- 22 hours ago
For educational purposes
The concept of a long range, fast, heavy fighter or 'zerstorer' (destroyer), lay close to the heart of Hermann Goering during the early years of the growth of the new German air force.
The chosen design came out of the Messerschmitt stable, the first prototype of the Bf-110 taking to the air in 1936.
Although fast, the size of the Bf-110 left it unable to dog-fight with the more nimble RAF fighters, and was revamped for further employment as a night-fighter, serving alongside other types, especially the Junkers Ju-88, the Luftwaffe's premier type in the nocturnal battles with RAF Bomber Command.
Using combat footage from all fronts and from film shot in the skies by night and day over Germany, this programme provides a dramatic account of the contribution made by the heavy fighters of the Luftwaffe in WWII.
The concept of a long range, fast, heavy fighter or 'zerstorer' (destroyer), lay close to the heart of Hermann Goering during the early years of the growth of the new German air force.
The chosen design came out of the Messerschmitt stable, the first prototype of the Bf-110 taking to the air in 1936.
Although fast, the size of the Bf-110 left it unable to dog-fight with the more nimble RAF fighters, and was revamped for further employment as a night-fighter, serving alongside other types, especially the Junkers Ju-88, the Luftwaffe's premier type in the nocturnal battles with RAF Bomber Command.
Using combat footage from all fronts and from film shot in the skies by night and day over Germany, this programme provides a dramatic account of the contribution made by the heavy fighters of the Luftwaffe in WWII.
Category
📚
LearningTranscript
01:01The concept of a long-range twin-engine strategic fighter found its advocates in Poland, France, the USA and Japan,
01:09as well as Germany.
01:10While Japan was to develop the Kawasaki Ki-45, which saw wide-scale service in the Pacific War, it was
01:18in Germany that the concept was most vigorously pursued.
01:26It would be wrong to think that such a type originated in the mid-30s.
01:31In fact, the need for such an aircraft was seen as early as the First World War.
01:36Operations with bombers such as this GOTA, which operated over enemy territory devoid of fighter escort, had prompted thoughts of
01:43a heavy fighter with sufficient range to fly with the bombers to their targets.
01:47It would also possess the ability to deal with enemy fighters sent up to shoot down the incoming attackers.
01:54Such a plane would also need to carry a heavy armament.
01:57It was also envisaged that such an aircraft could be used to fly far-ranging offensive missions over enemy territory.
02:05This concept was far too ambitious for the limited technology of the day to even begin to address.
02:11But this, notwithstanding, the whole notion of such an aircraft is flawed inasmuch as it is a compromise in all
02:17things.
02:18To attain the range, the plane has to be fairly large.
02:21If so, then it becomes unmaneuverable and unable to dogfight with the lighter and more nimble fighters it's seeking to
02:27destroy.
02:29A heavy airframe needs powerful engines, which in themselves raise the weight.
02:34In a real sense, the concept of the destroyer was to military aviation what the battlecruiser was to warships.
02:41A seemingly good idea at the time, but fundamentally flawed.
02:45That, in itself, however, was not enough to kill it.
02:51One man who was undoubtedly attracted to the idea of such an aircraft ended the First World War as a
02:57famous fighter pilot.
02:58He won the Paul Emerit and the Iron Cross First Class and was commander of the infamous Flying Circus.
03:05Fifteen years later, Hermann Goering, as the second most powerful man in the Third Reich,
03:10and the commander of the still clandestine Luftwaffe,
03:13was able to use his power and influence to see that such an aircraft would have a role and place
03:19in the new German Air Force.
03:27The specification for a Kampf destroyer was won by the firm of Messerschmitt,
03:32their prototype BF-110, flying on the 12th of May 1936.
03:39First production of the 110B took place in July 1938,
03:44with the type being powered by YUMO engines.
03:46Just 45 of this variant was manufactured.
03:51Pre-war film of the 110 is very rare.
03:54This short clip shows two BF-110Bs taking part in war games in 1937.
04:00They wear the large pre-war swastika on their fins.
04:06Although the destroyer Gruppen were cultivated as elite units in Germany before the war,
04:11and participated extensively in the Polish campaign,
04:15which began on the 1st of September 1939,
04:18no footage was taken of the type in action.
04:21Some four Gruppen were spread among the two Luftflotten committed to Case White.
04:25The BF-110s flew mainly escort sorties
04:28and were employed extensively in the tactical role supporting the army.
04:32This 110C was operated by the destroyer Gruppen of LG-1.
04:39BF-110s played a significant role in the destruction of 12 Wellington bombers
04:44in the Battle of the Heligoland Bight in December 1939.
04:48Such heavy losses led the RAF to switch to night bombing.
04:55Commander of the 110s in the Heligoland Bight was Wolfgang Falk,
04:59who was soon to emerge as the formative figure in Germany's night-fighting force
05:03and was to be a major player in overseeing its development throughout the war.
05:09BF-110Cs of one ZG-76 under the command of Falk
05:14provided top cover for the JU-52 units landing in southern Norway
05:18during Operation Weserubung in April 1940.
05:22They were, however, rapidly pulled back to Germany.
05:32When, on the 10th of May 1940,
05:35Hitler launched the Wehrmacht against France and the Low Countries,
05:38the Luftwaffe could deploy BF-110s belonging to four destroyer Geschwader.
05:42These included ZG-1, 2, 52 and 76
05:47and were allocated to Luftflotten 2 and 3.
05:51While in the opening phase of the offensive,
05:53the 110s found themselves engaging in aerial combat.
05:56Most sorties after the initial period saw them operating in the ground attack role.
06:01Rapid movement forward from base to base
06:04in support of the fast-moving mobile columns became the order of the day.
06:08It was over Dunkirk when the 110 units came into contact
06:12with large numbers of RAF Spitfires and Hurricanes for the first time
06:16that doubts began to arise over the alleged superiority of the 110.
06:21High losses were experienced
06:23and, as a precursor of what was to come over England a few months later,
06:27the 110 pilots found themselves unable to mix it
06:30with the more manoeuvrable British fighters.
06:32With the surrender of France
06:34and the rejection by Britain of his terms for peace,
06:37Hitler ordered the aerial campaign against England to begin
06:40as the first stage in his invasion plan.
06:43Goering's vaunted destroyers would now face their severest test.
07:03In the period of recovery after the battle for France,
07:06the destroyer Gishvarden went through a significant upgrading
07:09as new subtypes of the C and the D model were delivered.
07:13In Norway, 2 and 3 ZG-76 had taken delivery of the extended range BF-110D.
07:21Epro-Bung's Grupper 210, an experimental trials unit,
07:25took delivery of the first fighter-bomber variant in the C-4
07:28and started operating them attacking shipping in the channel.
07:32By the time the battle for Britain opened,
07:34the Luftwaffe could dispose of no fewer than 289 BF-110s for operations.
07:40Here, BF-110Cs of ZG-2 wearing their famous Bamberger-Hunter insignia
07:46are seen taxiing out prior to a mission over England.
07:50The strategy behind the employment of the 110 rested on its superior range.
07:55They were tasked with flying ahead of the bomber formations
07:58to entice the RAF fighters up into combat,
08:01forcing them to expend their fuel and ammunition
08:04before the arrival of the bombers.
08:06In the meantime, the Spitfires and Hurricanes needing to refuel and rearm
08:11would be found doing so by the Luftwaffe bombers
08:13as they arrived over the airfield.
08:16This, however, turned on the assumption,
08:18certainly unquestioned at the time the battle began,
08:21that the 110s could mix it with the RAF fighters and come out on top.
08:25Here, the plan fell down.
08:27For arriving over England,
08:29the 110s found themselves experiencing once more
08:31what some had first encountered over Dunkirk.
08:34Their charges simply could not follow
08:37the highly manoeuvrable Spitfires and Hurricanes
08:39which flew rings around the heavier German fighter.
08:43By comparison, it was sluggish and vulnerable to fire from the rear,
08:47the gunner proving of no worth with his single machine gun.
08:51Luftwaffe commanders overseeing the campaign
08:53looked on with some concern
08:55as the numbers of 110s being lost over England rose sharply.
08:59Goering was incensed that his elite fighters
09:02were being handled in this fashion
09:03and blamed the pilots,
09:05claiming that they were not using them properly.
09:07By the end of August,
09:08no fewer than 120 110s had been lost,
09:12a further 83 being shot down in September,
09:15forcing the disbandment of a number of destroyer units.
09:22This BF-110 belonging to ZG-26 horse vessel
09:26has crash-landed on a Kent beach.
09:29Its crew taken prisoner.
09:34Symbolic of the immense loss of experienced crew
09:37was Hauptmann Walter Rubensdorfer,
09:39commander of Eprobung's Grupper 210,
09:42shot down on August 15th over Croydon.
09:46The decimation of the destroyer Geschwaden
09:49in the Battle of Britain
09:50saw disbandment and amalgamation
09:52of a number of formations.
09:53As the surviving Staffen
09:55were pulled back into Germany
09:56to rehabilitate and be drawn to passengers new,
09:59a number of 110 units stayed in France.
10:24Here, 110s are seen giving top cover to Crete's marine units
10:27in the Bay of Biscay,
10:28where they quite frequently came under attack
10:30from British aircraft.
10:32These 110s belonged to KG-76
10:34and carry the famous shark mouth insignia on their nose.
10:39The first part of 1941
10:41saw the movement of a large number of 110s
10:44to the Mediterranean theatre
10:45in support of the German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece
10:49and, as part of the Luftwaffe detachment,
10:52sent to aid and give air cover to Rommel's Afrika Korps.
10:55One and second grouper KG-26
10:57and second Staffel KG-76
11:00were used almost exclusively in the fighter-bomber role.
11:04In North Africa, 110 units included the third grouper of ZG-26,
11:09which was later joined by the second Staffel.
11:12Although flying against the RAF,
11:14the North African theatre provided a more benign environment
11:17for the 110s, as they were not opposed by the Spitfire.
11:22The primary task of the 110 became that of ground support
11:26and acting as a long-range fighter-bomber
11:28operating in concert with Rommel's fast-moving ground forces.
11:32In the desert, the range of the 110 was a great advantage,
11:36allowing it to roam over the whole battlefield.
11:38A number of those seen here are carrying bombs
11:41and are the C-4 Yebo variant.
11:58The worst enemy of all for the ground crews of the 110s
12:02was the all-pervading dust.
12:04It was necessary to fit filters to the carburettor intakes
12:07to prevent the jets becoming clogged up,
12:09causing damage and wear to the engines.
12:12On this occasion, a small collection of British Army lorries
12:15and armoured cars,
12:16probably well within what they imagined to be their own lines,
12:19are being strafed by the 110s.
12:34The 110 was also employed for photo reconnaissance of enemy lines.
12:39This model, a C-5, employed a single RB50-30 camera
12:43being carried to the aircraft by the ground crew.
12:47BF-110 served in North Africa throughout the campaign.
12:51Later variants made their way into the theatre
12:53and were employed extensively for ground support and stuka escorts
12:57until the defeat of Rommel at El Alamein
13:00and the withdrawal into Tunisia.
13:09This picture of a BF-110 preparing to take off
13:12gives a very graphic impression of the clouds of dust raised
13:16as the throttles are opened up.
13:21Destined to become a major theatre of war
13:23for all variants of the 110 until 1944 was Russia.
13:27These 110 G2s of the Vespengeschwader date from late 1942.
13:37Operating to the fore of the advancing panzer columns
13:39in the advance into the USSR on June 22, 1941
13:44and obtaining up-to-date photographs of Soviet positions and deployments
13:48were the Henschel HS-126s of the Army Reconnaissance Squadrons.
13:53Rapid examination of the images returned from the battlefield
13:57were then communicated to Luftwaffe units.
14:00Following the successful surprise assaults on Soviet airfields
14:03which had caught most of the Red Air Force on the ground
14:06in the opening hours of the invasion
14:08many Luftwaffe units were turned over
14:10to support of the advancing German columns.
14:13Although four Luftflotten were committed to Barbarossa
14:16the number of 110 formations involved
14:19was small with most serving elsewhere.
14:22Only the second Grupper of ZG-26
14:25serving in the 8th Flieger Corps
14:27and Schnell Kampfgeschwader 210 in the 2nd Flieger Corps
14:31saw action in this period.
14:33It is 110Cs from the former unit that are seen in this film.
14:46Of interest is the tethered observation balloon
14:48which the aircraft passed
14:50and which was used to mark the forward German positions.
14:53Upon reaching their target area
14:55the Ju-88s begin their attack.
14:57The 110s, while flying top cover
15:00are now free to engage upon their secondary function
15:03for the mission, which is a frei-yagd or free-hunt.
15:06While vast numbers of Soviet aircraft
15:08had been destroyed on the ground
15:10a significant few survived the initial German onslaught
15:13to fly against the invaders.
15:15As most Soviet fighter types at this period
15:18were decidedly obsolescent
15:20the 110 was able to deal with
15:22many of the Soviet types they encountered.
15:24The heavy nose armament of the 110
15:26comprising of two 20mm cannon
15:29and four 7.9mm machine guns
15:32gave it a heavy punch.
15:34It was admirably suited to the role of ground attack
15:37and in the absence of the heavy anti-aircraft fire
15:40that would later make such operations
15:42extremely hazardous on the eastern front
15:44the 110s proved highly effective.
15:47Indeed the 110 C4s
15:49of Major Karl-Heinz Stricker
15:51Schnell Kampfgeschwader 210
15:53were tasked from the outset
15:55with the low-level assault
15:56on Soviet airfields and bridges.
15:59This Yebo variant of the 110
16:00was designed as a fighter bomber.
16:02It was fitted with two ETC 250 bomb racks
16:06under the fuselage
16:07and powered by two Daimler Benz
16:10601N engines
16:11and first saw action
16:12over the English Channel in July 1940.
16:33By the time this film of the 110s
16:36in action had been taken
16:37both Messerschmitt and Fokker-Wulf
16:39had taken the BF110 out of production.
16:41The former had already geared up
16:43to produce the 110's successor
16:45the Me210
16:46at its Augsburg and Regensburg plants.
16:50However, reports of the premature demise
16:53of the 110 were greatly exaggerated
16:55for problems with the Me210
16:57would see its predecessor reintroduced in 1942
17:00to rejuvenate the destroyer Geschwaden.
17:06As with all other types
17:08employed by the Luftwaffe
17:09in the atrocious Russian winter of 1941-42
17:13the severe cold brought particular problems.
17:16The 110's water-cooled Daimler Benz engines
17:18needed to be run throughout the night
17:20to stop them freezing.
17:22Usage of the 110 as a Yebo
17:24to attack Soviet ground forces
17:26was very high all through this period.
17:32Consideration of the Junkers 88
17:33in the heavy fighter role
17:35began almost as soon
17:36as its superb flying attributes
17:38became apparent.
17:39The type possessed a long range
17:41fine handling qualities
17:43and high speed
17:44all of which made it
17:45a prime candidate
17:46for employment as a destroyer.
17:48The prototype was based
17:50on an A1 airframe
17:51and appeared in early 1940
17:53with the production C2 model
17:56entering squadron service
17:57with KG-40
17:58in Norway during the spring.
18:00The more numerous
18:01C4 and C6 destroyer variants
18:04employed the later
18:05Ju-88A5
18:06and A4 bomber airframes.
18:08The glazed nose of the bomber
18:10was replaced with a metal cap
18:11which mounted a number
18:12of 20mm cannon
18:14and 7.92mm machine guns.
18:17The quantity in combination
18:18depending on field modifications.
18:20The heavy firepower
18:22saw the type employed
18:23on all fronts
18:24in the anti-shipping,
18:25train busting
18:26and ground attack roles.
18:28This C6 has its nose painted
18:31to simulate the bomber variant
18:32to fool Soviet fighters.
18:36One of the more unusual roles
18:38for which the ME-110
18:39was employed
18:40was as a glider tug
18:41for the massive ME-321 Gigant.
18:46First flown in February 1941
18:48the lack of aircraft
18:50with sufficient power
18:51to tow the glider
18:52into the air
18:52saw its designers
18:54alight upon
18:54an unusual proposal
18:56employing three BF-110s
18:59acting in concert.
19:01Subsequent Troika schlep
19:02as this arrangement
19:03came to be known
19:04was not without its pitfalls.
19:27Even with three 1-1-0s
19:29the Gigant also needed
19:30the help of rockets
19:32to help it get airborne.
19:33On at least one occasion
19:35the Troika schlep failed
19:36and all four aircraft
19:38plunged into the ground
19:39killing all involved
19:41including a large number
19:42of soldiers
19:43being carried
19:44for testing purposes.
19:46However,
19:46even the Troika schlep
19:47was not a solution.
19:48That arrived only
19:50with the Schvilling variant
19:51of the Heinkel 1-11 bomber.
19:57The reusable rockets
19:59were dropped by parachute
20:00after the Gigant
20:01was airborne.
20:09Meshersmith had been working
20:11on a second generation destroyer
20:12to replace the 1-1-0
20:14as early as 1937
20:15with the prototype seen here
20:17taking to the air
20:18on the 2nd of September 1939.
20:22Designed as a multi-role aircraft
20:24including that
20:25of a dive-bombing replacement
20:26for the Stuka
20:27the high expectations
20:29attending the new 2-1-0
20:30were to remain unrealised
20:32as development flying
20:33revealed the type
20:34to be plagued with problems.
20:36Even so,
20:371,000 ME-210As
20:39were ordered in 1940
20:40entering service
20:42with the Luftwaffe test
20:43Eprobung's Gruppe 210
20:45at the end of that year.
20:46By the end of 1941
20:48the 210 was deemed
20:49to be a failure
20:50shot through
20:51with so many defects
20:52that it was described
20:53as being vicious to fly.
20:55Even so,
20:57the investment in the type
20:58had been so great
20:59that heavily modified
21:00210A1s
21:02were delivered
21:02to the second group
21:03of ZG-1
21:04and elements of ZG-26
21:06in Sicily in 1942
21:08as replacements
21:09for the 1-1-0s.
21:12It was as a heavy fighter
21:13that 210 formations
21:15found themselves
21:15thrown into combat
21:17against Anglo-American forces
21:18in Tunisia
21:19in November 1942.
21:24ME-210s are seen here
21:26attacking a forward airfield
21:27manned by British
21:28and American forces.
21:29The 210s come in
21:31at low level
21:31to drop their bombs
21:32amid a hail
21:33of anti-aircraft fire.
21:39Heavy damage
21:40is inflicted
21:41on the Wildcat fighters
21:42and other types
21:43parked on the airfield.
21:50No 210s are lost
21:51lost on this sortie
21:52and they make good
21:53their escape.
22:00Although the 210
22:01rapidly left the inventory
22:02of the Luftwaffe,
22:04it nevertheless
22:04acquired a good reputation
22:06while serving
22:07in the Hungarian Air Force.
22:08Built under licence,
22:10it entered service
22:11in June 1943
22:12and was employed
22:13as a home defence fighter
22:15against bombers
22:16of the US 15th Air Force
22:17and also as a fast light bomber
22:19through to 1945.
22:23The decision to abandon
22:25the ME-210
22:26was taken in April 1942
22:28with Messerschmitt
22:29being ordered
22:29to stop production
22:30of the type.
22:31Although variants
22:32of the type
22:33were encountered
22:34over the British Isles
22:35in 1942,
22:36in addition to Tunisia,
22:38by 1943,
22:39the 210 was fading
22:40from Luftwaffe service.
22:46In substitute
22:47for the failed 210,
22:49a refined 110
22:50left the Messerschmitt
22:51production line
22:52in May 1942.
22:54Designated the 110 G2,
22:57it had an improved airframe
22:59and more powerful engines.
23:01To enhance versatility,
23:03conversion sets
23:04were made available
23:04to allow it to serve
23:05both as a heavy fighter
23:07and fighter-bomber.
23:08The first film
23:10of the new 110 G2
23:11in action
23:12came with a newsreel report
23:13of Luftwaffe operations
23:15in northern Finland
23:16in the summer of 1942.
23:18The F-110s
23:19of the 7th Destroyerstappen
23:21of Jagdgeschwader 5
23:22were seen providing
23:24fighter escort
23:25for Stukas
23:25of 4th Group LG-1
23:27attacking the strategic
23:29Soviet port
23:29of Mamansk.
23:31Gun camera film
23:32from a 110
23:33shows the downing
23:34of a defending
23:34cannon-armed
23:35116 Type 17 fighter.
23:40Whereas just 4 110s
23:42had been delivered
23:42to the Luftwaffe
23:43in February 1942,
23:45the cancellation
23:46of the 210
23:47and recommencement
23:48of 110 production
23:49on a wide scale
23:51after April
23:51saw 577 delivered
23:54by the end of that year.
23:56However,
23:56although there was
23:57a re-equipping
23:58of existing
23:59destroyer Geschwaden,
24:00the increasing importance
24:01of the type
24:02as a night fighter
24:03saw a reduction
24:04in output
24:05of the type
24:05as a destroyer.
24:07The only BF-110
24:09formation present
24:10with the Luftwaffe units
24:12concentrated
24:12for Operation Zitatel
24:14was the Panzer-Jager
24:15staffel
24:16of Destroyer
24:16Geschwader 1.
24:18These 110s
24:19had originally
24:19been part
24:20of an experimental
24:21flying anti-tank unit
24:22set up during
24:23the previous year
24:24to investigate
24:25the suitability
24:26of aircraft types
24:27in the tank destroyer role.
24:29A number of 110Gs
24:31mounting a modified
24:3237mm cannon
24:33in an under-fuselage
24:35fairing
24:36had been tested
24:36but found unsuitable.
24:38However,
24:39those employed
24:40at Kursk
24:40were subsequently
24:41returned to normal service
24:42as a heavy fighter
24:43and operated
24:44with Luftflot 6
24:46for the duration
24:46of the offensive.
24:48Even though
24:49the Soviet victory
24:50at Kursk
24:51marked the real emergence
24:52of the Red Air Force,
24:53the BF-110
24:54could still be employed
24:55in an offensive capacity
24:57as a fighter
24:58and succeeded
24:59in downing
25:00many Soviet aircraft.
25:18in this case,
25:20the opponent
25:20of the 110
25:21is an Ilyushin
25:22IL-2 Sturmovik.
25:24This was a specialised
25:25very heavily armoured
25:27ground attack aircraft
25:28known to the Luftwaffe
25:29as the Cementer
25:30because of its capacity
25:31to absorb heavy punishment
25:33before it was shot down.
25:35Indeed,
25:36the example in this film
25:37is taking a lot of fire
25:38from the nose guns
25:39of the 110.
25:40The problem
25:41for Soviet pilots
25:42flying this type
25:43was that the protective armour
25:44also made the aircraft
25:46unmanoeuvrable.
25:47Standard Luftwaffe practice
25:49was to first
25:49knock out the rear gunner
25:51then bring down the plane
25:52which inevitably
25:53tended to fly
25:54in a straight line.
25:55while built in larger numbers
25:57than any other type
25:58in World War II
25:59the Sturmovik
26:00was also shot down
26:01in greater numbers
26:02than any other.
26:14If for many
26:15the Me110
26:16was found wanting
26:17as a destroyer
26:18because of its undoing
26:19at the hands of the RAF
26:20in the Battle of Britain
26:21there is no justification
26:22in claiming
26:23it was a total failure
26:24given its sterling service
26:26with the Nachtflieger
26:27from 1940
26:28until the end of the war.
26:30Bearing the England Blitz
26:32badge of the night fighters
26:33it was the RAF's
26:34ever constant opponent
26:35in dark skies
26:37over the Reich.
26:38The notion
26:39that the Luftwaffe
26:40might need to develop
26:41a night fighting capability
26:42was not something
26:43that Hermann Goering
26:44in early 1940
26:46regarded with seriousness.
26:48If needed at all
26:49then he believed
26:50the combination
26:51of searchlights
26:52and heavy flak
26:52would see Germany through.
26:55In addition
26:55a number of Me109s
26:57had been allocated
26:58in 1939
26:59to form an experimental
27:01moonlight squadron.
27:04In June 1940
27:06Josef Kamhuber
27:07established the first
27:08night fighting division
27:09in Brussels
27:10following the beginning
27:11of the RAF's
27:12night raids in May.
27:14Casting around
27:15for aircraft to serve
27:16in the night fighter
27:17and intruder role
27:18led to Dornier
27:19being asked to adapt
27:20their DO-17Z
27:22medium bomber.
27:24Employing the nosecone
27:25from the JU-88C2
27:27destroyer
27:28led to the appearance
27:28of the DO-17 Kautz.
27:30Only one was produced
27:32before the improved
27:33Kautz II
27:33left the production line.
27:36Just after the Battle
27:37of France
27:38Hermann Goering
27:38appointed Hauptmann
27:39Wolfgang Falk
27:40the commander
27:41of destroyer
27:42Geschwader I
27:43to command the Luftwaffe's
27:44first nacked
27:45Jaggeschwader.
27:46NJG-1
27:47was drawn from
27:48two staffel
27:49and the first
27:49grupper of ZG-1
27:50and sent to Dusseldorf
27:52for night fighter
27:53training.
27:53To these were added
27:55fourth grupper
27:55of JG-2.
27:57In July
27:57the all-black
27:58110s transferred
27:59to Venlo in Holland
28:01as part of the
28:02first night fighting
28:03division.
28:04No specialised equipment
28:05was added
28:06or modifications
28:07made to what
28:08were standard
28:08BF-110C
28:10destroyers.
28:12One of the earliest
28:13depictions of
28:14night fighter
28:15operations shown
28:16to German audiences
28:17in early 1942
28:18is most revealing
28:19for what it does
28:20not show.
28:22Deutsche Wockenschau
28:23filmed principally
28:24for home audiences
28:25was also a vehicle
28:26for propaganda
28:27overseas
28:27and many copies
28:29were dispatched
28:29abroad through
28:30neutral countries.
28:32These ended up
28:32in the UK
28:33where they were
28:34studied with great
28:34care by intelligence
28:36operatives
28:36seeking to glean
28:37every item of value
28:39from the images.
28:39It was for security
28:41reasons that the
28:42German film editors
28:43did not include
28:44in this sequence
28:45any coverage
28:46of the radars
28:47that were the actual
28:48key to their
28:49whole night fighting
28:50system.
28:51In this film
28:52they have implied
28:52that observer sightings
28:54and sound directors
28:55are the source
28:56of the information
28:57used by the
28:57ground control.
28:59The system
28:59was known as
29:00Himmelbet
29:01or four-poster bed
29:02and was based
29:03on a belt
29:04of radar stations
29:05placed 20 miles
29:06apart.
29:08These ran
29:08along the coast
29:09of northern Germany
29:10from the Danish
29:11border south-westward
29:12through to the
29:13border of France
29:14and bisected
29:15the route taken
29:16by RAF night bombers
29:17on their way
29:18to Germany.
29:19Each radar station
29:20had its captive
29:21night fighter
29:22that was required
29:23to fly a continuous
29:24course that took
29:25it no further
29:25than 30 miles
29:26from each radar
29:27station.
29:28One Würzburg radar
29:30on site would track
29:31an incoming bomber
29:32relaying the information
29:34back to the control
29:34room.
29:35The station
29:36would then employ
29:37its second Würzburg
29:38to vector its captive
29:39night fighter
29:40onto the RAF bomber
29:41traversing its box.
29:44One of the rising
29:45stars of the
29:46Naft Flieger
29:47was Major Lent,
29:48awarded the
29:48Knights Cross
29:49in August 1941
29:50following his
29:5230th night victory.
29:53By January 1943,
29:55Lent had scored
29:5650 victories.
29:57He's seen here
29:58with members
29:58of his second
29:59grouper which
30:00he established
30:00at St Tron
30:01in Belgium
30:02in November 1941.
30:05The incoming
30:06RAF raids
30:07spread out
30:08across a wide
30:09front is tracked
30:10first by the
30:10long-range
30:11Freya radars.
30:12They were
30:13sufficiently accurate
30:13to plot the
30:14direction and heading
30:15of the bombers
30:16and determine
30:16the general areas
30:18of the line
30:18they would penetrate
30:19and fly over.
30:21When this had been
30:22ascertained,
30:22the night fighter units
30:23would be scrambled
30:24to take up their
30:25position in the boxes.
30:40By the end
30:41of 1941,
30:43the ME-110
30:43was the most
30:44numerous of all
30:45German night fighters.
30:47Although many
30:48of those employed
30:48were similar
30:49to their day fighter
30:50brethren,
30:51save in their
30:52all-black finish,
30:53in 1941,
30:54the first proper
30:55night fighting
30:56variant left
30:57Messerschmitt's
30:57production line.
30:58This was the F-4.
31:00It was equipped
31:01with more powerful
31:02engines and had
31:03the capacity
31:04to mount a heavier
31:04armament
31:05than an under-fuselage
31:07pannier.
31:08By March 1942,
31:10production of this
31:11specialised variant
31:12of the 1-1-0
31:12was running at
31:13some 36 per month.
31:15Although construction
31:17of this defensive line
31:18had begun in 1941,
31:20by the beginning
31:21of 1942,
31:22it had acquired
31:23a formidable depth.
31:24But the RAF
31:25had not sat
31:26passively by
31:27and were striving
31:27to find the weaknesses
31:29in the system.
31:30The most obvious,
31:31once they gauged
31:32its workings,
31:33was that only one
31:34aircraft could be
31:35tracked and only
31:36one fighter
31:37vectored at any
31:38one time.
31:39It did not take
31:40long for a bomber
31:41to traverse a box
31:4230 miles in extent,
31:44so the actual
31:45time available
31:46for a 1-1-0
31:47to intercept
31:47the RAF aircraft
31:48was quite limited.
31:51Once this was realised,
31:52Bomber Command chose
31:54to swamp a given
31:55area of the line
31:56with a large number
31:56of planes following
31:57in one after the other.
31:59While one or two
32:00might be brought down,
32:01by far and away
32:02the bulk would get
32:03through.
32:04This tactic was used
32:06on May 30, 1942,
32:08when Bomber Command
32:09dispatched 1,000 aircraft
32:11to hit Cologne
32:12with all flying
32:13the same route.
32:1441 aircraft were lost,
32:16far fewer than would
32:17otherwise have been
32:18shot down.
32:19In what was developing
32:21into a sophisticated
32:22game of technological
32:23cat and mouse,
32:24it took the RAF
32:25longer to undermine
32:26Himmelbet,
32:27which they finally did
32:28in July 1943.
32:35One of the limitations
32:36of filmmaking
32:37during the war,
32:38not always readily
32:39appreciated today
32:40when special effects
32:41are commonplace,
32:42was the inability
32:43to capture genuine
32:44night fighter action.
32:46So, in an attempt
32:47to portray night fighting
32:48for the German audience,
32:50the propaganda department
32:51has mixed genuine
32:52footage of ground action
32:53with studio simulations
32:55employing models.
32:5720mm flat guns,
32:59the searchlights,
33:00and the interior
33:00of the command
33:01and control center
33:02is genuine footage.
33:04Once the film cuts,
33:05however,
33:06to what purports
33:06to be a 110 night fighter,
33:08we are then looking
33:09at a model.
33:10All shots of the pilot
33:12inside the cockpit
33:13are also filmed
33:14on the ground.
33:15The film then shows
33:16the 110 shooting down
33:18what is meant to be
33:19an RAF Wellington bomber,
33:20but it too is a model.
33:22Of interest is the manner
33:23in which the 110
33:24is shown approaching
33:26the bomber
33:26at a much steeper angle
33:28than was actually the case.
33:39Alongside the ME110G2,
33:411942 also saw
33:43the appearance
33:44of the specialized,
33:45more heavily armed
33:47ME110G4
33:48night fighter.
33:49With the emergence
33:50of this 110
33:51and also of the
33:52JU88 night fighters
33:54carrying the same
33:54Liechtenstein radar
33:56and mounting
33:56large nose-mounted
33:58antennae,
33:58film coverage
33:59of night fighters
34:00ceases altogether.
34:02In the air war
34:03above the Reich,
34:04each side was now
34:05employing devices
34:06in their planes
34:07that placed them
34:08on the cutting edge
34:09of the new black art
34:10of electronic warfare,
34:11wherein the need
34:12to preserve secrecy
34:13was paramount.
34:15The year 1943
34:17had seen a steady rise
34:19in the sorties
34:19of the US 8th Army
34:21Air Force bomber squadrons
34:22flying out of England
34:23to attack targets
34:24in Germany.
34:25In a bid to provide
34:27a more effective air defense,
34:28the decision was taken
34:29in the autumn of 1943
34:31to strengthen the air defense
34:33of the Reich
34:34by resurrecting
34:35the nearly defunct
34:36destroyer Gruppen.
34:38Serving alongside
34:39the more usual
34:40110G2s
34:41was a new destroyer,
34:42although it bore
34:43more than a passing
34:44resemblance
34:45to the type
34:45that had sired it.
34:47Indeed,
34:47the ME410,
34:49which entered production
34:49with Messerschmitt
34:50in January 1943,
34:52was in effect
34:53a revamped 210,
34:55with all of its
34:56many problems
34:56eliminated.
34:58Although the Schnell bomber
34:59was deemed to be
35:00the primary variant,
35:01the war situation
35:03saw the destroyer version
35:04acquire growing significance
35:06to the Luftwaffe.
35:07In its light bomber role,
35:09the 410 began to appear
35:10in some numbers
35:11over the Mediterranean
35:12and was also encountered
35:14and shot down
35:15over England.
35:15By year's end,
35:18457 ME410s
35:20had been delivered
35:20from the Augsburg factory
35:22and production
35:23of a large number
35:24of field conversion kits
35:25saw it adapted
35:26to carry a variety
35:27of armament packages.
35:29Although a faster
35:30and more effective aircraft
35:31than the 110,
35:32it supplemented
35:33the earlier type
35:34rather than replaced it.
35:36Clearly,
35:36the older type
35:37still had an important role
35:39to play
35:39in the skies over Germany.
35:47Retaining the same bomb bay
35:49as the 210,
35:50the spacious compartment
35:51proved admirable
35:52for fitting of factory-supplied
35:54weapons containers.
35:55These permitted the type
35:56to carry an extra
35:57two 20mm cannon
35:59in addition to the standard
36:01in-built armament.
36:02It also permitted the 410
36:04to carry much heavier weapons.
36:16external ETC-50 shackles
36:19could also be fitted
36:20for the carriage of bombs.
36:25Armament comprised
36:27of two nose-mounted
36:2820mm cannon
36:29and two 7.92mm machine guns.
36:32The most interesting feature
36:34of the type's armament
36:35was carried over
36:36from the earlier ME-210
36:38and employed
36:39two 13mm MG-131 machine guns
36:42in remotely controlled barbettes
36:44mounted on the side
36:45of the fuselage
36:46just below the rear
36:48of the canopy.
36:49These two guns
36:50were controlled
36:50and fired
36:51by a complex movement
36:52and sighting mechanism
36:53used by the rear gunner.
37:02The use of destroyers
37:04against US bombers
37:05saw an increase in armament.
37:07This ME-110G-2
37:09mounts two MG-151s
37:11in the nose
37:12and a 37mm cannon
37:14under its fuselage.
37:16The U-4 variant
37:18of the ME-410B-2
37:20saw a 50mm cannon
37:21derived from the Army
37:22Pac-38 anti-tank gun
37:24mounted in the weapons bay.
37:26One of the major weapons
37:28One of the major weapons
37:28introduced onto ME-110
37:30and ME-410's attacking bomber
37:32formations in 1943
37:33was derived from the rocket launchers
37:36used by the Army.
37:37The 210mm version
37:39was an unguided weapon
37:41and carried a 47kg warhead
37:43to about 7,800 metres.
37:46The ME-110G-2R3 variant
37:50carried four 210mm rockets
37:52in tubes
37:53outboard of the engines
37:54as did the ME-410.
37:57Although the tubes
37:58affected the aerodynamics
37:59of both aircraft
38:00increasing their drag
38:02and lowering their airspeed
38:03this was deemed acceptable
38:05given their effectiveness
38:06in employing the rockets
38:07to break up
38:08US bomber formations.
38:09This then allowed
38:11the single-engined
38:12ME-109's
38:13and FW-190's
38:15to tear into the fray
38:16and shoot down
38:17the now less heavily
38:18protected B-17's
38:20and B-24's.
38:23Seen in the winter
38:24of 1943-44
38:26these 110G-2's
38:28are taking off
38:29to intercept
38:30an incoming
38:30US bombing raid.
38:32They carry a variety
38:33of armament.
38:34A number mount
38:35the rockets under wing
38:37others two
38:3730mm cannon
38:39in an under-fuselage tray
38:41and a few
38:42the 37mm cannon.
38:44Closing with the
38:45US bomber formation
38:46from above
38:47the 110's
38:48fire off their rockets
38:49from a maximum range
38:50of about 6,000 feet
38:52with the warhead prime
38:53to be exploded
38:54at between
38:551,800
38:55and 3,500 feet.
38:58The release
38:59of a large number
39:00of these powerful rockets
39:01did succeed
39:02in breaking up
39:03many bomber formations.
39:05The 37mm cannon
39:06armed 110's
39:08also proved
39:08the most effective.
39:09The weapon
39:10essentially the same
39:11as used
39:12on the tank-busting
39:13variant of the Stuka
39:14was more than
39:15destructive enough
39:16to destroy a B-17
39:17or a B-24
39:18with one shot.
39:20However,
39:21the weight of the weapon
39:22and its cumbersome container
39:23did little to aid
39:25the maneuverability
39:26of the Me-110.
39:27The most successful
39:29sortie for the 110's
39:30came on 11th January
39:321944
39:33when they assailed
39:34a formation
39:35of 650 bombers
39:37on their way
39:37to bomb Brunswick
39:39employing their rockets
39:40to first break up
39:41the Polk.
39:42Thereafter,
39:43they attacked the bombers
39:44now devoid
39:45of their defensive formation
39:46and downed 41
39:47in conjunction
39:48with the single-engined fighters.
39:50The returning crew members
39:52looked very happy
39:53with their morning's work.
39:54Such sorties
39:55were only possible
39:56when the bombers
39:57were beyond the range
39:58of escorting fighters.
40:00Once the Americans
40:01had solved the range problem,
40:03the 110's days
40:04would be numbered.
40:05While Me-410's
40:07operated in conjunction
40:08with the 110's,
40:09they also flew
40:10destroyer sorties alone.
40:12A quick-thinking
40:13US bomber crewman
40:15snapped this shot
40:16of a 50mm
40:17cannon-armed 410
40:18pulling away
40:19from his aircraft
40:20after it had made
40:21a firing pass.
40:23Film of the Me-410
40:25is not extensive.
40:26This sequence shows
40:28one returning to its base,
40:30the pilot waggling his wings
40:31to show that he scored
40:33a victory.
40:34This particular variant
40:35is a 410A2 R2.
40:38Two 30mm cannons
40:40have been mounted
40:41in the bomb bay
40:42to give the plane
40:43extra firepower.
40:44As soon as the plane
40:46has stopped,
40:46the ground crew
40:47or black men
40:48as they were nicknamed
40:49because of the colour
40:50of their overalls
40:51first congratulate
40:52the pilot and gunner,
40:53then set to work
40:55to get the aircraft
40:55ready for its next sortie.
40:59It was rare for aircrew
41:01other than famous aces
41:02to be interviewed
41:03in such depth
41:04by the newsreel.
41:05But at this time,
41:06late 1943,
41:08early 1944,
41:09the destroyer Gruppen
41:11were contributing
41:11in a major fashion
41:13to the success
41:14the Luftwaffe was having
41:15in shooting down
41:16American bombers.
41:17Using their hands
41:18to demonstrate,
41:19as all fighter pilots do,
41:21this Me-410 crew
41:23described their shootdown
41:24of a B-17
41:25and tell of how
41:26they approached
41:27the plane
41:27from slightly below
41:29before opening fire.
41:31It would seem
41:32their 410 variant
41:33was equipped
41:33with extra cannon
41:34as they described
41:36the manner
41:36in which the heavy fire
41:37from their guns
41:38could be seen
41:39dancing across
41:40the plane's skin
41:41and causing it
41:42to burst into flame.
41:43The 30mm cannon
41:45used on some destroyers
41:47was a most formidable weapon.
41:48It could bring down
41:49a heavy bomber
41:50in just a few shots.
41:56American survivors
41:57recall the coordination
41:58between destroyers
41:59and single-seat fighters
42:00in their attacks
42:01on the bombers.
42:09Caught by the PK cameraman
42:11is a post-sorty meeting
42:12between the 410
42:13Staffel commander
42:14and his men.
42:16Interest is the atmosphere
42:17of joviality
42:18and the manner
42:19of the commander.
42:20While the tome
42:21of the whole sequence
42:22is decidedly triumphalist,
42:23a number of enemy bombers
42:25having just been shot down,
42:26it would be fascinating
42:27to gain some insight
42:29into the thoughts
42:30of these men
42:30to see what they really felt
42:32at seeing so many US bombers
42:34streaming across Germany
42:35day after day,
42:37seemingly increasing in number
42:39irrespective of how many
42:40they are shooting down.
42:42Such meetings would not,
42:43however, continue much longer
42:45as the fate
42:46of the destroyer
42:47Geschwaden
42:47in the opening months
42:48of 1944
42:49was already sealed
42:50with the increasing range
42:52now being given
42:53to US day fighters
42:54in England.
43:03The addition of drop tanks
43:05to US escort fighters
43:06early in 1944
43:08effectively sealed
43:09the fate
43:10of the ME-110 destroyers
43:12in the daylight air war
43:13over Germany.
43:13The 410s,
43:15by virtue of their higher speed,
43:17survived only a little longer.
43:19Thunderbolts and Mustangs
43:20could now hit
43:21the German heavy fighters
43:22before they could
43:23reach the bombers.
43:24The fate of the 110s
43:26of ZG-26
43:27on March 16, 1944
43:29is a classic example.
43:32Out of 43 committed,
43:34Mustangs accounted
43:35for no fewer than 26
43:36in a matter of minutes.
43:39The subsequent loss rate
43:40was so high
43:41that the third grouper
43:42of the Geschwader
43:43disbanded within weeks
43:45and by June 1944
43:46only second grouper
43:48was flying 110s
43:49over Germany
43:50in daylight.
43:55The building
43:56of a huge bomber force
43:57was the largest
43:58single investment
43:59made by Great Britain
44:00during the Second World War.
44:02For Churchill,
44:03bombing represented
44:04the only means available
44:05to hit back
44:06at Nazi Germany.
44:07By 1943,
44:09British industry
44:10was turning out
44:11large numbers
44:11of heavy four-engined bombers
44:13with which to carry
44:14the air war
44:15to the Reich by night.
44:16With production
44:17based upon
44:18three four-engined heavies,
44:20namely the Lancaster,
44:21the Halifax
44:22and the Stirling,
44:23Bomber Command
44:24underwent
44:25a major expansion.
44:26This was mirrored
44:27by the growing sophistication
44:29of its methods
44:29and of the electronic technology
44:32used for bombing aids
44:33and targeting.
44:37Under Air Marshal
44:39Sir Arthur Harris,
44:40the priorities
44:41of the bomber campaign
44:42were identified
44:42as follows.
44:43The progressive destruction
44:45of the German military,
44:47industrial and economic system
44:49and the undermining
44:50of the morale
44:51of the German people
44:52to a point
44:53where their capacity
44:54for armed resistance
44:55is fatally weakened.
44:57In March 1943,
44:59the instruments
45:00available to him
45:01to attempt to realise
45:03these objectives
45:04comprised
45:05321 Lancasters,
45:07220 Halifaxes,
45:10141 Stirlings
45:11and 268 Wellingtons.
45:14March saw the launch
45:15of the Battle of the Ruhr,
45:17a sustained attempt
45:18by Bomber Command
45:19to destroy
45:20the productive capacity
45:21of Germany's
45:22premier industrial region.
45:24In July,
45:26the decision was taken
45:26to concentrate
45:27a series of heavy raids
45:29on one German city
45:30and Operation Gomorrah
45:32was born.
45:33In concert
45:34with US day bombers,
45:36Bomber Command
45:36hit Hamburg
45:37in four great raids
45:39over 10 days.
45:40Chosen because it allowed
45:42a clear and unambiguous return
45:44on the new H-2S bombing radar,
45:46the Hamburg raids
45:48were also important
45:49because they were begun
45:50with the dropping
45:51of millions of strips
45:52of aluminium foil
45:53which reflected
45:54the returns
45:55of the German Freya
45:56and Würzburg radars,
45:58rendering the Kamhuber line
46:00and the Himmelbett defence system
46:02impotent in the short term.
46:04German night fighters
46:06were thus unable
46:06to intercept British bombers
46:08in any significant numbers
46:10and the loss rate
46:11among the attacking aircraft
46:12was low.
46:13In all, 87 were lost,
46:16representing less than 3%
46:18of the aircraft committed.
46:20Other RAF technical advances
46:22also assisted the heavies.
46:24A device known as Buzo
46:26was fitted
46:26to give the bomber crews
46:27advance warning
46:28of the radar
46:29employed
46:30to lay the 88mm
46:31flat guns
46:32and their attendant searchlights.
46:34Then there was Monika,
46:36an early form
46:37of rear warning radar
46:38designed to tell
46:39the bomber
46:40of the proximity
46:41of a German night fighter.
46:46Although the employment
46:47of WINDOW
46:48had had a devastating
46:49short-term effect
46:50on the German
46:51night fighter defence,
46:52steps were rapidly taken
46:53to surmount
46:54the problems
46:55raised by it.
46:56Although Himmelbett
46:57had clearly been compromised,
46:59it was nevertheless
47:00still the basis
47:01of the whole system.
47:03Alternative methods
47:04that came online
47:05once the WINDOW
47:06problem was solved,
47:07including what came
47:08to be called
47:09tame bore.
47:10Night fighters carrying
47:11airborne radar
47:12were given a continuous
47:13running commentary
47:14from ground control
47:15in order to vector them
47:17into the general vicinity
47:18of an RAF bomber.
47:19The British response
47:21was to give false instructions
47:22on the same wavelength
47:23used by the German pilots
47:25to confuse them.
47:27Although Hermann Goering
47:28is seen here
47:29inspecting a 110 night fighter,
47:31the sometime chief
47:32of the Luftwaffe
47:33remained woefully ignorant
47:34of technical matters
47:35relating to the night fighter arm.
47:38Whilst the Luftwaffe
47:39had employed
47:40earlier variants
47:41of the Ju-88
47:42in the night fighter role,
47:43it was only with
47:44the introduction
47:45of the G-series
47:46in late 1943
47:47that the type
47:48really began
47:49to fulfil its potential.
47:51When the British
47:52captured this particular
47:53plane in July 1944,
47:55they discovered
47:56that its Flensburg radar
47:57was attuned
47:58to the moniker
47:59tail warning radars
48:00employed by RAF bombers
48:02to warn them
48:03of the approach
48:03of German night fighters.
48:06The entry into service
48:08of the G-1 coincided
48:09of the G-1 coincided
48:09with a marked rise
48:10in RAF losses
48:11in early 1944
48:12and was to continue
48:14flying until war's end
48:15in 1945.
48:17The G-6 variant
48:19employed more powerful
48:20Junker's YUMO
48:21in-line engines
48:22to give the type
48:23higher speed.
48:24Although the radar
48:25combinations
48:26were some of the most
48:27sophisticated,
48:28it arrived too late
48:29to make any significant
48:30impact on the air war.
48:32This G-6
48:33allows us to view
48:34the fixed, angled guns
48:36mounted atop the fuselage
48:37to allow the Ju-88
48:39and Me-110
48:40to fire into the vulnerable
48:42belly of RAF bombers.
48:45Operating up to a range
48:46of 30 miles,
48:47the Naxos passive homing device
48:49fitted on top of the canopy
48:51allowed Ju-88s
48:53to fix the positions
48:54of RAF bombers
48:55by the emissions
48:56from their H-2S
48:57bombing radar.
48:59The ferocity of the air war
49:01and the darkness
49:02over Germany
49:03can be illustrated
49:04by examining
49:05RAF bomber losses
49:06between January 1943
49:08and March 1944.
49:11This period
49:12covered the battles
49:12of the Ruhr,
49:13Hamburg
49:14and Berlin.
49:155,881 British heavy bombers
49:19were lost
49:19in this period.
49:21German nightfighter crews,
49:23although accounting
49:24for most of these
49:25RAF planes brought down,
49:26had also suffered
49:27heavy losses.
49:31Another bomber type
49:32converted to the nightfighter roll,
49:34albeit in small numbers,
49:35was the Dornier
49:36DO-217.
49:38Employing both radial
49:39and inline engines,
49:41the Liechtenstein-equipped
49:42J and N variants
49:44were not a success,
49:45the type being found
49:46to be too heavy,
49:48slow and cumbersome
49:49for the nightfighting roll.
49:50It was taken off
49:52active service by 1944.
49:54Nightfighter aces
49:55were fated by the German press
49:57in the same fashion
49:58as the single-seat
49:59fighter aces.
50:00The highest scoring
50:01of the Nachtflieger
50:02was Wolfgang Schnaufer,
50:04who shot down
50:04121 aircraft
50:06in 164 operational sorties.
50:10On October 16, 1944,
50:14he was awarded the diamonds
50:15to his Knight's Cross
50:16at the same ceremony
50:17as Jagdwaffe ace
50:19Eric Hartmann,
50:20who received his from Hitler
50:21at his headquarters
50:22at Rastenburg
50:23in East Prussia.
50:24All of Schnaufer's kills
50:26were made in a 110 G4.
50:28He served as
50:29Gruppen commander
50:30of 4NJG1.
50:32Schnaufer survived the war
50:34only to die
50:34in a motoring accident
50:35in 1950.
50:38Oberst Helmut Lent,
50:40commander of NJG3
50:41and holder of the Knight's Cross
50:43with diamonds,
50:44achieved 105 victories.
50:46He died in an accident
50:47in October 1944
50:49when he and his two crewmen
50:51crashed in their 110
50:52at Paderborn
50:53in bad visibility.
50:57Prince Sein Wichtenstein
50:59scored 83 victories,
51:00the bulk of his kills
51:02employing the Ju-88.
51:03He was shot down
51:04and killed
51:05on the 21st of May 1944.
51:08In the course of the air war
51:10in the night skies
51:10over Germany,
51:11circumstances often
51:13forced the defenders
51:14to adopt unusual methods
51:15for downing RAF bombers.
51:18Following the introduction
51:19of Window in 1943,
51:21an ex-bomber pilot
51:23named Heio Herrmann
51:24proffered the idea
51:25of employing single-seat
51:27day fighters
51:27to attack RAF bombers
51:29fixed by German searchlights
51:31over the target area.
51:33Devoid of radar direction
51:35until such time
51:36as the German boffins
51:37found a way
51:37to counter window,
51:39Herrmann was ordered
51:40by Goering
51:40to form a special unit.
51:42Taking the name
51:43of wild boar
51:44to describe their methods,
51:46Me-109s
51:47and FW-190s,
51:49crewed in the main
51:50by ex-bomber pilots,
51:52flew in the skies
51:52above Hamburg and Berlin.
51:54In two raids
51:56on the capital
51:56on the 24th
51:57and 25th of August
51:58and 1st of September 1943,
52:02Herrmann's fighters
52:02shot down 56
52:04and 47 RAF heavies.
52:06On the 4th September,
52:08another 26 were brought down.
52:14Believed by many
52:15in Germany's
52:16nightfighter arm
52:17to have been the aircraft
52:18that could have won
52:19the air war
52:19was the Heinkel He219.
52:22Indeed, some say
52:23it was the best
52:23nightfighter of the war.
52:25Although many of the claims
52:26for the performance
52:27of the type
52:27have been questioned since,
52:29there is no doubting that,
52:30had it entered full production,
52:32the 219 might have changed
52:34the odds in the night skies
52:35over Germany.
52:38That it did not
52:40has much to do
52:40with the internal wrangling
52:42between different interest groups
52:43in the Luftwaffe.
52:44The most important voice
52:46against the 219
52:47was Field Marshal
52:48Erhard Milch.
52:50Charged with oversight
52:51of aircraft production,
52:53he was firmly of the opinion
52:55that the 219
52:56was a plane too many
52:57and that its role
52:59could best be carried out
53:00by the Ju88.
53:02Heinkel managed to produce
53:03a total of 195
53:05of the 219s
53:06with another 73
53:07being produced
53:08and employed
53:09for research purposes.
53:12Those that flew
53:13shot down 104 heavy bombers.
53:17Another type
53:18that did not enter production
53:20but was also thought of
53:21as a potential destroyer
53:22as well as a nightfighter
53:24was Kurt Tank's
53:25wooden TA-154.
53:27Indeed,
53:28the specification
53:29for this type
53:30flowed from the requirement
53:31for a two-seat nightfighter
53:33with a long loiter time
53:34and a heavy armament
53:36of two 20mm
53:37and two 30mm cannon.
53:40First flown on July 1st, 1943,
53:43following extensive testing,
53:45a production line
53:46was set up in 1944.
53:48However,
53:49problems with bonding
53:50the wood on the airframe
53:52and the adoption
53:52of the emergency fighter program
53:54in November 1944
53:56brought an end
53:57to all further work
53:58on the type.
54:02The most radical
54:04and potentially effective
54:05of all the types
54:06to be conceived
54:07both as a destroyer
54:08and as a knacked Jäger
54:09was the Dornier
54:10DO-335.
54:12Better known
54:13as the Arrow,
54:14this type employed
54:15both a pusher
54:16and a tractor propeller.
54:18The prototype
54:19first flew
54:20on October 26, 1943.
54:25By September 1944,
54:27a unit had been set up
54:29to test the operational
54:30characteristics of the Arrow
54:31and the DO-335A1
54:34was on the assembly lines.
54:36However,
54:37the war situation
54:37was declining
54:38and although
54:39a most promising type,
54:41the 335 remained
54:43at war's end
54:43just a fascinating
54:45might have been.
54:47With Germany's surrender
54:49in May 1945,
54:50the former airfields
54:52of the Night Fighters
54:53were a litter
54:53of destroyed
54:54and abandoned aircraft.
54:56For five years,
54:57destroyer and knacked Jäger
54:59had been key types
55:00in the Luftwaffe's inventory,
55:01had played a major role
55:03in the years of victory
55:04and had fought hard
55:06along the road
55:06to defeat.
55:22of the Night Fighters
55:22of the Night Fighters
55:22of the Night Fighters
55:23of the Night Fighters
55:23of the Night Fighters
55:23of the Night Fighters
55:24of the Night Fighters
55:25of the Night Fighters
55:25of the Night Fighters
55:25of the Night Fighters
55:25of the Night Fighters
55:25of the Night Fighters