cargo,
00:39thus becoming the shortest maritime route connecting the Middle East and Europe to the Asia-Pacific region.
00:46And should any of the littoral states decide to leverage on this strait,
00:49much like Iran with the Strait of Hormuz, this could similarly disrupt trade flows
00:54and therefore send shockwaves to both regional and the global economy.
00:59So, what are some lessons here from ASEAN, from the Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Melaka?
01:05This is what we want to discuss with our guests joining us at this moment,
01:09Aristio Ardarmawan, Assistant Professor of International Law at the Universitas Indonesia.
01:14Thank you so much, Aristio, for joining us on Awani Global.
01:19Talking about your recent article, Lessons for ASEAN from the Strait of Hormuz,
01:23what do you think are some of the biggest lessons here that we can take in this part of the
01:28world?
01:29Right, thanks. Thank you very much.
01:30First of all, Nailah, for having me on the show. It's really delightful.
01:33So, I think, as you mentioned earlier, I think now it's been more than six months
01:38and the Strait of Hormuz has remained closed.
01:40So, I think it's a good time for ASEAN to learn what can we learn,
01:46particularly to ensure the geography in our region as well.
01:49Certainly, there are a lot of things that we can learn from the Strait of Hormuz.
01:52ASEAN needs to diversify, for example, its resources and oil and gas.
01:56But in particular, in how to ensure the Strait of ourself, the Strait of Melaka,
02:01as you mentioned, remains open.
02:03I think that's the key point that we're going to be discussing today.
02:06Because, of course, the Strait of Hormuz shows us that it doesn't need
02:10a very advanced warships or aircraft carrier or anything like that
02:15to really block an international strait.
02:17It just needs a few cheap drones.
02:21It just needs a few strikes to commercial vessels passing to the straits.
02:25And, of course, the insurance is going to be spiked and de facto the strait is closed.
02:29So, it is very much concerning nowadays with all the advanced technologies that happen.
02:33So, I think it's about time for ASEAN to think, putting scenarios and what if,
02:40if this skeletons happens in our regions and how do we ensure freedom of navigations
02:45in the Strait of Melaka.
02:46This is a big what if, of course.
02:48This is the billion-dollar question.
02:50But looking at the current, you know, securitized, increasingly securitized
02:56and militarized environment in the region, you, of course, rightly pointed out,
03:00you know, not necessarily needing advanced and expensive warships.
03:06But, you know, there is a reality that we're seeing these days in this part of the world.
03:10There is a lot of interest there among some countries in Southeast Asia
03:13for more advanced or more expensive, you know, military weapons or warships.
03:19But going back to the point of what if, how vulnerable exactly is the Strait of Melaka
03:25to similar disruptions?
03:27Do you think it's important to maybe take into account this increasingly securitized
03:32or militarized environment that we're seeing now?
03:35Yeah, I think there's two ways to answer these questions.
03:37The first one, I think if you look at the possible conflict scenarios that happen in the regions,
03:42we're not in a much better position than the Middle East, right?
03:45We've seen a lot of, a couple of hotspots at least in our regions in the East Asia,
03:49either in the Taiwan Straits or in the South China.
03:52These both are posed a risk for having an escalation any times, any soon, right?
03:57So it's better prepared than no-have strategies when an escalation comes.
04:02So that's the first.
04:03So we have to pose a similar risk of conflict in the regions.
04:07But the second one, I should say that we are in, luckily, in a better position.
04:11If we look at the Strait of Melaka, countries bordering the Strait of Melaka
04:18is all parties to unclosed, right?
04:19We talk about Malaysia, we talk about Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand,
04:23all of the parties to unclosed, right?
04:25And they are all committed to uphold the clause
04:28and keep the transit passage in the international straits, remains open.
04:33It's a bit tricky if we compare it to Iran, for example.
04:36Iran is not a party to unclosed.
04:37Yes, Iran signed the treaties.
04:38Yes, Iran has the obligations, but it's different with the parties.
04:42It can't be brought, for example, to international tribunals for incompliance.
04:46So the way I see is that there's always a risk of possibilities of conflict
04:50happening in the regions.
04:52Yes, there is all parties, all litoral states in Melaka,
04:57party to unclosed, they want to uphold unclosed.
04:59But of course, when a conflict happens,
05:02it very often is not as simple as what the law says, right?
05:05There's always a lot of political considerations,
05:08there's strategies involved, and so on and so forth.
05:10So I think there's both the risk that we have,
05:14but there's also a strategies or a good side
05:18that we are a party to the law of this convention.
05:21We don't hear about this enough, at least in my perspective,
05:24in media or amongst policymakers,
05:26the importance of keeping the Strait of Melaka open.
05:30Why it's important to global trade, energy security particularly.
05:35When we're looking at the Strait of Hormuz,
05:38similarly, only after we're seeing disruptions that,
05:41you know, the reverberations and the shockwaves that were felt
05:44across the whole world,
05:46only then did we realise how important it was to the global trade.
05:50Why is this also the case for the Strait of Melaka?
05:53Is this something that you think, you know,
05:55deserves a lot more attention?
05:57Yeah, I think that's a good point,
05:59because of course, I think we are often taking for granted
06:02that these trades have remained open until it's closed, right?
06:04And we are not aware on how devastating the impact
06:07for the global economy as a whole.
06:09I think it's a thing that we have to really look at very closely.
06:13And if we look at the Strait of Melaka, of course,
06:14as you mentioned earlier,
06:15it's one of the most important trades in the world.
06:17It encompasses a third of the world trade passing through.
06:22It's become the most important route for goods and resources,
06:28travelling from Europe to Asia.
06:30It's very important for China,
06:32very strategically important for China.
06:34So it's people just realise on how important.
06:37And of course, I think some of the government
06:41also just realise on how we can maybe take a leverage
06:45on that strategic positions and how to get more advantage on that, right?
06:51Particularly, for example, now there's a discourse
06:53on how that Iran might impose tariffs there
06:57or any strategic mechanisms and so on and so forth.
07:00So there's a lot of countries that are trying to take a leverage
07:04on these strategic positions as well.
07:06Now, in your article, you also mentioned about the recent debate over tolls.
07:12It's rather interesting the different perspectives that we're getting,
07:15the different stances that we're getting within the region itself.
07:19Inspired by the Iranian move to impose a toll on vessels
07:22passing through the Strait of Hormuz,
07:24Indonesian Minister of Finance also proposing
07:28this imposing of a toll on vessels through the Strait of Melaka,
07:31generating more income for Indonesia,
07:34also supported by the Chief of Indonesian Coast Guard,
07:38but later clarified this wasn't a serious proposal.
07:40We're, of course, quite used to the back and forth in our region.
07:44But other literal states, Singapore and Malaysia, however,
07:48immediately responding that there would be no imposition of a toll fee.
07:54So touching on this debate,
07:55what does this tell us about the strategic importance of the Strait
08:00and the sort of strategic importance held by literal states
08:04or shared by states in this region?
08:07Yeah, I think it's very interesting debates.
08:09And so it was all over the media headlines,
08:11I think, a few weeks ago,
08:13when the Indonesian Finance Ministers then half-jokingly,
08:17at the first place, say that,
08:18why don't we just get more imposed tariff stalls
08:21and can generate money, right?
08:22And it is surprisingly that it was supported by the Chief of Coast Guard
08:26who's saying like, yeah, I think it's quite a good idea, right?
08:28When it was asked by a journalist.
08:31So I think that's the underlying on the thinking
08:33about how we can use this leverage, of course,
08:36to get benefits for it, to get more avenue for the countries.
08:38I think it's always there, right?
08:40So I think it's quite interesting observed.
08:42But of course, there's a lot of clarifications
08:44that it's not legal under international law and so on and so forth.
08:48But I think what we would have seen here
08:50is that there's always been those thinking
08:52within the government officials,
08:54whether we realize it or not, when we like it or not.
08:56And what's most important, then, reflecting on that particular event
09:00in how we can strengthen our commitment in the regions, right?
09:03Of course, then, as you already mentioned,
09:06Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia,
09:08we're all the benefactors of the law of sea convention.
09:11And it's really in our interest to comply
09:13and ensure the law of sea conventions
09:15is being respected here in the regions.
09:17And imposing tariffs and tolls to the straits
09:20is really contradicts with the transit passage regimes
09:24under the law of sea conventions.
09:25And of course, therefore, compliance with the law
09:28is something that we should really promote
09:31and promote in the regions.
09:33So going back to this key question
09:36of how or what some of the lessons
09:39that ASEAN can learn from the Strait of Hormuz,
09:41I think it boils down to the question of prevention.
09:45And in preventing, we have ASEAN mechanisms in place.
09:51What are your thoughts on framework or regulatory frameworks
09:55that are already existing within ASEAN?
09:58Or perhaps, like thereof,
10:00do you think that we have the necessary mechanisms needed
10:04to protect freedom of navigation in the Melaka Strait?
10:08What are your thoughts?
10:09Yeah, so I think ASEAN, Southeast Asia,
10:12as you might aware, it's very much a maritime medium, right?
10:14We are very much connected by the oceans.
10:16We are hosting the South China Sea,
10:18one of the most important part of oceans as well.
10:21So I think we're very much aware
10:22that maritime is very important.
10:24And we have a lot of mechanisms, documents in ASEAN.
10:27We have ASEAN Maritime Forum.
10:29We have the ASEAN Maritime Outlook,
10:30which was just recently released a few years ago.
10:33We have ASEAN Maritime Forum Plus
10:35with some other countries.
10:37So we have a lot of documents.
10:39And all these documents is basically underscoring
10:42and reiterating the importance of freedom of navigations
10:44in the regions.
10:45It's important the freedom of vessels passing through the straits.
10:49If you look at the documents, literally,
10:52a lot of those documents are ensuring
10:54that we uphold and we recognize the importance of navigations
10:58and ensuring navigations in our regions.
11:00But the problem is really is when a conflict happens, right?
11:04We're not necessarily talking
11:05that countries randomly impose a tariff or close a strait, right?
11:08We talk about what if a conflict happens, escalations happen,
11:12for example, or even what if one of the parties
11:15or literal states parties to the conflict?
11:19And they decided to impose a block, for example, in Malacca.
11:25So that's the real questions, right?
11:26And what I'm afraid is that ASEAN doesn't really have
11:29a crisis management strong that have or can impose
11:32or can enforce a decision to any particular state, right?
11:37There has been a lot of criticisms, I think,
11:39in an ASEAN decision-making process.
11:41For example, in the crisis of Myanmar,
11:44yes, ASEAN make an urgent meeting.
11:46Yes, the ASEAN having a five-point consensus.
11:48But can it really be enforced?
11:51Well, there's a lot of equations.
11:52And there's a similar situations
11:54if a crisis happens in the region as well
11:56or if any literal state decided to block this strait, right?
11:59I think there has been a lot of thinking
12:01of the effectiveness of ASEAN decision-making.
12:04And I think that's imposed the biggest challenge
12:07of how to ensure the strait treatment opens
12:11in a conflict scenario.
12:13So I think the scenario building,
12:14what are the decisions makers think about the situations,
12:18what are the legal tools that we have?
12:20I think it's very important.
12:21And now is the best time for ASEAN
12:24to really think about that
12:25and trying to think and build scenarios of possibilities.
12:30So this big what-if question,
12:32of course, we don't want to imagine this scenario,
12:35but we have to.
12:36If in any case,
12:38if a major conflict were to erupt in the region
12:41involving the strait of Melaka,
12:43a big what-if, of course.
12:44But if there was an attempt by a power
12:47to disrupt shipping through the strait of Melaka
12:49during a hypothetical conflict,
12:52but who do you think would actually have the authority
12:54or the capacity to respond?
12:56I mean, you said there's a lot of criticism towards ASEAN
13:00about its capability to handle a crisis or a conflict,
13:04much as we've seen with Myanmar.
13:06It's also questionable the extent to which they've tried to deal with Thailand
13:10and Cambodia as well.
13:11But if there were such conflict involving the strait of Melaka,
13:16would it have to involve all four literal states?
13:19Would it have to involve ASEAN?
13:21What would this look like?
13:23I think the main groupings,
13:25which are going to be having a more important role,
13:27I should say,
13:28is the literal states of the strait of Melaka.
13:31I think it's just even before,
13:33those four literal countries,
13:35or three basically,
13:37literal countries has always been very sensitive
13:39with internationalizing the strait of Melaka.
13:41And that's why the main reasons,
13:43and these three countries initially,
13:44and then Thailand joined the groupings,
13:47they want to make or keep the security issues,
13:49for example,
13:51the piracy issues only among those literal states.
13:53There's always a reluctance of involving other countries,
13:56including the major powers such as the US,
13:58to get involved in those straits.
14:00That was the main reasons
14:01of the state of Melaka patrol's establishment
14:05in the very first place, right?
14:06So anything that's going to happen
14:08or in responding to any crisis,
14:10I think those four literal states,
14:12three or four literal states,
14:13are going to be the one
14:14who's having to play a more important role
14:16in making any decisions
14:18and ensuring the strait of Melaka opens.
14:21However, though,
14:22ASEAN should play an important role, right?
14:24These four,
14:24all four countries are part of ASEAN.
14:27And all these strategic issues
14:29or security issues
14:30is going to be impacting the whole regions.
14:32So ASEAN,
14:32even though we can't really make
14:34an enforceable decisions maker,
14:39it's important for the groupings
14:41or for the regional organizations
14:43to ensure all these countries,
14:44to ensure the strait of Melaka opens
14:46and to be able to influence
14:48any decisions that is made
14:49in the straits
14:50whenever conflict scenarios happen.
14:53What could potentially even
14:56complicate the situation even more
14:58is looking at the sort of strategic
15:01orientations that ASEAN member states
15:04have with different major powers.
15:06Looking specifically, for example,
15:08Thailand and the Philippines
15:10being US treaty allies,
15:11Singapore having close defense ties
15:14with Washington, Malaysia, Indonesia
15:16perhaps more strategically hedging their bets.
15:20Could these different strategic orientations
15:23make a more unified ASEAN response
15:25to a potential conflict more difficult?
15:28I think we might have seen
15:28a little bit of this
15:29in the Thailand-Kambodia crisis.
15:32Do you think that this could
15:33complicate things even more?
15:35Yeah, I think that is always
15:37one of the main challenge
15:38in ASEAN decision-making process
15:40that all of the countries
15:41we often don't have any
15:42one single preference
15:43or one single country
15:46that we are aligned to, right?
15:47There's a lot of different interests
15:48and all different preference
15:49and that's pretty normal
15:51for ASEAN.
15:53For example,
15:53if we looked at how ASEAN
15:55responds to ASEAN,
15:56there's also quite different diverge, right?
15:58How the Philippines responds,
15:59how Singapore and so on and so forth.
16:01And exactly as you mentioned,
16:02I think that's going to be
16:03the main challenge.
16:05If you reflect in histories a bit,
16:07back in 2012, for example,
16:09ASEAN failed to issue
16:10the joint statements
16:11on the South China Sea
16:12and particularly because
16:13of these diverging preference.
16:16Some countries,
16:16they don't want to upset China
16:17and so on and so forth, right?
16:19So, yes, I should say
16:20that's going to remain
16:21a big challenge for ASEAN
16:23decision-making process.
16:25But I think there is
16:27a shared interest, of course,
16:28in having the regions
16:29remain peaceful,
16:30having these streets
16:31remain open.
16:32I think we should go back
16:33to those very underlying
16:35shared interests in ensuring
16:36or in making decisions
16:37that best for the regions
16:40and not particularly
16:42just based on these
16:43individual countries' preferred interest.
16:46This shared interest
16:48in keeping the waters
16:49open and safe,
16:50you repeatedly call
16:51for this shared commitment
16:52to keeping the Melaka
16:53Strait open
16:54before a crisis even happens.
16:56But what would this commitment
16:58actually look like
16:59in practical terms?
16:59You pointed out
17:00some of the documents,
17:01some of the mechanisms
17:02that ASEAN has.
17:03what do you think ASEAN
17:04has to do now
17:05in order to prevent
17:07such conflict or disruption
17:08to happen?
17:10Of course,
17:11there's a lot of ways
17:12in ways to prevent a conflict.
17:14But to really
17:15prevent a conflict
17:16is, of course,
17:17is the abilities
17:19to open for a dialogue
17:20and channel for communications.
17:22I think, for example,
17:22in the South China Sea,
17:24when there's a lot
17:24of overlapping claim
17:25among Southeast Asian countries
17:27and also China,
17:28I think it's going to be
17:29one of the toughest challenge
17:31and one of the possibilities
17:32of crisis that happens.
17:34Yes, we are still
17:35maybe far
17:36with the code of conduct,
17:38but I think
17:38the ASEAN mechanisms,
17:40the venue for corporations
17:42and diplomatic mechanisms
17:43and dialogue,
17:44I think it will
17:45certainly helping
17:47and prevent
17:47any escalations
17:49or conflict, right?
17:50Because, of course,
17:51if the conflict
17:52might be more possible
17:54to escalate
17:55where we don't sit
17:57and talk with each other,
17:58right?
17:58So, that's the venue
17:59for a dialogue
18:01and diplomatic mechanisms.
18:02I think it's still
18:03very important.
18:04And, of course,
18:04if a crisis happened,
18:06there will need
18:07to be a venue again
18:08for a talk
18:11and collective decisions.
18:13This avenue
18:14for collective decision,
18:16do you think
18:16that ASEAN should also
18:17develop a contingency plan
18:20as well
18:20if there were to
18:21have any disruption
18:23or any conflict
18:24in the strait?
18:25What should this
18:26contingency plan look like?
18:28Yeah, I think it's,
18:29of course,
18:30that's the what-if questions,
18:32right?
18:32The contingency plan
18:33is basically
18:34what-if questions,
18:34what are the mechanism,
18:35what are the tools,
18:36what are the venue
18:37for dialogue
18:38and so on and so forth.
18:39So, I think that is the,
18:41I mean,
18:42certainly,
18:43if there is a crisis happen,
18:43there will be
18:44an immediate meeting
18:45of ASEAN head of state
18:46but what kind of decisions
18:48that they can issue?
18:49How can they enforce
18:50and keep up
18:51with those decisions?
18:52I think that it's part
18:54of, I think,
18:55a broader questions
18:55of ASEAN crisis management
18:58as a whole
18:59and how ASEAN
19:00can enforce its decisions,
19:02right?
19:02There have been
19:02a lot of conversations
19:04on how weak is ASEAN
19:06can actually enforce
19:08their decisions
19:09and so on and so forth.
19:10So, I think that's the key.
19:11So, I think there should be,
19:13yes,
19:13what-if questions
19:14and contingency plans
19:16of what are the venues
19:17that are being used,
19:18what are the tools
19:19of enforcing
19:20its decisions,
19:21collective decisions.
19:22I think that's the most
19:23important part
19:24that ASEAN should reflect,
19:25right?
19:26Looking at the security
19:29of Southeast Asian waters
19:30as a whole
19:31and drawing on,
19:33you know,
19:33recent experiences
19:35like the Thailand-Cambodia
19:36conflict,
19:39we saw,
19:40to an extent,
19:41involvement
19:42of international
19:43or major
19:44global powers
19:45such as China
19:46and the United States
19:47playing a role
19:48in the ceasefire.
19:50if we were to see
19:52or to,
19:53you know,
19:54draw from this example
19:55and apply it
19:56in the context
19:57of the Strait of Melaka,
19:59do you think
20:00that there is a role
20:01to be played
20:01by some of these powers,
20:03China,
20:04the United States,
20:05maybe perhaps even
20:07Quad members,
20:08Australia,
20:09India,
20:09Japan,
20:10or do you think
20:11ASEAN should draw
20:12a line somewhere
20:13to avoid
20:15involving them too much,
20:17internationalizing
20:17the security
20:18of the Strait?
20:20No,
20:20yeah,
20:21I think it's
20:21a very good question,
20:22but I think
20:22it also depends
20:23on what are
20:23the type
20:24of the situations
20:24that we want
20:25to involve
20:26those extra-regional
20:27power,
20:28for example,
20:29and also ASEAN states
20:30in particular,
20:31they might have
20:32differences
20:32and preference
20:33and how they see
20:34the involvement
20:35of this extra-regional power,
20:37right?
20:37Some countries,
20:38such as the Philippines,
20:39for example,
20:39they always welcome
20:40the role of the United States
20:41presence in the regions,
20:43right?
20:43Some other countries,
20:44Indonesia,
20:45for example,
20:45we've always been
20:46very reluctant
20:46to see more presence
20:49and sort of military presence
20:51in the regions,
20:52right?
20:52So there's a diverging position,
20:54and there's also
20:55a lot of ways
20:56of how these major powers
20:57can evolve
20:57in the regions,
20:59right?
20:59We welcome cooperations
21:01and joint exercises,
21:02Garuda-Shield exercises,
21:04for example,
21:05as a preventive mechanisms,
21:06right?
21:06But when a decision,
21:07when a crisis happens,
21:08for example,
21:09it will become,
21:10it depends on the situation,
21:12right?
21:12Which country is involved
21:14in the conflict,
21:15for example?
21:16If a conflict happens
21:20in the Taiwan Strait,
21:21for example,
21:21to what extent
21:21the US is involved
21:22in the particular conflict,
21:23right?
21:24If a complex scenario
21:25is happening
21:26in the South China,
21:26which country is going
21:27to be involved?
21:28Whether it's going
21:28to be Philippines
21:28and China,
21:29whether it's going
21:29to be US is involved?
21:31So I think it's
21:32very difficult questions
21:34to answer
21:34because it's very much
21:35tailored in particular
21:36to what kind
21:37of circumstances,
21:38which countries
21:39are involved
21:39as a parties
21:40to the conflict,
21:41and so on and so forth.
21:43Of course,
21:44a lot of what ifs,
21:45a lot of hypotheticals
21:46that we've been discussing
21:47through our interview here,
21:49but a lot of the unthinkable
21:52did transpire
21:53and did shock us
21:54in just the period
21:55of the past year or two.
21:58So to, I guess,
22:00prepare for the worst
22:01and five months
22:02into this hormos crisis,
22:04what do you think
22:05is one thing
22:05that ASEAN can do
22:07and should already
22:08be doing now
22:09in order to prevent
22:10something similar
22:11from erupting closer
22:12to home?
22:14Yeah, so I think
22:15it's reflecting
22:16to what we just discussed.
22:19I think it's,
22:20yes, we don't want
22:21any conflicts
22:22to happen in the regions,
22:23but yes, again,
22:25I would agree with you
22:26that there are a lot
22:26of surprise
22:27in the past few years now
22:28and we can't really
22:29avoid that, right?
22:30So I think ASEAN officials,
22:32ASEAN secretariat
22:33should let this
22:34contingency plan.
22:35What if scenarios happen?
22:36What if these scenarios happen?
22:38What a decision
22:39that should be made?
22:39What channels should be used?
22:41What are the mechanisms?
22:42I think that's the contingency plan
22:43that we should think about.
22:45Or maybe we might want
22:46to talk more deeply again
22:47with the ASEAN decisions
22:49making scenario,
22:52for example,
22:52or the ASEAN charter
22:53or those of the more
22:55fundamental ASEAN
22:56as in our organization.
22:57So I think there's
22:58a lot of ways
22:59in how we think,
23:01how we reflect
23:02on this mechanism.
23:03So we're not only responding
23:05to an event
23:05that already happened,
23:07but we can mitigate
23:08or building up scenarios
23:11of avoiding conflict.
23:13Just lastly,
23:14I think it's also important
23:15to go back to what you
23:17and I think a lot of analysts
23:18like to point out
23:20this ability
23:21or inability
23:22on ASEAN's part
23:24to handle
23:25a certain crisis
23:26or a conflict.
23:27I think in its defense,
23:29ASEAN is a rather young player
23:31when it comes to regional blocks.
23:33But there's also
23:34a lot of question
23:35or criticism
23:36when it comes to ASEAN's
23:38non-interference policy
23:40and some of its
23:42central, fundamental principles
23:45calling into question
23:46ASEAN's foundation.
23:48Do you think that
23:49this has to do
23:49with a more existential question
23:52of ASEAN
23:53and its non-interference policy perhaps?
23:55Or do you think that this is something
23:57that's still workable
23:57within ASEAN's existing
23:59framework and mechanism?
24:02Yeah, but I think
24:03that's a good question.
24:04And also there has been
24:05a lot of discussions
24:06on the relevance
24:07of this non-interference
24:09and so on.
24:10But I think
24:11if we look at
24:11these conflict scenarios,
24:12I think it's not necessarily
24:13non-interference
24:14because it's not only
24:15going to be relating
24:16to the issues
24:17that is in individual countries
24:19domestically,
24:20but it's going to be
24:21definitely involve
24:21all these
24:23many different countries.
24:24So I think
24:26thinking about
24:27what are the contingencies
24:28or what are the tools
24:30that ASEAN can make
24:32or can have.
24:33ASEAN, of course,
24:33is not a collective
24:34defense mechanism.
24:35We are not a treaty alliance
24:37as in a defense per se.
24:39But what if, for example,
24:40yes,
24:41let's take an example
24:42of the South China Sea
24:43for a case.
24:44Yes, we try to avoid
24:45the conflict
24:46by clearing the code of conduct.
24:47But what if, for example,
24:49the escalations
24:49between the Philippines
24:50and China
24:51are getting worse and worse,
24:52and there's an open conflict
24:56and so on and so forth.
24:58What are the ASEANs
24:59going to do?
25:00I think that is
25:00the most important questions
25:02that we have to deal
25:06with collectively
25:07as a region,
25:08more fundamentally
25:08as a tool,
25:09for example,
25:10what are the crisis
25:11response mechanisms
25:12that just go beyond
25:13the statement?
25:14Yes, there will be
25:15a statement
25:15released by ASEANs
25:17condemning
25:17and so on and so forth.
25:18But what are really
25:19the practical mechanisms
25:20that we can use?
25:21I think that need
25:22more, even more
25:23deeper thinking
25:24and more deliberate
25:25discussions
25:25among ASEAN member states.
25:27Yes, with open dialogue
25:29and open channels
25:30of communication,
25:31hopefully we'll be able
25:32to keep straits
25:34and waterways open
25:35as well.
25:36Plenty more we'd like
25:36to discuss,
25:37but that is all the time
25:38that we have
25:39and hopefully we'll be able
25:40to follow up on this
25:41perhaps in the next few months
25:42to come.
25:43Surely a lot of developments
25:45that we can expect
25:47in the Strait of Hormuz.
25:48But that is all the time
25:49that we have, of course.
25:50Thank you once again
25:51to Arisio Ardarmawan,
25:52Assistant Professor
25:53of International Law
25:53at the Universitas Indonesia,
25:56sharing some thoughts
25:57on the lessons
25:58that we can learn
25:59from the Strait of Hormuz
26:01crisis,
26:01the shockwaves
26:02that it's sent
26:03throughout the entire
26:04global economy
26:05and potentially
26:07setting a precedent
26:08for other regional
26:10maritime chokepoints.
26:11A big lesson,
26:12of course,
26:12for us in this part
26:14of the world
26:14as we have the Strait of Melaka
26:16involving four literal states
26:18and just as critical
26:20and important
26:21to the global economy
26:22as well.
26:23Critical and tough
26:25to bitter,
26:26tough pills
26:27to swallow,
26:28of course,
26:29but lessons
26:30that has to be learned.
26:31Thank you once again
26:32to Arisio
26:32for joining me
26:33on Awani Global.
26:34That is all
26:34with me at this hour.
26:36We'll see you next time.
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