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For educational purposes
The German Luftwaffe entered the Second World War with the world's most effective bomber force, built around the Heinkel He-111 and Dornier D0-17 medium bombers, and the new Junkers JU-88 'Schnellbomber'.
From its outset, the new Luftwaffe was planned as a tactical instrument designed to provide air support to the Army in what was assumed would be a short war.
In this program, which covers combat operations from North Africa through to Northern Norway, and the Atlantic approaches to the Battle of Stalingrad.
The role of the Luftwaffe's bombing in the period of Germany's military expansion between 1939 and 1942 is told employing dramatic and graphic footage.
The German Luftwaffe entered the Second World War with the world's most effective bomber force, built around the Heinkel He-111 and Dornier D0-17 medium bombers, and the new Junkers JU-88 'Schnellbomber'.
From its outset, the new Luftwaffe was planned as a tactical instrument designed to provide air support to the Army in what was assumed would be a short war.
In this program, which covers combat operations from North Africa through to Northern Norway, and the Atlantic approaches to the Battle of Stalingrad.
The role of the Luftwaffe's bombing in the period of Germany's military expansion between 1939 and 1942 is told employing dramatic and graphic footage.
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LearningTranscript
01:00Adolf Hitler had felt sufficiently confident in the strength of the Nazi regime for him to openly declare the existence
01:06of an air force that had been denied to Germany under the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty.
01:11In reality, however, all he was doing was to publicly affirm a process that had been ongoing since the Nazi
01:19takeover of power.
01:20Within days of his becoming chancellor in January 1933, Adolf Hitler had sanctioned the secret building of a new German
01:28air force.
01:29Thus, by the time it was officially unveiled, the Luftwaffe could already boast a strength of nearly 2,000 aircraft
01:36and some 20,000 men.
01:40Significantly, one of the main types of aircraft shown to illustrate the growing power of Germany's bomber wings was already
01:47in the process of being phased out by the Luftwaffe, even as this film was being made.
01:52The Dornier DO-23, a development of its dangerous forebear, the DO-11, was also deemed to be a failure
02:00with production of the type beginning and ending in the previous year.
02:04Although some 210 machines of this purpose-designed bomber were built, its performance was so poor that the Luftwaffe increased
02:13production of the bomber version of the Junkers 52 transport in preference.
02:17Furthermore, prototypes of new second-generation bombers were already being tested.
02:24Such matters were of little consequence, however, to the makers of this film, whose primary concern in showing the type
02:30in action was to communicate the image of an already powerful and effective Luftwaffe, both in Germany and beyond.
02:38In this, they succeeded for 1936 sees the beginning of genuine concern within British and French military intelligence about the
02:46growth and potential of the new Luftwaffe.
02:51The death in June 1936 of General Weber, the first Luftwaffe chief of staff, was to have a major impact
02:58on the bombing arm, believing, as he did, the need for the Luftwaffe to possess a long-range bomber able
03:04to reach Scotland and the Urals from Germany.
03:08Dornier's response was the DO-19, which first flew in October 1936.
03:13The four low-powered engines permitted a maximum speed of just under 200 miles an hour and a range of
03:19994 miles, carrying a moderate bomb load.
03:24Taking to the air some months later was the Junkers' Ju-89.
03:28It also mounted four engines and had a similar performance to the DO-19.
03:33However, with Weber's death, the writing was on the wall for these two projects.
03:39In April 1937, Luftwaffe commander Hermann Göring and General der Flieger Erhard Milch endorsed the recommendation of the new Luftwaffe
03:49chief of staff to cancel the Ural bomber project.
03:52Both were concerned that building a heavy bomber force would detract from construction of the larger number of twin-engine
03:58bombers.
03:59The air staff, however, continued to demand a four-engine heavy bomber, for which Heinkel was issued a contract to
04:05build the HE-177 in 1937.
04:14Entering service with the Luftwaffe in the summer of 1936 and serving alongside the DO-23 and JU-52 in
04:21the Kampfergruppen was the Junkers' JU-86.
04:24As with a number of other bomber types, this aircraft had been flown originally in the guise of a civilian
04:30airliner for service with the Deutsche Lufthansa.
04:32The production of the bomber variant began in late 1935, with KG-152 being its first recipient, although those seen
04:41in this film belonged to the bomber unit named for General Weber following his death.
04:47Although employing the characteristic Junkers' double wing flaps, the JU-86's most unusual claim to fame lay in the employment
04:55of Jumo diesels for power plants.
04:57The bomber variant introduced the extensively glazed nose and the under-fuselage dustbin gun position, which was lowered only when
05:06in flight.
05:07Although developed for other specialised roles, the JU-86 bomber was quickly phased out, ending its days as a training
05:14type and emergency transport aircraft in Russia.
05:18Although first developed to satisfy a Lufthansa specification for a high-speed transport, the narrow fuselage of Dornier's DO-17
05:26led to it being rejected as an airliner, whereupon it was taken up by the Air Ministry for adoption as
05:33a bomber.
05:34Dubbed the Flying Pencil, the DO-17 was also developed as a recce type.
05:38Both the bomber E and the recce F models were powered by twin 750 horsepower BMW inline engines, which gave
05:47then a good turn of speed.
05:49In its primary role, the 17E carried a very moderate bomb load of just 1,650 pounds and had a
05:56range of just over 600 miles.
05:58Maximum speed of this variant was some 220 miles an hour.
06:02By the end of 1937, four Camp Geschwader had equipped with a type, and the decision was taken to send
06:09a number to Spain for service with the Condor Legion.
06:11The high speed of the DO-17s allowed them to range across Spanish skies with impunity.
06:17By mid-1938, the arrival of faster Soviet-supplied fighters saw this advantage leach away.
06:25The DO-17E was extensively photographed throughout this period, especially when on manoeuvres with the army.
06:31Fitting radial engines to the type saw the emergence of the DO-17M and P variants.
06:37These began to replace the earlier models of the DO-17 in the bomber and recce units from 1938 onwards.
06:45On September 19, 1938, Luftwaffe strength returns indicated that 479 of all models of the DO-17 were serving with
06:54frontline units.
06:55The redesigned DO-17Z, introduced in 1939, had a deeper forward fuselage and heavier defensive armament.
07:05One of the most influential German aircraft to emerge in the interwar years was the Heinkel 8G-70.
07:11Adopted by the Luftwaffe, it was used mainly for reconnaissance.
07:15Many of its features were employed in the design of the Heinkel 111, the type that provides the defining image
07:21of the Luftwaffe bomber at war.
07:23In essence, a scaled-up HE-70 had retained the same elliptical wings and fuselage design.
07:29The first prototype was flown as early as February 1934.
07:34Entering Luftwaffe service in late 1936, in 1937, 30 HE-111Bs were dispatched for combat testing to Spain.
07:44From 1937 through 1939, further variants of the design left the production lines.
07:49These were identified as the E, F, and J models.
07:53It was, however, only with the introduction of the Daimler-Benz-powered model P to Luftwaffe bomber units in early
07:591939,
08:00that the type was to acquire the very distinctive glazed and asymmetric nose
08:05that was to characterize the type until taken out of production in the autumn of 1944.
08:11The HE-111 was to be encountered on every front on which the Luftwaffe operated between September 1939 and the
08:19end of the conflict.
08:21Though obsolescent long before, in the absence of a suitable replacement,
08:25the Heinkel 111 soldiered on as both bomber and transport,
08:29flying its very last operational sorties quite literally in the closing days of the war.
08:35Although the Model P remained in limited production through to early 1940,
08:39it was the YUMO-powered Model H-Series, extending to some 23 subtypes,
08:45which was to become the most numerous of all the HE-111 models to see service.
08:51The first H-1 only entered Luftwaffe service in May 1939.
08:56But so rapid was the production of this variant,
08:59that no fewer than 400 had been delivered by the time Poland was attacked on the 1st of September,
09:05with over half of all the HE-111s in service on that date,
09:09being of this mark.
09:11Although defensive armament was improved on the H-2,
09:15the relatively weak protection afforded by the onboard machine guns
09:18and the vulnerability of the type to attack by enemy fighters
09:21only became really apparent during the Battle of Britain.
09:25Nevertheless, it is true to say that Heinkel's HE-111
09:29was one of the truly classic aircraft designs of the Second World War
09:33and, for that reason, it holds an honourable place in the Aviation Hall of Fame.
09:52The last of the triumvirate of Luftwaffe medium bomber types
09:56to emerge before the onset of the war was the Junkers 88.
09:59The first taking to the air in December 1936,
10:03the type nevertheless experienced a fairly long gestation period,
10:07with the first production model, Ju-88A1s,
10:10only reaching frontline Luftwaffe squadrons just before the onset of war.
10:14Although the Ju-88 had its fair share of teething problems,
10:19the Luftwaffe was keenly aware of the very great potential exhibited by the design.
10:24Indeed, the Ju-88 was to emerge as the most versatile of all the aircraft
10:29to serve with the Luftwaffe in the Second World War,
10:32operating in a myriad of different and diverse roles.
10:36Although belonging to a later generation than its stablemates,
10:39the D0-17Z and the HE-111,
10:42the Ju-88 nevertheless retained features in its design
10:46common to all three,
10:48which can be identified as distinctively Germanic.
10:51The most obvious of these was the tendency to group the crew together
10:55in the nose and behind extensive glazing.
10:57It was here that the bomber's defensive armament was also concentrated.
11:02In the case of the Ju-88A1,
11:04this comprised just three 7.9mm MG-15 machine guns.
11:09One fired through the front canopy,
11:12one was operated from the rear of the canopy,
11:14and the other fired rear-width from the under-fuselage nose gondola.
11:18Combat revealed this to be inadequate,
11:21and in the later A5 and A4 models,
11:24this was significantly increased.
11:37In keeping with the enthusiasm for dive-bombing espoused by some quarters of the Luftwaffe,
11:42the Ju-88 was one of the largest aircraft used by the Germans
11:46capable of carrying out this task.
11:49No aspect of its design, allied to a bomb load and range,
11:53which mirrored that of the HE-111 and DO-17Z,
11:56better exemplifies the planned role of the Luftwaffe bomber force on the eve of war
12:01as being to service the tactical requirements of the German army.
12:06Early on the morning of August 26, 1939,
12:10the commanders of Luftwaffe units belonging to air fleets 1 and 4,
12:14under the commands of Generals Kesselring and Lure,
12:17spread out on airfields in East Prussia and in Pomerania and Silesia,
12:21were flashed the secret call sign Ostmarkflug.
12:24This somewhat prosaic reference to an eastern border cross-country flight
12:28was the instruction for them to begin final preparation of their units
12:32for the launch of Fall Weiss,
12:34the codename for the German invasion of Poland,
12:37due to begin on the 1st of September.
12:40Over the next few days, Luftwaffe ground crew,
12:42nicknamed the Black Men after the colour of their overalls,
12:46worked round the clock to prepare their charges for the coming conflict.
12:50Bombs were loaded, guns checked and ammunition stored.
12:54On the eve of the attack on Poland,
12:56all remaining aircraft were deployed to their forward operating bases.
13:00Final confirmation of the attack came in the early hours,
13:04and by the break of day,
13:05pilots and their crew were entering their aircraft
13:07in readiness for the green light to begin the aerial assault on Poland.
13:12Of the 1,600 aircraft assembled by the Luftwaffe for the invasion of Poland,
13:17some 400 comprised Heinkel 111s,
13:20KGs 1, 26 and 27,
13:23and Leergeschwader 1 operated with Air Fleet 1,
13:27with only KG 4 equipped with Heinkels,
13:29serving with the 4th Air Fleet.
13:31Of the four DO-17Z equipped bomber wings,
13:35KGs 2 and 3 operated under the auspices of Air Fleet 1,
13:39and KGs 76 and 77 with Air Fleet 4.
13:43In total, 319 serviceable DO-17Zs were employed in the aerial assault.
13:51Primary targets of the medium and die bombers on the opening days of the assault
13:55were the Polish airfields.
13:57Although the term blitzkrieg would be coined by the Anglo-French allies
14:01to describe the form of warfare now unleashed by the Wehrmacht on the hapless Poles,
14:06it was nevertheless appreciated by the Germans
14:09that the destruction of the enemy air force in the opening days of the conflict
14:13was the key to securing a rapid victory.
14:15So it was the opening assaults by the bomber wings of the Luftwaffe
14:19were targeted on Polish airfields.
14:21The first DO-17 sortie of the war took place
14:25when at 05.30 hours,
14:27the Staffel from KG 3 took off from an airbase in East Prussia
14:31to attack the approaches to the railway bridge at Der Schau.
14:35All other DO-17 Staffeln were winging their way eastward
14:38to destroy the Polish air force.
14:41HE-111 units, including a number still using the earlier P variant,
14:46were involved in heavy bombing raids on Polish airbases
14:49from Lemberg through to Krakow.
14:51The Heinkels of LG-1 and KG-27 targeted Warsaw on the opening day of the war.
14:57The intensity of operation saw a rapid turnaround of the bombers
15:01when they returned to their bases.
15:25With command of the air established within a few days,
15:28the bomber Geschwader were used to support the operations of the army,
15:31bombing bridges, railway yards and troop concentrations.
15:35They were also employed in the heavy bombing of Warsaw.
15:38While they had performed well,
15:41the bombers had nevertheless suffered losses.
15:43Approximately 78 medium bombers were lost in the campaign,
15:47a larger number of HE-111s becoming casualties than the DO-17s.
15:54On the 10th of May 1940, German forces invaded France and the Low Countries.
16:00The German strategy was to entice Allied forces to advance from their positions
16:04along the Belgian border into the country itself
16:07and take up positions to block what they believed to be the main German thrust
16:11coming through Holland and northern Belgium.
16:14A second German thrust comprising the bulk of the armour was to cross the river Meuse
16:19and make for the Channel Coast
16:21and cut off the Allied forces in Belgium from France.
16:24A key element in the German plan was to be played by the Luftwaffe.
16:29Almost all of the DO-17 and HE-111 bomber wings were involved,
16:33amounting to some 1,120 aircraft.
16:37Pilots had been awakened in the very early hours
16:39to be briefed for the first time on their targets.
16:41The day had broken with a massive strike by all bombers
16:45against airfields in Holland, Belgium and France.
16:48Many Allied aircraft were caught on the ground.
16:51RAF Blenheim bombers of 114's squadron
16:54based at Conde Road to the south of Reims
16:57were caught in this fashion.
16:59DO-17s roared across the airfield, dropping their bombs
17:02and destroying six of the squadron's 18 bombers.
17:06As on many other airfields,
17:08they had made easy targets being lined up wingtip to wingtip.
17:11The remaining 12 were rendered unusable for combat operations.
17:16Throughout the day, the raids against airfields continued,
17:19some 50 beyond Paris being struck by Heinkels and Dorniers.
17:23Nevertheless, sufficient Allied fighters had survived the first strikes
17:26to make life difficult for the bombers.
17:34The scenes of destroyed and abandoned equipment littering the beaches of Dunkirk
17:39and shown to German audiences on the weekly newsreel
17:41did not tell the whole story.
17:43In the skies over Dunkirk,
17:46RAF hurricanes and spitfires
17:48had inflicted worrying losses on the Kampfergruppen.
17:51The medium bombers had revealed themselves to be vulnerable
17:54and lacking in defensive firepower.
17:57In consequence of the losses inflicted by RAF Fighter Command,
18:00participating bomber formations had shared the same fate as the Stukas
18:04and seen their numbers shrink by 50%.
18:07In the euphoria of the victory over France,
18:10the experience of the bombers over Dunkirk
18:13and the lessons to be drawn were forgotten,
18:15only to be forcibly relearned even more painfully
18:18in the skies over Great Britain.
18:42The second phase of the Western Campaign
18:45began in early June
18:46with a major offensive by the Germans
18:48against the French positions
18:49on the line of the rivers Aisne and Somme.
18:52This had been preceded in familiar fashion
18:54by further massive airstrikes by the Luftwaffe.
18:58Under the codename of Operation Paula,
19:01the Luftwaffe struck at all the still employable airfields
19:04of the French Air Force on June the 3rd.
19:06The results were devastating.
19:09Surviving French airpower was effectively wiped out.
19:12The German Air Force now flew through the skies of France
19:15with impunity and were once more able
19:18to turn their full attention
19:19to supporting the ground operations.
19:22Devastating attacks were made
19:24on the French defensive positions
19:25and, in conjunction with the panzers,
19:28the Aisne and Somme lines
19:29had been breached by the 10th of June.
19:37Newsreel cameramen flying with the bomber crews
19:39now captured sorties by HE-111s
19:42as they flew over Paris
19:43and attacked the huge railway marshalling yards
19:46to the south of the city.
19:48Flying above the railway lines,
19:50the Heinkels now search for targets of opportunity,
19:53strafing and bombing anything
19:55that seemed to have any military value.
19:58Paris was occupied on June the 10th
20:00and the German advance pushed southward.
20:03The French forces were showing
20:04all the signs of disintegration.
20:07Operations ended with the armistice
20:09signed at Compiègne on June the 22nd.
20:28Although German air operations
20:30had begun sometime before the 10th of August 1940,
20:34Göring was, however, on hand
20:35to witness the start of Adla Tag,
20:37or Eagle Day,
20:39which was the designated date
20:40for the formal beginning
20:42of the aerial campaign against Great Britain.
20:45Even so, it was some two days later
20:47that the campaign began in earnest.
20:50Seeing combat for the first time
20:52in significant numbers
20:53was the new JU-88A1.
20:56On the 12th of August,
20:5863 JU-88s from KG-51 Eidelweiss
21:01bombed Portsmouth.
21:03On the 15th,
21:0450 belonging to KG-30
21:06flew from their base in Denmark
21:08and attacked the RAF airbase at Driffield.
21:11Of the three bomber types employed by the Luftwaffe,
21:15the JU-88 was undoubtedly the most effective.
21:18But that observation was only relative,
21:21for it too was discovered to be as vulnerable
21:23as the HE-111 and the Dornier 17
21:26to fighter attack by the RAF.
21:29Luftwaffe's strategy at this time
21:31was to target RAF airfields
21:33in order to pin down and destroy
21:34the assets of fighter command.
21:37Initially, such raids were undertaken
21:39by the bombers
21:40without the close protection
21:41of the BF-109s of the Jagdwaffe.
21:44In the early stages of the battle,
21:46they were encouraged to engage
21:47in hunt-and-kill missions
21:48against RAF fighters.
21:51When the latter attacked the bombers,
21:53their lack of protective armor
21:54and poor defensive firepower
21:56made them highly vulnerable.
21:58Losses among the Kampfergruppen
22:00began to mount.
22:05On September 7th,
22:07Göring was once more
22:08standing on the cliffs
22:09at Camp Blanc-Nay,
22:10but this time to watch his bombers
22:12sweep overhead
22:13to begin the campaign against London.
22:16Switching the bombers
22:17from attacking the airfields
22:18to hitting London
22:19may have been good for propaganda,
22:21but was a strategic error
22:23of the First Order.
22:25The RAF were thus given
22:26the breathing space
22:27to recoup its losses
22:28and prepare for the next round.
22:49On Göring's instructions,
22:51the fighters now attended closely
22:53to the vulnerable bombers,
22:54but the limited range of the BF-109
22:57prevented them giving their
22:58larger and slower charges
23:00protection to the target
23:01and all the way back again.
23:04Vectored onto the incoming
23:05German raids by radar,
23:07the British fighters
23:08often waited for the 109s
23:10to turn back
23:10before hitting the bombers.
23:13The 15th of September
23:14witnessed the climax
23:15of the air battle.
23:17The first large-scale Luftwaffe raid
23:19was made in the morning,
23:20but was met by a very large number
23:22of Spitfires and Hurricanes
23:24as it neared London
23:25just before midday.
23:26The German formation,
23:28composed almost exclusively
23:30of DO-17s,
23:31was broken up
23:32and did not hit London
23:34in any strength.
23:35A second raid in the afternoon
23:37by a very large number
23:38of bombers
23:38was met by 170 RAF fighters.
23:42The German fighter escort
23:43was unable to prevent
23:45the Spitfires and Hurricanes
23:46shooting down the bombers.
24:08Although Luftwaffe raids continued,
24:11they never thereafter
24:12matched the pitch
24:13of the 15th of September.
24:14Two days later,
24:16on the 17th,
24:17the British intercepted
24:18and decoded a signal
24:19from the OKW
24:20ordering the dismantling
24:22of invasion transport facilities
24:24in Holland.
24:25This was the first indication
24:26that Operation Sea Lion,
24:28the codename
24:29for the proposed invasion of Britain,
24:31had been cancelled indefinitely.
24:34Goering now had time
24:35to rue the cost
24:36of a strategic air campaign
24:38waged by an instrument
24:39that was not designed for,
24:41nor was up to,
24:42the task.
24:43In a report
24:44from the office
24:45of Ernst Udett,
24:46the quartermaster general
24:47of the Luftwaffe,
24:48he pondered the figures
24:50that gave a detailed breakdown
24:51of Luftwaffe losses
24:52between the 3rd of August
24:54and the 28th of September.
24:56A total of 719 bombers
24:59had been lost
24:59in that period,
25:00as well as 400
25:01of the crews
25:02that flew them.
25:13for the populace of London,
25:15who now endured
25:16months of night bombing
25:17by the Luftwaffe,
25:18the Battle of Britain
25:19was still in one sense
25:20being fought.
25:21By the end of October,
25:23less than 100 bombers
25:24were being employed
25:25in daylight raids.
25:26Nearly all the bomber assets
25:28had already been shifted
25:30to night raids,
25:30with 1,150 aircraft
25:32available for employment.
25:34The consequences
25:36of the battle
25:36were to be profound.
25:38The losses
25:39to the Luftwaffe bomber arm
25:40were never made good.
25:42As important
25:43as the losses
25:43in aircraft
25:44were those of aircrew,
25:46many of whom
25:46were veteran flyers
25:47and whose expertise
25:48would soon be sorely missed.
25:51Furthermore,
25:52it was his failure
25:53to defeat Britain
25:54that turned Hitler's gaze
25:55eastwards towards Russia.
26:25While the newsreel
26:26shows an affable
26:27and amiable Reich marshal
26:29visiting his men in France
26:30and awarding them medals
26:32for the valiant service,
26:33it is clear
26:34that his personal prestige
26:35and that of the Luftwaffe
26:37had taken a tumble
26:38in Hitler's eyes.
26:40There is also little doubt
26:41that the defeat
26:42had an effect
26:43on Göring as well.
26:44He was never keen
26:45on the war
26:46and expressed views
26:47in September 1939
26:49that suggest
26:50that he remained
26:51in himself
26:52unconvinced
26:53that Germany could win.
26:54In his subsequent
26:56withdrawal of interest
26:57from the Luftwaffe
26:58and his ever deeper
26:59self-indulgences,
27:01there was perhaps
27:02exhibited the character
27:03of one who already believed
27:04he saw the writing
27:06on the wall
27:06for Germany.
27:28essential to the planning
27:29of any major bombing raid
27:31was the availability
27:31of up-to-date intelligence
27:33of the target.
27:34The provision
27:35of photo reconnaissance units
27:37in the Luftwaffe
27:37had been built
27:38into its organisation
27:39from the beginning.
27:41The first aircraft
27:42employed for the role
27:43was the Heinkel He-70.
27:46This was replaced
27:47by the Do-17
27:48from 1937 onwards.
27:50This aircraft
27:51made way in turn
27:52for the specialised
27:53photo recce variant
27:54of Ju-88 A-1.
27:57This Junkers aircraft
27:58was regarded
27:59by the Luftwaffe
28:00as the jewel
28:01in its crown.
28:02Derived from
28:03the A-1 bomber variant,
28:05the photo recce type
28:06began to enter service
28:07in small numbers
28:08with the
28:09Alf-Klarungsgrupper
28:10in 1940.
28:11Others were attached
28:12to the standard
28:13bomber gruppen.
28:15The advantage
28:16of the Ju-88
28:17in this role
28:17was its relatively
28:18high speed
28:19and fairly long range.
28:21In this photo recce mission,
28:23the Ju-88
28:24flies out over
28:25enemy territory
28:25to acquire
28:26the necessary
28:27photo intelligence
28:28of the enemy's
28:29defences and dispositions.
28:31During the flight,
28:33the delicate
28:33wide aperture lens
28:34is protected
28:35by a cover
28:36which is only withdrawn
28:37as the aircraft
28:38makes its photo pass
28:39over its target.
28:40A number of images
28:41are rapidly taken
28:42and the Ju-88
28:43beats a fast retreat
28:45before it can be
28:46intercepted
28:47by enemy fighters.
28:48The keynotes
28:49of photo recce operations
28:50were and still are
28:51speed and stealth.
28:53With the task accomplished,
28:55the radio operator
28:55signals base
28:56that the aircraft
28:57will be shortly returning
28:58with the desired film
29:00and to have preparations
29:01made for its rapid development.
29:33once the plane has landed,
29:35the observer takes
29:36the film cartridge
29:36out of its housing
29:37and having left
29:38the aircraft boards
29:39a motorcycle combination.
29:42This delivers him
29:43and the film
29:44under escort
29:45to the photographic
29:45interpretation centre
29:47on the airbase.
29:48Grasping the film cassette,
29:50the soldier now
29:50enters the building
29:51and prepares to hand it
29:52over to the duty officer.
29:55Having scrutinised
29:56the manifest,
29:57the officer takes possession
29:58of the film case
29:59and passes it on
30:00to the labs.
30:03The film is then
30:05developed by the staff
30:06and made into a form
30:07suitable for use
30:08in the mission planning
30:09by a bomber crew.
30:11Employing highly detailed maps
30:13of the Coventry area,
30:14the crew plans its flight
30:15to the target.
30:16Many of these maps
30:17were acquired by Germany
30:18before the war,
30:19either by open purchase
30:20or in secret.
30:23In the meantime,
30:24the ground crews
30:24bomb up the aircraft
30:25for the mission.
30:27HE-111s and JU-88s
30:29are being readied
30:29for the famous raid
30:30on the city of Coventry
30:31that took place
30:32on the 14th of November 1940.
30:35Not seen or even hinted at
30:37in this film
30:38is the use of X-beams,
30:39an early form
30:40of electronic guidance system.
30:43Under the codename
30:44of Moonlight Serenade,
30:45the pathfinders of KG-100
30:47dropped flares over Coventry
30:49beginning at 19.20 hours.
30:54Over the next 11 hours,
30:56449 German bombers
30:58attacked the city.
30:59500 people were killed,
31:01over 1,200 injured
31:03and 60,000 buildings
31:05destroyed along
31:06with the famous cathedral.
31:07The attack on Coventry
31:09was the Luftwaffe's
31:10most devastating raid
31:11on any UK target.
31:31For Admiral Dönitz,
31:32officer-commanding U-boats,
31:34the German occupation
31:35of the French Atlantic coast
31:37was an event
31:38of the greatest significance
31:39for the submarine war
31:40against Great Britain.
31:42Indeed, the first train
31:44carrying torpedoes
31:45and personnel
31:45to support their operations
31:47arrived at the Biscay Port
31:48of Lorient
31:49on the day after
31:50the signing of the armistice
31:52with France
31:52with the first U-boat
31:54docking on July 7.
31:58Late June
31:59had also seen
32:00the first deployment
32:01of Focke-Wulf FW-200 Condors
32:04belonging to the first
32:05staffel of KG-40
32:07to the former French airbase
32:08at Bordeaux-Mérignac
32:10in support of the U-boat campaign.
32:12Although not originally
32:14intended for Luftwaffe service
32:15in the anti-shipping
32:16and reconnaissance roles,
32:18the FW-200
32:19had been quickly adopted
32:21for these purposes
32:22with the earlier-than-expected
32:24outbreak of war
32:25in 1939.
32:28The Condors flew from Bordeaux
32:30out to the west of Ireland
32:32and then northwards
32:33to land at Trondheim
32:34or Stavanger
32:35in Norway.
32:36Although initially
32:37credited by the British
32:39with being able to carry
32:40a formidable offensive load,
32:42in reality
32:42the Condor
32:43toted a maximum
32:44of the five
32:45550-pound bombs
32:47seen being loaded
32:48by the ground crew.
32:50Defensive armament
32:51of the C-1 variant
32:53comprised of
32:54three MG-15 machine guns
32:55and one 20-millimeter cannon.
33:00With the aircraft
33:01fully bombed up
33:02and fuelled
33:03and the crew briefed
33:04with the latest intelligence
33:05from Marine Group West
33:06at L'Oreal,
33:07the mission began.
33:09However,
33:10in the first few months
33:10they were employed
33:11as part of the Luftwaffe's
33:12general campaign
33:13against the British Isles
33:14being used to drop bombs
33:16on land targets.
33:18It was only in August
33:19that they were fully switched
33:20to the anti-shipping role
33:22in support of the U-boat campaign
33:24against the convoys
33:25carrying vital goods
33:26and material
33:27from the United States
33:28and Canada
33:29to fuel Britain's war effort.
33:31For the crew
33:32the long flight
33:33was helped
33:34by the relatively
33:34spacious interior
33:36of the Condor,
33:37a legacy of its origins
33:38as a pre-war airliner
33:40built for Lufthansa
33:41to operate
33:42on the long-range
33:43overseas flights
33:44to the USA
33:45and elsewhere.
33:47With a range
33:48of some 2,100 miles
33:49when employing
33:51its economical cruising speed
33:52of 158 miles per hour
33:54the Condor
33:55was able to range
33:56far out to the west
33:57of Ireland
33:58in search of prey.
34:00In the absence
34:01of air cover
34:01for the convoys
34:02poor anti-aircraft defences
34:04on the merchant ships
34:05and a paucity
34:06of naval escorts
34:08the Condors
34:09were able to attack
34:10the convoys
34:10with impunity.
34:12In the eight months
34:13between August 1940
34:14and February 1941
34:16the Condors of KG-40
34:19accounted for 85 vessels
34:21amounting to 363,000 tonnes
34:25of shipping sunk.
34:26One of the more spectacular
34:28victories was achieved
34:29by Oberleutnant
34:30Bernhard Yop
34:31when on the 26th of October
34:331940
34:33his Condor damaged
34:35the Canadian Pacific liner
34:37the Empress of Britain
34:38of the northwest coast
34:40of Ireland
34:40its burning hulk
34:42later being sunk
34:43by U-32.
34:44The vulnerability
34:45of the convoys
34:46in this early period
34:48of the war
34:48is clearly seen
34:49in this film
34:50of an attack
34:51by a number of Condors.
34:52In the absence
34:53of anti-aircraft fire
34:55the large aircraft
34:56are able to approach
34:57their targets
34:58from low level.
34:59Machine gun fire
35:00from the side positions
35:01is employed
35:02to spray the decks
35:03of the merchantmen
35:04while the gunner
35:05in the nose
35:06of the gondola
35:06slung under the fuselage
35:08of the Condor
35:09turns his destructive
35:1020mm MG151 cannon
35:13on the approaching target.
35:16Bombs were released
35:17at low level
35:17to cut down on error
35:19but as can be seen
35:20even this did not
35:21guarantee success
35:22for when flying
35:23at just over mast height
35:25many bombs failed
35:26to land
35:26on the moving targets.
35:28Such a regime
35:29with the Condors
35:30flying in this manner
35:31lasted through
35:32to the summer of 1941
35:33when British countermeasures
35:35began to make life
35:36more difficult
35:37for the predatory
35:38Luftwaffe bombers.
35:40In addition to mounting
35:41anti-aircraft guns
35:42which made the low level
35:44bombing run
35:44more hazardous
35:45Condors now also
35:47found themselves
35:47facing enemy
35:48fighter aircraft.
35:50It is a measure
35:50of the desperate
35:51British need
35:52to get air cover
35:53over the convoys
35:54to ward off the Condors
35:55that they were even
35:56prepared to sacrifice
35:57a Hurricane fighter
35:58on a one-shot operation.
36:02Launched from a catapult
36:03at the approach
36:04of a Condor
36:04the Hurricane
36:05would attack
36:05the enemy aircraft
36:06but being unable
36:08to land afterwards
36:09the pilot would ditch
36:10his aircraft
36:11and be rescued
36:12as it sank.
36:13The first Condor
36:14shot down in this fashion
36:15was destroyed
36:16on the 3rd of August 1941.
36:19The appearance of fighters
36:20operating from escort carriers
36:22also led to relatively
36:23high losses
36:24to the German type.
36:26In spite of Churchill's
36:28designation of the Condor
36:29as a scourge
36:30its undoubted effectiveness
36:32was always hampered
36:33by its limited availability.
36:34For example,
36:36in 1940
36:37just 26 FW200Cs
36:39were built
36:40with another 58
36:41completed the following year.
36:44The problem of small numbers
36:45was compounded
36:46by problems
36:47inherent to the design
36:48of the aircraft.
36:49The rapidity
36:50with which had been
36:51drafted into service
36:52precluded the modifications
36:54necessary
36:55to strengthen
36:55its rear spar
36:56which resulted
36:57in many suffering
36:59a broken back.
37:00The fuel lines
37:01that run along
37:02the bottom
37:02of the fuselage
37:03made it extremely vulnerable
37:04to enemy fire.
37:06Failure to strengthen
37:07the airframe
37:08stopped the Condor
37:09being able to take
37:10evasive action
37:11when attacked
37:11for fear of airframe failure.
37:14The Condors
37:15also had the task
37:16of transmitting
37:17coordinates of the convoys
37:18they had attacked
37:19or spotted
37:19back to U-boat
37:20command at L'Oreal.
37:22The aircraft
37:23did not broadcast
37:23directly to the submarines.
37:25From here
37:26the relevant information
37:27would then be encrypted
37:28employing Enigma
37:29coding machines
37:30and then rebroadcast
37:32to the U-boats
37:33out in the Atlantic.
37:34Having received
37:36and decoded
37:36the signal
37:37the U-boats
37:38would proceed
37:38to the coordinates
37:39of the convoy
37:40making allowances
37:41for tide
37:42and movement.
37:42the wind.
38:13In practice, the process of vectoring U-boats onto convoys using data sent from the Condors never met with any
38:20success.
38:21In part, this was because it was not possible for the Navy, who lacked their own spotter planes like the
38:26Condor,
38:27to manage to coordinate properly with the Luftwaffe.
38:30It was in search of this greater harmony that, in January 1941, Dönitz appealed to Hitler,
38:36arguing his case for the U-boat arm in the Atlantic to be given its own eyes.
38:42Hitler concurred and subordinated KG-40 and its Condors to his submarine command.
38:48This did not go down at all well with Göring.
38:51Nevertheless, it was the Condors rather than the U-boats who benefited from this new relationship.
38:57On 9 February, U-37 sighted convoy HG-53 outbound from Gibraltar and heading home to Britain.
39:05The commander of the U-boat, Corvette Capitan Earn, attacked and sank two ships, some 160 miles to the southwest
39:13of Cape Vincent.
39:15He then called Lorient, who dispatched six of KG-40's Condors, which then succeeded in sinking another five of the
39:23vessels in the convoy.
39:24Ten days later, a Condor called in U-boats to a convoy, and a Wolfpack was formed up, which dispatched
39:31three ships, with the Condors sinking a further nine.
39:35However, the results for such cooperation never truly realised Dönitz's expectations.
39:41After all the action, it was time for the crew to relax on the homeward leg of the flight.
39:46A more carefree atmosphere now pervades the aircraft as the stress of combat gives way to the relief of exhaustion
39:53and the prospect of landfall in Norway.
39:56After an exceptionally long flight from Bordeaux-Mérignac, the Condor gets ready to make its final approach into Trondheim.
40:04Flying over the base, the Condor waggles its wings in the best fighter tradition to indicate its success in achieving
40:11a kill.
40:13Visible on the forward fuselage just under the canopy is the world-in-a-ring insignia carried by Condors serving
40:20with KG-40.
40:21A number of those Condors making this round-trip to Norway would soon find themselves being stationed permanently in that
40:28country from 1942 onwards to help combat the convoys sailing from Britain to Murmansk.
40:45The crew disembark to be greeted by ground crew.
40:49Once the victory tally is known, one of the ground crew takes his paint and brush to mark the latest
40:55victory of this Condor on its tailplane.
41:01It is a measure of the optimism of most of the senior German commanders that the war would remain short
41:07that when the invasion of Russia was launched on June 22nd 1941,
41:12they appeared unconcerned that the bomber arm had 200 fewer aircraft on strength than on the eve of the Western
41:18Campaign one year before.
41:20Not only had German bomber production failed to keep pace with losses during this period,
41:26but no attempt had been made to expand output to actually increase the number of bombers available for operations.
41:33Nor did the opening weeks of the Eastern Campaign do anything other than reinforce this conviction.
41:39Such was the pace and success of the German advance that even Franz Halder, the Army Chief of Staff,
41:46was to write in early July that all seemed to be over in the East already,
41:51and that Hitler had been right after all in stating that only six weeks would be needed to defeat Russia.
41:59For the Luftwaffe, this period was one of unbridled success.
42:03The 90 bomber Staffel committed to the attack were distributed between Airfleets 1, 2 and 4.
42:09They were employed in the same fashion as in Poland and the West.
42:20June 22nd had witnessed massive raids by DO-17s, JU-88s and HE-111s on the priority target of Soviet
42:29airfields.
42:30All of those in Western Russia had been secretly photographed in spy flights
42:34by high-flying recce aircraft in the months before the attack.
42:38In order to ensure that most of the vast number of aircraft deployed on these fields
42:43were destroyed at the outset of the campaign,
42:46Luftwaffe bomber formations crossed into Soviet territory at great height
42:50to ensure that they arrived over their targets at 03.15 hours
42:54and at the very moment the German Army crossed the frontier.
42:58The subsequent destruction of Soviet aircraft was very great,
43:02but such were their numbers that during the second wave of strikes,
43:06German bombers were assailed by large numbers of enemy fighters that had survived the first.
43:12Nevertheless, by the end of June, the Luftwaffe had gained air supremacy over the northern and central sectors
43:18and air superiority in the south.
43:21Nevertheless, problems for the bomber formations began to mount.
43:25The further they moved eastward, the more thinly spread out they became
43:28and the more difficult it was for them to be supplied.
43:31In addition, a major constraint on their effective use was the manner in which they had become tied to Army's
43:38apron strings.
43:40Given the lack of sufficient numbers of the ground support types such as the Stuka,
43:45the medium bombers were employed instead as substitutes, becoming mere adjuncts of the Army,
43:51employed as flying artillery, as Adolf Gallen put it.
43:54However, for the newsreel cameramen of the propaganda department attached to the advancing ground forces,
44:00the scenes of massive destruction of Soviet forces and equipment, such as that seen here,
44:06and which was attributed to the bombers of the Luftwaffe, made good copy for sending back to Germany.
44:12Indeed, these scenes were repeated on many occasions,
44:15as the bombers were tasked to destroy railway stations and trains in sidings,
44:20troop concentrations, artillery positions, and assault the huge columns of the retreating Red Army.
44:27When shown on the weekly Bockenschau in the cinemas in the Fatherland,
44:31such powerful images did much to foster a sense of optimism among the populace
44:36that the war in the East would indeed be soon over.
44:42Yet the triumphalist mood communicated by the propaganda department
44:46was not mirrored by the Luftwaffe bomber commanders.
44:49Serious concern was being expressed at the way the scale and pace of operations
44:54was resulting in high bomber losses.
44:57The four Heinkel 111 Gruppen in action in Russia by the end of July
45:01could deploy only 128 serviceable bombers on August the 16th.
45:08The total numbers of this type operating in all theatres was just 190 machines.
45:13Such was the level of operational attrition.
45:16As significant were the high numbers of valuable aircrew loss
45:19by having the medium bombers employed on operations for which they had not been designed.
45:25Losses among the approximately 400 Ju-88s available on June the 22nd
45:30had also been high.
45:32In short, the bomber units were being worn down by accumulation of factors.
45:37Losses through combat attrition,
45:40a rise in the unserviceability of machines brought about by the pace of operations,
45:44and constant shifting of bomber units from one sector to another.
45:49Ad-hoc airfields on unsuitable terrain led to damage to the undercarriages of many bombers,
45:54factors compounded by the great stress being placed upon the overstretched transport arm.
46:01In early August, the head of the Luftwaffe, Reich Marshal Hermann Goering,
46:05was captured on the newsreel visiting a headquarters on the Eastern Front.
46:09There to greet him was Field Marshal von Brauschitz, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
46:14Although appearing to be outwardly smiling and optimistic,
46:18Goering was not a happy man.
46:20He was one of the very few senior military and party figures
46:24who had openly expressed his profound doubts about the wisdom of invading Russia to Hitler.
46:30Throughout early 1941, and right up until the very last minute,
46:35he had dogged the Fuhrer and tried to get him to change his mind.
46:38Once the plan for the invasion of Russia was revealed,
46:42he also expressed his view that it was unlikely that the USSR
46:46could be defeated in the six-week period Hitler had allowed for the campaign.
46:51In one of his final attempts to change Hitler's mind,
46:55he stated that the ground forces can't fight anymore without Luftwaffe support.
47:01They're always screaming for the Luftwaffe.
47:03There's nothing I'd like better than to see you proven right,
47:07but frankly, I doubt that you will be.
47:11Goering clearly had a better grasp of matters than did his leader.
47:18On the closing day of September,
47:20the Germans launched what they expected to be the last phase of the campaign
47:24that would see the Soviet Union defeated before the onset of the winter.
47:29Codename Typhoon, its first objective was the destruction of the bulk of the Soviet armies,
47:35screening the approaches to Moscow.
47:37Thereafter, with the defences in front of the Soviet capital shattered,
47:41it was expected to fall swiftly to German armoured columns.
47:45So committed to supporting the army had the bomber units been in the opening phase of Barbarossa,
47:51that it had not the time or the resources to address other strategic targets beyond the main battlefield.
47:57So it was not until a month after the invasion of Russia
48:01that Moscow experienced its first raid by the Luftwaffe.
48:05Drawing on bombers from a number of different camp-geschwader,
48:09approximately 200 HE-111s and JU-88s took off from the airfields in the Smolensk area
48:15and headed towards the Soviet capital on the night of the 21st-22nd of July.
48:21The defences of Moscow were well prepared and equipped for the incoming Luftwaffe raid.
48:26The capital was surrounded by anti-aircraft guns
48:29and a number of Soviet fighter squadrons based on airfields around the city.
48:34Alexander Verth, a British war correspondent serving in Moscow at the time,
48:38described how impressive was the anti-aircraft barrage,
48:41with shrapnel clattering down onto the streets like a hailstorm
48:45and dozens of searchlights lighting the sky.
48:48He stated that he had never heard or seen anything like it, even in London.
48:53The Luftwaffe had not expected to encounter such heavy defences.
48:57According to work, the Soviets claimed that just 10 or 15 planes out of the attacking 200 had broken through.
49:05Leading the bombers of KGs 27, 53, 54 and 55 over the city
49:11were the pathfinders of Kampfer Grupper 100 and 3 KG 26,
49:16who dropped flares over the primary targets.
49:19According to German sources, which dispute the Soviet claims,
49:23most of their aircraft did drop their loads,
49:25amounting to 104 tons of high-explosive and 46,000 incendiary bombs on Moscow itself.
49:32This attack was followed by two others over the next two nights,
49:36but they were smaller in scale.
49:38Moscow was to be attacked, albeit in a desultory fashion,
49:42on another 73 occasions by the end of 1941,
49:46but these were mainly nuisance raids undertaken by forces comprising 10 bombers or less.
50:00The forward momentum of Operation Typhoon, broken by three weeks of rain and mud in October,
50:07finally resumed with the onset of the frost and snow in November.
50:10The German army struggled forward in the face of growing cold and exhaustion,
50:15and supported by a declining Luftwaffe.
50:18In October, the numbers of bombers available for combat had fallen to 40%.
50:23Figures for fighters and dive bombers were only marginally better.
50:27As the infantry wrapped themselves up in whatever was to hand to protect themselves from the penetrating cold,
50:33and the panzers clanked their way across the frozen earth,
50:36every mile nearer the Soviet capital brought with it the undeniable evidence
50:41of the growing strength of a revived Soviet air force.
50:44Nor was the ability of the Luftwaffe to assist the offensive,
50:48aided by Hitler's decision to withdraw bomber groups from Russia and dispatch them to Sicily.
50:54Within days of the final collapse of Typhoon,
50:58the Soviets went over to the counter-offensive before Moscow,
51:01inflicting on the Wehrmacht its first great defeat of the war.
51:05Between early December and the end of the winter,
51:08the German forces in the line before Moscow came perilously close to destruction.
51:22Although short-range battlefield reconnaissance sorties were still undertaken by the Henschel HS-126,
51:29longer-range photographic coverage of enemy positions was carried out by the JU-88Ds of the Alf-Klarungsgruppen.
51:36This example has arrived back at its airfield with the latest photos of Soviet dispositions.
51:41In the photographic interpretation section,
51:44the pictures are developed and then studied.
51:47From the information drawn from the images,
51:49orders are then sent to the bomber unit.
51:57The film is on the Trockentrommel.
52:05And here the evaluation.
52:36Junkers 88s belonging to KG-51 are prepared for combat by their black men.
52:41Working in such freezing conditions where the temperatures could fall to minus 40 degrees,
52:47made such a task quite appalling.
52:50However, during the course of the winter of 1941-42,
52:53the desperate military situation made it essential for the Luftwaffe
52:57to be able to support the army in the face of the Soviet winter offensive.
53:01The JU-88s take off and head for their targets across a desolate, snowy landscape.
53:14In Russia, the once proud bombing arm of the mighty Luftwaffe would,
53:18in the months and years to come, be slowly bled white.
53:38In Russia, in Russia then they´m not mad at all,