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Inside the escalating military struggle to control space and the satellites we rely on.

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00:12Space. Long a peaceful frontier.
00:15It's becoming more militarized by the day.
00:18A fight in space could be decisive to a war on Earth.
00:22In the near future, we may need to exchange blows in space.
00:26New technologies.
00:28It's like something out of Star Wars. Inconceivable even ten years ago.
00:32Are raising new questions.
00:34What would a war in space actually look like?
00:37Some answers are chilling.
00:39The nuclear-capable weapon in space that could threaten.
00:42Such a weapon is a doomsday weapon.
00:44Others, surprising.
00:46Then it grabbed this other satellite. First time we've seen that.
00:49What's clear, space is vital not only to daily life.
00:53Nearly every single person on this planet uses space. Every day.
00:56But to the future of warfare.
00:59There has not been a domain that human beings have not figured out a way to fight in.
01:03Why is space any different?
01:05Space Wars. Right now on NOVA.
01:26February 5th, 2022.
01:30500 miles north of Moscow,
01:33a Russian rocket lifts off
01:35carrying a satellite named
01:37Cosmos-2553.
01:40The U.S. military
01:41detects something highly unusual.
01:44Cosmos-2553
01:45was deployed into a 2,000 kilometer
01:47orbit. That's actually kind of high.
01:50There's not a lot of satellites
01:51out there.
01:52The altitude raises concerns.
01:55It went to a very unique
01:57place in space.
01:59Deep into the radiation belt,
02:01where spacecraft generally do not want
02:03to operate.
02:04Congressman Mike Turner, chairman of the House Intelligence
02:07Committee, issues a cryptic
02:09message. News outlets
02:11immediately pick up the story.
02:13CBS News has learned the U.S. has
02:15informed Congress of a, quote, serious
02:17national security threat on Russia's efforts
02:19to deploy a nuclear anti-satellite
02:21system in space.
02:23They suspected that the Russians were actually
02:25testing the development of a
02:27nuclear bomb in orbit that they would
02:29be able to detonate at any time
02:31that they desired.
02:32A nuclear explosion in space could
02:35devastate the massive networks of satellites
02:37that underpin the technology
02:39of modern life.
02:41Everybody in the United States makes
02:43use of space every day, whether they realize
02:46it or not. It's now become part of everything that we do.
02:50Altogether, more than 12,000 active satellites
02:53are orbiting the Earth, from 100 to 22,000
02:57miles above our heads.
02:59GPS satellites, our phones use them to pinpoint our location
03:03almost anywhere on Earth.
03:05Weather satellites, without them, killer storms could strike
03:09without warning. Communication satellites, essential
03:13for keeping us connected and informed.
03:15And eyes in the sky, peering down, gathering data,
03:19monitoring everything from crop growth
03:21to the global supply chain.
03:23And peering up, telescopes helping us understand
03:26the story of our universe.
03:28Pretty much there's no part of your life
03:30that is not touched by space.
03:31Our society is more reliant on space today
03:34than it was yesterday, and will be more reliant tomorrow
03:36than it is today. And that curve's been moving upward
03:39really since we entered the space domain as humans.
03:43Space has also become fundamental
03:45to how the American military operates.
03:48Satellites are essential for battlefield communication
03:51and targeting. Without them, commanders are blind.
03:55The more sophisticated these space-based systems,
03:59the greater edge they provide,
04:01and the more valuable targets they become.
04:05So in 2019, the U.S. created the Space Force,
04:09America's first new branch of the military
04:12in more than 70 years.
04:14At the Combined Space Operations Center in California,
04:18service members, known as guardians,
04:21prepare for potential conflicts.
04:23Former Deputy Commander of U.S. Space Command
04:26Lieutenant General John Shaw
04:27directed many Space Force missions.
04:30The reason that we have a Space Force
04:32is you need to be able to develop, organize, train,
04:35and equip for a potential fight in space,
04:37which could ultimately be decisive
04:39to a war on Earth.
04:41Roughly 100 countries have satellites
04:44of all kinds in space.
04:45But the U.S. remains the dominant military player,
04:49far outspending its nearest competitor, China.
04:54And with more satellites launched in the past five years
04:57than in the last six decades combined,
05:01scientists and engineers are being recruited
05:03into the battle to dominate space.
05:12Humans have always looked to the sky,
05:15wondering what lies beyond.
05:17But today, there are eyes looking back,
05:20and increasingly, they are military eyes.
05:24Intelligence analysts for the U.S. government
05:26are alert to the shift.
05:29Chirag Parikh served in the White House
05:31on the National Space Council,
05:33where he prepared for possible space war scenarios.
05:40Imagine an extreme scenario.
05:42Two nations are in conflict.
05:44One decides to detonate a nuclear weapon in space.
05:49Because space has no atmosphere,
05:50there is no mushroom cloud or heat blast.
05:53But there is an electromagnetic pulse, or EMP,
05:56that fries the electronics of satellites
05:59within its line of sight.
06:00On the ground, cell towers, emergency services,
06:03the electrical grid, all fail.
06:05Crisis ensues.
06:08Such a weapon is kind of a doomsday weapon.
06:10It's so indiscriminate.
06:12If Russia were to detonate a nuclear weapon in space,
06:15it would destroy Russia's own satellites,
06:17our satellites, Chinese satellites, commercial satellites.
06:20It would endanger the International Space Station
06:22and the Chinese Space Station.
06:24In the 80 years since the first atomic bombs were dropped
06:28on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan,
06:31the world has been building nuclear weapons of all shapes and sizes.
06:35These bombs either split or join atoms
06:39to release huge amounts of energy.
06:42And while on Earth, nuclear explosions unleash destructive blast waves,
06:48along with heat, blinding light, and radiation,
06:52in space, they do something different.
06:55In the late 1950s and early 60s,
06:58the U.S. and Soviet Union conducted eight nuclear tests in space.
07:03The largest was called Starfish Prime.
07:07In 1962, the U.S. launched a 1.4-megaton hydrogen bomb
07:13and detonated at 250 miles above the South Pacific.
07:18This footage shows a high-altitude explosion.
07:23When you set off a nuclear weapon in space,
07:26there'll be a flash of X-rays and gamma rays that travels out.
07:31And when those high-energy particles hit satellites,
07:34even thousands of miles away, they can cause severe damage.
07:38The detonation unexpectedly destroyed
07:41about a third of the 24 satellites orbiting the world at the time.
07:45It took out, like, for example, the U.K.'s first satellite.
07:47Gone.
07:48And it didn't stop there.
07:50The electromagnetic pulse was so severe
07:53that it impacted the electrical grid
07:55and knocked out streetlights in Honolulu.
07:58Dangerous high-energy particles released in the explosion
08:01were trapped by Earth's magnetic field,
08:04continuing to damage satellites for months.
08:08It was a sobering lesson that led to an international ban
08:11on nuclear weapons in space,
08:13but it underscored an unavoidable reality.
08:17There is this idea that, hey,
08:19we don't want to weaponize space,
08:21we don't want to militarize space,
08:22we want space to be peaceful.
08:24And yet the uncomfortable fact is
08:26it's really been militarized from the very beginning.
08:29Even in the early 1960s,
08:31most of the satellites we were putting up
08:33were for military purposes.
08:35But that militarization was conducted largely out of sight,
08:39while public attention focused on NASA's peaceful exploration.
08:45For many years, the United States did not like to talk about
08:48offensive space capability
08:50because the last thing we wanted to encourage anyone to do
08:54was to think about shooting down satellites.
08:57When we sent the astronauts to space in the 1960s,
09:00the intelligence community would have liked for the astronauts
09:03to not take any pictures looking back at the Earth
09:05because they were afraid that would remind people about spy satellites.
09:09NASA said no.
09:10Like, you couldn't come back and say,
09:11oh, we forgot to look at the Earth.
09:13There was a deep sense of we need to keep space secret.
09:17So it is a real change of mindset,
09:20bringing space into the realm of open discussion
09:23as just a regular part of warfare.
09:27There's been a real shift,
09:28I would say, just over the past 10 years
09:30in how comfortable the United States is
09:31in talking about its interest in
09:33and need for military capabilities in space.
09:36We are ready to repel all challengers
09:38and any attempt to defeat the U.S. in space will fail.
09:41Thank you, General.
09:42The White House later clarified
09:44that the Russian satellite Cosmos-2553,
09:47which initially caused so much alarm,
09:50was in fact not carrying a live nuclear bomb,
09:53but they suspect it was a part of a program
09:56to eventually deploy one.
09:58What's clear is that the militarization of space
10:01is only accelerating.
10:02We have always used space for military purposes,
10:06and we are now starting to think about it
10:08as a domain where, you know,
10:10we may need to, you know, exchange blows.
10:13But exchanging blows in space
10:15turns out to be more complicated
10:17than military leaders
10:18and even some science fiction writers have imagined.
10:22You know, as an engineer in aerospace,
10:25I love science fiction movies,
10:27but little of what you see, for example,
10:30in Star Wars is actually physically possible.
10:33In a single scene of Rogue One,
10:36there are at least five things going on
10:39that challenge our understanding of physics.
10:41First, most of these spacecraft
10:43that are around this Earth-like planet are hovering.
10:47We know you're not going to hover in low-Earth orbit.
10:50If you're in low-Earth orbit,
10:51like the International Space Station is,
10:53it's like you're on railroad tracks
10:55and you're going 17,000 miles an hour.
10:58The second thing is
10:59you're seeing people flying spacecraft
11:01like TIE fighters and X-wings
11:03that are flying and diving
11:05as though it's a dogfight.
11:07That's not how things work in space.
11:10On Earth, fighter planes turn
11:12by pushing against the air,
11:14but in the vacuum of space,
11:16there's no air to push against.
11:18So spacecraft can't actually turn on a dive
11:21or perform tight maneuvers.
11:23The only way to maneuver
11:24is with your rocket engines.
11:26And because you're going so fast,
11:29to change your direction
11:30like you see in a Star Wars movie
11:32would take so much energy
11:34you couldn't carry enough fuel to do that.
11:37The third thing is they're dropping bombs
11:40as though there's gravity.
11:41That's not how it works.
11:43When you let go of something,
11:44it's just going to fly along with you.
11:45The fourth issue is
11:47space is a vacuum.
11:49So there's no sound.
11:52There is no medium for sound
11:55to travel through.
11:56So no explosions.
11:58And oh, by the way,
12:00those explosions are unrealistic.
12:02It's in a vacuum.
12:03And that explosion will be gone
12:05in milliseconds.
12:07So Star Wars is great science fiction,
12:09but it's not based in reality.
12:11So what is the reality?
12:13The rules of physics make movement
12:15in space very predictable,
12:17so objects can be easy to track.
12:19But with more than 12,000 human-made satellites
12:22now orbiting the planet,
12:24the U.S. military partners
12:25with private companies
12:27like ComSpock in Pennsylvania
12:28to monitor what's actually happening up there.
12:32Paul Graziani is the company's founder and CEO.
12:35A satellite is anything
12:37that's orbiting around another body.
12:40So for instance,
12:41the moon is a satellite of the Earth,
12:43and the Earth is a satellite of the sun.
12:45So the term satellite
12:47can mean an active satellite
12:49or it can mean
12:49a very tiny piece of space debris.
12:52There are a lot of objects up there.
12:55Right now,
12:56we're tracking around 49,000,
12:58is what the U.S. government tracks.
13:00And of those 49,000,
13:02roughly 12,000 of them
13:03are operational satellites.
13:05The rest of them are spacecraft
13:07that are no longer operational
13:09or space debris.
13:11Satellites travel around the Earth
13:13in predictable paths.
13:15To stay in orbit,
13:17a satellite has to move forward fast enough
13:20to counteract the gravity,
13:21pulling it downward.
13:23Because the Earth is curved,
13:25if a satellite moves at the right speed,
13:27it can keep falling
13:29but never reach the ground.
13:31This way,
13:32it moves in a continuous loop,
13:34an orbit.
13:36So you need enough speed
13:38to keep going in your constant direction.
13:41But orbit of satellites
13:42have all sorts of variables.
13:45We develop software
13:46that takes inputs
13:47from telescopes and radars
13:49and antennas.
13:50And from those inputs,
13:52we figure out
13:53where those objects in space
13:55are at any moment
13:56and where they're going to be going.
13:58The term used by the military
14:00or national security side
14:02is space domain awareness.
14:04What is that object
14:05and what might it be able to do?
14:10Back in the Apollo days,
14:12there were maybe
14:13a few dozen satellites
14:14operating in space.
14:16A decade ago,
14:18it had gotten up to 1,200 satellites.
14:22Today, we have over 12,000.
14:24And we're looking at maybe
14:26another Factor X increase
14:27to more than 100,000 satellites
14:29a decade from now.
14:31Almost all satellites operate
14:33in one of three orbital realms.
14:36The three main orbital regimes
14:38are low-Earth orbit,
14:40medium-Earth orbit,
14:41and geosynchronous orbit.
14:43And you can think of low-Earth orbit
14:45as being between 250 and 1,200 miles
14:49above the Earth.
14:50What we're looking at here
14:51are the low-Earth orbit satellites
14:53that we are tracking currently.
14:55Joe Calero is ComSpock's
14:57Director of Operations.
14:59In LEO, the accuracy of the data
15:02in our system is between 25 and 50 meters.
15:06Low-Earth orbit, or LEO,
15:08is the easiest to get to.
15:10It also allows the fastest communication
15:12with the ground.
15:13So today, nearly 90% of all satellites
15:16operate there,
15:18including the International Space Station
15:20and the growing number
15:21of commercial satellite networks,
15:23like the SpaceX Starlink system.
15:26There's a lot of satellites,
15:27there's a lot of debris,
15:28but space is a huge volume.
15:31And so while it looks relatively dense
15:34with satellites,
15:36there is way more space
15:37between these objects than it appears.
15:40The vastness of space
15:42is hard to comprehend.
15:43Even the relatively small area
15:46where satellites normally operate
15:48is about 75 trillion cubic miles,
15:51roughly 300 times larger
15:53than the volume of Earth itself.
15:55I've shrunk the Earth
15:57down to 16 inches across.
15:58This means that every inch
16:00is about 500 miles.
16:03Most things are actually happening
16:05within arm's reach of the planet,
16:07so to speak.
16:08We talk about three orbital regimes,
16:10low-Earth orbit,
16:11within about 1,000 kilometers
16:13of the Earth's surface.
16:15Medium Earth orbit,
16:17so about two feet away
16:18from this 16-inch globe.
16:20And geosynchronous orbit,
16:22which gets a little bit
16:23of an arm stretch,
16:24but about four feet away
16:25from the Earth.
16:26So what we're looking at here
16:28is the geosynchronous belt.
16:30It is the furthest orbit regime
16:31that we typically use
16:33for satellites.
16:34In geosynchronous orbit,
16:36around 22,000 miles up,
16:38a satellite moves in perfect sync
16:41with the Earth's rotation.
16:42So it can stay over a fixed point,
16:45putting it in a perfect position
16:46for telecommunications,
16:48weather forecasting,
16:49or spying.
16:51It was Arthur C. Clarke,
16:53a science fiction writer,
16:54who started to formulate this idea
16:55that satellites that are in orbit
16:58in that belt
16:58are actually moving around the Earth
17:00at the same rate
17:01the Earth is rotating,
17:02and so they're always
17:02in that same spot in the sky.
17:04But some of the most important
17:06satellites sit between LEO and GEO
17:08in a relatively quiet realm
17:10called medium-Earth orbit.
17:12So this is medium-Earth orbit,
17:15or MEO,
17:16and this is where we have put
17:18our GPS satellites.
17:20It's not hard to imagine
17:21the disaster
17:22if these suddenly stopped working.
17:28A Navy warship
17:30is patrolling the ocean.
17:31The ship is guided
17:33by GPS satellites.
17:35Suddenly,
17:36the GPS signals go out.
17:38They can't navigate.
17:39They have decision uncertainty.
17:40Operations grind to a halt.
17:42The ship is a massive sitting duck
17:44in the middle of the ocean.
17:46In recent years,
17:48the U.S. Navy
17:49has been preparing
17:50for just such a scenario.
17:53Sailors used to be taught
17:54celestial navigation
17:55to determine where their ship was.
17:58They stopped doing that
17:59when they got a GPS.
18:00Why waste their time doing that?
18:01But there's a danger
18:02in becoming too dependent
18:04on a utility
18:04that's vulnerable
18:05to attack from an adversary.
18:07The Navy realized
18:08there's a non-zero chance
18:10that the global positioning system
18:11might not be operating
18:13to our satisfaction.
18:14Well, celestial navigation
18:16was taught
18:16for nearly 200 years
18:17at the Naval Academy.
18:19So they have reintroduced
18:21the use of sextants.
18:23They want to have a backup
18:25for a really bad day
18:26should our adversaries
18:27take out the GPS constellation.
18:29The Global Positioning System
18:31is a group of more than 30 satellites
18:34in medium Earth orbit,
18:36about 12,000 miles above the planet.
18:39GPS was developed
18:40to solve a targeting problem.
18:42If you're a ballistic missile submarine
18:44and you surface
18:45or come near the surface
18:46and you're ready
18:47to launch your missiles,
18:48how do you know where you are?
18:49Well, a really nice way to do it
18:50would be to get precise signals
18:52from satellites in space.
18:53Each satellite broadcasts
18:55a radio signal
18:56providing its location
18:57and precise time
18:59from an onboard atomic clock
19:01accurate to within
19:03a billionth of a second.
19:04GPS satellites
19:06are all synchronized
19:07on the same clock
19:08and they rely on communicating
19:10that timing signal
19:11back down to the surface
19:12of the Earth.
19:13And then our receiver
19:14figures out
19:14the difference
19:15of when we receive those signals
19:17from different satellites
19:18to calculate where we are
19:20and how fast we're moving.
19:23The 1990s Gulf War
19:25was the first major conflict
19:26that used GPS widely
19:28and it was a game changer.
19:30It allowed a precision
19:33of weaponry
19:34that we had never seen before.
19:36In World War II,
19:37it took 1,000 bombs
19:39to destroy a factory
19:40that you were going after.
19:43Whereas in the early 1990s,
19:45one airplane
19:45could actually hit targets
19:47with precision
19:48with just a few bombs
19:49that are GPS-guided.
19:50so that revolutionized warfare.
19:53Because it came out
19:55of the military,
19:56GPS was classified
19:57and held as a top-secret capability,
19:59but eventually
20:00the U.S. government said,
20:01no, this is a utility
20:02that should be provided
20:03to the world.
20:04At first,
20:05the accuracy of the signal
20:06made available to the public
20:08was intentionally degraded.
20:10In the 1990s,
20:11with the civilian version
20:12of the signal,
20:13300 feet was as accurate
20:15as you could be.
20:17In 2000,
20:18President Clinton
20:19removed that limitation
20:20for the civilian population.
20:22And that opened up
20:23all sorts of uses.
20:25Today,
20:26anyone with a GPS receiver
20:28knows exactly where they are
20:30nearly anywhere on Earth.
20:31They also have access
20:33to the satellite's atomic clocks.
20:35modern banking relies
20:37on these clocks
20:38to precisely timestamp
20:39every digital transaction,
20:41from stock trades
20:43to ATM withdrawals.
20:45GPS is crucial
20:46for both the modern economy
20:48and modern warfare.
20:50I had the privilege
20:51of having the global
20:52positioning system
20:53under my command
20:54out at Shriver Space Force Base
20:56in Colorado Springs.
20:57And the center of GPS
20:58is an operations floor
21:00with eight people
21:00that operate
21:01that entire constellation
21:02for both military
21:04and civilian applications.
21:06The U.S. is not alone
21:07in having a global
21:08navigation system.
21:09The European Union,
21:11the Chinese,
21:12and the Russians
21:13all have independent
21:15constellations of satellites.
21:17In fact,
21:18your phone
21:19is tracking satellites
21:20from all four
21:21of those constellations.
21:23But these openly available
21:24signals leave
21:25a crucial technology
21:27vulnerable to attack.
21:29An adversary could want
21:30to eliminate
21:31those GPS satellites,
21:32Right now, though,
21:34we've seen adversaries,
21:35when they want to
21:37counter a navigation system
21:38from space,
21:40do localized jamming
21:41on the ground.
21:42The radio signals
21:43that GPS satellites send
21:45are weak by the time
21:46they reach the ground.
21:47So local jammers
21:48broadcasting
21:49on the same frequency
21:50can easily drown them out.
21:53It's actually happening
21:54all over the world.
21:55And it's affected
21:56civilian air traffic.
21:57A plane carrying
21:58the EU Commission
21:59President Ursula von der Leyen
22:01was targeted
22:02by GPS jamming
22:04while trying to land
22:04in Bulgaria.
22:06Russia regularly
22:07jams over Europe,
22:08and recently,
22:09the U.S.
22:10has done the same
22:11in the Caribbean
22:11and Middle East.
22:13But intentional interference
22:15has extended
22:16beyond just GPS.
22:18Good afternoon.
22:18Russia launched
22:20cyber attacks
22:21in late February
22:22against commercial
22:23satellite communications networks
22:25in an effort
22:26to disrupt
22:26Ukrainian command
22:27and control
22:28during the invasion.
22:29In the hours
22:30before Russia
22:31invaded Ukraine
22:31in February 2022,
22:33Russia launched
22:34a cyber attack
22:35that knocked out
22:36satellite-based communications
22:38and internet systems
22:40across Ukraine.
22:41Ukraine turned
22:42to Elon Musk,
22:44the head of SpaceX
22:45and owner
22:45of a satellite constellation
22:47called Starlink,
22:48for help.
22:49There were people
22:50in the Ukrainian military
22:51tweeting at Elon Musk
22:52directly,
22:53saying,
22:53can you please
22:54help us out?
22:54So Elon was able
22:55to snap his fingers
22:56and get it
22:57into the country
22:57very quickly.
22:59Starlink provides
22:59satellite-based internet
23:01using a novel approach.
23:03Instead of covering
23:04the whole Earth
23:04with a few large satellites
23:06in geosynchronous orbit,
23:08it uses a constellation
23:09of small satellites
23:11in low Earth orbit.
23:12So instead of sending
23:13a signal all the way
23:14to geosynchronous
23:15and bouncing it back down,
23:16you just send it up
23:17a few hundred miles
23:18and back down.
23:20These satellites
23:20are communicating
23:21with their nearest neighbor,
23:22and their nearest neighbor
23:23is communicating
23:24with their next nearest neighbor.
23:25That makes this network happen.
23:28Starlink brought Ukraine
23:30back online
23:31and helped level
23:32the battlefield.
23:33The Russians
23:34were not happy,
23:35and the head
23:36of the Russian Space Agency
23:37even hinted
23:38that Elon Musk
23:39personally might be
23:41a legitimate military target.
23:43As the war continued,
23:44SpaceX appeared
23:45to be limiting the service
23:47for certain regions
23:48and uses.
23:49There are a lot
23:49of people that said,
23:50look, you know,
23:50it's kind of scary
23:51that you can have
23:52this capability
23:52you depend upon
23:53for your military.
23:54It could just be turned off,
23:56not because a government
23:57has thought about it
23:58or a military has said,
23:59okay, this meets our needs,
24:01but a private citizen.
24:03It is concerning
24:04that one person
24:05has so much control.
24:08In 2025,
24:10there were over 12,000
24:12operating satellites
24:13on orbit.
24:14About 70% of those
24:15are from one U.S. company,
24:17SpaceX,
24:17SpaceX and their
24:18Starlink constellation.
24:20SpaceX has been responsible
24:22for probably around
24:23two-thirds
24:24of national security launches
24:26in recent years.
24:27They're now putting up
24:2850 satellites
24:29at least once a week.
24:30So Elon Musk
24:32owns something like
24:33three-quarters
24:34of all the satellites
24:35that the human race
24:36has operating.
24:37SpaceX recently began
24:39providing the U.S. military
24:40with a customized version
24:42of Starlink
24:43called Star Shield.
24:44It's one of several
24:46military satellite constellations
24:48being developed
24:49for communications,
24:50spying,
24:51missile defense
24:52and GPS.
24:53It's really
24:54an entirely new paradigm,
24:56having large numbers
24:57of relatively disposable satellites
25:00operating at a low altitude.
25:02But even these satellites
25:04might be vulnerable
25:05to another kind of weapon
25:06that people have long imagined.
25:09Lasers.
25:14Imagine this.
25:15A series of
25:17high-powered lasers
25:18conduct a coordinated attack.
25:20Ground-based
25:21and space-based weapons
25:23hit our intelligent satellites.
25:24They destroy optics
25:26and fry electronics.
25:27Suddenly,
25:28we can no longer see
25:29behind enemy lines.
25:30Our military
25:31and intelligence services
25:33are rendered blind.
25:35General Atomics
25:36is one of the world's
25:37largest privately-owned
25:39defense companies.
25:40In their lab
25:41in San Diego, California,
25:43Robert Peterkin
25:44demonstrates
25:44how laser technologies
25:46can be used
25:47for military purposes.
25:49Since the day
25:50the laser was invented
25:51in 1960,
25:53people have been imagining
25:55ways to weaponize lasers.
25:58Lasers work
25:59by amplifying
26:00and aligning
26:01light particles.
26:02So all of the energy
26:04is focused
26:05into a single
26:06concentrated beam.
26:08One type
26:09of laser technology
26:10has been deployed
26:11as a weapon
26:12for years.
26:13It's called
26:13dazzling.
26:15So this is
26:15the small laser
26:16we're going to use
26:17to demonstrate
26:18laser dazzling.
26:22We're ready to go,
26:23so let's turn off
26:24the laboratory lights.
26:27I'm going to
26:28switch the laser
26:29on
26:29and
26:30intercept
26:31the camera
26:32located
26:33a couple
26:34of meters
26:34across the room.
26:36The green laser
26:37is about to hit
26:38the aperture
26:38of the camera
26:39and on the camera
26:40you should start
26:41to see
26:42some green laser light.
26:44Many satellites
26:45rely on optical sensors
26:47like those
26:48in digital cameras
26:49but these sensors
26:51can be vulnerable.
26:52As I continue
26:53to slightly move
26:55the laser beam
26:57I can obliterate
27:00the image
27:01the laser
27:03intensity
27:03is overwhelming
27:04the electronics
27:05in that camera
27:07but it causes
27:08no damage
27:09so when I move
27:10the laser beam
27:11away
27:13the image
27:14reappears.
27:16If my laser
27:17was powerful enough
27:19I could
27:20in principle
27:21dazzle
27:22a satellite
27:22from the ground.
27:23both the Russians
27:25and the Chinese
27:26have a truck
27:28mounted
27:28laser dazzling
27:29system
27:30that is deployable
27:31they've displayed
27:32them.
27:34It's a weapon
27:35it's a weapon system
27:36it's kind of
27:37optical jamming
27:38if you will
27:38and we see
27:40our adversaries
27:41feeling this
27:42because we see
27:42the attempted
27:43interruptions
27:44in our satellite
27:45systems.
27:46The US
27:47China
27:48and Russia
27:49are all known
27:49to have
27:50laser dazzling
27:51systems
27:51though none
27:52have acknowledged
27:53using them
27:54against adversary
27:55satellites.
27:56The US
27:56has claimed
27:57that both
27:58Russia
27:58and China
27:59have used
28:00lasers
28:01to try
28:01and dazzle
28:02American
28:02spy satellites
28:03possibly
28:05American
28:06commercial
28:06imaging
28:07satellites
28:08nobody
28:08wants to
28:09give many
28:09details
28:10and they
28:10also
28:11don't
28:11they don't
28:12want to
28:12let the Russians
28:13know
28:13was the dazzling
28:14effective or not.
28:16And higher
28:16power lasers
28:17can not only
28:18dazzle
28:19but destroy
28:20though the
28:21details
28:21of the
28:21weapon
28:22used
28:22for this
28:22test
28:23remain
28:23restricted.
28:24If the
28:25power
28:25is sufficiently
28:26high
28:27and I'm
28:27able to
28:28keep
28:28the beam
28:29on the
28:30drone
28:30for sufficiently
28:30long
28:31I can
28:32defeat
28:33the drone
28:34and this
28:35drone
28:35will then
28:36fall
28:36to the
28:36ground
28:37and
28:37will
28:37no
28:38longer
28:38be
28:38able
28:38to
28:38bother
28:39me.
28:40At
28:41close
28:41range
28:41a 30
28:42kilowatt
28:43laser
28:43the equivalent
28:44of 30
28:45million
28:45laser
28:46pointers
28:46concentrated
28:47into
28:47one
28:48beam
28:48can burn
28:49through
28:49solid
28:50steel.
28:51This
28:51hole
28:52was made
28:52here
28:53in this
28:54laboratory
28:54with a
28:55laser
28:55of several
28:56tens
28:56of
28:56kilowatts
28:57but the
28:58details
28:58of how
28:59weapons
28:59class
29:00lasers
29:00work
29:01are held
29:02at a
29:02higher
29:03classification
29:03level.
29:05Laser
29:06weapons
29:06have been
29:07used on
29:07land
29:07and at
29:08sea
29:09but putting
29:10them in
29:10space
29:10is a
29:11challenge.
29:12Lasers
29:13are
29:13large
29:14consumers
29:14of power
29:15so you
29:16need
29:16large
29:17battery
29:17banks
29:18you
29:18need
29:18large
29:19solar
29:19arrays.
29:20To
29:20date
29:21no
29:21nation
29:21has
29:22acknowledged
29:22putting
29:23a
29:23laser
29:23weapon
29:23in
29:24space.
29:24But
29:25because
29:25it
29:25can
29:25operate
29:26over
29:26large
29:27distances
29:27and
29:28it's
29:28not
29:28attenuated
29:29by an
29:29atmosphere
29:30directed
29:31energy
29:31will be
29:31the
29:31weapon
29:32of
29:32choice
29:32in
29:32future
29:33space
29:33combat.
29:34But
29:34for
29:34now
29:35many
29:36military
29:36satellites
29:37are
29:37potentially
29:37vulnerable
29:38to
29:38large
29:39scale
29:39attack
29:39from
29:40a
29:40more
29:40conventional
29:41weapon.
29:45Our
29:45spy
29:46satellites
29:46detect
29:46a
29:47ballistic
29:47missile
29:47launch
29:48but
29:48this
29:48isn't
29:49going
29:49to
29:49the
29:49other
29:49side
29:49of
29:49the
29:49earth
29:50this
29:50is
29:50going
29:50into
29:51space.
29:52These
29:52weapon
29:53systems
29:53known as
29:54direct
29:54ascent
29:55anti-satellite
29:55weapons
29:56attack
29:57missile
29:57warning
29:57satellites
29:58communication
29:58satellites
29:59intelligence
30:00satellites
30:00within
30:01minutes
30:01these
30:02satellites
30:02are
30:02destroyed
30:03our
30:04military
30:04and
30:05intelligence
30:05services
30:06go
30:06dark.
30:07At
30:08a
30:08space
30:08force
30:08base
30:09in
30:09Colorado
30:09missile
30:10defense
30:10units
30:11use
30:11satellites
30:12to
30:12scan
30:13for
30:13infrared
30:13heat
30:14signatures
30:14of
30:15enemy
30:15missile
30:15launches
30:16and
30:16coordinate
30:17intercepts.
30:18With a
30:19handful
30:19of these
30:20satellites
30:20in
30:21orbit
30:21we
30:21can
30:22surveil
30:23the
30:23whole
30:23world
30:23and
30:24see
30:24any
30:24rocket
30:25launch
30:25anywhere
30:25on
30:25the
30:25planet.
30:26An
30:27attack
30:27on
30:27these
30:27satellites
30:28could
30:28open
30:29the
30:29door
30:29for
30:29undetected
30:30missile
30:30launches.
30:31There's
30:32been
30:32five
30:32anti-satellite
30:34missile
30:34operations
30:35done
30:35so far
30:36and
30:36the
30:36first
30:36was
30:37actually
30:37conducted
30:37by the
30:38United
30:39In
30:401985
30:41the
30:41U.S.
30:42an
30:42anti-satellite
30:43rocket
30:44from
30:44an
30:44F-15
30:45fighter
30:45and
30:46blew
30:46one
30:46of
30:46its
30:46old
30:47satellites
30:47into
30:47hundreds
30:48of
30:48pieces.
30:49At
30:49the
30:49time
30:50the
30:50Soviet
30:50Union
30:50had
30:51a
30:51good
30:51number
30:51of
30:51satellites
30:52operating
30:52in
30:52low
30:53Earth
30:53orbit
30:53that
30:53they
30:53were
30:53going
30:54to
30:54use
30:54in
30:54a
30:54potential
30:55conflict
30:56with
30:56the
30:56United
30:56States
30:57and
30:57we
30:58were
30:58motivated
30:58at
30:58the
30:58time
30:59to
30:59say
30:59how
31:00do
31:00we
31:00deprive
31:00them
31:01of
31:01that
31:01capability
31:01The
31:02test
31:03served
31:03as a
31:03cautionary
31:04tale
31:04not only
31:05for the
31:05Soviet
31:06Union
31:06but
31:07for
31:07anyone
31:07with
31:08hardware
31:08in
31:08space
31:09It's
31:09relatively
31:10easy
31:10to
31:10blow
31:10up
31:11a
31:11satellite
31:11but
31:12that
31:12generates
31:13tons
31:13of
31:13debris
31:14and
31:15that
31:15makes
31:16space
31:16unusable
31:17for
31:17everyone
31:17Despite
31:19the
31:19risks
31:20in
31:202007
31:21China
31:22used
31:22a
31:22missile
31:22to
31:23destroy
31:23one
31:23of
31:23their
31:24own
31:24defunct
31:24satellites
31:25There
31:26are
31:26countries
31:26who
31:26are
31:27pursuing
31:27very
31:27aggressive
31:28very
31:28impressive
31:29counter
31:29space
31:30capabilities
31:30which
31:31I
31:31cannot
31:31go
31:31into
31:32here
31:32because
31:32of
31:33classification
31:33restrictions
31:36People
31:37talk about
31:37hitting a
31:38bullet
31:38with a
31:38bullet
31:39The
31:40satellite
31:40you're
31:40shooting
31:41at
31:41is
31:41probably
31:41traveling
31:42at
31:42about
31:4217,000
31:43miles
31:43an
31:43hour
31:44and
31:45if
31:45you're
31:45coming
31:45at
31:45it
31:45from
31:45the
31:46opposite
31:46direction
31:46at
31:475,000
31:47miles
31:47an
31:48hour
31:49that's
31:49an
31:50incredibly
31:50high
31:51closure
31:51rate
31:52and
31:53kinetic
31:53energy
31:54is
31:54equal
31:54to
31:54one
31:55half
31:55mass
31:56times
31:56velocity
31:57squared
31:57that's
31:57a
31:57big
31:57velocity
31:58squared
31:58so
32:00you produce
32:00a tremendous
32:01amount
32:01of kinetic
32:01energy
32:02at
32:02impact
32:02that
32:03just
32:03totally
32:04obliterates
32:04the
32:04satellite
32:05and
32:06creates
32:06this
32:06large
32:06field
32:07of
32:07debris
32:07The
32:09Chinese
32:09satellite
32:10strike
32:10created
32:11thousands
32:11of pieces
32:12of orbiting
32:12debris
32:13and
32:14the farther
32:14an
32:14object
32:15is
32:15from
32:15Earth
32:15the
32:16less
32:16gravity
32:17and
32:17atmospheric
32:18drag
32:18it
32:18encounters
32:19so
32:19the
32:20longer
32:20it
32:20stays
32:20in
32:21orbit
32:21Now
32:22that
32:22altitude
32:22was
32:23500
32:23miles
32:24and
32:25debris
32:25at
32:25that
32:25altitude
32:26is
32:27going
32:27to
32:27persist
32:27for
32:28tens
32:28of
32:28years
32:28if
32:29not
32:29a
32:29century
32:30or
32:30longer
32:31Just a
32:32year
32:32later
32:33the
32:33US
32:33announced
32:34that
32:34a
32:34disabled
32:35American
32:35satellite
32:36around
32:36130
32:37miles
32:37up
32:37carrying
32:38highly
32:39toxic
32:39rocket
32:40fuel
32:40was
32:41in
32:41danger
32:41of
32:41falling
32:42to
32:42Earth
32:42and
32:43so
32:43the
32:43US
32:44said
32:44you
32:44know
32:44what
32:45we
32:45have
32:46this
32:46satellite
32:46that's
32:46not
32:46working
32:47it's
32:47filled
32:47with
32:47this
32:47chemical
32:48we
32:48don't
32:49know
32:49where
32:49it's
32:49going
32:49to
32:49crash
32:49it'd
32:50be
32:50bad
32:50for
32:51people's
32:51health
32:51we
32:52better
32:52shoot
32:52it
32:52down
32:53Officials
32:54were
32:54concerned
32:54that
32:55the
32:55satellite's
32:55hydrazine
32:56fuel
32:56tank
32:57might
32:57survive
32:58reentry
32:59and crash
32:59in a
33:00populated
33:00area
33:01A
33:02mission
33:02was
33:02given
33:03to
33:03US
33:03strategic
33:03command
33:04where I
33:04was
33:04at
33:05the
33:05time
33:05and
33:06this
33:06was
33:06truly
33:07a
33:07mission
33:07to
33:08protect
33:09humans
33:10you'll
33:10see
33:10the
33:10intercept
33:11you'll
33:11see
33:11the
33:12hit
33:12of
33:12the
33:12mass
33:13there
33:13you
33:13go
33:15what
33:16we're
33:16watching
33:16right
33:17now
33:17is
33:18this
33:18cloud
33:18that's
33:19forming
33:19right
33:20here
33:21US
33:22will
33:22swear
33:22up
33:22and
33:22down
33:23it
33:23was
33:23a
33:23safety
33:24hazard
33:25I've
33:25always
33:25said
33:26well
33:26clearly
33:26they
33:26were
33:26doing
33:27this
33:27operation
33:27in
33:28response
33:29to
33:29the
33:29Chinese
33:29I
33:30can
33:30tell
33:30you
33:30that
33:30was
33:30not
33:31the
33:31intent
33:31of
33:31the
33:32mission
33:32all
33:32but
33:34if
33:34I
33:34was
33:34putting
33:35myself
33:36in
33:36a
33:37of
33:37Chinese
33:37shoes
33:37I
33:38would
33:38assume
33:39that
33:40there
33:40was
33:40a
33:41demonstration
33:41there
33:42some
33:43questioned
33:43whether
33:44the
33:44shoot
33:44down
33:44was
33:45necessary
33:45but
33:46because
33:46the
33:46satellite
33:47was
33:47relatively
33:48low
33:48the
33:49debris
33:49quickly
33:50re-entered
33:50the
33:50atmosphere
33:51and
33:51burned
33:52up
33:52then
33:53in
33:532019
33:54India
33:55shut
33:55down
33:56a
33:56test
33:56satellite
33:57with
33:57a
33:57missile
33:57and
33:58in
33:592021
33:59just
34:00three
34:00months
34:01before
34:01invading
34:02Ukraine
34:02Russia
34:03made
34:04a
34:04move
34:07I
34:08was
34:08actually
34:08on
34:08the
34:08operations
34:09floor
34:09at
34:10United
34:10States
34:11Space
34:11Command
34:11in
34:12November
34:12of
34:122021
34:13and
34:13was
34:14dismayed
34:14as
34:15we
34:15saw
34:15the
34:16launch
34:16happen
34:19the
34:19Russians
34:20kinetically
34:21intercepted
34:21Cosmos
34:221408
34:23which was
34:24a
34:24defunct
34:24intelligence
34:25satellite
34:26and
34:27we
34:27started
34:28to
34:28see
34:28that
34:29we
34:29no
34:29longer
34:29had
34:29one
34:29target
34:30satellite
34:30but
34:31a
34:31field
34:31of
34:31debris
34:32my
34:33assessment
34:34is that
34:34they
34:34conducted
34:35an
34:35actual
34:36intercept
34:36just
34:36to
34:36prove
34:37they
34:37could
34:37do
34:37it
34:37and
34:37say
34:38that
34:38no
34:38one
34:38could
34:39keep
34:39them
34:39from
34:39doing
34:39it
34:39Russia
34:40defended
34:41the test
34:41and
34:42accused
34:42the
34:43U.S.
34:43of
34:43accelerating
34:44the
34:44militarization
34:45of
34:45space
34:46they
34:47they
34:47did
34:47at
34:47an
34:48altitude
34:48of
34:48250
34:49miles
34:50which
34:50happened
34:50to
34:51be
34:51the
34:51same
34:52altitude
34:52as
34:53the
34:53International
34:53Space
34:53Station
34:54hey
34:55Mark
34:55good
34:55morning
34:55sorry
34:56for
34:56the
34:56early
34:56call
34:57we
34:58were
34:58recently
34:58informed
34:59of
34:59a
34:59satellite
35:00breakup
35:00and
35:01need
35:02to
35:02have
35:03you
35:03guys
35:03start
35:04reviewing
35:04the
35:05safe
35:06haven
35:06procedure
35:07NASA
35:08required
35:08the
35:09astronauts
35:09to
35:09shelter
35:10in
35:10their
35:10emergency
35:11spacecraft
35:11and
35:12they
35:12had
35:12to
35:12begin
35:12maneuvering
35:13the
35:14International
35:14Space
35:14Station
35:15to
35:15avoid
35:15this
35:15debris
35:16the
35:17astronauts
35:18were
35:18unscathed
35:19but
35:19for
35:20months
35:20the
35:20space
35:21station
35:21had
35:21to
35:21maneuver
35:22to
35:22stay
35:22clear
35:23of
35:23the
35:23fragments
35:24much
35:25of
35:25that
35:25debris
35:25has
35:26fallen
35:26out
35:26of
35:26orbital
35:26array
35:27but
35:27a
35:27lot
35:27remains
35:29we're
35:29still
35:29tracking
35:30hundreds
35:30pieces
35:31of
35:31debris
35:31from
35:32that
35:32particular
35:32event
35:33so
35:35far
35:35nations
35:36have
35:36only
35:36shot
35:36and
35:37hit
35:37their
35:37own
35:37satellites
35:38but
35:39given
35:39the
35:39danger
35:40posed
35:40by
35:40a
35:40single
35:41tiny
35:41fragment
35:42of
35:42debris
35:42the
35:43prospect
35:44of
35:44a
35:44full
35:44scale
35:44anti-satellite
35:46missile
35:46battle
35:46in
35:46space
35:47is
35:47daunting
35:52a
35:53massive
35:53barrage
35:53of
35:54anti-satellite
35:54missiles
35:55creates
35:56tens
35:56of
35:56thousands
35:56of
35:57pieces
35:57of
35:57debris
35:57this
35:59is
35:59when
35:59the
35:59nightmare
35:59scenario
36:00begins
36:00known
36:01as
36:01the
36:01Kessler
36:02Syndrome
36:02this
36:03debris
36:03cascades
36:04and
36:05intersects
36:05with other
36:06satellites
36:06causing
36:06them
36:07to be
36:07destroyed
36:07causing
36:08more
36:08debris
36:08and
36:09in
36:09a
36:09self
36:09perpetuating
36:10chain
36:10reaction
36:11thousands
36:12of
36:12satellites
36:13get
36:13destroyed
36:14chain
36:15reaction
36:16or not
36:16space
36:17junk
36:17is
36:18already
36:18a
36:18problem
36:19just
36:20because
36:20you're
36:20up there
36:20moving
36:2117,000
36:22miles
36:22an hour
36:22doesn't mean
36:23everything is
36:24moving
36:24in the same
36:25direction
36:25as you
36:25in fact
36:27very little
36:27is moving
36:28in the same
36:28direction
36:28as you
36:30orbits
36:30all
36:31have
36:31different
36:32orientations
36:33so it's
36:33not about
36:34the pieces
36:35that are
36:35in your
36:35orbit
36:36it's
36:37about
36:37the pieces
36:37that are
36:38at your
36:38altitude
36:39but have
36:40different
36:40orbital
36:41paths
36:42and the
36:43biggest
36:43risk
36:44is
36:44the piece
36:45coming at
36:46you
36:46from a
36:46perpendicular
36:46direction
36:47that's
36:48going to
36:48hit you
36:48at 17,000
36:50miles
36:50an hour
36:51space
36:52junk
36:52comes in
36:53all sizes
36:54from
36:54spent
36:55rocket
36:55stages
36:56to
36:56defunct
36:57satellites
36:57to
36:58lost
36:58astronaut
36:59gloves
36:59to
37:00errant
37:00screws
37:01recently
37:02a small
37:03untracked
37:04piece
37:04of debris
37:05hit
37:05the
37:05Chinese
37:06space
37:06station
37:07it hit
37:07their
37:08evacuation
37:09module
37:09that
37:10they were
37:10planning
37:10to go
37:11back
37:11home
37:11on
37:11there
37:12was
37:12no
37:13loss
37:13of
37:13life
37:13but
37:14it
37:14could
37:14have
37:14been
37:14much
37:14worse
37:15a
37:16massive
37:16collision
37:17between
37:17two
37:17satellites
37:18happened
37:18in
37:192009
37:19a
37:20US
37:21communications
37:21satellite
37:22inadvertently
37:23hit
37:23a
37:23defunct
37:24Russian
37:25satellite
37:25and
37:26it
37:26created
37:27an
37:27enormous
37:28debris
37:28field
37:29it's
37:30not
37:30clear
37:30how
37:31close
37:31we
37:31are
37:32to
37:32reaching
37:32a
37:32Kessler
37:33threshold
37:33that
37:34could
37:34start
37:35a
37:35chain
37:35reaction
37:36and
37:36render
37:36orbits
37:37unusable
37:37or
37:38if
37:38we'll
37:38ever
37:39get
37:39there
37:40space
37:40is
37:41enormously
37:42vast
37:42even
37:43though
37:43there
37:43are
37:43more
37:44than
37:4412,000
37:44satellites
37:45and
37:45tens
37:46of
37:46thousands
37:46of
37:46more
37:46pieces
37:47of
37:47debris
37:47stuff
37:48is
37:48not
37:48constantly
37:49bumping
37:49into
37:49each
37:50other
37:50others
37:51believe
37:51the
37:51chain
37:52reaction
37:52is
37:53already
37:53underway
37:59everything
37:59got
37:59shredded
38:00in
38:00about
38:00half
38:01an
38:01hour
38:01but
38:03really
38:03this
38:03happens
38:04over
38:04decades
38:04like
38:05most
38:06environmental
38:06disasters
38:07it's a
38:08very
38:08slow
38:09moving
38:09car
38:10crash
38:10I
38:12think
38:12the
38:12Kessler
38:12chain
38:12reaction
38:13is
38:14already
38:14happening
38:15certainly
38:15in
38:16some
38:16orbital
38:17regimes
38:17there's
38:18enough
38:19debris
38:19that
38:20it's
38:20not
38:20the
38:21problem
38:21of
38:21just
38:21waiting
38:22to
38:23see
38:23if
38:23things
38:23hit
38:23each
38:24other
38:24and
38:24statistically
38:25calculating
38:25the
38:25probability
38:26it's
38:27how
38:27good
38:28are
38:28your
38:28dodge
38:28maneuver
38:29schemes
38:29and
38:30how
38:31well
38:32can
38:32you
38:32control
38:33the
38:33flow
38:33of
38:33traffic
38:34most
38:35satellites
38:35rely
38:36on
38:36solar
38:37panels
38:37to
38:37power
38:38their
38:38onboard
38:38electronics
38:39but
38:40they
38:40carry
38:40small
38:41amounts
38:41of
38:42fuel
38:42to
38:43enable
38:43maneuvering
38:44with
38:44thrusters
38:45in
38:462025
38:47SpaceX
38:48had
38:48to
38:48do
38:48300,000
38:50maneuvers
38:50to
38:51make
38:51sure
38:51their
38:51spacecraft
38:52did
38:52not
38:53impact
38:53either
38:53a piece
38:53of
38:54debris
38:54or
38:54another
38:55satellite
38:55so
38:57this
38:57is
38:57really
38:57getting
38:58to
38:58the
38:59edge
38:59of
39:00being
39:00tenable
39:00I
39:01really
39:01worry
39:01if
39:02we
39:02go
39:02from
39:0210,000
39:03satellites
39:03to
39:04100,000
39:04satellites
39:05it
39:05may
39:06no
39:06longer
39:06be
39:07possible
39:07to
39:07successfully
39:08do
39:08all
39:08the
39:09dodging
39:09that's
39:09needed
39:10I
39:11think
39:11we're
39:11going
39:11to
39:11learn
39:11the
39:12hard
39:12way
39:12most
39:13new
39:13satellites
39:14are
39:14equipped
39:14with
39:15thrusters
39:15but
39:16the
39:16same
39:16technology
39:17that
39:17can
39:17help
39:18satellites
39:18maneuver
39:19can
39:19also
39:20enable
39:20another
39:21kind
39:22of
39:22attack
39:27imagine
39:27a number
39:28of small
39:28agile
39:29satellites
39:29approaching
39:30some
39:31of our
39:31key
39:31national
39:32security
39:32assets
39:33suddenly
39:34suddenly
39:34we
39:35start
39:35losing
39:35communications
39:36GPS
39:37starts
39:37getting
39:37jammed
39:38other
39:38satellites
39:38are
39:38being
39:39moved
39:39out
39:39of
39:39their
39:39orbits
39:39it's
39:41hard
39:41to
39:41know
39:41exactly
39:41what's
39:42happening
39:42but
39:43it's
39:43clear
39:43these
39:44attacks
39:44are
39:44something
39:44new
39:46governments
39:46rarely
39:47talk
39:47openly
39:48about
39:48military
39:49operations
39:50in
39:50space
39:50but
39:51in
39:51southern
39:51California
39:52one
39:53private
39:53company
39:54has
39:54glimpsed
39:54some
39:55of the
39:55cutting
39:55edge
39:56technologies
39:56that
39:57are
39:57driving
39:57space
39:58warfare
40:00exoanalytic
40:00runs
40:01a network
40:01of
40:01small
40:02optical
40:02telescopes
40:03that
40:04track
40:04objects
40:04in
40:05geosynchronous
40:06orbit
40:06more than
40:0622,000
40:07miles
40:08up
40:08MJ
40:09Jeffries
40:10oversees
40:10the
40:11network
40:11so
40:11here
40:12at
40:12exoanalytic
40:12we
40:12operate
40:13a
40:13global
40:13network
40:14of
40:14telescopes
40:14on
40:15the
40:15map
40:15right
40:15here
40:15you're
40:16seeing
40:16all
40:16of
40:16our
40:16observatories
40:17we're
40:18in
40:18South
40:18Africa
40:18Morocco
40:19Spain
40:20France
40:21Greece
40:21we have
40:22them
40:22smattered
40:23across
40:23Australia
40:24United
40:24States
40:24and
40:25Hawaii
40:25we are
40:26also
40:26down
40:26here
40:27in
40:27both
40:29the
40:29telescope
40:29network
40:30is
40:30a
40:31series
40:31of
40:3240
40:32observatories
40:33all
40:34around
40:34the
40:34world
40:34about
40:35400
40:35telescopes
40:36total
40:36so
40:37right
40:37now
40:37I'm
40:37going to
40:38click
40:38in
40:38the
40:38telescope
40:391818
40:39if
40:40you
40:40look
40:40at
40:41the
40:41map
40:41in
40:41the
40:41lower
40:41left
40:42hand
40:42corner
40:42it
40:42shows
40:43you
40:43that
40:43we
40:43have
40:43a
40:43target
40:43symbol
40:44around
40:44Western
40:45Australia
40:45and
40:46that's
40:46where
40:46this
40:46observatory
40:46is
40:47and
40:47I
40:48can
40:48go
40:48ahead
40:48and
40:48zoom
40:48in
40:49on
40:49the
40:49night
40:49sky
40:49in
40:50real
40:50time
40:59come
40:59over
40:59here
40:59to
41:00France
41:00any
41:00of
41:00them
41:01are
41:01at
41:01our
41:01disposal
41:02exoanalytic
41:03can
41:03detect
41:03the
41:03light
41:04reflected
41:04by
41:04even
41:05small
41:05objects
41:06from
41:0622,000
41:07miles
41:08away
41:08with
41:09one
41:09telescope
41:10and
41:10one
41:10picture
41:11we
41:11can
41:11see
41:11something
41:12about
41:12this
41:12size
41:13but
41:14using
41:1410
41:14telescopes
41:15co-located
41:16and putting
41:16all their
41:16frames
41:17together
41:17we can
41:18track
41:18something
41:18down
41:19about
41:19this
41:19size
41:19all
41:20the
41:21observations
41:21that
41:22we
41:22take
41:22with
41:22a
41:22part
41:23of
41:23our
41:23telescope
41:23network
41:24are
41:24what's
41:29so
41:29right
41:29now
41:29that's
41:29about
41:30700
41:30active
41:31objects
41:31now
41:32of
41:32those
41:32700
41:33objects
41:3330
41:34of
41:34them
41:34are
41:35not
41:35in
41:35the
41:35public
41:35catalog
41:36these
41:3730
41:37objects
41:38include
41:38classified
41:39reconnaissance
41:40and
41:40military
41:40satellites
41:41that
41:41the
41:41Space
41:41Force
41:42doesn't
41:42publicly
41:43discuss
41:43but
41:44because
41:44it's
41:45hard
41:45to
41:45hide
41:45in
41:46space
41:46even
41:47the
41:47infrared
41:48detection
41:48satellites
41:49that
41:49anchor
41:49the
41:50U.S.
41:50defense
41:51system
41:51called
41:52SIBRS
41:52are
41:53visible
41:53currently
41:54we're
41:54tracking
41:54SIBRS
41:55GEO4
41:56parked
41:56up
41:56at
41:56GEO
41:57and
41:57we
41:57can
41:57see
41:58that
41:58it's
41:58positioned
41:58above
41:59the
41:59African
42:00continent
42:00since
42:01it's
42:01a
42:01geostationary
42:02satellite
42:02it always
42:03maintains
42:04the same
42:04position
42:05it doesn't
42:05move to
42:06the left
42:06or move
42:07to the
42:07right
42:07and
42:08sometimes
42:08exoanalytic
42:09finds
42:10surprises
42:11in
42:122021
42:13China
42:14launched a
42:14satellite
42:15into
42:15geosynchronous
42:16orbit
42:16the
42:17stated
42:17purpose
42:18of
42:18Shijong
42:19or
42:19SJ21
42:20was
42:21debris
42:21removal
42:22so
42:23this
42:23gets
42:23launched
42:23up
42:24it
42:24arrived
42:24at
42:25GEO
42:25and
42:25it
42:25does
42:26a
42:26maneuver
42:26to
42:27go
42:27and
42:27rendezvous
42:28around
42:28another
42:29Chinese
42:29satellite
42:30called
42:30Compass
42:30G2
42:31and
42:32then
42:32it
42:32goes
42:32and
42:32actually
42:33captures
42:33Compass
42:34G2
42:35so
42:36you've
42:36got
42:36these
42:36two
42:36objects
42:37right
42:37that
42:38are
42:38orbiting
42:38the
42:38earth
42:38at
42:39thousands
42:39of
42:39miles
42:39an
42:39hour
42:40and
42:40you've
42:41got
42:41to
42:41move
42:41them
42:41close
42:42to
42:42one
42:42another
42:42with
42:43imperfect
42:43knowledge
42:44right
42:44about
42:45what
42:45their
42:45orbits
42:45are
42:46so
42:46that
42:47when
42:47they
42:47touch
42:48they
42:48don't
42:48hit
42:48each
42:49other
42:49at
42:49100
42:49miles
42:50an
42:50hour
42:56in
42:57a
42:57moment
42:57here
42:57you're
42:57going
42:58to
42:58see
42:58instead
42:58of
42:58that
42:58square
42:59spinning
42:59it's
42:59going
43:00to
43:00be
43:00stuck
43:00now
43:01it's
43:01stuck
43:01SJ-21
43:03may
43:03have
43:03grabbed
43:03onto
43:04the
43:04other
43:04satellite
43:05with
43:05an
43:05arm
43:06a
43:06maneuver
43:06exoanalytic
43:07had
43:08never
43:08seen
43:08before
43:08that
43:09was
43:09a
43:09pretty
43:09big
43:10deal
43:10so
43:10now
43:11we
43:12have
43:12to
43:12ask
43:12ourselves
43:13what
43:13are
43:13they
43:13going
43:13to
43:13do
43:14suddenly
43:14after
43:15weeks
43:16of
43:16orbiting
43:16together
43:17both
43:17satellites
43:18disappeared
43:19in
43:19January
43:202022
43:21I
43:22went
43:22to
43:22go
43:22see
43:22the
43:22location
43:23of
43:23SJ-21
43:24and
43:25there
43:25was
43:25nothing
43:25there
43:26so
43:27it
43:27was
43:27a
43:27pretty
43:27big
43:28effort
43:28for
43:29our
43:29team
43:29to
43:29go
43:29and
43:29refine
43:30the
43:30satellite
43:31but
43:31once
43:32we
43:32did
43:32we
43:32saw
43:32that
43:33SJ-21
43:33was
43:34moving
43:34very
43:34quickly
43:35east
43:35to
43:35west
43:37like
43:38a tow
43:38truck
43:39SJ-21
43:40grabbed
43:41another
43:41satellite
43:42and
43:42moved
43:43it
43:432,000
43:44miles
43:45stopped
43:46released
43:47it
43:47and
43:48then
43:48SJ-21
43:49returned
43:492,000
43:50miles
43:51back
43:51to
43:51the
43:52sacred
43:52belt
43:53China
43:54is
43:54doing
43:54some
43:55very
43:55cutting
43:55edge
43:56things
43:56in
43:56space
43:57and
43:58demonstrating
43:58capabilities
43:59that
44:00I
44:00think
44:01the
44:01US
44:01in
44:01general
44:02and
44:02the
44:02DOD
44:03in
44:03particular
44:03wishes
44:03it
44:04had
44:05and
44:06so
44:06that's
44:06causing
44:06some
44:07concerns
44:08China
44:09insists
44:10they
44:10disposed
44:10of a
44:11defunct
44:11satellite
44:11as part
44:12of a
44:12debris
44:12removal
44:13test
44:13but
44:14many
44:14instead
44:15saw
44:15a
44:15public
44:16demonstration
44:16of a
44:17tool
44:17easy
44:18to
44:18repurpose
44:18for
44:19offense
44:19in
44:20the
44:20event
44:20of a
44:20conflict
44:21yeah
44:22it's
44:22worrisome
44:23of course
44:24they'll tell you
44:25it's for
44:25peaceful
44:26purposes
44:26the United
44:28States has not
44:28done anything
44:29like that
44:30and that alone
44:31would have been
44:32remarkable for the
44:33career of
44:33SJ-21
44:34but then
44:35in
44:36January
44:362025
44:37China
44:38launched
44:38another
44:39satellite
44:40SJ-25
44:41to rendezvous
44:42with SJ-21
44:43and then
44:44sure enough
44:45right around
44:46July of
44:462025
44:47we saw
44:48them dock
44:49the
44:50the publicly
44:50available
44:51information
44:51states
44:52that SJ-25
44:53is some
44:53sort
44:54of a
44:54refueling
44:55satellite
44:55there
44:56was a
44:56fuel
44:57transfer
44:57from SJ-25
44:59to SJ-21
45:00that
45:01replenished
45:01its
45:02tanks
45:02remember
45:03in space
45:04if you want
45:05to get
45:05somewhere
45:05fast
45:06you have
45:06to spend
45:06a lot
45:07of
45:07fuel
45:07fuel
45:08is the
45:09most
45:09important
45:10expendable
45:11resource
45:11that you
45:12have
45:12fuel
45:13determines
45:13how often
45:14you can
45:14maneuver
45:15how fast
45:16you can
45:16maneuver
45:16and you
45:17can
45:17imagine
45:18if you
45:19no longer
45:19had fuel
45:20as a
45:20limiter
45:20what you
45:21could
45:21do
45:22my
45:22response
45:23to
45:23seeing SJ-21
45:24do the
45:24towing
45:25operation
45:25and then
45:26do the
45:26refueling
45:26operation
45:27was kind
45:28of some
45:28respect
45:29and it
45:30was a
45:30realization
45:31to never
45:31underestimate
45:32your
45:32adversary
45:34grabbing a
45:34satellite
45:35in orbit
45:35isn't the
45:36only way
45:37to mess
45:37with it
45:38in
45:382019
45:40observers
45:40tracked
45:41the launch
45:41of a
45:41Russian
45:42satellite
45:42and noticed
45:43something
45:43odd
45:44the single
45:45dot
45:45showing
45:46the
45:46satellite
45:47soon
45:47split
45:47into
45:48two
45:48and
45:49then
45:49into
45:49three
45:50Russia
45:51is unique
45:51in using
45:52a technique
45:52of deploying
45:53spacecraft
45:54from other
45:55spacecraft
45:56you can see
45:57as many
45:57as three
45:58of these
45:58nesting
45:59dolls
45:59or
45:59matryoshka
46:00dolls
46:00where
46:01one
46:02satellite
46:02will release
46:03another
46:03and that
46:04will release
46:04a third
46:06that object
46:07could be
46:07anything
46:07it could
46:08be a
46:09kinetic
46:09weapon
46:09that's
46:10intended
46:10to
46:10impact
46:11it could
46:11be
46:11a
46:11weapon
46:12that's
46:12intended
46:12to
46:13jam
46:13you
46:14just
46:14don't
46:14know
46:14Russia
46:15claims
46:16these
46:16nesting
46:17doll
46:17satellites
46:17are
46:18intended
46:18to
46:18inspect
46:19other
46:19satellites
46:20for
46:20damage
46:20but
46:21Komsbach
46:21has observed
46:22them following
46:23classified
46:23U.S.
46:24satellites
46:24at times
46:25coming
46:25within 50
46:26miles
46:27there's no
46:28other reason
46:28to come up
46:29close to
46:29one of our
46:30very sensitive
46:30and important
46:31satellites
46:31than for
46:32bad
46:33intent
46:33what they're
46:34trying to
46:34do is
46:35intimidate
46:35us
46:35and let
46:36us know
46:36that if
46:37we got
46:37into a
46:38conflict
46:38that those
46:39satellites
46:39would cease
46:40to exist
46:40small
46:41mobile
46:42satellites
46:43that can
46:43attack
46:43in a
46:44variety
46:44of
46:44ways
46:45might
46:45be
46:45the
46:46future
46:46of
46:46space
46:47warfare
46:51with
46:51little
46:52warning
46:52hundreds
46:53of
46:53satellites
46:54deploy
46:54on-orbit
46:55weapons
46:55against
46:56our
46:56national
46:56security
46:56space
46:57assets
46:57jamming
46:58blazing
46:59kinetic
46:59effects
46:59cyber
47:00intrusions
47:01billions
47:02of dollars
47:02of national
47:03security
47:03satellites
47:04are rendered
47:05useless
47:05leaving
47:06our military
47:07back on
47:07earth
47:08crippled
47:13evan rogers
47:14is a founder
47:15of satellite
47:15maker
47:16true
47:16anomaly
47:17he's racing
47:18to build
47:18small
47:19agile
47:19satellites
47:20that might
47:21be key
47:21to this
47:22new
47:22style
47:23of
47:23warfare
47:23spacecraft
47:24subsystems
47:25have become
47:25less
47:26expensive
47:26and they
47:27become
47:27smaller
47:27which
47:28allows
47:29you to
47:29deploy
47:29more
47:30satellites
47:30in a
47:30single
47:31launch
47:31than you
47:32would
47:32previously
47:32where a
47:33single
47:33launch
47:34was
47:34dedicated
47:34to a
47:35single
47:35billion
47:35dollar
47:35spacecraft
47:36so
47:37we build
47:38them
47:38smaller
47:38or build
47:38them
47:38cheaper
47:39this
47:40new
47:40spacecraft
47:41is called
47:42jackal
47:42jackal
47:43is a
47:43multi-role
47:44space
47:45superiority
47:45platform
47:46it's designed
47:47to track
47:48and follow
47:48highly agile
47:49targets
47:50as our
47:51adversaries
47:52have built
47:52more and more
47:53highly maneuverable
47:54systems
47:55we've needed
47:56to adapt
47:56to that
47:57jackal
47:58has extra
47:59fuel tanks
47:59and highly
48:00efficient
48:00thrusters
48:01that give
48:02it more
48:02maneuverability
48:03and range
48:04than most
48:04traditional
48:05satellites
48:05so
48:06these are
48:06the tiny
48:07little rocket
48:07engines
48:08that allow
48:08the jackal
48:09spacecraft
48:09to move
48:10from point
48:11A to point
48:11B
48:11within an
48:12orbit
48:13cleanliness
48:13is really
48:14important
48:14because if
48:15you get
48:15dirt
48:15or particulates
48:17inside those
48:17thrusters
48:18it can cause
48:18jamming
48:19and leakage
48:20of fuel
48:20so these
48:21have
48:21a lot
48:22of thrust
48:23that allow
48:24us to
48:24really quickly
48:25maneuver
48:25and get
48:26into position
48:27to go
48:27perform
48:28whatever
48:28mission
48:28is that
48:29we need
48:29to go
48:29do
48:29it's
48:30designed
48:31to get
48:31close
48:31to a
48:32target
48:32for now
48:33carrying
48:33a camera
48:34but ultimately
48:35perhaps a
48:36jammer
48:36or even
48:37a laser
48:37weapon
48:38there's no
48:39technological
48:39barrier to
48:40deploying a
48:40laser on
48:41jackal
48:41the question
48:42is how far
48:43away do you
48:44need the
48:44target to
48:44be to
48:45engage it
48:45if it's
48:46very close
48:46that technology
48:47exists
48:47very far
48:48away
48:48that's a
48:49pretty
48:49significant
48:49technological
48:50hurdle
48:50but for
48:51most engagements
48:52a handful
48:53of kilometers
48:54a space
48:54to space
48:55laser
48:55is totally
48:56achievable
48:58carrying
48:58even
48:59simple
48:59weapons
49:00maneuverable
49:01cheap
49:01satellites
49:02can
49:02potentially
49:03take
49:03out
49:03billion
49:04dollar
49:04behemoths
49:05they can
49:06lie dormant
49:07in space
49:07for months
49:08or years
49:09and be
49:09hard to
49:10identify
49:10as weapons
49:11this ability
49:12to have
49:13lots of
49:14satellites
49:14that can
49:15interact
49:15with each
49:16other
49:16that is
49:17going to
49:17be a
49:17very
49:18different
49:18sort
49:18of
49:19future
49:20than
49:20what
49:20we've
49:20been
49:20used
49:20to
49:21in
49:21earth
49:21orbit
49:22international
49:23agreements
49:24are few
49:24and far
49:24between
49:25when it
49:25comes to
49:26the
49:26militarization
49:26of
49:27space
49:27nothing
49:28governs
49:29how
49:29close
49:29one
49:30satellite
49:30can
49:31get
49:31to
49:31another
49:31or
49:32most
49:32of
49:33what
49:33companies
49:33and
49:33governments
49:34do
49:34up
49:35there
49:35all
49:36of
49:36those
49:36things
49:36from
49:37the
49:37wild
49:37west
49:37era
49:38are
49:38going
49:38to
49:38happen
49:39in
49:39space
49:39if
49:39we
49:40don't
49:41prepare
49:42for
49:42them
49:43the
49:43main
49:44international
49:44agreement
49:45the
49:45outer
49:46space
49:46treaty
49:47of
49:471967
49:48prohibits
49:49nuclear
49:50weapons
49:50but
49:51says
49:51nothing
49:51about
49:51conventional
49:52weapons
49:53in
49:53space
49:53and
49:54while
49:54the
49:55US
49:55Russia
49:56and
49:56China
49:56are
49:57all
49:57party
49:58to
49:58the
49:58treaty
49:58there
49:59have
49:59been
49:59no
49:59major
50:00new
50:00agreement
50:01since
50:01space
50:02is a
50:03shared
50:03domain
50:03and
50:04actions
50:04by one
50:05actor
50:05can affect
50:06everyone's
50:06ability
50:06to
50:07utilize
50:07space
50:07there's a lot
50:09of work being done
50:09in diplomatic circles
50:10on space
50:11issues
50:11but at the
50:12United Nations
50:13they've been going
50:14in circles
50:14frankly for decades
50:15now
50:17I think
50:17I think
50:17I think the
50:18likelihood
50:18of
50:19any
50:19arms
50:20control
50:20for space
50:21in the
50:21near term
50:22is pretty
50:22low
50:22I'm actually
50:23pretty
50:23pessimistic
50:24I'm afraid
50:25we are
50:26headed towards
50:27a higher
50:27level
50:28of
50:28militarization
50:29and
50:29weaponization
50:30of space
50:31in 2025
50:32the White House
50:33mandated the
50:34development
50:34of a new
50:35space-based
50:36missile defense
50:37system
50:37called
50:38Golden Dome
50:39the Golden Dome
50:40will be capable
50:41of intercepting
50:42missiles
50:42even if they
50:43are launched
50:44from other
50:45sides of the
50:46world
50:46and even if
50:47they're launched
50:47from space
50:48the program
50:49is supposed
50:50to include
50:50a constellation
50:51of satellites
50:52that can
50:53actively
50:53shoot down
50:54missiles
50:55critics have
50:55pointed out
50:56that besides
50:57the many
50:57technical
50:58challenges
50:58involved
50:59Golden Dome
51:00would be a
51:00major
51:01escalation
51:02satellites
51:03that can
51:03shoot down
51:04missiles
51:04can easily
51:05be aimed
51:05at other
51:06satellites
51:07we have
51:08not yet
51:08seen
51:09satellite
51:09to satellite
51:10attacks
51:11I think
51:12those will
51:12happen
51:12in the
51:13future
51:13what if
51:14I had
51:14a satellite
51:15that had
51:16a mechanical
51:16arm
51:16and it
51:17could grab
51:17another
51:18satellite
51:19would that
51:19be a
51:20weapon
51:21well I
51:21used to
51:21fly that
51:22weapon
51:22it's
51:22called
51:22the
51:22space
51:23shuttle
51:23but it
51:24wasn't
51:24built
51:24to be
51:25a
51:25weapon
51:26so
51:26we don't
51:27even
51:27have a
51:27good
51:27definition
51:28of what
51:28is a
51:28weapon
51:28and what
51:29is not
51:29a
51:29weapon
51:30in
51:30space
51:31we're
51:31now in
51:32my mind
51:33thinking
51:33about
51:34space
51:35warfare
51:35as we
51:36thought
51:36about
51:36air
51:37warfare
51:37in the
51:381920s
51:38we are
51:39so early
51:40in the
51:40testing
51:41and training
51:41that it's not
51:42even quite
51:43clear how
51:43this whole
51:43thing will
51:44play itself
51:44out
51:45as
51:45technology
51:46progresses
51:47it's up
51:47to humankind
51:48to decide
51:49how to
51:50use it
51:50but what's
51:51increasingly
51:52clear
51:52is that
51:53it's no
51:53longer
51:54possible
51:54to ignore
51:55what's
51:56happening
51:56above our
51:57heads
51:57there has
51:58not been
51:58a domain
51:59that human
52:00beings have
52:00not figured
52:01out a way
52:01to fight
52:01it
52:03underwater
52:03on top
52:04of the
52:04water
52:04on land
52:05in the
52:06air
52:07why is
52:07space
52:08any
52:08different
52:32one
52:52water
52:52in the
52:52more
52:52than
52:52the
52:52pumping
52:52water
52:52and
52:52in the
52:58and
52:58have
53:27A CIDADE NO BRASIL
53:28A CIDADE NO BRASIL

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